Gammons v. Cody et al

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHAWN TAYLOR GAMMONS,
Plaintiff,
1:25-CV-1714
v. 	(AJB/DJS)
GREENE COUNTY SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT,
et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
SHAWN TAYLOR GAMMONS
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Albany, New York 12206
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
On February 4, 2026, this Court issued a Report-Recommendation that the
Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, in this matter be dismissed. 	Dkt. No. 6. 	The District Court
adopted the Report-Recommendation and granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended
Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 15. 	The Amended Complaint was filed and is before the
undersigned for review. Dkt. No. 19, Am. Compl.1
1 Several additional Motions filed by Plaintiff are pending. Dkt. Nos. 17 & 20. Given the recommendation that the
Amended Complaint be dismissed, it is also recommend that those Motions be denied.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 9

- 2 -
The legal standards for that review were set forth in detail in the prior Report-
Recommendation, Dkt. No. 6 at pp. 2-3, and will not be repeated here. 	In essence, the
obligation to review the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires the
Court to consider whether it: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As noted in the original Report-
Recommendation “[a] court’s initial review of a complaint under § 1915(e) must
encompass the applicable standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” including
Rule 8. Dkt. No. 6 at p. 3.
I. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint names eight Defendants. Am. Compl. at pp. 1-2.
It asserts six causes of action. Id. at p. 3. The Amended Complaint identifies three causes
of action brought pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) which recognized that a local municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violations of constitutional rights under certain circumstances. Am. Compl. at
p. 3. Those claims are brought against Columbia County and Greene County. Id. at p. 1.
The Amended Complaint then identifies three causes of action against individual
Defendants, one each against Defendants Leggio, Tailluer, and Costanzo. Id. at p. 3. The
Amended Complaint offers relatively little by way of factual allegation. It identifies some
of the individually named Defendants by title, id. at p. 2, then contains these allegations:
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 2 of 9

- 3 -
B. The Three Monell Customs
CUSTOM ONE: Case Fragmentation as Deprivation Tool
Tailluer established a policy of refusing to integrate related family
proceedings (2015-2024). Costanzo maintains this policy (October
29, 2026 administrative announcement confirming continuation of
Tailluer’s administrative policy). Leggio implements by operating a
separate support docket.
CUSTOM TWO: Exploitation of Family Trauma
Tailluer established scheduling to maximize distress (July 14, 2025
hearing 3 hours before Eliana’s funeral). Costanzo continued this
practice (October 29, 2025 hearing announcing my constitutional
rights do not apply in his courtroom). Leggio coordinated timing to
ensure trauma-informed litigation.
CUSTOM THREE: Cross-Docket Coordination
Tailluer and Costanzo coordinate as senior and Administrative
Judges to manufacture outcomes. Leggio executes with 116-day
delay and 1-day post-trial filing.
C. The 116-Day Coordination: Mathematical Proof
Leggio’s 	proceedings 	concluded 	November 	5, 	2025.
Recommendation due November 25, 2025. Filed February 28, 2026-
one day after Costanzo trial concluded February 27, 2026.
Probability of innocent explanation: 1 in 10,000 (250 hearing
days/year x 40 possible trial dates).
Id. at pp. 2-3.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 3 of 9

- 4 -
II. DISCUSSION
A. State Action under Section 1983
The Court begins by noting that Defendants Gross and Zacker are identified as
Guardians Ad Litem and named as Defendants in the case. 	Am. Compl. at p. 2. 	No
factual allegations are then made against them. 	See generally id. 	The failure to make
factual allegations against these individuals is a basis for dismissal. So too is the fact that,
as Guardians Ad Litem, these individuals are not state actors who are subject to suit under
section 1983. Parent v. New York, 786 F. Supp. 2d 516, 538 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 485
F. App’x 500 (2d Cir. 2012); Storck v. Suffolk Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d
927, 941 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing cases).
B. Improper Party
The Greene County Support Collection Unit is again named as a Defendant. Am.
Compl. at p. 2. For the reasons identified in the Court’s prior Report-Recommendation
Plaintiff cannot assert a claim against this Defendant. Dkt. No. 6 at pp. 6-7.
C. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff purports to assert claims against Columbia County and Greene County.
Am. Compl. at p. 1.
In Monell, the Supreme Court found that “the language of § 1983, read against the
background of the . . . legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not
intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 4 of 9

- 5 -
of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” 	436 U.S. at 691. 	Courts apply “rigorous
standards of culpability and causation” to ensure that the municipality is not held liable
solely for the actions of its employees. Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). Thus, in order
for an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated to have recourse against
a municipality under § 1983, he must show that he was harmed by a municipal “policy”
or “custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 690-91.
This Court’s prior Report-Recommendation noted that Plaintiff had failed to allege
any unconstitutional policy. 	Dkt. No. 6 at p. 9. 	Plaintiff now alleges the existence of
three unconstitutional municipal “customs”: case fragmentation as a deprivation tool,
exploitation of family trauma, and cross-docket coordination. Am. Compl. at p. 2. Each
is supported with entirely conclusory factual allegations. 	Id. 	Plaintiff claims, for
example, that the municipal Defendants had “a policy of refusing to integrate related
family proceedings” and “established scheduling to maximize distress.” Id. He offers no
additional factual support to explain these claims.
“The mere assertion, however, that a municipality has such a custom or policy is
insufficient 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	allegations 	of 	fact 	tending 	to 	support, 	at 	least
circumstantially, such an inference.” Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d
Cir. 1993). 	“To the extent that any allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint suggest
that the purported conduct was pursuant to a policy, they are wholly conclusory and lack
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 5 of 9

- 6 -
any factual detail” and that is a basis for dismissal. D.J. by Comfort v. Corning-Painted
Post Area Sch. Dist., 722 F. Supp. 3d 148, 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2024).
D. Claims against Individual Defendants
Three “individual liability” claims are asserted in the Amended Complaint against
Defendants Leggio, Tailluer, and Costanzo. 	Am. Compl. at p. 3. 	Each Defendant is
identified as either a state judge or support magistrate. 	Id. at pp. 2-3. 	These claims
should be dismissed.
First, a court’s initial review of a complaint under § 1915(e) must encompass the
applicable standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . .
. ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a). 	The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being
asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and]
prepare an adequate defense.” 	Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations and internal alterations omitted). 	The Amended Complaint
offers little factual detail as to these claims as well. Where, as here, the pleading “does
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 6 of 9

- 7 -
not provide an adequate description of the particular acts by the defendant which led to
this suit or an explanation of how such acts were illegal” dismissal is appropriate. Id.
Second, each Defendant is likely immune from suit. This Court outlined the legal
principles underlying judicial immunity in prior litigation involving Plaintiff this way:
Judicial immunity is applicable to conduct taken by the court as part of its
judicial power and authority, and its absolute protection extends to all
judicial acts except those performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 	The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the scope of a judge’s jurisdiction must be construed
broadly. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citing Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 336 (1871)). 	Generally, “acts arising out of, or
related to, individual cases before [a] judge are considered judicial in
nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). 	“[E]ven
allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id.
at 209. 	This is because “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would
be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1994).
“Judicial immunity is overcome in only two circumstances: (1) a judge is
not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in
the judge’s judicial capacity; and (2) a judge is not immune for actions,
though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
McCluskey v. Roberts, 2022 WL 2046079, at *5 (2d Cir. June 7, 2022)
(internal quotation omitted). 	Acts related to a specific case, such as the
orders of protection and support determinations at issue here, are clearly
judicial in nature. 	Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d at 210. And “[j]udicial
immunity applies to these judicial acts even if they were allegedly done
maliciously or corruptly.” McCluskey v. Roberts, 2022 WL 2046079, at *5.
Gammons v. Cody, 2025 WL 2722411, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2719776 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2025). 	Given the
nature of the allegations in the original Complaint, it appears likely that Plaintiff’s claims
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 7 of 9

- 8 -
against these individuals relate to judicial actions taken by them, Plaintiff’s conclusory
claims to the contrary, Am. Compl. at p. 3, notwithstanding. 	See Estes-El v. Town of
Indian Lake, 954 F. Supp. 527, 534 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that a party’s conclusory
assertions are insufficient to defeat an immunity claim). Plaintiff’s perfunctory pleading,
however, makes it difficult to address the immunity question with certainty.
E. Leave to Amend
“Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant
without granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting
Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). Here, Plaintiff was granted leave
to amend and so given the nature of the allegations, the Court recommends that further
leave to amend not be granted and that the Amended Complaint be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED as set
forth above; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s other pending Motions be DENIED; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 8 of 9

- 9 -
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: March 30, 2026
Albany, New York
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Case 1:25-cv-01714-AJB-DJS Document 22 Filed 03/30/26 Page 9 of 9