Turner v. Goldman Financial

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TERRANCE TURNER,
Plaintiff,
1:25-cv-1561
v. 	(ECC/DJS)
GOLDMAN FINANCIAL, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
TERRANCE TURNER
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Fayetteville, North Carolina 28314
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil complaint filed by Plaintiff. Dkt. No.
1. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. 	Dkt. No. 2. 	That Motion has been granted. 	The matter has been
referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3. 	The Court
recommends that the Complaint be dismissed with leave to amend.
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
The Complaint names as Defendants Goldman Financial, the Office of the
Inspector General, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Security and Exchange Commission, the 	Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower
Office - ICE, and the USSOCOM. Dkt. No. 1 at p. 2. The Complaint alleges that “[t]he
defendant company,” presumably Defendant Goldman Financial, performed illegal and
discriminatory techniques when interviewing Plaintiff for a job, including by arriving late
or failing to appear at virtual job interviews, subjecting Plaintiff to “psychological
examination,” and asking Plaintiff illegal interview questions about where Plaintiff lives,
where Plaintiff has lived, why Plaintiff has not advanced himself in his career yet, and
whether Plaintiff has a criminal record. Dkt. No. 1-1 at pp. 4 & 7-9; see also Dkt. No. 1-
1 at pp. 20-24 (containing job posting at Goldman Financial and messages exchanged
between Plaintiff and Goldman Financial relating to Plaintiff’s application for a job with
Goldman Financial).
The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff was not hired “due to the issue of a
background check and perhaps maybe because [he is] black.” 	Id. at p. 13. In addition,
the Complaint alleges that Defendant operates in violation of federal law, including by
“exceedingly 	profiting 	from 	transactions,” 	“[a]rbitrarily 	throwing 	away 	loan
applications,” and “withhold[ing] pay until the deal closes” by paying employees on
“commission.” Id. at pp. 7, 12, & 16-18.
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The Complaint asserts claims pursuant to: the Dodd Frank Act for charging
unreasonable 	transaction 	fees; 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	for 	subjecting 	Plaintiff 	to
psychological examination and a criminal background check as components of his job
application and discriminating against Plaintiff for being black; the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
for arbitrarily throwing away loan applications; and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act
for paying employees on commission such that pay is “with[e]ld . . . until the deal closes
and money is dispended and issued.” Id. at pp. 14-18.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must
contain:
(1) 	a 	short 	and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	grounds 	for 	the 	court’s
jurisdiction . . . ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
F ED . R. CIV . P. 8(a). 	The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being
asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and]
prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
A complaint that fails to comply with basic pleading requirements presents too heavy a
burden for defendants to craft a defense, “provides no meaningful basis for the Court to
assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] claims,” and may properly be dismissed.
Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet these requirements or provide the notice
to Defendants that Rule 8 requires. The allegations in the Complaint appear to relate to
actions taken while Plaintiff was interviewing for a job, Dkt. No. 1 at p. 4; Dkt. No. 1-1
at pp. 7-9 & 20-24, or issues regarding compensation, fees, or processing of loans, Dkt.
No. 1-1 at pp. 12-14 & 16-18. The nature of those actions, however, are unclear.
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In particular, the Complaint fails to offer sufficient detail about the nature of
Plaintiff’s claims and the specific conduct that each of the named Defendants is alleged
to have engaged in. 	Plaintiff names as Defendants Goldman Financial, Office of the
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, Security and
Exchange Commission, Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower Office - ICE, and
USSOCOM. Dkt. No. 1 at pp. 1-2. However, most of the factual allegations contained
in the Complaint only vaguely refer to “defendant” without specifying which Defendant
is being referenced. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-1 at p. 7 (stating “[t]he defendant operates their
business in violation of . . . law” and “the defendant did not interview the plaintiff”). In
doing so, the Complaint improperly fails to “connect any allegation to a particular
Defendant.” Scott v. Romano, 790 F. Supp. 3d 226, 233 (W.D.N.Y. 2025). The Court is
therefore left to guess which actions were taken by which Defendants.
Based on Plaintiff’s submission of the job posting at Goldman Financial and the
messages exchanged between Plaintiff and the company relating to Plaintiff’s application
for a job, the Court presumes, but cannot be sure, that, in referencing the “defendant
company” that Plaintiff interviewed with for a job position, Plaintiff may be referring to
Defendant Goldman Financial. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at pp. 20-24. However, even assuming
that Plaintiff is referencing Goldman Financial in discussing actions taken by the
“defendant company,” see id., it is unclear what connection the remaining Defendants
have to this lawsuit, including the Office of the Inspector General, the U.S. Department
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of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Security and Exchange Commission, the
Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower Office - ICE, and the USSOCOM.
Additionally, while the Complaint asserts claims pursuant to the Dodd Frank Act
for charging unreasonable transaction fees, as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act,
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act for arbitrarily
throwing away loan applications, see id. at pp. 14 & 16-17, it is not clear what standing
Plaintiff has to pursue these claims, including what injury Plaintiff himself has suffered
or is in imminent danger of suffering as a result of these alleged violations. See Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (explaining that,
“[f]or an injury to be particularized” so as to meet the demands of Article III standing, “it
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”) (citations and quotations
omitted). 	For example, Plaintiff does not allege that he was charged an unreasonable
transaction fee by any of the Defendants or that any of the Defendants threw away a loan
application that he filed. See generally Dkt. No. 1-1.
Similarly, while Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act by paying employees on commission such that pay is “with[e]ld . . . until
the deal closes and money is dispended and issued,” id. at pp. 14-18, Plaintiff does not
allege that he was employed by any of the Defendants. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts
that he was not hired by Defendants “due to the issue of a background check and perhaps
maybe because [he is] black.” Id. at p. 13.
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Finally, Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act for Defendants
allegedly: subjecting Plaintiff to “psychological examination”; asking Plaintiff illegal
interview questions about where Plaintiff lives, where Plaintiff has lived, why Plaintiff
has not advanced himself in his career yet, and whether Plaintiff has a criminal record;
and discriminating against Plaintiff for being black. Id. at pp. 4, 7-9, & 14-16. Plaintiff
does not allege sufficient facts demonstrating how the “psychological examination” that
he performed “to get th[e] interview,” id. at p. 12, or how the other questions that Plaintiff
was asked regarding his location, career advancement, and criminal history run afoul of
the Civil Rights Act. 	See Grassel v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 2017 WL
1051115, 	at 	*10 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	20, 	2017) 	(citing 	cases 	where 	psychological
examinations of prospective employees were permitted).
With regard to Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff
for being black, Plaintiff has failed to “offer more than conclusory allegations that he was
discriminated against because of his race.” Calderon v. Ulster Cnty. Area Transit, 2025
WL 3171016, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2025) (quoting Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995));
see Houston v. Dep’t of Educ. Union & Psychologist, 2025 WL 3005055, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 	27, 	2025) 	(citations 	omitted) 	(holding 	that, 	“[e]ven 	under 	the 	most 	liberal
interpretation of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff d[id] not state claims of
discrimination” because “Plaintiff d[id] not allege any facts that plausibly connect[ed] an
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alleged adverse employment action to a protected status”); see, e.g., Obah v. Dep’t of
Prob., 2025 WL 3033667, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2025) (holding that “Obah’s claims
of discrimination [we]re conclusory and fail[ed] to plausibly allege an actionable claim”
because “[h]is amended complaint d[id] not explain how the alleged failure to hire was
racially discriminatory, other than mentioning that he was of Nigerian de[s]cent and spoke
with an accent, and the city officials whom he spoke with were “Born Americans/Latin.”).
Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants “refused to hire [him] . . . perhaps maybe because
[he is] black” and that “[b]ecause [he is] black, and not white, [he is] treated as a weird
thing,” Dkt. No. 1-1 at pp. 13 & 15, without more, are insufficient.
Given its lack of clarity, the Complaint is clearly subject to dismissal. However,
“a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave
to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that
a valid claim might be stated.’” 	Bruce v. Tompkins Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel.
Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927
F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Complaint
be dismissed, but that Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to amend.
The Court advises Plaintiff that should he be permitted to amend his Complaint,
any amended pleading he submits must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Any such amended complaint, which shall supersede and replace in
its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff, must contain sequentially numbered
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paragraphs containing only one act of misconduct per paragraph. Thus, if Plaintiff claims
that his civil and/or constitutional rights were violated by more than one defendant, or on
more than one occasion, he should include a corresponding number of paragraphs in his
amended complaint for each such allegation, with each paragraph specifying: (i) the
alleged act of misconduct; (ii) the date, including the year, on which such misconduct
occurred; (iii) the names of each and every individual who participated in such
misconduct; (iv) where appropriate, the location where the alleged misconduct occurred;
and (v) the nexus between such misconduct and Plaintiff’s civil and/or constitutional
rights.
Plaintiff is further cautioned that no portion of his prior Complaint shall be
incorporated into his amended complaint by reference. 	Any amended complaint
submitted by Plaintiff must set forth all of the claims he intends to assert against the
Defendants and must demonstrate that a case or controversy exists between the Plaintiff
and the Defendants which Plaintiff has a legal right to pursue and over which this Court
has jurisdiction. If Plaintiff is alleging that the named defendant violated a law, he should
specifically refer to such law.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed without prejudice
and with leave to amend; and it is
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ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: December 9, 2025
Albany, New York
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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