Bulris v. Bulris-Rowell et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
DONNA M. BULRIS,
Plaintiff, 	No. 1:25-CV-0549
v. 	(GTS/PJE)
NANCY BULRIS-ROWELL, HILLERY CLINTON,
MEN AND WOMEN IGNORANT SOCIETY,
PRESIDENT OBAMA,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Donna M. Bulris
35904
CNY PC
Building 39, Ward 501
P.O. Box 300
Marcy, New York 13403
Plaintiff pro se
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
I. Background and In Forma Pauperis
Plaintiff pro se Donna M. Bulris purported to commence this action on May 2,
2025, with the filing of a complaint and an unsigned application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) in lieu of paying this Court’s filing fee. See Dkt. Nos. 1 (“Compl.),
2. District Judge Suddaby issued an Order directing administrative closure with
opportunity to comply with the filing fee requirements. See Dkt. No. 4. On May 5, 2025,
plaintiff filed a letter motion requesting representation and a separate letter motion
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requesting “ex parte” representation. See Dkt. Nos. 5, 6. On June 11, 2025, Judge
Suddaby directed the Clerk to provide plaintiff with a change of address form, notice of
the May 8, 2025, Order directing administrative closure, and sua sponte granted plaintiff
an extension of time to comply with the Court’s May 8, 2025, Order. See Dkt. No. 7.
On June 23, 2025, plaintiff filed notice of a change of address. See Dkt. No.8. She
another notice on June 30, 2025. See Dkt. No. 9. On June 30, 2025, plaintiff filed a
second application for leave to proceed IFP, an inmate authorization form, and another
motion to appoint counsel. See Dkt. Nos. 10, 11, 12.
The Court reopened the case on July 1, 2025, after receiving plaintiff’s second
IFP application. See Dkt. No. 13. On July 11, 2025, plaintiff filed a letter. See Dkt. No.
15. On July 21, 2025, plaintiff filed a request for appointment of counsel and a request
to arrest and sanction Nancy Bulris-Rowell. See Dkt. No. 15. On July 22, 2025, plaintiff
filed another letter, an attachment to which appears to relate to service, and an
incomplete inmate authorization form. See Dkt. Nos. 17, 18. On July 25, 2025, plaintiff
filed a letter. See Dkt. No. 19. On September 9, 2025, plaintiff filed a letter and notice
of change of address. See Dkt. No. 20. On November 13, 2025, plaintiff filed a
supplement to her complaint. See Dkt. No. 21.
Upon review of plaintiff’s applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the
undersigned concludes that plaintiff is financially qualified to proceed IFP, and the
motion is granted. See Dkt. Nos. 10, 17.1
II. Legal Standards
1 Plaintiff is advised that in forma pauperis status does not excuse her from full financial responsibility for
any costs or fees she may incur in this action.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal
(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Thus, it is a court’s responsibility to determine that a plaintiff
may properly maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed further with his
action.” Praileau v. Fischer, 930 F. Supp. 2d 383, 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2013).2
Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his
submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” 	Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Second Circuit stated,
our cases have also indicated that we cannot read into pro se
submissions claims that are not consistent with the pro se
litigant’s 	allegations, 	or 	arguments 	that 	the 	submissions
themselves 	do 	not 	suggest, 	that 	we 	should 	not 	excuse
frivolous or vexatious filings by pro se litigants, and that pro
se status does not exempt a party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. . . .
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks, citations, and footnote omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,
537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). 	Although detailed allegations are not required at the
pleading stage, the complaint must still include enough facts to provide the defendants
with notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which these claims are
based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
2 A court’s initial screening of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a) does not
preclude a later dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Tisdale v. Hartley, 442 F. Supp. 3d 569, 572-73
(W.D.N.Y. 2020).
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550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
Further, “pro se pleadings still must comply with . . . the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”3 Kastner v. Tri State Eye, No. 19-CV-10668 (CM), 2019 WL 6841952, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2019) (quoting Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994));4 see also
FED. R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a pleading shall contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” “a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . and . . . a demand for the relief sought . . . .”).
A complaint that fails to comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too a heavy
burden in terms of defendants’ duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no
meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.” 	Gonzales v.
Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). As the Second Circuit has held, “[w]hen a
complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has
the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861
F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 	However, “[d]ismissal . . . is usually
reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” 	Id. (citations
omitted).
III. Initial Review
3 Hereinafter, “Fed. R. Civ. P.”
4 All unpublished cases cited in this Report-Recommendation and Order, unless otherwise noted, have
been provided to plaintiff. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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A. Complaint
Plaintiff’s complaint is handwritten on a form complaint. See Compl. It is
essentially indecipherable, written in incomplete thoughts and partial sentences;
sprawled across the printed language of the form complaint, leading to it being illegible;
and written both vertically and horizontally, with it being unclear where sentences and
paragraphs are meant to end, making it difficult to comprehend. See id. at 1-5.
Attached to the complaint are thirty-two pages of printouts from what appear to be
online resources relating to identity theft and credit reports, with unexplained circling,
underlines, question marks, asterisks, check marks, and mostly illegible handwritten
notations. See id. at 6-38. The complaint states: “idnty (sic) thief of child,” “C.P.S.
courts intention miss used state lawyers court judges for years,” “state failure to duty,
intention toucher, Donna Bulris privite (sic) family distant family, rights misused as well.
Evil, malious (sic), gross deperavation (sic). So many people thats (sic) patehic (sic)
years of abuse, courts misused of proper law calling it the law gov. maybe also politic,
their perseption (sic).” Id. at 1-2. “Also raped at knife point. Moher (sic) for the wrong
medical of child. Tochure (sic) sexual abuse of profit domestic violence intentional miss
us (sic) internation use. $ Bank right property rights. While courts. No justification
Intention harm perhaps set up. They enjoyed it. So had enough. Pay $ for many them
hurting child.” Id.
In a supplement to her complaint, plaintiff states
reverse order of protection on Nancey Rowell . . . . was charged with her
crime, criminal child abuse, of N. Rowell. . . . Professional misconduct of
Clinton County, C.P.A. 	Misuse, illegally obtained information . . . . Privite
(sic) information and use with no right nor authority to have and/or use,
stolen insurance, stolen benifits and services of Donna Bulris’s. N. Rowell
stole Donna Bulris disability Insurance to use for herself on Donna Buriss
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child, with services payed (sic) by it, stolen services. 	State insurance of
Donna Bulris, wa (sic) stolen by N. Rowell, statute and statutory rights,
violated and or unlawful.
Dkt. No. 21 at 2-3. 	Plaintiff states that Rowell “didn’t take child to ear
appointments, properly, timely, intentionally.” 	Id. at 3. 	Plaintiff further states,
“quality of care violated, unlawful, unqualified medical care. 	Without child as
stated, less care than average child receives, bad faith, suport (sic) illegal with
father mis used unlawful without unjust gov.” Id. 	Plaintiff contends that this case
involves “misuse, right to the legal right to love and affection with my child (sic)
without it taken into consideration.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff further states, “professional
misconduct of Dr. Flaute and Dr’s deceit of Development assessment and proper
procedure, fraudulent and or unlawful clone improper.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff “requests
for punishment of this crime (family offense) and other crimes of others for various
charges. 25-30 year approx. Damages. 	A life time. 	Identy (sic) thief of Dona
Bulris.” 	Id. at 4. 	Plaintiff makes references to conspiracy throughout her
supplement. See generally dkt. no. 21.
B. Discussion
Plaintiff has filed other actions in this District. See 1:10-CV-0922 (TJM/ATB),
Bulris v. Kudrle (dismissed 2/10/12) (not incarcerated); 1:02-CV-0053 (TJM/DRH),
Bulris, et al. v. Saratoga Co. Social, et al.5 (dismissed 5/28/02); 1:11-CV-0202
(DNH/DRH), Bulris v. Buris-Rowell (case dismissed 4/25/11, appeal dismissed
5 In this case, plaintiff also named as a defendant “Nancey Rowell, appointed temporary custody of
Senator Alexander Frank Bulris I.” See 1:02-CV-0053 (TJM/DRH), Bulris, et al. v. Saratoga Co. Social, et
al., Dkt. No. 1. In that action, plaintiff identified Senator Alexander Frank Bulris I as her natural child, who
was in “Nancy Bulris-Rowell”’s custody. See id.
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11/18/11), the latter two of which may6 have had similar content to what is contained in
the instant complaint. See generally Grant v. ASPCA, No. 22-CV-775 (PKC) (LB), 2022
WL 2669926, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2022) (dismissing majority of second amended
complaint where the pleading was, among other things, “‘illegible in places, alleges facts
in a disjointed, stream-of-consciousness manner, and discusses past legal claims and
issues, many of which have been the subject of her prior dismissed lawsuits in this
Court.’”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s complaint plainly fails to meet the requirements of Rules 8 and 10. See
generally Compl., Dkt. No. 21. It does not state claims in numbered paragraphs, each
limited to a single set of circumstances. See FED. R. CIV . P. 10. It does not set forth
decipherable facts, dates, or any cognizable legal claims beyond snippets of conclusory
allegations. See FED. R. CIV . P. 8. Plaintiff fails to sufficiently explain how any of the
defendants are involved in a violation of any federal law or constitutional right such that
this Court would have subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, some of the defendants
named in the caption do not appear to even be mentioned within the body of the
complaint. See generally Compl.; Dkt. No. 21. The complaint and supplement are
unintelligible and often illegible streams-of-consciousness. See Harris v. Yarbrough,
No. 5:18-CV-1086 DNH/TWD, 2018 WL 6435896, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 5:18-CV-1086 (DNH/TWD), 2019 WL 1470258
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2019) (quoting VTech Holdings Ltd. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP,
No. 03 Civ. 1413, 2003 WL 21756623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003) (“To screen the
complaint in its current state . . . “‘would be enormously wasteful of [the Court’s]
6 The complaints in plaintiff’s other cases appear similarly difficult to comprehend.
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resources.’”)). “[E]ven under the most liberal review, the Court cannot discern any
plausible factual allegations concerning any harm that [plaintiff] supposedly suffered,
any acts of defendants that caused any harm, or any rights of his that allegedly were
infringed.” Keita v. IBM, 17-cv-1276 (ENV)(ST), 2017 WL 11467560, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 26, 2017), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 114675566 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017).
It clearly does not set forth “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Generally, “[a] pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court
granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.
2014) (citation omitted). “However, if the problems with a complaint are ‘substantive’
rather than the result of an ‘inadequately or inartfully pleaded’ complaint, an opportunity
to re-plead would be ‘futile’ and ‘should be denied.’” Edwards v. Penix, 388 F. Supp. 3d
135, 144-45 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
2000)). Plaintiff’s complaint is “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely
devoid of merit[.]’” Hines v. United States, 6:10-CV-06837 (MAT) 2020 WL 570605, at
*2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2020). Plaintiff’s is “a case[ ] in which the complaint[s are] so
confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is
well disguised.’” Story v. Cent. Intel. Agency, No. 1:24-CV-00631 (MAD/CFH), 2024 WL
4467414, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:24-CV-00631 (MAD/CFH), 2024 WL 4849844 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024) (quoting
Lamothe v. Brown, 5:22-CV-161 (TJM/CFH), 2023 WL 316013, at *7 (D. Vt. Jan 19,
2023)).
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Even if plaintiff would be able to amend to provide clear and distinct claims and a
request for relief that complied with Rules 8 and 10, from the little that can be discerned
from her current submission, the undersigned is able to deduce that she seeks review
about areas of law that are beyond this Court’s jurisdiction. Insofar as plaintiff seeks to
contend that any or all of the defendants stole her identity, this Court would not have the
jurisdiction to investigate nor direct the prosecution of any such violation. See Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (holding that prisoners lack standing to seek the
issuance of an arrest warrant); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A]
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
of another.”); McFadden v. Ortiz, 5:12-CV-1244 (MAD/ATB), 2013 WL 1789593, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013). Importantly, “[t]here is no private federal cause of action for
identity theft.” Porter v. Hayes, No. 5:22-CV-1067 (TJM/TWD), 2022 WL 16744238, at
*3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:22-CV-1067
(TJM/TWD), 2023 WL 315682 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also id. (quoting Hernandez v. Doe, No. 16-CV-2375 (KAM)(LB),
2016 WL 4995231, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2016)) (“‘18 U.S.C. § 1028 is purely
criminal in nature and creates no private right of action.’”).
Further, to the extent plaintiff references child abuse of “Senator Alexander Frank
Bulris,” who she identifies as her son, it appears plaintiff wishes this Court to review
custody and/or child welfare-related issues or criminal matters. See Compl.; Dkt. No.
21. Plaintiff raised custody-related claims in a past action she sought to bring against
Nancy Bulris-Rowell and appears to seek to do the same here. Plaintiff appears to
contend that Nancy Bulris-Rowell, who has custody of plaintiff’s son, stole plaintiff’s
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identity in order to use her insurance and/or benefits for the medical care of plaintiff’s
son, failed to timely take the child to certain medical appointments, and did not obtain
the level or quality of medical care plaintiff prefers for the child. See generally dkt. no.
21. 	Plaintiff may also be seeking this Court to review a custody arrangement or
address concerns she has with Ms. Rowell’s care-related choices regarding plaintiff’s
son. See id. at 7 (“unjust separation, interferarance (sic) of and with me and father and
father being together with mother. Also with child and child right to both parents, also
together unjust DNA use and rights, privite (sic), privite (sic) family affair privitcy (sic),
the ‘right to be left alone’ pursue happiness”; “child not in mothers entire life, no
protection of adult rights, no respect ever given, address contact”).
To the extent plaintiff asks this Court to review or modify a child custody
arrangement, this Court does not have jurisdiction. “The domestic-relations abstention
doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from interfering in state cases raising custody
or domestic relations issues.” Davila v. Arias, No. 24-CV-02904 (NRM) (LB), 2024 WL
4593499, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2024) (citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905
F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990); Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 623 (2d Cir. 2019);
Blair v. Ilion, No. 24-CV-126, 2024 WL 1532257, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024));
Mochary v. Bergstein, 42 F.4th 80, 89 n.15 (2d Cir. 2022).
To the extent plaintiff is asking the Court to “reverse” or modify an order of
protection, see Compl. at 2-3, this Court cannot act to exercise appellate jurisdiction
over state court judgments under Rooker-Feldman. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (noting that Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars federal courts from reviewing cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of
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injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”);
McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2007); Craft v. New York State Supreme
Ct., Dutchess Cnty., No. 22-CV-10347 (LTS), 2022 WL 17822718, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
19, 2022) (“[I]nsofar as Plaintiff is seeking to overturn or vacate the judgment granting
an order of protection against him, he is alleging that he lost in state court before he
commenced these proceedings; he is complaining of injuries caused by the judgment
granting the order of protection; and he is inviting this Court to reverse that judgment.
Such a claim must therefore dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because
lower federal courts cannot review state court judgments.”).
The Court can only exercise subject matter jurisdiction over “civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or civil
actions wherein there is diversity of citizenship between the parties and the matter in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	The complaint, even as confused
and piecemeal as it is, makes clear that there is neither a federal question nor diversity
jurisdiction. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 21; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.”).
As no better pleading could cure these defects, the undersigned recommends
dismissal without leave to amend. See, e.g., Story, 2024 WL 4467414, at *6 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 10, 2024) (citing Sherven v. United States, No. 1:23-CV-02912 (UNA), 2023 WL
7128466, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Oct. 27, 2023) (dismissing a case following initial review when
“the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, or postulat[e]
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events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind[.]”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); Davila, 2024 WL 4593499, at *2 (“Because the domestic relations
abstention doctrine precludes this Court's exercise of jurisdiction, any attempt to amend
the complaint would be futile.”) (citing Deem, 941 F.3d at 621).7
In light of the undersigned’s recommendation, it is further recommended that
plaintiff’s various requests for appointment of counsel (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 12, 16) be denied,
without prejudice to renew should the matter be permitted to proceed, and that plaintiff’s
request that this Court arrest8 and sanction defendant Bulris-Rowell be dismissed as
moot. See Dkt. No. 16.
IV. Conclusion
Wherefore, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No.
10, is granted; and it is
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. Nos. 1, 21, be DISMISSED
without prejudice and without opportunity to amend for lack of subject-matter
7 Plaintiff names former President Obama and former United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(misspelled as Hillery) in the caption but does not discuss them or their alleged involvement in the
complaint. See Cipriani v. Buffardi, 9:06-CV-889 (LEH/DRH), 2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2007) (citation omitted) (“A complaint cannot be maintained against a defendant who is listed in the
caption, but against whom no facts are alleged in the body of the complaint.”). Regardless, even if plaintiff
could amend to set forth their involvement in the alleged identify theft or custody issues involving
plaintiff’s child, such a claim would be “fanciful, irrational, or wholly incredible,” and, thus, legally frivolous.
See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Moreover, the Court would not have subject matter
jurisdiction over these underlying claims against such defendants for the reasons set forth, supra.
8 For the same reasons noted, supra, a private individual does not have standing to seek the arrest or
prosecution of another.
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jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii);9 and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s requests for appointment of counsel, Dkt. No. 5,
6, 12, 16, be DENIED without prejudice; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s request that this Court arrest and sanction
Nancy Bulris-Rowell, Dkt. No. 16, be DISMISSED as moot; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve this Report-Recommendation & Order on
plaintiff in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) days within which
to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85,
89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.
1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV . P. 6(a), 72.10
9 The undersigned recommends dismissal due to failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Porter, 2022 WL 16744238, at *3 (citing F ED. R. C IV . P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) (dismissing without opportunity to amend and “recommend[ing] that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim”
where the plaintiff’s “claims are not cognizable as private causes of action under federal law.”); Praileau v.
United States, No. 16-CV-7882 (CM), 2017 WL 4350584, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2017) (“After separating
legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts
make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. [] Plaintiff names the City and
County of New York and the Superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility as defendants, but he
provides no facts to support a claim for relief against any of them. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims
against these defendants for failure to state a claim.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). The
undersigned declines to also recommend dismissal for frivolity because, as difficult and confused are
plaintiff’s complaint and supplement, the undersigned is able to discern at least some indication, however
slight, of what plaintiff seeks this Court to review.
10 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail,
three (3) additional days will be added to the fourteen-day (14) period, meaning that you have seventeen
(17) days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file
objections. See F ED. R. C IV . P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday,
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Dated: November 24, 2025
Albany, New York
or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday. See id. § 6(a)(1)(c).
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