USA v. Ciera Washington, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRYAN OTERO,
Defendant.
1:25-cr-00296 (AMN)
APPEARANCES:
United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York
445 Broadway – Room 218
Albany, New York 12207
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ALBERT Y. DAYAN, ESQ.
80-02 Kew Gardens Road – Suite 902
Kew Gardens, New York 11415
Attorneys for Defendant
OF COUNSEL:
MIKAYLA ESPINOSA, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
JEFFREY BROWN, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
ALBERT Y. DAYAN, ESQ.
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Presently before the Court is the Government’s motion to declare Defendant Bryan Otero
to be in material breach of his plea agreement (“Plea Agreement” or the “Agreement”) with the
Government. Dkt. No. 68 (the “Motion”). Defendant filed an opposition to the Government’s
Motion, see Dkt. No. 84, the Government filed a reply in support of its Motion, see Dkt. No. 85,
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 1 of 17

2
and with leave of Court, Defendant filed a sur-reply in further opposition to the Government’s
Motion. Dkt. No. 95.
For the reasons set forth below, the Government’s Motion is granted.
II. 	BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2025, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant along with two alleged co-
conspirators. See Dkt. No. 1. The indictment charges Defendant with one count of conspiracy to
commit healthcare fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347 and 1349, two counts of healthcare
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and two counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). See id.
A. The Plea Agreement
On September 26, 2025, Defendant entered into a Plea Agreement with the Government.
See Dkt. No. 43. Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count
of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347 and 1349, and one
count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. See id. at ¶ 1(a). In turn,
the Government agreed that it would move to dismiss the remaining charges—two counts of
healthcare fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft—and agreed not to bring additional
federal criminal charges against Defendant based on the conduct described in the indictment or
the factual basis section of the Plea Agreement. See id. at ¶¶ 2(a)-(b).
Additionally, according to the Plea Agreement, Defendant must pay restitution to the
victims of his offenses in the amount of (i) $3,913,442.58 to the New York State Medicaid
program; (ii) $75,720.69 to CVS Pharmacy Inc.; and (iii) $ 74,442.57 to Walgreens Co., see id.
at ¶ 1(d)(1)-(3), and must also forfeit a money judgment in the amount of $260,717.21. Id. at ¶
1(e). The Plea Agreement further provides that Defendant must identify all assets in which he
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 2 of 17

3
has any legal or equitable interest, identify all assets valued at more than $5,000 that have been
transferred to third parties since the date of the first offense giving rise to the Plea Agreement,
and not transfer any assets valued at more than $5,000 without the approval of the Asset Recovery
Unit of the United States Attorney’s Office until the fine, forfeiture, and restitution are paid in full
or are otherwise terminated. Id. at ¶¶ 1(f)(1), (I)(4).
Furthermore, Defendant agreed to preserve and liquidate assets as outlined in the Asset
Preservation and Liquidation Agreement (“APLA”), which is attached to and fully incorporated
into the Plea Agreement. Id. at ¶ 1(d)(6); see also Dkt. No. 43-1. The APLA establishes the terms
under which Defendant must sell or otherwise dispose of his available assets for purposes of
satisfying his restitution obligations. See Dkt. No. 43-1. Specifically, under the APLA, Defendant
agreed to provide a complete and accurate list of all residential and commercial properties that he
owns individually, or that are owned by any business in which he has an interest, within seven
days of the execution of the Plea Agreement. 	Id. at ¶ 5. 	Defendant further agreed to provide
complete and accurate financial disclosure affidavits, for himself individually and for each of his
businesses, within thirty days of the execution of the Plea Agreement. Id. at ¶ 6. 	However, if
requested, Defendant must complete such affidavits and provide supporting documentation “no
later than 10 days after receiving such a request,” and Defendant’s failure to do so timely and
accurately “may, in addition to any other penalty or remedy authorized by law, constitute the
[D]efendant’s failure to accept responsibility under [Section] 3E1.1” of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines (“USSG”). Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ I(1). Pursuant to the APLA, Defendant also agreed to
preserve his assets by agreeing to not “sell, transfer, borrow against, make withdrawals or
transfers from, commit waste against, or otherwise impair the value of any real property, personal
property that might reasonably have a value of $1,000.00 or more, bank accounts, investment
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 3 of 17

4
accounts, stocks, or bonds,” in which he has an interest. Dkt. No. 43-1 at ¶ 10. Defendant also
agreed to surrender 100% of the net proceeds of the sale of certain property, including all funds
from the JP Morgan Chase accounts of Fortune 4 Diabetics (a company owned solely by
Defendant), a 2024 Cybertruck, a 2017 Mercedes-Benz S550, and certain property located in
Wood-Ridge, New Jersey (“Wood-Ridge Property”). Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16-17.
Furthermore, if Defendant breaches any term or condition of the Agreement or
supplemental agreements with the Government, the Government, has, among other things, the
right to void the Plea Agreement, in whole or in part. See Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ J (emphasis added).
B. Change of Plea Hearing
On October 10, 2025, after execution of the Plea Agreement, Defendant and his counsel,
along with the Government, attended a change of plea hearing (“Change of Plea Hearing” or
“Hearing”). See Dkt. No. 76. Defendant was placed under oath, confirmed that he was not under
the influence of any narcotics, alcohol, drugs, or medication, and affirmed that his ability to
understand the proceedings was not impaired in any way. 	Id. at 3:05-18, 5:22-25, 6:01-09.
Defendant also affirmed that he understood the penalties for making a false statement. See id. at
3:19-25.
Defendant subsequently affirmed that he had adequate time and opportunity to discuss the
indictment and all aspects of his case with his attorney. 	Id. at 6:23-25, 7:01. 	Defendant also
affirmed that he understood all of his rights and still wished to plead guilty. 	Id. at 9:21-25.
Defendant then pled guilty to counts one and six of the indictment, and admitted to the forfeiture
allegation. Id. at 10:03-25, 11:01-21. Further, Defendant affirmed that he had the opportunity to
carefully review the Plea Agreement with his attorney, and that he understood the terms that he
was agreeing to in the Plea Agreement. Id. at 20:04-10.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 4 of 17

5
Then, the Government specifically articulated the sentencing possibilities. In particular,
the Government affirmed the following on the record:
The [D]efendant has agreed to forfeit . . . $260,717.21. 	There is a mandatory
special assessment of $100 per count, for a total of $200. 	And there is also
restitution of $3,913,442.58 to the state Medicaid program, $75,720.69 to CVS,
and $74,442.57 to Walgreen’s. 	This [P]lea [A]greement does contain a[n]
attachment that is a[n] asset forfeiture and liquidation agreement, and . . . on page
4 of that agreement, the defendant has agreed to forfeit . . . the JP Morgan Chase
accounts for Fortune 4 Diabetics, which is a company that is wholly owned by the
defendant for the accounts ending in 7501, 7210, 2233, and 7210. 	He has also
agreed to turn over for the purposes of satisfying . . . the restitution the 2024
[C]yber truck . . . that is identified in that agreement, as well as the 2017 Mercedes-
Benz S550 that’s identified in that agreement. He’s also agreed to list his property
. . . in Wood-Ridge, New Jersey, with the proceeds of that being applied towards
restitution.
Id. at 21:07-25, 22:01-03. Defendant subsequently affirmed that he understood the sentencing
possibilities recited by the Government. Id. at 22:05-09.
Furthermore, Defendant affirmed that he understood that he did not have a right to
withdraw his guilty plea after it is entered by the Court. Id. at 24:20-23. Defendant’s counsel
also confirmed that he advised Defendant of his rights, the nature of the charges against him, and
the consequences of pleading guilty. See id. at 27:12-18. The Court then accepted the Defendant’s
guilty plea, finding, inter alia, that Defendant pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily, and that
Defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. See id. at 28:19-25, 29:01-04.
C. The Parties’ Actions Following the Change of Plea Hearing
On October 15, 2025, the Government emailed Defendant’s counsel requesting that
Defendant provide complete and accurate financial disclosure affidavits by 5:00 pm on October
31, 2025, noting that paragraph I(1) of the Plea Agreement requires that Defendant provide
complete and accurate financial disclosure affidavits and supporting documentation within ten
days of a request by the Government. See Dkt. No. 68-2 at 2. In response, Defendant’s counsel
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 5 of 17

6
stated that he would not be able to complete the financial disclosure affidavits within ten days and
instead needed two weeks. See id. The Government confirmed that two weeks was acceptable,
so long as the documentation was received by October 31. See Dkt. No. 68-3 at 2. On November
3, 2025, after the deadline had elapsed and the Government had not received the required
documentation, the Government emailed Defendant’s counsel asking when they should expect to
receive the completed affidavits. See id. Defendant’s counsel replied stating that he was out of
the country and that he was “[n]ot sure what paperwork” the Government was referring to. Id.
The Government noted that the paperwork was outlined in the Government’s previous email sent
on October 15, and reminded Defendant’s counsel that failure to timely and accurately complete
the affidavits may “constitute the [D]efendant’s failure to accept responsibility under USSG §
3E1.1.” 	Dkt. No. 68-4 at 2-3. 	On November 5, 2025, the Government again provided the
paperwork to Defendant’s counsel and stated that the Government expected Defendant to provide
all documentation as soon as possible. Id. at 2. On November 10, 2025, the Government again
emailed Defendant’s counsel requesting that the completed documentation be provided that week,
warning that failure to comply with the terms of the Plea Agreement may warrant a loss of
acceptance of responsibility credit, which could add nearly a year of imprisonment to Defendant’s
Sentencing Guidelines range. See id.
Approximately two months later, on January 13, 2026, after still receiving nothing, the
Government emailed Defendant’s counsel once more, stating that the Government “will proceed
with a request that [Defendant] not be awarded acceptance of responsibility credit if [it] do[es]
not hear back from [him] by this Friday, January 16.” Dkt. No. 68-5 at 2. Defendant’s counsel
replied stating, “I thought I reached out to you earlier this week. 	Please let me know what’s
expected from my client please.” Id. After the Government reiterated to Defendant’s counsel that
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 6 of 17

7
his client was required to provide completed financial disclosure affidavits and supporting
documentation in October, Defendant’s counsel apologized for the delay and stated that he “[w]ill
work on it early next week.” See Dkt. No. 68-6 at 2-3. The Government responded that the Plea
Agreement outlined an agreed-upon ten-day turnaround time for the documentation, and given
that these documents were requested in October, the Government expected that they would be
completed “as immediately as possible.” Id. at 2. The following day, Defendant’s counsel again
requested another copy of the financial disclosure affidavits. See id. After the Government yet
again provided the paperwork, Defendant’s counsel stated that the Government “should have
everything back . . . on Tuesday[,] [January 20, 2026].” Id. On January 20, 2026, Defendant’s
attorney delayed again, stating that the documentation would be complete by Thursday morning,
January 22, 2026. Dkt. No. 68-7 at 2. On January 22, 2026, after once again receiving nothing,
the Government emailed Defendant’s counsel asking for an update. See id. Defendant’s counsel
stated that he and Defendant were still working on the documentation, but that it should hopefully
be completed “within a day.” Id. Unsurprisingly, the Government did not receive any documents
from Defendant that day, or the following day, and so on January 26, 2026, the Government
emailed Defendant’s counsel, requesting another update. See Dkt. No. 68-8 at 2. In response,
Defendant’s counsel asked for a phone call. Id. On January 28, 2026, Defendant’s counsel and
the Government spoke by phone, during which the Government discussed the contents of the Plea
Agreement and its attached APLA. See Dkt. No. 68 at 14. Defendant’s counsel asked for copies
of 	the 	agreements, 	and 	represented 	that 	the 	Government 	would 	receive 	the 	completed
documentation that week, as Defendant was completing the documentation with his accountant.
Id. at 15.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 7 of 17

8
Then, on January 30, 2026, Defendant’s counsel emailed the Government and for the first
time stated that his client “believes that it is unfair that he should liquidate his other assets beyond
his minimal gains and temporary/minimal participation in the scheme for which he pleaded guilty
to,” and “wants to go back to the judge on this subject.” Dkt. No. 68-10 at 2. In response, on
February 2, 2026, the Government stated the following:
[Defendant] signed a plea agreement and a liquidation agreement that are both in
direct contravention to his new position that he believes he should not liquidate
his assets to pay the victims of his crime. 	He specifically agreed to liquidate a
variety of items, in addition to agreeing that he would pay restitution in the amount
of $4,063,605.84. 	He also stated that he understood the terms of the plea
agreement when he pled guilty to his crimes. 	He also agreed to complete the
financial disclosures. 	We expect to hear from you by the end of the day today
regarding his cooperation—otherwise, we will indeed have to go back to the Judge
about his breach of the terms of the plea agreement.
Id. In response, Defendant’s counsel declared that the parties “have to go back to the judge” and
added:
[Defendant] is not withdrawing his plea. 	But he will contest the other financial
terms of the [A]greement. His position is simple. He feels like he is being robbed
of everything he owns and the (sic) he worked legitimately hard for, for causing a
200k loss in this case. If you want to withdraw from the plea agreement? He is
ok with that too.
Id. 	The Government indicated in response that there was no justifiable basis for Defendant to
withdraw from the Plea Agreement, and insisted on his specific performance of the Agreement.
See Dkt. No. 68 at 15. 	Then, on February 6, 2026, Defendant finally provided the requested
financial disclosure affidavits to the Government, but the Government claims that the affidavits
are incomplete and reveal the dissipation of over two million dollars in assets. See id.; see also
Dkt. No. 68-11 at 2. 	Defendant’s counsel also maintained that Defendant “disagrees that
immediate pre-sentencing liquidation of his primary residence and personal vehicles is necessary
at this time,” and that a payment-based structure or court supervision was more appropriate. Dkt.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 8 of 17

9
No. 68-11 at 2. Defendant’s counsel suggested that the parties renegotiate the arrangement, and
if that is not possible, ask “the Court [to] address the issue so that enforcement terms can be
clearly set.” Id.
Moreover, apart from the financial disclosure affidavits, under the Plea Agreement,
Defendant is also required to provide the Government with a complete and accurate list of all
residential and commercial properties owned by him individually, and by any business in which
he had an interest, by October 3, 2025. See Dkt. No. 43-1 at ¶ 5. To date, Defendant has provided
no such list. Dkt. No. 68 at 13. Additionally, Defendant is required to market his Wood-Ridge
Property with a reputable real estate agent approved in writing by the Government by October
26, 2025. See Dkt. No. 43-1 at ¶ 17. To date, Defendant has not done so. Dkt. No. 68 at 13.
Defendant is also required to surrender his 2024 Cybertruck, his 2017 Mercedes-Benz S550, and
the balances (as of July 30, 2025) contained in four JP Morgan Chase accounts. See Dkt. No. 43-
1 at ¶ 16. Again, Defendant has not surrendered any of these items to date. Dkt. No. 68 at 13.
On February 24, 2026, the Government filed the instant Motion seeking to have the Court
(i) declare Defendant to be in material breach of the Plea Agreement and (ii) order that Defendant
specifically perform his obligations under the Plea Agreement. See generally id. On March 30,
2026, Defendant opposed the Motion, contending that (i) Defendant did not understand what he
was agreeing to when he signed the Plea Agreement, (ii) that the Government is not entitled to
specific performance of the Plea Agreement, and, in any event, (iii) Defendant did not breach the
Plea Agreement because he complied with its constitutionally permissible provisions. 	See
generally Dkt. No. 84. On April 7, 2026, the Government filed a reply in support of the Motion,
see Dkt. No. 85, and with this Court’s permission, Defendant filed a sur-reply in further opposition
to the Motion on April 20, 2026. Dkt. No. 95.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 9 of 17

10
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As a threshold matter, both defendants and the government are bound to the terms of plea
agreements, and neither party to a plea agreement may ‘unilaterally rewrite the agreement to
protect its interests.’” 	United States v. Rubenstein, 228 F. Supp. 3d 223, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 1989)). In determining whether a
defendant has breached his plea agreement, district courts apply a preponderance of the evidence
standard. 	See United States v. Byrd, 413 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2005). 	“We review a plea
agreement in accordance with principles of contract law and look to what the parties reasonably
understood to be the terms of the agreement to determine whether a breach has occurred.” United
States v. Sealed Defendant One, 49 F.4th 690, 696 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005). Additionally,
given 	that 	the 	government 	enjoys 	disproportionate 	bargaining 	power 	in 	plea 	agreement
negotiations, we “construe plea agreements strictly against the government and do not hesitate to
scrutinize the government’s conduct to ensure that it comports with the highest standard of
fairness.’” United States v. Rivera, 115 F.4th 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v.
Wilson, 920 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2019)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1455 (2025).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. The Plea Agreement
The Government contends that Defendant has breached the Plea Agreement (and the fully
incorporated APLA) by failing to identify all property that he owns, by refusing to forfeit certain
assets that he is required to surrender and liquidate to satisfy his restitution obligations, and by
willfully dissipating certain assets that he is required to preserve. See generally Dkt. No. 68.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 10 of 17

11
Courts review interpretations of plea agreements by “look[ing] both to the precise terms
of the plea agreements and to the parties’ behavior” in order to determine what “the reasonable
understanding and expectations of the defendant were as to the sentence for which he had
bargained.” Wilson, 920 F.3d at 163 (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).
“If a contract is clear, courts must take care not to alter or go beyond the express terms of the
agreement, or to impose obligations on the parties that are not mandated by the unambiguous
terms of the agreement itself.” 	Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). “Moreover, a party cannot create an ambiguity in an otherwise plain agreement merely
by urging different interpretations in the litigation.” Id. (citation and brackets omitted).
Mindful that plea agreements are to be construed strictly against the Government, the
Court concludes that the plain text of the Plea Agreement supports the Government’s position that
Defendant is obligated to preserve, liquidate, and surrender certain enumerated assets. The Plea
Agreement unambiguously states that “[D]efendant agrees to preserve and liquidate assets as
outlined in the attached [APLA].” Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ 1(d)(6). Specifically, the APLA states that
Defendant agreed to preserve his assets by “agree[ing] not to sell, transfer, borrow against, make
withdrawals or transfers from, commit waste against, or otherwise impair the value of any real
property, personal property that might reasonably have a value of $1,000.00 or more, bank
accounts, investment accounts, stocks, or bonds,” in which Defendant has an interest. Dkt. No.
43-1 at ¶ 10. Defendant further agreed to surrender the following assets to satisfy restitution:
(a) All funds in the following JP Morgan Chase accounts for Fortune 4 Diabetics,
as of July 30, 2025[:] (i) Account ending - 7501[,] (ii) Account ending - 7210[,] (iii)
Account ending - 2233[,] [and] (iv) Account ending - 7210[;] (b) 2024 Cybertruck
Cyberbeast VIN: 7G2CEHEE3RA019877[;] [and] (c) 2017 Mercedez Benz (sic)
S550 VIN: WDDUG8FB4HA317196.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 11 of 17

12
Id. at ¶ 16. Additionally, the APLA explicitly states that Defendant agrees to sell the Wood-Ridge
Property in accordance with certain conditions enumerated in subparagraphs (a) through (k) of
paragraph 17 of the APLA. See id. at ¶ 17. Furthermore, if the Wood-Ridge Property did not sell
within 120 days of the execution of the Plea Agreement, the APLA states that Defendant
“underst[ood] that the [Government] may pursue forfeiture, file a foreclosure action, and/or seek
the appointment of a receiver to sell the [Wood-Ridge] Property[.]” Id. at ¶ 19. The terms in the
Plea Agreement and incorporated APLA are clear on their face. 	Defendant had no reasonable
expectation that he could maintain possession of the funds in Fortune 4 Diabetics’ bank accounts,
or retain ownership of his Cybertruck, Mercedes-Benz, or the Wood-Ridge Property under the
terms of the Plea Agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1313-14 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding that defendant breached material terms of the plea agreement by refusing to turn
over “all personal and corporate financial information requested by the Government”).
Moreover, within seven days of the execution of the Plea Agreement, Defendant “agree[d]
to provide the [Government] with a complete and accurate list of all residential and/or commercial
properties owned by [Defendant] individually and owned by any business in which [Defendant]
ha[s] an interest.” Dkt. No. 43-1 at ¶ 5. Defendant also agreed to submit complete and accurate
financial disclosure affidavits and supporting documentation within ten days of a request by the
Government. 	Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ I(1). Again, the terms of the Plea Agreement and incorporated
APLA are clear and unambiguous—and again, Defendant has not complied with those terms.
Defendant separately contends that he did not breach the Plea Agreement because he
complied with the terms of the Agreement that are constitutional. 	See Dkt. No. 84 at 6-7.
Specifically, Defendant asserts, without offering any supporting authority, that requiring him to
liquidate and surrender his assets to satisfy restitution without a hearing violates the Takings
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 12 of 17

13
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because such a taking can only be knowingly and intelligently
waived. See id. at 7. Defendant contends that at the time he entered into the Plea Agreement, he
did not understand that he would have to liquidate and surrender his assets, including his primary
residence, his vehicles, and his personal and business bank accounts, to satisfy his restitution
obligation. See id. at 1-2, 9.
This argument lacks merit. During the Change of Plea Hearing, Defendant affirmed that
he had the opportunity to carefully review the Plea Agreement with his attorney, and that he
understood the terms he was agreeing to, as outlined in the Agreement. See Dkt. No. 76 at 20:04-
10. 	Furthermore, by signing the Plea Agreement, Defendant “acknowledge[d] reading each of
the provisions of th[e] [P]lea [A]greement with the assistance of counsel and understand[ing] its
provisions.” 	Dkt. No. 43 at ¶ M. 	Moreover, during the Hearing, the Government specifically
identified on the record the assets that Defendant agreed to forfeit for the purpose of satisfying
restitution. 	See id. at 21:07-25, 22:01-03 (stating that Defendant “agreed to forfeit . . . the JP
Morgan Chase accounts for Fortune 4 Diabetics . . . for the accounts ending in 7501, 7210, 2233,
and 7210[,] . . . agreed to turn over . . . the 2024 [C]yber truck . . . as well as the 2017 Mercedes-
Benz S550[,] [and] . . . agreed to list [the Wood-Ridge Property]”). 	Defendant subsequently
affirmed that he understood the sentencing possibilities recited by the Government, see id. at
22:05-09, and further affirmed that there was no reason why his ability to understand these
proceedings was impaired. Id. at 6:06-09. Thus, the record indicates that during the Change of
Plea Hearing, Defendant “reasonably understood” the Plea Agreement to require him to liquidate
and surrender the assets specified in the Agreement.
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 13 of 17

14
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Government has established by a preponderance
of the evidence a breach of the terms of the Plea Agreement. The Court now turns to determining
whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy in this case.
B. Remedy
“In general, the remedy for a breached plea agreement is either to permit the plea to be
withdrawn or to order specific performance of the agreement.” Wilson, 920 F.3d at 168 (quoting
Vaval, 404 F.3d at 154); see also United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[W]hen a defendant breaches his plea agreement, the Government has the option to either seek
specific performance of the agreement or treat it as unenforceable.”). “The choice of remedies is
generally a discretionary one guided by the circumstances of each case.” United States v. Ramsey,
503 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia,
United States v. Brody, 808 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The nature of the remedy varies with
the nature of the broken promise and the facts of each particular case.”)).
In the present case, the Plea Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of remedies that the
Government possesses in the event that Defendant breaches the Agreement. See Dkt. No. 43 at ¶
J(2) (noting that the Government “will have the following remedies, among others” (emphasis
added)). Given Defendant’s repeated failure to submit complete and accurate documentation and
Defendant’s refusal to forfeit certain assets that he is required to surrender under the Plea
Agreement, in addition to Defendant’s purported attempts to dissipate his assets, the Government
requests that this Court order Defendant to specifically perform his obligations under the Plea
Agreement. See Dkt. No. 68 at 18-19. Under these circumstances, the Court sees no reason to
deny the Government’s request. The Court cannot discern any adverse impact on public policy
or the public’s interest that would arise from the Court ordering Defendant to comply with the
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 14 of 17

15
provisions of the Plea Agreement into which he voluntarily entered. 	See United States v.
Alexander, 736 F. Supp. 1236, 1242-43 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (ordering defendant to surrender certain
assets to the government in accordance with his plea agreement), aff’d, 901 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1990).
Accordingly, the Court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, that the Government is
entitled to specific performance of the Plea Agreement. 	Specifically, Defendant shall comply
with the terms of the Plea Agreement by (i) submitting to the Government a complete and accurate
list of all residential and commercial properties that Defendant and his businesses own pursuant
to paragraph 5 of APLA; (ii) re-submitting to the Government complete and accurate financial
disclosure affidavits for both Defendant and his businesses with supporting documentation
pursuant to paragraph 6 of the APLA; (iii) surrendering the 2024 Cybertruck, the 2017 Mercedes-
Benz S550, and the balances of the JP Morgan Chase accounts ending in 7501, 7210, 2233, and
7210 as of July 30, 2025, pursuant to paragraph 16 of the APLA; and (iv) marketing the Wood-
Ridge Property in accordance with the conditions enumerated in subparagraphs (a) through (k) of
paragraph 17 of the APLA.
Lastly, to the extent that Defendant purportedly dissipated over two million dollars of his
assets in violation of the Plea Agreement, see Dkt. No. 68 at 13, 17-18 (citing Dkt. No. 68-1), the
Government is entitled to seek the forfeiture of substitute property. 	According to the Plea
Agreement, if any of the property described in the forfeiture allegation of the indictment, i.e., a
money judgment equal to the value of the proceeds that Defendant derived from the offenses, “(a)
cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been transferred or sold to, or
deposited with, a third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (d) has been
substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with other property which cannot
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 15 of 17

16
be divided without difficulty, the [Government] shall be entitled to forfeiture of substitute
property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(e).” 	See Dkt. No. 43 at ¶
1(e)(2).
Moreover, district courts have the authority to issue restraining orders pursuant to the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to secure a defendant’s funds in anticipation of restitution. 	See
United States v. Kelly, 627 F. Supp. 3d 148, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing United States v. Catoggio,
698 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (concluding that the All Writs Act permits restraint of
a defendant’s assets between conviction and sentencing to ensure their availability for anticipated
restitution)), aff’d, 128 F.4th 387 (2d Cir. 2025). 	Here, given that Defendant is subject to
mandatory restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, and there is sufficient reason to believe that
a restraining order is necessary to ensure the future availability of Defendants’ assets to satisfy
restitution, the Court enjoins Defendant from liquidating, transferring, or disposing of the funds
contained in the JP Morgan Chase accounts ending in 7501, 7210, 2233, and 7210.
After the Government receives Defendant’s completed financial disclosure affidavits, it
may submit a further application for relief to the Court, if necessary.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Government’s motion to declare Defendant to be in breach of the Plea
Agreement, Dkt. No. 68, is GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant must immediately (i) submit to the Government a complete and
accurate list of all residential and commercial properties that Defendant owns individually, or that
is owned by any business in which Defendant has an interest; (ii) re-submit to the Government
complete and accurate financial disclosure affidavits with supporting documentation for
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 16 of 17

17
Defendant individually and for each of his businesses; (iii) surrender the 2024 Cybertruck, the
2017 Mercedes-Benz S550, and the balances of the JP Morgan Chase accounts ending in 7501,
7210, 2233, and 7210 as of July 30, 2025; and (iv) market the Wood-Ridge Property in accordance
with the conditions enumerated in subparagraphs (a) through (k) of paragraph 17 of the APLA;
and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant is enjoined from liquidating, transferring, or disposing of the
funds contained in the JP Morgan Chase accounts ending in 7501, 7210, 2233, and 7210; and the
Court further
ORDERS that Defendant and the Government shall each file and serve an affidavit as to
whether Defendant is in full compliance with the terms of the Plea Agreement by May 1, 2026
at 5:00 PM; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 23, 2026
Albany, New York
Case 1:25-cr-00296-AMN Document 98 Filed 04/23/26 Page 17 of 17