United States of America v. $25,002.05 seized from JPMorgan Chase Account ending in 9869, held in the name of Adejoke T. Olumodeji et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	1:24-CV-429
(MAD/DJS)
$25,002.05 seized from JPMorgan Chase Account
ending in 9869, held in the name of Adejoke T.
Olumodeji, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OFFICE OF THE UNITED 	ELIZABETH A. CONGER, AUSA
STATES ATTORNEY
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261-7198
Attorney for Plaintiff
OFFICE OF THE UNITED 	JOSHUA R. ROSENTHAL, AUSA
STATES ATTORNEY 	NICHOLAS C.E. WALTER, AUSA
James T. Foley U.S. Courthouse
445 Broadway, Room 218
Albany, New York 12207-2924
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ADEJOKE T. OLUMODEJI
Cliffside Park, New Jersey
Claimant, pro se
OLUWASEUN ADEKOYA
Montgomery County Jail 200 Clark Drive
P.O. Box 432
Fultonville, New York 12072
Claimant, pro se
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
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I. BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2024, the United States filed a verified compliant for forfeiture in rem for
the Defendant Properties as proceeds of offenses in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 1344 and 1349 (conspiracy to commit bank fraud) pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), and as property involved in offenses in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 1956 and 1957 (money laundering) pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A). See Dkt. No. 1. On April 10, 2024, the Government filed an
amended verified complaint including an additional basis for forfeiture pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 984(a)(1)(A). See Dkt. No. 6-1.
On April 19, 2024, the Government filed a certificate of service of the amended complaint
showing that it had mailed copies of the amended verified complaint for forfeiture in rem, the
verified complaint for forfeiture in rem, the warrant for arrest of articles in rem, the notice of
potential claimant, and the Individual Rules and Practices of the Hon. Mae A. D'Agostino to
Claimant Oluwaseun Adekoya at his place of incarceration, which, at that time, was the Albany
County Correctional Facility, and to his attorney, at the time, in the related criminal matter, Scott
W. Iseman. See Dkt. No. 7. The certificate of service also showed that the Government mailed
the same items to Claimant Adejoke Olumodeji at her last known address. See id.
On April 29, 2024, Claimant Olumodeji filed a letter on the docket indicating that she had
received notice and requesting an extension of sixty days after the expiration of the original thirty-
five-day deadline to file a claim. See Dkt. No. 10. Magistrate Judge Stewart issued a text order
on May 7, 2024, extending Claimant Olumodeji's deadline to file a response to the complaint to
June 28, 2024. See Dkt. No. 11.
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On July 24, 2024, the Government applied for entry of default by the Clerk of the Court,
which was entered on the following day. See Dkt. Nos. 14, 15. On July 29, 2024, the
Government filed its motion for default judgment. See Dkt. No. 16. As part of its service on
Claimants, the Government included a copy of the notice on the docket dated July 29, 2024,
setting the motion response hearing deadline for August 19, 2024. See Dkt. No. 17. 	The
certificate of service filed on July 29, 2024, states that the motion papers were mailed to Claimant
Adekoya at his place of incarceration and to his attorney, and to Claimant Olumodeji at her last
known address. See id.
On July 31, 2024, the Court issued a text notice setting the response deadline as August
12, 2024. The text notice further directed the Government to serve potential claimants with a
copy of the text notice, along with all motion papers. The Government's certificate of service
dated July 31, 2024, indicates that the Government served the text notice and motion papers as
directed on Claimants. See Dkt. No. 18. No claim was filed, timely or otherwise, by Claimants,
or any other party. As such, on September 27, 2024, the Court issued the final order of forfeiture,
forfeiting the Defendant Properties to the United States, and ordering the entry of a judgment of
default. See Dkt. No. 19. Judgment of default was entered that same day. See Dkt.
No. 20.
On October 9, 2024, Claimants filed a motion to set aside the default under Rule 55(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 21. Because default judgment had already
been entered, the Court construed Claimants' motion as being made pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b), and on April 22, 2025, the Court denied the motion in its entirety. See
Dkt. No. 24. Specifically, the Court held that Claimants' conclusory assertions were insufficient
to justify relief under any of the applicable provisions of Rule 60(b). See id. at 5-8.
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Following the Court's denial of Claimants' first motion to set aside the default judgment,
Claimant Adekoya filed three motions for the return of property, see Dkt. Nos. 27, 30, 34, a
second motion to set aside judgment, see Dkt. No. 32, and two additional motions seeking
various, non-substantive relief, see Dkt. Nos. 39, 41. In addition, the Government filed a motion
for a more definitive statement in response to Claimant Adekoya's first motion for return of
property. See Dkt. No. 28.
As set forth below, all pending motions are denied, and no additional motions submitted
by Claimants will be considered by the Court.
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Motions for Return of Property
As noted, Claimant Adekoya has filed three motions seeking the return of property
pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 27, 30, 34. In
his motions, Claimant Adekoya notes that this civil in rem forfeiture action "pertains only to
property expressly listed in the forfeiture complaint. Items not named therein were not the subject
of forfeiture and cannot be lawfully retained under its authority." Dkt. No. 30 at 4. Attached to
his first motion, Claimant Adekoya included seventy-three pages of pictures of the items seized
from his New Jersey residence during the execution of the search warrant on December 12, 2023,
in the underlying criminal matter. See Dkt. No. 27 at 7-80.
Claimant Adekoya brings these motions pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. This action, however, is a civil forfeiture action, governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, any motion under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure needed to be brought in the underlying criminal matter, not this civil forfeiture
proceeding. See United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 414 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Moreover, to the extent that Claimant Adekoya is seeking the return of items that were
subject to judicial forfeiture in this action, the proper vehicle for doing so is a motion for relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; see also De
Almeida v. United States, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38,
40 (10th Cir. 1996). Courts have found that the existence of a pending forfeiture proceeding
"'affect[s] a trial court's discretion to grant or retain [Rule 41(g)] equitable jurisdiction'" and such
motions "will be dismissed for want of equity if the moving party has an adequate remedy
otherwise or if he cannot show irreparable injury." Caracas Int'l Banking Corp. v. United States,
670 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146-47 (D.P.R. 2009) (citations omitted). And "[c]ivil forfeiture
proceedings have been found to provide an adequate remedy at law for matters raised in motions
filed pursuant to Rule 41(g)." Id. at 147 (citations omitted) (citing De Almeida, 459 F.3d at 382);
Shaw v. United States, 891 F.2d 602, 603-04 (6th Cir. 1989). Finally, where, as here, criminal
proceedings against the movant have been completed, the movant may commence a new civil
action seeking the return of property that was not otherwise subject to forfeiture. See United
States v. Sash, 581 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court denies Claimant Adekoya's motions brought under Rule 41(g) for these
various reasons. Additionally, having denied Claimant Adekoya's motions for the return of seized
property, the Government's motion for a more definite statement (Dkt. No. 28) is denied as moot.
B. Rule 60(b) Motion
1. Standard of Review
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
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neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). In general, "a movant bears the burden in Rule 60(b) motions." Gater
Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz, 2 F.4th 42, 53 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). "The decision
whether to grant a party's Rule 60(b) motion is committed to the 'sound discretion' of the district
court[.]" Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
2. Rule 60(b)(1)
Rule 60(b)(1) provides for relief from judgment because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). In deciding whether relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is
warranted, the Second Circuit has identified "four non-exclusive equitable factors that
'determin[e] what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable."'" William v. City of New York,
727 Fed. Appx. 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.
Ltd.P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). Those four factors are: (1) the danger of prejudice to the
non-moving party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3)
the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant;
and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. See id. (citation omitted). Of these four
considerations, the Second Circuit has stated that the preeminent factor under the Rule 60(b)(1)
inquiry is the reason for the delay. See In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2005).
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In his motion, Claimant Adekoya1 contends that he satisfies the criteria for relief under
Rule 60(b)(1) because (1) "Claimant['s] failure to respond was due to improper service and lack
of access to law library"; (2) "Claimant promptly filed this motion upon becoming aware of the
judgment, demonstrating a commitment to participate in the proceedings"; (3) "[t]he government
will not suffer undue prejudice by vacating the default judgment, as this is an early state of
litigation, and the forfeiture action remains unresolved"; (4) "Claimant has consistently acted in
good faith and has not attempted to delay or avoid these proceedings"; and (5) a meritorious
defenses exists. Dkt. No. 32 at 10.
As the Government notes, Claimant Adekoya's "submission offers little more than a
rehashing of [his] previously-rejected Rule 60(b) motion," which this Court previously rejected.
Dkt. No. 40 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 24. Claimant Adekoya's conclusory recitation of the various
factors considered in motions under Rule 60(b)(1) is insufficient to warrant relief. Moreover, the
conclusory assertions are belied by the record. For example, Claimant Adekoya claims that he
failed to respond due to improper service. See Dkt. No. 32 at 10. However, as discussed above,
on April 19, 2024, the Government filed a certificate of service of the amended complaint
showing that it had mailed copies of the amended verified complaint for forfeiture in rem, the
verified complaint for forfeiture in rem, the warrant for arrest of articles in rem, the notice of
potential claimant, and the Individual Rules and Practices of the Hon. Mae A. D'Agostino to
Claimant Adekoya at his place of incarceration at the Albany County Correctional Facility, and to
his attorney in the related criminal matter, Scott W. Iseman. See Dkt. No. 7. The certificate of
1 Although this motion initially asserts that it is being brought by both Claimants, the substance of
the motion makes clear that it is being submitted solely by Claimant Adekoya. Whether the
motion is considered brought by both Claimants or solely Claimant Adekoya would not alter the
Court's decision to deny the relief request.
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service further showed that the Government mailed the same items to Claimant Olumodeji at her
last known address. See id. Similarly, on July 29, 2024, the Government filed a certificate of
service noting that its motion for default judgment had been served on Claimants and Claimant
Adekoya's criminal attorney in the same manner, and Claimants were thereafter notified of the
response deadline of August 12, 2024. See Dkt. Nos. 17, 18. Nothing about this service was
improper, and Claimant Adekoya submits no evidence suggesting that he did not actually receive
notice of these filings.
Moreover, Claimant Adekoya previously acknowledged that he was aware of the default
judgment entered on August 26, 2024, yet he again fails to explain why he waited until October 9,
2024, to file his first motion to set aside the judgment. Similarly, this Court denied his initial
motion on April 22, 2025, yet Claimant Adekoya waited until September 9, 2025, to file his
second motion and provides no explanation for such an unwarranted delay.2
Because Claimant Adekoya has failed to provide any substantive information explaining
the nature of the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," he has failed to meet his
burden under Rule 60(b)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).
3. Rule 60(b)(2)
To prevail on the grounds of newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), the movant
must establish that
(1) the newly discovered evidence was of facts that existed at the
time of trial or other dispositive proceeding; (2) the movant must
have been justifiably ignorant of them despite due diligence; (3) the
evidence must be admissible and of such importance that it
probably would have changed the outcome; and (4) the evidence
must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.
2 Trial in the related criminal matter concluded on June 25, 2025.
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Metzler Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). To qualify as "new evidence" under Rule 60(b)(2), the movant must present evidence
that is "truly newly discovered or could not have been found by due diligence." Space Hunters,
Inc. v. United States, 500 Fed. Appx. 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (citing United States
v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1983)).
In his motion, Claimant Adekoya claims that "[t]he newly discovered evidence consists of
financial records and other documents directly related to the property involvement or lack thereof
in criminal activities alleged in the forfeiture action. This evidence refutes the Government's
claims that the property was involved in activities covered by §§ 981(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(C)." Dkt.
No. 32 at 12. Further, Claimant Adekoya argues he "made diligent efforts to gather all relevant
evidence prior to the entry of judgment, including attempts to obtain records, however this
evidence became accessible only after the judgment due to unavailability of records." Id.
As the Government notes, Claimant Adekoya fails to explain what newly discovered
evidence he intends to present, beyond saying that it "consists of financial records and other
documents directly related to the property involvement or lack thereof in criminal activities
alleged in the forfeiture action." Id.; see also Dkt. No. 40 at 2. This conclusory description of the
allegedly newly discovered evidence is insufficient to establish that the evidence was of such
importance that it probably would have changed the outcome. See Gibson v. Wise, 331 F. Supp.
2d 168, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying motion under Rule 60(b)(2) where the plaintiff failed to
submit the alleged newly discovered evidence or otherwise explain its materiality).
Accordingly, the Court denies Claimant Adekoya's motion insofar as he seeks relief under
Rule 60(b)(2).
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4. Rule 60(b)(3)
Rule 60(b)(3) provides for relief from a judgment on the basis of "fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party."
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3). To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, a movant must show, among
other things, "that the conduct complained of prevented the moving party from fully and fairly
presenting his case." State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158,
176 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
In his motion, Claimant Adekoya argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3)
because "the Government misrepresented facts regarding the bank deposits" and "presented
financial records that inaccurately depicted the source of funds as proceeds of unlawful activity."
Dkt. No. 32 at 13. Further, Claimant Adekoya contends that "the Government's actions, including
obscuring relevant transaction[] dates of financial connections to funds derived from bank fraud
in the Northern District of New York . . . prevented [him] an opportunity from fully presenting
the case against forfeiture." Id. at 14.
The Government, in its response, appropriately relies on the most recent case law on this
issue, which the Court also turns to. See Dkt. No. 40 at 2. "While the Second Circuit has never
addressed the precise meaning of 'misconduct' as used in Rule 60(b)(3), it has held that the
moving party, to be entitled to relief, must prove the opposing party's misconduct by 'clear and
convincing evidence.'" Adidas Am., Inc. v. Thom Browne, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 3d 352, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Fleming v. N.Y. Univ., 865 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1989)). As this
Court held in denying the first motion under Rule 60(b), Claimant Adekoya's "threadbare
allegations of misconduct come nowhere close to meeting his burden of proffering clear and
convincing evidence." Dkt. No. 40 at 2 (citing Dkt. No. 24 at 6; In re Mader, 661 B.R. 1, 16
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(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(3) motion because the movant's arguments
"consist[ed] of wholly conclusory and unsupported claims of misconduct"); Resource Grp. Int'l
Ltd. v. Chishti, 794 F. Supp. 3d 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (denying the defendant's Rule 60(b)(3)
motion because the "belated and conclusory assertions hardly constitute clear and convincing
evidence that [the plaintiff] engaged in fraud or misconduct before this Court")).
Accordingly, the Court denies Claimant Adekoya's motion insofar as he seeks relief under
Rule 60(b)(3).
5. Rules 60(b)(4)-(6)
"A judgment is not voidable under Rule 60(b)(4) merely because it is erroneous." Nat'l
Acad. of Television Arts and Scis., Inc. v. Multimedia Sys. Design, Inc., No. 23-7952, 2025 WL
400212, *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2025). "Instead, Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where
a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due
process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard." United Student Aid Funds,
Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010).
Rule 60(b)(5) provides that "a court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding" when, as applicable here, "applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). As the Second Circuit has explained, the prospective
application clause of Rule 60(b)(5) is rooted in the "traditional power of a court of equity to
modify its decree in light of changed circumstances." Tapper v. Hearn, 833 F.3d 166, 170 (2d
Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). "That a court's action has continuing consequences . . . does not
necessarily mean that it [applies prospectively] for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)." Id. (citation
omitted). "Such a broad interpretation of this provision would render the word 'prospectively'
superfluous and eviscerate the principle of finality." Id.
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Rule 60(b)(6) provides for relief from judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief."
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show "extraordinary
circumstances" justifying the reopening of a final judgment. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S.
524, 535 (2005); see also Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)) ("Recognizing Rule 60(b)(6)'s
potentially sweeping reach, courts require the party seeking to avail itself of the Rule to
demonstrate that 'extraordinary circumstances' warrant relief"). In determining whether
extraordinary circumstances are present, a court may consider a wide range of factors. See Buck
v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 123 (2017). These circumstances may include, in an appropriate case,
"the risk of injustice to the parties" and "the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the
judicial process." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
Moreover, "Rule 60(b)(6) provides a catchall for 'any other reason that justifies relief.'
This . . . is available only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable." Kemp v. United
States, 596 U.S. 528, 528 (2022). "Where a party's Rule 60(b) motion is premised on grounds
fairly classified as mistake, inadvertence, or neglect, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is foreclosed."
Stevens, 676 F.3d at 67-68 (citation omitted).
In his motion, Claimant Adekoya seeks to void the judgment under each of these
provisions. His arguments are essentially that (1) the Defendant Properties are not substantially
connected to the crimes of bank fraud conspiracy and money laundering; and (2) that venue in
this district is improper. See Dkt. No. 32 at 14-39.
Claimant Adekoya is incorrect that the Defendant Properties are not substantially
connected to the crimes set forth in the amended complaint. The amended complaint details
Claimant Adekoya's conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering and connects each of
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the Defendant Properties to those schemes. See Dkt. No. 6-1 at ¶¶ 8-135.3 As such, the amended
complaint demonstrates that the Defendant Properties are substantially connected to the violations
of federal law, and Claimant Adekoya's arguments to the contrary are without merit.
Claimant Adekoya's arguments concerning jurisdiction and venue do not warrant vacating
the judgment. He argues that the Government was required to connect every single item subject
to forfeiture to a fraudulent transaction in this District. See Dkt. No. 32 at 20-24. The
Government correctly notes "[t]hat is not the standard." Dkt. No. 40 at 3. As explained, the
amended complaint sufficiently relates each of the Defendant Properties to the bank fraud
conspiracy that included numerous overt acts in this District. See Dkt. No. 6-1 at ¶¶ 8-135. "A
forfeiture action or proceeding may be brought in . . . the district court for the district in which
any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(A).4
Accordingly, the Court finds that Claimant Adekoya has failed to establish that he is
entitled to relief under Rules 60(b)(4), (b)(5), or (b)(6), and these portions of his motion are
denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
3 At the time the amended complaint was filed, Claimant Adekoya's criminal charges were still
pending. He has since been convicted of the alleged bank fraud conspiracy and money
laundering. See United States v. Adekoya, 23-CR-491, Dkt. No. 698. Throughout that case,
Claimant Adekoya repeatedly argued that venue was not appropriate in this district. This Court
rejected that argument, as did the jury.
4 The Government states in a footnote that "[a]lthough it is not pled in the amended complaint,
venue is also appropriate in the Northern District of New York because the subject properties are
currently located in this district." Dkt. No. 40 at 3 n.1. 28 U.S.C. § 1395(c) provides that "[a]
civil proceeding for the forfeiture of property seized outside any judicial district may be
prosecuted in any district into which the property is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1395(c); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)(B). However, there are no allegations that the Defendant Properties were
"seized outside any judicial district." Rather the amended complaint alleges the Defendant
Properties were seized from Claimant Adekoya's apartment in New Jersey. See Dkt. No. 6.
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After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Claimant Adekoya's three motions for return of property (Dkt. Nos. 27, 30,
34) are DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Claimant Adekoya's second motion to set aside the judgment (Dkt. No. 32)
is DENIED; and the Court further
ORDERS that Claimant Adekoya's two motions inquiring as to the status of this matter
(Dkt. Nos. 39, 41) are DENIED as moot; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Government's motion for a more definitive statement (Dkt. No. 28) is
DENIED as moot; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 2, 2026
Albany, New York
5 Claimant Adekoya has been afforded considerable special solicitude in this matter in
light of his pro se status. The Court has now issued two separate orders denying Claimant
Adekoya's multiple motions seeking to vacate the default judgment entered in this case. No
additional motions will be considered by the Court. Any future relief must be sought on appeal to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals should Claimant Adekoya determine that an appeal is
warranted in this matter. Any new motions seeking substantive relief will be summarily stricken
from the docket, without further order of the Court.
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