Temple of Noya et al v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TEMPLE OF NOYA et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MERRICK GARLAND et al.,
Defendants.
1:24-cv-01195 (AMN/DJS)
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
HECKER FINK LLP 	SEAN HECKER, ESQ.
350 Fifth Avenue – Suite 63rd Floor 	DAVID GOPSTEIN, ESQ.
New York, New York 10118 	TREVOR MORRISON, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 	AMIT JAIN, ESQ.
ALISHA BRUCE, ESQ.
GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO 	GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO, ESQ.
900 Pacific Coast Highway – Suite 305
Huntington Beach, California 92648
Attorney for Plaintiffs
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE 	JOHN D. HOGGAN, JR., ESQ.
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
445 Broadway – Room 218
Albany, New York 12207
Attorney for Defendants
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2024, plaintiffs Temple of Noya (the “Temple”), Maria Ann Morgan,
Dr. Alan Hutchins, Michelle Bentsman, and Jonathan Katayama (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
commenced this action pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et
seq. (“RFRA”), against defendant federal officers Merrick Garland, Alejandro Mayorkas, Anne
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Milgram, and Troy A. Miller (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Presently
before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 21 (“Motion”); see also Dkt. Nos.
26-27. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
II. 	BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the Complaint, its attachments,
or materials it incorporates by reference, and are assumed to be true for purposes of ruling on the
Motion, see Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 9 F.4th 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam), or are otherwise matters of public record, see
Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020).
A. The Parties
The Temple is a New York religious corporation, first incorporated in 2015 in Kings
County and now located in the Catskill Mountains. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 20.
Plaintiff Maria Ann Morgan is the founder and a leader and trustee of the Temple. Id. at
¶ 24. Plaintiff Dr. Alan Hutchins is the chairman and a leader of the Temple, and also oversees its
operations. Id. at ¶ 26. Both are residents of Ulster County. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26.
Plaintiff Michelle Bentsman is a trustee, volunteer, and participant of the Temple, and a
resident of Massachusetts. 	Id. at ¶ 29 & n.5. 	Plaintiff Jonathan Katayama is a volunteer and
participant of the Temple, and a resident of Brooklyn. Id. at ¶ 31.
Defendants are four federal officers: the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).1 Id. at ¶¶ 33-36. Defendants are sued
1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Pamela Bondi, the current
Attorney General, has been automatically substituted in place of her predecessor, Merrick Garland;
Kristi Noem, the current Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, has been
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exclusively in their official capacities, based on their alleged responsibility for enforcing the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (“CSA”). Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 33-36.
B. Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations
“Plaintiffs believe in a cosmology in which plant spirts are conscious beings, with unique
personalities and qualities.” 	Id. at ¶ 4. 	The Temple is a religious organization that provides
ceremonies based on this belief system. 	See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 4, 7. 	These ceremonies include the
consumption of a particular substance (ayahuasca), which Plaintiffs consider “a sacrament, like
communion in other religions.” Id. at ¶ 7. Ayahuasca is also “a tea that contains the hallucinogenic
drug dimethyltryptamine (‘DMT’), which is a drug that is regulated by the federal government
under the [CSA].” 	Iowaska Church of Healing v. Werfel, 105 F.4th 402, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
(citation omitted); see also Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 92 F.4th 953,
957, 959-60 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Controlled substances are classified into five distinct schedules
based on their acceptable legitimate medical uses and abuse or dependency potential. . . . Schedule
I drugs have no current accepted medical use and have a high potential for abuse. . . . Ayahuasca
contains DMT, which the CSA lists as a Schedule I controlled substance, making it generally
illegal to handle or use.”) (citations omitted); Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 10, 51-52. According to Plaintiffs,
“[a]yahuasca is vital to [their] religious practice” and, “[w]ithout ayahuasca, Plaintiffs would be
unable to connect directly with the plant spirits that are at the core of their religious exercise.”
Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 10.
automatically substituted in place of her predecessor, Alejandro Mayorkas; Terrance Cole, the
current DEA Administrator, has been automatically substituted in place of his predecessor, Anne
Milgram; and Rodney Scott, the current CBP Commissioner, has been automatically substituted
in place of Troy A. Miller. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer
who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the
action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.”); see also Dkt.
No. 27 at 3 n.1. The Clerk is respectfully directed to update the docket accordingly.
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In the early 2010s, Plaintiff Morgan “became acquainted with the traditional spiritual
practices” of certain indigenous communities “in the Amazon rainforest.” Id. at ¶ 69. She began
traveling to Peru to learn more. Id. at ¶¶ 69-70. “Despite being at the top of her field, [Plaintiff]
Morgan chose to scale back her work as a fashion stylist to make more time for her religious
training and practice. She spent the next several years applying herself to her studies[.]” Id. at
¶ 71. Through her studies, Plaintiff Morgan ultimately learned “the core knowledge, training, and
experience in which the Temple’s practice is rooted.” Id. at ¶ 72.
In 2015, after further travel to Peru, Plaintiff Morgan founded the Temple in Kings County.
Id. at ¶¶ 20, 73-74. 	Initially, “[t]he community began with a small group of fewer than 20
individuals who shared a common spiritual interest in exploring their connection with the plant
spirits, but it grew rapidly by word of mouth.” Id. at ¶ 74.
In 2016, Plaintiff Katayama joined the Temple. Id. at ¶ 31.
In 2017, Plaintiff Morgan met Plaintiff Dr. Hutchins, a chiropractor who previously
consumed ayahuasca when he traveled to Peru in 2003. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. 	Plaintiff Dr. Hutchins
eventually “left his business career to work at the Temple full-time. Through this work, he and
[Plaintiff] Morgan became committed life partners and have collaborated to bring their shared
vision for the Temple and its community to life.” Id. at ¶ 28.
In 2018, Plaintiff Bentsman joined the Temple, after previously consuming ayahuasca
when she traveled to Peru in 2015. Id. at ¶ 30.
As participation in ceremonies expanded, Plaintiff Morgan moved the Temple’s physical
location north from Brooklyn, first to Croton-on-Hudson and eventually to the Catskill Mountains.
Id. at ¶¶ 75, 78. It was there, in 2023, that the Temple was formally re-incorporated and its current
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physical grounds consecrated. Id. at ¶¶ 75, 79.
Plaintiffs allege that the Temple has had “thousands” of participants in its ceremonies since
2015. 	Id. at ¶¶ 95, 114. 	In order to participate in a ceremony, a prospect must first receive “a
personal referral from an existing community member” and then complete a multi-step screening
process. Id. at ¶ 82; see also id. at ¶¶ 83-88. Plaintiffs allege that most participants “return to the
Temple to participate in ceremonies at least once, and many return on a regular basis.” Id. at ¶ 92.
Plaintiffs allege that “[b]ecause ayahuasca is sacred to the Temple, to disrespect it by
misusing it for non-spiritual purposes would, in effect, be sacrilegious.” Id. at ¶ 86. As a result,
Plaintiffs allege that ayahuasca is strictly controlled at the Temple, including being “logged,
weighed, and stored in a hidden vault protected by a biometric lock and alarm.” Id. at ¶ 94.
According to Plaintiffs, their “procurement, possession and use of [ayahuasca] in their
religious and spiritual ceremonies facially violates the CSA, which, as explained, makes it a crime
to manufacture, posses, import, use, or distribute any mixtures that contain even trace . . . amounts
of controlled substances such as DMT.” Id. at ¶ 99.
As a result, Plaintiffs assert, in January 2023, federal authorities “seized a suitcase owned
by a Temple leader at John F. Kennedy Airport” (“JFK”) that contained ayahuasca paste. Id. at ¶
101. In March 2023, federal authorities arrested Plaintiff Morgan at JFK for carrying ayahuasca
paste “in her own suitcase as she returned from religious travel to Peru.” Id. at ¶ 101.
Following Plaintiff Morgan’s arrest, Plaintiffs allege that she was charged in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (“Eastern District”) with knowingly and
intentionally importing one or more controlled substances into the United States, in violation of
the CSA. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 102 & n.19. Plaintiffs further allege that, ultimately, “[Plaintiff] Morgan
resolved her federal criminal prosecution through a guilty plea to misbranding pursuant to the
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act[.]” Id. at ¶ 103 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a)(1)). However,
as the Complaint makes clear:
Neither [Plaintiff] Morgan nor any other Plaintiff in any way challenges [Plaintiff]
Morgan’s plea, conviction, or sentence, nor the forfeiture of the Temple’s
[ayahuasca] in connection with her arrest. Plaintiffs discuss these agonizing events
solely to illustrate the credible, concrete, and imminent threat of prosecution all
Plaintiffs face absent judicial intervention. 	To that end, no Plaintiff seeks
retrospective relief, such as damages; Plaintiffs only seek prospective relief against
future CSA enforcement, which would violate their rights under RFRA.
Id. at ¶ 104 n.20.
When Plaintiff Morgan pled guilty in the Eastern District, she admitted that, on March 3,
2023, she had brought to JFK from Peru four packages of ayahuasca paste and that the packages
were mislabeled as another substance. United States v. Morgan, Case No. 23-cr-00487, Dkt. No.
21 at 28:14-20 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 4, 2023) (“EDNY Prosecution”);2 see also Giraldo v. Kessler,
694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We also take judicial notice of relevant matters of public
record.”) (citations omitted). 	In advance of Plaintiff Morgan’s sentencing, three of the six
attorneys who filed the Complaint here made a submission on her behalf. 	EDNY Prosecution,
Dkt. No. 24. 	Therein, they stated, inter alia, that Plaintiff Morgan “has learned from this
experience and appreciates the importance of accurately labeling the contents of any packages she
brings into the United States, including for religious purposes” and, “[a]s a result, she intends to
apply for an exemption from the federal Government that would, if granted, enable her to practice
her religion openly, without fear of prosecution.” Id. at 10. At Plaintiff Morgan’s sentencing, she
made similar statements. Id., Dkt. No. 31 at 12:22-13:3.
Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Morgan’s arrest and prosecution have caused some Temple
2 Citations to court documents utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system, and not the documents’ internal pagination.
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participants to limit or halt their religious exercise. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 105. Plaintiffs further allege
that they “currently lack any reliable method of procuring [ayahuasca] from Peru, as is necessary
for their religious practice.” Id. at ¶ 106. Plaintiffs assert that the ayahuasca they have obtained
domestically “lacks the direct link to the land and the spiritual energetic signature of [ayahuasca]
sourced and prepared in Peru.” Id. at ¶ 107. Because this “impedes” Plaintiffs’ “ability to fully
connect with the source of their tradition and the native plant spirits. . . . when Plaintiffs have used
domestically sourced ayahuasca in their practice, they have done so only by mixing it with stores
of [ayahuasca] from Peru.” Id. As a result, Plaintiffs contend, their “inability to procure, import,
possess, or use ayahuasca has required them to ration the Temple’s existing supply of [ayahuasca]
and jeopardizes their religious practice entirely.” Id. at ¶ 108.
C. Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims
Based on these factual allegations, the one-count Complaint asserts a claim for violation of
RFRA based on “[t]he omnipresent threat that Defendants will enforce the CSA against
Plaintiffs[.]” 	Id. at ¶ 118; see also generally id. at ¶¶ 117-20. 	Plaintiffs seek declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. Id. at 34.
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the claim,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
Under this standard, a pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are “plausible on
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[their] face,” id. at 570. In considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pled
facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. ATSI Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). This presumption, however, does not
extend to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed because (i) Plaintiffs needed to,
or at least should, pursue an administrative exemption from the CSA; and (ii) Plaintiffs have not
alleged that this process constitutes a substantial burden.3 See generally Dkt. Nos. 21-1, 27.
A. Administration Exhaustion
The parties agree that there is an administrative process through which the DEA can
provide a religious exemption from the CSA. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 44 (“To be clear, Plaintiffs
do not here challenge the DEA’s guidance.”); Dkt. No. 21-1 at 3; see also Soul Quest, 92 F.4th at
957-58, 958 n.9 (“[T]he CSA provides a process by which a person may be permitted to ‘possess,
manufacture, distribute, or dispense’ controlled substances without violating the statute. . . . To
obtain this permission, the person must ‘obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney
General in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by’ the Attorney General. . . .
Although the CSA provides that the Attorney General issues registrations, the Attorney General
has delegated this responsibility to the DEA Administrator.”) (citations omitted). 	Indeed, the
federal judge who sentenced Plaintiff Morgan noted the availability of this process, see EDNY
3 On April 15, 2025, after the Motion was fully submitted, the parties jointly requested that the
Court stay “proceedings in this matter so that the parties may work toward an agreement that would
obviate the need for further judicial proceedings in this matter[.]” 	Dkt. No. 30. 	The parties
proceeded to provide, as requested, status reports regarding their continued progress. Dkt. Nos.
32, 34, 36, 41, 45. On January 13, 2026, the parties indicated that they had been unable to reach a
negotiated resolution and requested that this Court proceed to decide the Motion. Dkt. No. 45.
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Prosecution, Dkt. No. 31 at 15:17-18 (“The defendant could have sought a religious exemption
from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration.”), and Plaintiff Morgan and her counsel
indicated to that judge that she would pursue an exemption through it, see, e.g., id. at 13:1-3 (“After
this case is concluded, I will be moving forward with pursuing a religious exemption from the
government.”).
Defendants provide various policy arguments as to why Plaintiffs should have pursued an
administrative exemption, but no legal authority establishing that RFRA requires the exhaustion
of administrative remedies. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 21-1 at 12-15. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, skip
over Plaintiff Morgan and her counsel’s prior representations to a federal judge that she would
pursue such an exemption, but do cite non-binding authority to support their position that RFRA
does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 	See, e.g., Dkt. No. 26 at 17-18;
Oklevueha Native Am. Church of Hawaii, Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 838 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The
Government argues that we should require Plaintiffs to exhaust this administrative remedy,
because doing so would allow the DEA to apply its expertise to Plaintiffs’ claim, possibly moot
the case if the claim is granted, and help build a record for judicial review. We decline, however,
to read an exhaustion requirement into RFRA where the statute contains no such condition, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4, and the Supreme Court has not imposed one. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has reviewed a RFRA-based challenge to the CSA without requiring that the plaintiffs first
seek a religious use exemption from the DEA.”) (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the statute does not mandate administrative
exhaustion. 	See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“Judicial relief[.] 	A person whose religious
exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
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defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”); see also
Iowaska Church, 105 F.4th at 407 (“A charitable religious organization’s use of a controlled
substance such as DMT, the possession and distribution of which is generally illegal under the
CSA . . . may obtain an exemption for such use in one of two ways—from the [DEA] or a federal
court.”) (citation omitted). As a result, Defendants have not established that Plaintiffs’ failure to
pursue an administrative exemption from the DEA requires dismissal of their RFRA claim.
Similarly unpersuasive is Defendants’ alternative argument, that this case should be stayed
in order for Plaintiffs to seek an administrative exemption. Dkt. No. 21-1 at 12-14. As Plaintiffs’
correctly note, Dkt. No. 26 at 26, numerous courts have rejected such requests when evaluating
RFRA claims arising from the alleged religious use of ayahuasca. See, e.g., Church of Celestial
Heart v. Garland, No. 23-cv-00545, 2024 WL 99808, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2024) (“[T]he Court
declines Defendants’ request to decline to review Plaintiffs’ claim until after they have sought an
exemption from the DEA.”) (citations omitted); Arizona Yage Assembly v. Garland, 671 F. Supp.
3d 1013, 1020 (D. Ariz. 2023) (“[T]he Defendants’ alternative request that the Court stay the case
to allow Plaintiffs to apply for an exemption is denied.”); Church of the Eagle & the Condor v.
Garland, No. 22-cv-01004, 2023 WL 11905258, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2023) (“The Court
declines Defendants’ request for the Court to dismiss or stay the case until Plaintiffs apply directly
to the DEA for an exemption. . . . RFRA ‘plainly contemplates’ that this Court may consider
Plaintiffs’ requested relief from the CSA.”) (citations omitted). 	Defendants fail to address this
authority and provide no basis for this Court to reach a different result. See Dkt. No. 27 at 7-8.
In sum, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs were required to pursue an administrative
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exemption before filing suit does not provide a basis for this Court to dismiss or stay this case.4
B. Failure to State a Claim
RFRA “prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substantial burdens on religious
exercise, absent a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means.” 	Tanzin v.
Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 45 (2020) (citation omitted). “To establish a prima facie RFRA violation, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they sought to engage in the exercise of religion and that the
defendant-officials substantially burdened that exercise.” Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 51, 59 (2d
Cir. 2022). As to the former, “‘exercise of religion’ is defined broadly as ‘any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.’” Tanvir v. Tanzin, 120
F.4th 1049, 1058 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A)). As to the
latter, “RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ test ‘requires an objective inquiry into the extent of the
governmental pressure on the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.’” 	Id. at 1059 (quoting Kravitz v.
Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2023)). “[A] substantial burden exists where the state ‘put[s]
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Newdow v.
Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76
F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996)). 	“Finally, once a plaintiff establishes that the government
substantially burdened his exercise of religion, ‘[t]he government then faces an ‘exceptionally
demanding’ burden to show ‘that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties . . . .’’” Tanvir,
4 To the extent that Defendants’ arguments relate to the Court’s jurisdiction to grant the declaratory
relief Plaintiffs seek, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 18 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202), Defendants do
not address the factors set forth by the Second Circuit, see Admiral Ins. Co. v. Niagara Transformer
Corp., 57 F.4th 85, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2023) (stating that “district courts retain ‘broad discretion’ to
decline jurisdiction under the [Declaratory Judgment Act]” and identifying factors that “should
inform a district court’s exercise of such discretion”) (citation omitted). As a result, the Court does
not reach this issue.
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120 F.4th at 1059 (alterations in original) (quoting Sabir, 52 F.4th at 59).
The arguments advanced by Defendants as to why Plaintiffs have failed to state a RFRA
claim are quite narrow.
As Plaintiffs note, Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their
exercise of religion. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 26 at 11 (“For purposes of their motion, Defendants rightly
do not dispute the sincerity or religious nature of Plaintiffs’ religious practice.”); see generally
Dkt. No. 27. Given this, the Court need not address the issue. See also Tanvir, 120 F.4th at 1058
(“In considering whether a plaintiff has engaged in the exercise of religion, we ‘are not permitted
to ask whether a particular belief is appropriate or true – however unusual or unfamiliar the belief
may be.’ . . . Rather, ‘[o]ur scrutiny extends only to whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular
belief and whether the belief is religious in nature.’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Jolly,
76 F.3d at 476).
Defendants also do not seriously challenge Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding substantial
burden. 	Defendants merely suggest in passing that Plaintiff has not alleged such a burden.
Compare Dkt. No. 21-1 at 3, 7, with id. at 7-12; Dkt. No. 27 at 3-7. But “[w]here a party refers to
an issue in only a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by any effort at developed argumentation,
it must be deemed waived—or, more precisely, forfeited.” Palmese v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No.
24-cv-5915, 2026 WL 265962, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026) (quoting O’Sullivan v. PHH Mortg.
Corp., No. 22-cv-4420, 2025 WL 1835926, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2025)). As Defendants have
failed to develop this argument, the Court does not consider it further. See also Aiello v. Stamford
Hosp., 487 F. App’x 677, 678 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The premise of our adversarial system is that
[federal] courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as
arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.”) (alteration in original)
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(quoting Coalition on W. Valley Nuclear Wastes v. Chu, 592 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Instead, Defendants develop a separate argument: that to state a RFRA claim, Plaintiffs
need to allege that the DEA’s administrative exemption process itself constitutes a substantial
burden. 	See, e.g., Dkt. No. 21-1 at 7 (“[T]he Complaint fails to state a claim because,
fundamentally, all of Plaintiffs’ grievances stem from their refusal to obtain, much less apply for,
a registration through [the] DEA’s religious-exemption process. 	To prevail on a RFRA claim,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate how [the] DEA’s religious exemption process—which allows a
petitioner, under certain circumstances, to import and use controlled substances within the CSA
framework—substantially burdens their allegedly sincere exercise of religion.”). 	Plaintiffs
respond, inter alia, that “Defendants attack a claim that Plaintiffs have not pleaded” and rely on
numerous district court decisions rejecting similar arguments. Dkt. No. 26 at 15-16.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 	As presented by Defendants, this argument is largely
derivative of their administrative exhaustion arguments, and unpersuasive for similar reasons. See
supra Section IV.A. Other courts have also considered and rejected this very same argument. See,
e.g., Church of Celestial Heart, 2024 WL 99808, at *23 (“Defendants argue under 12(b)(6) that
the complaint fails to state a claim because, fundamentally, all of Plaintiffs’ grievances stem from
their failure to obtain, much less apply for, a registration through DEA’s exemption process.
Defendants argue that to prevail on the RFRA claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate how DEA’s
exemption process substantially burdens their allegedly sincere exercise of religion, and Plaintiffs
have not attempted to plead such burden. . . . Defendants now attempt to have the Court hold
Plaintiffs must allege the exemption process is the substantial burden, if they have not attempted
to utilize the exemption process. The Court rejects this request.”) (footnote omitted); Arizona Yage
Assembly, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 1021-22 (“While Defendants try to re-cast Plaintiff’s alleged ‘burden’
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as one imposed by the DEA’s exemption process, that was not how Plaintiffs made their allegations
in the Fifth Amended Complaint. . . . Plaintiffs argue they are burdened by the CSA’s complete
ban on ayahuasca use and importation . . . not by the exemption process outlined by DEA’s
Guidance.”) (footnote and citations omitted). As noted above, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not seek
to challenge the DEA’s administrative process. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 44 (“To be clear, Plaintiffs do
not here challenge the DEA’s guidance.”). And Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiffs’
RFRA claim cannot proceed unless it challenges the DEA’s administrative exemption process.
Compare Sabir, 52 F.4th at 59 (“To establish a prima facie RFRA violation, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they sought to engage in the exercise of religion and that the defendant-officials
substantially burdened that exercise.”).
For all of these reasons, the Court denies the Motion.5
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Government’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 21, is DENIED, as set forth
in Section IV of this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 4, 2026
Albany, New York
5 Given the arguments raised by Defendants, the Court need proceed no further with the analysis.
Tanvir, 120 F.4th at 1058 (“[O]nce a plaintiff establishes that the government substantially
burdened his exercise of religion, ‘[t]he government then faces an ‘exceptionally demanding’
burden to show ‘that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties . . . .’’” (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Sabir, 52 F.4th at 59)).
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