Smith v. Murray et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
MASON SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	1:25-CV-750
(MAD/DJS)
DR. PIA GHANIME, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's motion to disqualify the undersigned, see Dkt. No. 52,
as well as Plaintiff's notice and letter motion requesting withdrawal from electronic service,
correction of docket address, and removal of telephone number, see Dkt. No. 53.
The Court will first address Plaintiff's motion for the undersigned's recusal. See Dkt. No.
52. Plaintiff moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, and argues that the undersigned must recuse
herself from this matter because (1) of the undersigned's prior representation of Albany Medical
Center and its physicians; (2) Plaintiff has had issues with electronic filing; (3) the matter has
been pending for nine months without discovery; (4) a telephone number Plaintiff provided to
gain access to the Managed File Transfer ("MFT") portal is listed on the docket; and (5) the Court
has not "asked for" audio recordings of telephone calls made to the telephone number on the
docket. See generally id.
The test for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is whether "an objective, disinterested observer
fully informed of the underlying facts, [would] entertain significant doubt that justice would be
done absent recusal[.]" United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992). Under 28
Case 1:25-cv-00750-MAD-DJS Document 54 Filed 04/20/26 Page 1 of 6

2
U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge "shall disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." Recusal is also required "[w]here in private practice [the judge]
served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom [s]he previously practiced
law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer
has been a material witness concerning it[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (emphasis added). "The prior
representation of a party by a judge or h[er] firm with regard to a matter unrelated to litigation
before h[er] does not automatically require recusal." Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Lovaglia, 954
F.2d at 815 ("A judge's prior representation of one of the parties in a proceeding . . . does not
automatically warrant disqualification"). "Nor does a judge's prior experience in the pertinent
area of law justify recusal." Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music Ltd. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 08-CV-
6143, 2011 WL 5825321, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2011) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
802 F.2d 658, 659 (3d Cir. 1986)). "Where the standards governing recusal are not met,
'disqualification is not optional; rather, it is prohibited.'" Id. (quoting In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d
194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d
Cir. 1988) ("A judge is as much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as he is
obliged to when it is") (citation omitted).
"The judge presiding over a case is in the best position to appreciate the implication of
those matters alleged in a recusal motion." In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d at
1312. "Litigants are entitled to an unbiased judge; not to a judge of their choosing." Id.
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants Dr. Pia Ghanime and Dr. Gregory B. Stepanets,
psychiatrists at Capital District Psychiatric Center ("CDPC"), as well as Courtney L. Butler, a
licensed social worker at CDPC. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶ 3. As noted, Plaintiff requests the
Case 1:25-cv-00750-MAD-DJS Document 54 Filed 04/20/26 Page 2 of 6

3
undersigned's recusal from this matter due to, among other things, prior representation of Albany
Medical Center. The undersigned represented Albany Medical Center in unrelated matters
approximately fifteen years ago. Notably, neither Albany Medical Center nor CDPC are named
as Defendants in the present matter—individuals who purportedly work for CDPC are the only
Defendants. Plaintiff does not contend that the undersigned previously represented any of the
named Defendants. Indeed, the undersigned can confirm that she never represented any parties
named in this action. Regardless, the Second Circuit has stated that "[a] judge's prior
representation of one of the parties in a proceeding . . . does not automatically warrant
disqualification." Lovaglia, 954 F.2d at 815 (citation omitted). The Court finds that neither prior
representation of a tangentially related entity in unrelated matters, nor prior experience in the field
of medical malpractice litigation compels recusal.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that technical issues with using MFT and the listing of
certain identifying information on the docket compel recusal, the Court also disagrees. Magistrate
Judge Stewart's denial of Plaintiff's "motion to enforce," based on Plaintiff's failure to complete
certain necessary paperwork has no bearing on the undersigned's impartiality. See Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion") (citation omitted); see also Neroni v. Grannis, No. 3:11-CV-
1485, 2016 WL 4386009, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016) ("'Prior adverse rulings . . . are generally
not a basis for disqualification'") (citations omitted).
With regard to the length of time this matter has been pending, the Court notes that
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See
Dkt. No. 6. Before service of process was made, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting permission to
amend the complaint, filed an amended complaint, and filed numerous notices and motions
Case 1:25-cv-00750-MAD-DJS Document 54 Filed 04/20/26 Page 3 of 6

4
related to proceeding under a pseudonym and electronic filing. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 9, 10, 11, 13,
15, 17. Defendants waived service and appeared in October 2025. See Dkt. Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21.
Shortly after appearing via counsel, Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on
November 21, 2025. See Dkt. No. 29. There is nothing out of the ordinary about the pace at
which this case is proceeding, besides delays caused by Plaintiff's filing of docket information-
related requests. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how the undersigned has, in any way,
contributed to the length of time this matter has been pending.
Finally, Plaintiff filed a "Notice Regarding Harassment, Surveillance, and Interference
with Pending Proceedings." See Dkt. No. 50. According to Plaintiff, he has received telephone
calls to the telephone number listed on the docket and has experienced "conspicuous activity
which include[s] sirens by the Saratoga County Sheriff's Office in and around Plaintiff's
residential area." Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff takes issue with the Court not "ask[ing] for" recordings of
these purported telephone calls. Dkt. No. 52 at 6. However, Plaintiff reiterates that he does not
request any action from the Court, he merely contends that "a reasonable person would ask why a
presiding judge, upon receiving a formal notice from a litigant stating that he possessed audio
evidence of conduct directed at him in connection with a pending federal case, would not ask to
see it." Id. at 7. The Court has received and reviewed all of Plaintiff's filings, but nothing in the
present requests bears on this Court's ability to fairly and impartially decide the matter at hand.
Telephone calls made to a publicly available telephone number do not compel the undersigned's
recusal.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's request for the undersigned's recusal, see Dkt. No. 52, is
denied.
The Court will now turn to Plaintiff's motion requesting withdrawal from electronic
Case 1:25-cv-00750-MAD-DJS Document 54 Filed 04/20/26 Page 4 of 6

5
service, correction of docket address, and removal of telephone number. See Dkt. No. 53.
Plaintiff's request to electronically file documents via PACER/ECF was granted. See Dkt. No. 38.
Since that time, Plaintiff has confronted issues with PACER registration. See Dkt. No. 45. On
February 10, 2026, Magistrate Judge Stewart denied Plaintiff's request to compel compliance with
the order granting him access to electronic filing. See Dkt. No. 47. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed
what he labels an objection to the order denying his request to compel such compliance. See Dkt.
No. 51.
Now, Plainitff asks the Court to withdraw him from electronic filing, remove his email
address and telephone number from the docket, and correct his address of record. See Dkt. No.
53. Plaintiff's request that his electronic filing access be rescinded is granted and the Court will
direct the Clerk of Court to remove Plaintiff's email address and telephone number from the
docket.1
The balance of the issues Plaintiff raises are moot. The mailing address listed on the
docket currently matches the address contained in Plaintiff's request, see id. at 2, so Plaintiff's
request that this information be corrected is denied as moot. And, to the extent Plaintiff requests
relief from this Court related to Magistrate Judge Stewart's denial of Plaintiff's request to compel
compliance with the order granting him access to ECF, see Dkt. No. 51, such motion is denied as
moot because Plaintiff's request to withdraw from electronic filing is granted herein
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion to disqualify the undersigned (Dkt. No. 52) is DENIED;
1 Plaintiff has filed numerous documents containing the email address that he now asks be
removed from the docket. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 51 at 8; Dkt. No. 52 at 13. The Court cannot
change these filings, but will order that the email address be removed from the docket heading.
Case 1:25-cv-00750-MAD-DJS Document 54 Filed 04/20/26 Page 5 of 6

6
and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's notice and letter motion requesting withdrawal from electronic
service, correction of docket address, and removal of telephone number (Dkt. No. 53) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED AS MOOT in part, as described above; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's objection to Magistrate Judge Stewart's February 10, 2026, Text
Order (Dkt. No. 51) is DENIED AS MOOT; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to rescind Plaintiff's access
to electronic filing and remove Plaintiff's email address and telephone number from the docket;2
and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order on the parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 20, 2026
Albany, New York
2 As a result of this Order, Plaintiff will receive docket filings, notifications, and service of
documents via mail to the address listed on the docket.
Case 1:25-cv-00750-MAD-DJS Document 54 Filed 04/20/26 Page 6 of 6