USA v. Watts, et al

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff.
-v- 	1:25-CR-411 (AJB/DJS)
JAEL WATTS and LUIS PINO-COPETE,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On December 4, 2025, the United States of America (the “Government”) obtained a
twelve-count superseding indictment that charges defendant Jael Watts (“Watts”) with ten counts
of wire fraud, one count of aggravated identity theft, and one count of conspiring with her co-
defendant and husband Luis Pino-Copete (“Pino-Copete”) to commit wire fraud. Dkt. No. 62.
On January 23, 2026, Watts moved pro se to: (1) sever her case from her co-defendant;
and (2) compel certain discovery. Dkt. No. 100, 101. The Government has opposed. Dkt. No.
105. The motions have been fully briefed and will be considered on the basis of the submissions
without oral argument.
II. 	BACKGROUND1
Watts and Pino-Copete ran a tax-exempt organization called Pearl Transit. Pearl Transit
claimed to provide transportation and community outreach services to the elderly and disabled in
1 This brief recitation of the facts is based on a review of the docket, including the affidavit in support of the criminal
complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and the allegations in the superseding indictment, Dkt. No. 62.
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 1 of 9

- 2 -
several states, including New York. Watts served as Pearl Transit’s Operations Manager and Pino-
Copete served as the company’s Vice President of Operations.
In March of 2022, Pearl Transit applied for funding through a State-Federal program that
helps meet the transportation needs of the elderly and disabled. Watts signed this application her-
self and allegedly forged the signature of an attorney on the document, too. Later, in December of
2023, Watts signed a contract on behalf of Pearl Transit to provide transportation services to New
York State customers. 	This contract was worth about $1,275,550, with a substantial portion of
this sum being eligible for reimbursement under the State-Federal program mentioned above.
In September and October of 2024, Pearl Transit submitted several reimbursement requests
to New York State. State auditors reviewed those requests and sought additional documentation
from the company to support the claimed expenses. In response to those inquiries, Watts enlisted
the help of her husband to fabricate and submit supporting documentation: driver payroll expenses,
employee and driver names, direct deposit details, ride history information from the relevant time
period, and Pearl Transit’s office locations. According to the Government, an investigation has
revealed that many of the assertions contained in these supporting documents are false.
On July 18, 2025, a Special Agent with the U.S. Department of Transportation swore out
a criminal complaint that charged Watts with wire fraud. Dkt. No. 1. Watts was arrested. See
Dkt. No. 3. At her initial appearance, U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart appointed the Office
of the Federal Public Defender (“OFPD”) to represent her. Dkt. No. 9. The Government moved
for detention. See Dkt. No. 13.
Watts was remanded to federal custody at the Albany County Correctional Facility pending
a detention hearing. See Dkt. No. 26. Soon after, Judge Stewart conducted the hearing and ordered
Watts detained on August 19, 2025. Id. She appealed, Dkt. No. 28, but this Court rejected her
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 2 of 9

- 3 -
arguments and affirmed. Dkt. No. 45. Watts took a further appeal of the detention order to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Dkt. No. 53, which likewise rejected her arguments
and affirmed. Dkt. No. 109. Pino-Copete has since been arrested as well. See Dkt. No. 80.
On August 29, 2025, Watts moved to defend herself in this action pro se. 	Dkt. No. 36.
Judge Stewart promptly held a representation hearing. 	There, he relieved the OFPD, cautioned
Watts about the serious risks involved in proceeding without the benefit of knowledgeable criminal
counsel, and appointed an experienced member of the bar as standby counsel on her behalf. Dkt.
No. 31. Thereafter, Watts filed a series of pro se motions seeking release from custody along with
other forms of relief. Dkt. Nos. 52, 55, 57, 91. Those motions have all been denied. Dkt. Nos.
88, 90, 104.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Watts has moved to: (1) sever her case from her co-defendant; and (2) compel certain dis-
covery. Dkt. No. 100, 101. The Government has opposed. Dkt. No. 105.
1. Severance
First, Watts has moved for an order dismissing her from this action or, in the alternative,
severing the charges against her from those asserted against her co-defendant. Dkt. No. 100. Ac-
cording to Watts:
In the event of out-of-court statements concerning his own culpabil-
ity on the charged offenses, which may implicate me as well, [Pino-
Copete] may choose not to testify at a joint trial. If such a statement
is admitted against me, I will be prejudiced and denied my Consti-
tutional right to confrontation. No other remedy other than sever-
ance and separate trials will suffice because potential incriminatory
statements may not be redacted to eliminate references to me.
Dkt. No. 100 at 1–2.
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 3 of 9

- 4 -
Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern joinder and severance
in criminal cases. Generally speaking, joinder of two or more defendants is permitted “if they are
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transac-
tions, constituting an offense or offenses.” F ED. R. C RIM. P. 8(b). However, if joinder “appears to
prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the
defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” F ED. R. C RIM. P. 14(a).
Measured against this general legal standard, Watts and Pino-Copete are properly joined
as co-defendants. The Second Circuit has interpreted Rule 8’s “same series of acts or transactions”
language to mean that “joinder is proper where two or more persons’ criminal acts are ‘unified by
some substantial identity of facts or participants,’ or ‘arise out of a common plan or scheme.’”
United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cervone,
907 F.2d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 1990)). 	Accordingly, “[t]he established rule is that a non-frivolous
conspiracy charge is sufficient to support joinder of defendants under [Rule 8(b)].” United States
v. Nerlinger, 862 F.2d 967, 973 (2d Cir. 1988) (collecting cases).
A review of the superseding indictment confirms that the Government has charged Watts
with a non-frivolous conspiracy, i.e., conspiring with her husband to commit wire fraud by, inter
alia, seeking reimbursement for services that Pearl Transit did not provide. “The elements of wire
fraud are: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of the scheme, and (3) use
of the wires to further the scheme.” United States v. Jabar, 19 F.4th 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 569 (2d Cir. 2015)). 	“Conspiracy to commit wire fraud
requires merely the agreement between defendants to engage in the foregoing and an overt act by
one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id.
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 4 of 9

- 5 -
The factual allegations in the superseding indictment track these elements. Among other
things, the superseding indictment alleges that Watts and Pino-Copete engaged in a common plan
or scheme to fraudulently obtain payment from New York State by submitting reimbursement
requests for services that were not in fact performed by Pearl Transit. 	See Dkt. No. 62. 	The
superseding indictment further alleges that both co-defendants engaged in a series of acts in fur-
therance of that common plan or scheme, including working together to fabricate supporting doc-
umentation to submit to State auditors. See id.
These allegations are more than sufficient to satisfy the approach that our circuit has taken
to the joinder of co-defendants under Rule 8(b). See, e.g., Rittweger, 524 F.3d at 178 (“Under the
plain language of Rule 8(b), the decision to join parties turns on what is ‘alleged’ in the ‘indict-
ment.’”); United States v. Feyrer, 333 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We use a common sense
approach when considering the propriety of joinder under Rule 8(b).”).
“Even with proper joinder under Rule 8, Rule 14 provides that a district court may none-
theless grant a severance of defendants’ joint trial if it appears that a defendant or the government
is prejudiced by a joinder.” 	Feyrer, 333 F.3d at 114 (cleaned up). 	However, there is a strong
preference in the federal system “for the joint trial of defendants indicted together.” United States
v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir. 1993). 	Accordingly, the Supreme Court has explained that
severance is warranted only when “there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment
about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).
Watts has not made anywhere near the showing that would be required to grant her the
relief she seeks at this time. To be sure, “[t]he risk of prejudice associated with joinder varies with
the facts of each case.” Feyrer, 333 F.3d at 114. And of course, “the trial judge has a continuing
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 5 of 9

- 6 -
duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear.” 	Schaffer v. United
States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960). But Watts’s only meaningful argument on this point is based on
a vague reference to unidentified “out-of-court statements” that may prejudice her. Dkt. No. 100.
That is hardly enough to justify severance. First off, a “defendant must show not simply
some prejudice but substantial prejudice.” United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir.
2004) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). As the Government points out, given the nature of the
alleged conspiracy, the proof at trial would “involve nearly complete, if not total, overlap with the
charge against Pino-Copete,” her alleged co-conspirator. Dkt. No. 105 at 10.
Under those circumstances, there is a better-than-even chance that any relevant out-of-
court statements would be equally admissible at trial against Watts and her co-conspirator. See,
e.g., United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining operation of Rule
801(d)(2)(E)’s hearsay exception for statements made by co-conspirator in furtherance of a con-
spiracy).
Although that evidence might be “prejudicial” to Watts’s defense in the sense that it may
tend to prove the Government’s conspiracy charge or other charges against her, it would not es-
tablish the kind of substantial prejudice with which Rule 14’s stringent standard is concerned. See
United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that so-called “spillover
prejudice” occurs when “evidence admissible against only one defendant is prejudicial to all de-
fendants”).
However, even assuming for the purpose of this motion practice that Watts’s conclusory
assertions might establish some risk of prejudice, there is no indication at this time that an appro-
priate limiting instruction at trial would be an insufficient remedy. 	“As a general matter, even
where multiple defendants are charged with the same crimes, the use of an out-of-court statement
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 6 of 9

- 7 -
admission does not violate the Confrontation Clause when accompanied by an instruction limiting
its admissibility as against the declarant defendant.” United States v. Defreitas, 701 F. Supp. 2d
309, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting cases). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently confirmed
that measures short of severance will typically satisfy constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Samia
v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 654–55 (2023). 	Accordingly, Watts’s motion to sever must be
denied.
2. Discovery
Second, Watts has moved to compel discovery of multiple categories of the Government’s
evidence against her. Dkt. No. 101. In opposition, the Government represents that it has disclosed
the requested materials to Watts in an electronic format in December of 2025 and again in January
of 2026. Dkt. No. 105 at 13.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs pre-trial criminal discovery. Rule 16 ob-
ligates the Government to disclose, on a continuing basis, a broad range of statements, records,
and other documents and objects. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 16(a)(1), (c). Likewise, although it may
not be a pre-trial discovery rule, Brady and its progeny require the disclosure of “evidence favor-
able to an accused,” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), which includes evidence that may
be useful to impeach the credibility of a government witness, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972). Notably, however, Rule 16 also carves out a list of information that is not subject
to disclosure. F ED. R. C RIM. P. 16(a)(2). And a statutory provision called the Jencks Act expressly
provides that non-party witness statements are not discoverable until after the witness has testified
on direct examination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Upon review, Watts’s motion to compel discovery is denied in all respects. 	First off,
Watts’s motion to compel amounts to little more than an unelaborated listing of the categories of
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 7 of 9

- 8 -
information that are subject to disclosure under Rule 16. See Dkt. No. 101. The bar is set fairly
low, but a criminal defendant seeking to obtain discovery under Rule 16 typically has to “make a
prima facie showing of materiality,” United States v. Clarke, 979 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2020), which
involves some indication that the evidence being sought “could be used to counter the govern-
ment’s case or to bolster a defense.” United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993).
A pro forma list of categories of information covered by Rule 16 hardly meets this standard.
Second, the Government represents that it has disclosed all of the requested materials—the
ones that are subject to disclosure at this time, anyway—to Watts in an electronic format on two
occasions. 	Dkt. No. 105 at 13. 	The Government has offered supporting documentation to that
effect. 	Exs. 1 & 2 to Dkt. No. 105 (identifying list of disclosures). 	The Government has also
offered documentation establishing that Watts can access these electronic documents at the facility
where she is being detained. Ex. 3 to Dkt. No. 105 (detention facility representative confirming
that Watt has access to USB drives and a suitable computer for reviewing disclosures). Further,
according to the Government, Watts “reviewed the discovery, including some of the content on
the USBs provided by the Government, with her stand-by counsel, the investigators, and the un-
dersigned AUSA, at the U.S. Attorney’s Office on February 12, 2026.” Dkt. No. 105 at 13.
The Court has reviewed the Government’s representations (and supporting documenta-
tion). The Court is also well-familiar with this pending criminal matter from prior motion practice.
Based on the available filings and the Court’s knowledge base, and even accounting for defend-
ant’s unrepresented status, the Court concludes that Watts’s pro forma motion to compel is utterly
without merit. Accordingly, Watts’s motion to compel discovery must be denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Watts’s motions are without merit and must be denied.
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 8 of 9

- 9 -
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendant Jael Watts’s motion to sever (Dkt. No. 100) is DENIED; and
2. Defendant Jael Watts’s motion for discovery (Dkt. No. 101) is DENIED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 2, 2026
Utica, New York.
Case 1:25-cr-00411-AJB Document 114 Filed 04/02/26 Page 9 of 9