Balash v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION et al

1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
In re:
ANNA THERESA BALASH,
Chapter 13
Case No. 25-11042-1-pgr
Debtor.
_______________________________________
ANNA THERESA BALASH,
Plaintiff, 	Adv. Pr. No. 25-90026-1-pgr
v.
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION1, et al.,
Defendants
_________________________________________
1 not in its individual capacity but solely as owner trustee for RCF2 Acquisition Trust (“US Bank”).
Signed this 27 day of February, 2026.
Patrick G. Radel
_______________________________
United States Bankruptcy Judge
So Ordered.
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 13

2
APPEARANCES:
ANNA THERESA BALASH 	ANNA THERESA BALASH
Debtor
DAY PITNEY LLP 	KEVIN MACTIERNAN, ESQ.
Attorneys for Selene and U.S. Bank
605 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10158
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP 	ELLIS M. OSTER. SR., ESQ.
Attorneys for SPS and Fay
800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
New York, New York 10022
ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ, SCHNEID, 	KEVIN ROGER TOOLE, ESQ.
CRANE & PARTNERS, PLLC
Attorneys for PHH
900 Merchant Concourse
Suite 310
Westbury, NY 11590
ANDREA E. CELLI-TRUSTEE 	BONNIE BAKER, ESQ.
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
7 Southwoods Boulevard
Albany, NY 12211
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEBTOR’S MOTION
TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND GRANTING U.S. BANK’S AND SELENE’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
1. 	Anna Theresa Balash (“Debtor”) filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 13
of the United States Bankruptcy Code (25-11042, Docket No. 1) pro se on
September 11, 2025.
2. 	On November 3, 2025, Debtor filed this Adversary Proceeding against six
Defendants: U.S. Bank National Association (“US Bank”); PHH Mortgage
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 13

3
Corporation (“PHH”); Select Portfolio Servicing (“SPS”)2; Fay Servicing LLC
(“Fay”); Selene Finance (“Selene”); and Nationstar Mortgage LLC as Mr.
Cooper (“Nationstar”). (Docket No. 1)
3. 	In the Complaint, Debtor asserts three3 causes of action: violations of the
Foreign 	Agents 	Registration 	Act 	(“FARA”); 	violations 	of 	the 	Fair 	Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); and asks that this Court to quiet title and
remove 	an 	allegedly 	invalid 	lien 	from 	615 	State 	Street, 	Hudson, 	NY
(“Property”) obtained from an allegedly fraudulent mortgage. (Complaint at 16,
18, & 24).
4. 	On January 20, 2026, in response to this Court’s Memorandum Decision and
Order dismissing Debtor’s Complaint against SPS (Doc. No. 27), Debtor filed
an Emergency Motion to Amend her Complaint (“Emergency Motion”) (Doc.
No. 28).
5. 	At the time, U.S. Bank and Selene had a pending joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
No. 6), which was fully briefed (see Debtor’s Response at Doc. No. 16) and set
to be heard on January 22, 2026.
6. 	The Court scheduled a conference on Debtor’s Emergency Motion for the same
date.
7. 	Debtor appeared pro se, Bonnie Baker, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Chapter
13 Trustee, Kevin MacTiernan appeared on behalf of Selene and US Bank,
2 A Memorandum Decision and Order granting SPS’s Motion to Dismiss it from this adversary proceeding was
entered on January 15, 2026. (Doc. No. 27).
3 The Complaint contains Counts One, Two, and Four but no Count Three.
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 13

4
Kevin Toole appeared on behalf of PHH, and Ellis M. Oster Sr., Esq. appeared
on behalf of Fay and SPS.
8. 	At the January 22, 2026, The Court heard argument on US Bank’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) and the Debtor’s Emergency Motion (Doc. No. 28).
9. 	After the hearing, the Court entered a Text Order directing the Debtor to file
a statement in support of her Emergency Motion and attach the proposed
amended Complaint as an accompanying exhibit. (Doc. No. 35). In light of the
Emergency Motion, the Court set briefing for the Emergency Motion and
extended the deadlines for PHH and Fay to file dispositive motions. (Doc. Nos.
35 & 36).
10. On February 5, 2026, the Debtor filed her supplemental Motion to Amend
Complaint (“Motion to Amend”) (Doc. No. 39) and on February 19, 2026, US
Bank and Selene filed a joint objection (Doc. No. 57) to the Motion to Amend.4
11. The Motion to Amend was deemed submitted as of February 19, 2026. (Doc.
Nos. 35 & 44).
12. For the reasons outlined below, Debtor’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 39) is denied
and US Bank’s and Selene’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted.
4 PHH filed a letter (Doc. No. 47) indicating that it takes no position on Debtor’s Motion to Amend and SPS filed a
letter (Doc. No. 48) asking that the Motion to Amend be denied as to SPS and this Court has already granted its
Motion to Dismiss.
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 13

5
Motion to Amend
13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), as made applicable by Bankruptcy
Rule 7015, provides that: “A party may amend its pleading once as a matter
of course no later than:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21
days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”
14. “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
15. Debtor’s Complaint was served on November 9, 2025, and US Bank and
Selene’s joint Motion to Dismiss was filed on December 3, 2025. The
Emergency Motion was not filed until January 20, 2026. Thus, the Court’s
leave is necessary in order for Debtor to amend her Complaint.
16. “It is well established that leave to amend a complaint need not be granted
when amendment would be futile.” Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir.
2003).
17. “Futility is directly intertwined with the standard for a motion to dismiss. A
court may properly deny leave to amend where the amended complaint would
not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Pergament v. Yerushalmi
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 13

6
(In re Yerushalmi), No. 07-72816-478, 2009 WL 2982964, at *4 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2009).
18. In this case, permitting the Debtor to amend her Complaint would be futile.
19. While the Debtor has added additional causes of action in the proposed
Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 39-1), the relief that Debtor seeks remains the
same: that this Court undue the judgment of foreclosure and sale of the
Property.
20. Second Circuit law is clear that a federal court, other than the Supreme
Court, may not review a state court judgment even when the federal court
litigant argues that the state court judgment is void. Buckskin Realty Inc. v.
Windmont Homeowners Association, Inc. (In re Buckskin Realty Inc.), No. 01-
13-40083-NHL, 2016 WL 5360750, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016); see
also Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021). (“The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect
are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court is the
only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.”).
21. This Court has issued multiple decisions and orders explaining that the
Court cannot grant the relief Debtor seeks. See Memorandum, Decision and
Order (Doc. 25); see also In re Balash, 25-11042, Decision and Order Granting
In Rem Relief From Stay (Doc. No. 67) & Order Denying Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order to Stay Eviction Proceedings (Doc. No. 94).
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 13

7
22. Additionally, the District Court has issued decisions holding that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from hearing cases that in effect are
appeals from state court judgments. See (Doc. No. 6, Ex. F) (Balash v. U.S.
Bank, et al., 1:23-cv-00614 (AMN/DJS), Memorandum Decision and Order
(N.D.N.Y. Aug,. 15, 2024)); Doc. No. 6, Ex. G) (Balash v. Yiannakis Costa
Ioannides Estate, et al., 1:24-cv-00679 (AMN/DJS), Memorandum-Decision
and Order (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2025)).
23. As Judge Nardacci explained:
The Court has carefully considered whether to grant leave to amend the
Complaint, given Plaintiff’s pro se status. See Gomez v. USAA Federal Sav.
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the Court finds that
amendment would be futile because the lack of subject matter jurisdiction here
is a substantive defect which cannot be cured with better pleading. See Cuoco
v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The problem with [plaintiff]’s
causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it. Repleading
would thus be futile. Such a futile request to replead should be denied.”);
Planck v. Schenectady Cnty., No. 12-cv-0336, 2012 WL 1977972, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (denying pro se plaintiff leave to amend because “lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction is generally viewed as a substantive defect”); see
also Balash-Ioannidou v. Contour Mortgage Corp., No. 22-cv-4506, 2022 WL
3358082, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint
without prejudice and without leave to amend because “amendment would be
futile”) (citation omitted).
(Doc. No. 6, Ex. F at 6).
24. The Court adopts Judge Nardacci’s sound reasoning. This Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, no amount of pleading can cure the defect,
and Debtor’s amendments are futile.
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
25. Having determined that Debtor’s Complaint cannot be amended, the Court
turns to US Bank’s and Selene’s (together “Movants”) Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. No. 6).
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 13

8
26. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable in
adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b).
27. Rule 12(b)(6) empowers the bankruptcy court to dismiss a complaint that
“fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
28. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all
factual allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.
2006).
29. A Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if “the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of h[er] claim which would entitle h[er] to
relief.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
Violations of the FARA
30. Construed liberally, Count One of Debtor’s Complaint alleges that Movants
violated FARA by failing to register as a foreign agent. (Docket No. 1 at 16–
17).
31. Debtor’s FARA claim lacks any chance of success as there is no private right
of action to enforce a FARA violation. Gong v. Sarnoff, No. 23-CV-343 (LJL),
2023 WL 5372473, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) (“[E]very court to have
considered the issue, in this Circuit and elsewhere, has held that no private
right of action can be implied in FARA.”); Henry v. Washington, No. 3:22-CV-
5673-DGE, 2022 WL 9491957, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), report and
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 13

9
recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-05673-DGE, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 14, 2022) (“[T]here is no private cause of action provided for in the
act such that Plaintiff could sue for a violation of it.”); Weican Meng v.
Xinhuanet Co., No. 16 CIV. 6127 (ER), 2017 WL 3175609, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July
25, 2017) (“[N]o language in [the] statute or its legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to establish cause of action in any entity other than Federal
Government.”).
32. As such, Count One of Debtor’s Complaint must be dismissed as to Movants.
Violations of the FDCPA
33. Count Two of Debtor’s Complaint alleges violations of the FDCPA.
34. While the Complaint is not clear as to what conduct Movants are alleged to
have done, the Complaint does state that “[t]he Bank Defendants . . . willfully
commenced a foreclosure debt collection action in the State Court by[] relying
on improper paperwork when the foreclosure case was commenced as well as
through the life of the case and ignored various attempts to bring the debt
current.” (Docket No. 1 at 22).
35. The Complaint goes on to state: “Defendants stole my property with their
illegal Foreclosure.”5 (Id.)
36. Thus, it seems clear that Debtor is seeking to prosecute violations of the
FDCPA occurring before and during the foreclosure action. Id.
5 The Court notes that Debtor was not a signatory on the note or mortgage nor a Defendant in the Foreclosure action.
(Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C). Debtor’s late husband, Yiannakis C. Ioannides, was executed the note and mortgage and
was the sole Defendant in the Foreclosure action. Id.
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 13

10
37. “Claims under the FDCPA are subject to a one-year statute of limitations from
the date a violation occurs.” Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 22-1528-CV,
2023 WL 6380061, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2023).
38. The foreclosure action on the Property began on February 12, 2012. 	(Docket
No. 9, Ex. B). A decision and order granting a judgment of foreclosure and sale
was 	entered 	on 	January 	23, 	2018. 	(Id.) 	The 	Property 	was 	ultimately
transferred to U.S. Bank, on December 5, 2023. (Id., Ex. C)
39. Thus, based upon the allegations set forth in the Complaint, the latest that a
FDCPA violation could have occurred in connection with the foreclosure is
December 2023. 	For a claim to have been timely under the FDCPA, it must
have been brought no later than December 2024. As this adversary proceeding
was filed on November 3, 2025, any claim for a violation under the FDCPA
arising out of the foreclosure sale is time barred.
40. Debtor also alleges that “continuing to pursue eviction proceedings when a full
accounting per GAAP has not been provided is a violation of the FDCPA ....”
(Docket No. 1 at 10).
41. The FDCPA applies only to “debt collectors.” Henson v. Santander Consumer
USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 582 U.S. 79, 137 S. Ct. 1718,
198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017). Movants are not “debt collectors” as defined by the
FDCPA because there is no “debt” owed to them by the Debtor.6
6 Additionally, “when [an] entity acts to collect its own debts [as opposed to collecting debts on behalf of another], it
is acting as a creditor, not a debt collector.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir.
2016), aff'd, 582 U.S. 79, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017).
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 13

11
42. Debtor was never a party to the note and mortgage at issue in this case. Even
if she were, the Property has belonged to US Bank since December 5, 2023.
(Doc. No. 6, Ex. C).
43. The Supreme Court has stated that in order for the FDCPA to apply, a debt
must be “currently due at the time of collection and not a debt that was due
only in some previous period.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582
U.S. 79, 84, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722, 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017).
44. As such, Count Two of the Complaint must be dismissed as to Movants.
Declaratory Relief seeking to quiet title and/or invalidate U.S. Bank’s
lien
45. Count Two asks the Court to “quiet title” and “have the lien removed and the
sale 	that 	took 	place 	set 	aside,” 	while 	Count 	Four 	asks 	that
the Invalid Lien . . . be removed from the property, along with any rights
alleged by Third Party.” (Docket No. 1 at 23–24).
46. Movants no longer hold a lien against the Property. US Bank owns the
Property. (Doc. No. 6, Ex. C).
47. A Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale in favor of U.S. Bank was entered on
January 23, 2018, and a Referee’s Deed conveyed the Property to U.S. Bank on
December 5, 2023. (Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C).
48. However, even if one of the Movants were a lienholder, “Second Circuit law is
clear that a federal court, other than the Supreme Court, may not review a
state court judgment even when the federal court litigant argues that the state
court judgment is void.” Buckskin Realty Inc. v. Windmont Homeowners Ass’n
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 13

12
(In re Buckskin Realty Inc.), No. 1-13-40083-NHL, 2016 WL 5360750, at *4
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016).
49. While Debtor argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to bankruptcy
courts, this Court is bound by the law of the Second Circuit. Vossbrinck v.
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To the extent
[Plaintiff] asks the federal court to grant him title to his property because the
foreclosure 	judgment 	was 	obtained 	fraudulently, 	Rooker–Feldman 	bars
[Plaintiff’s] claim.”).
50. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over a case if the relief requested would result in the reversal or
modification of a state court judgment. Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th
Cir. 1995)); see also Holmes v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Holmes), No.
19-23497 (SHL), 2020 WL 4279576, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020)
(“Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . precludes federal district courts from exercising
appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments.”); see also Rooker v. Fid.
Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983). 	It also “bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court determinations.”
Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 128 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482–83 n.16).
51. “[T]here is no fraud exception to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.” 	Holmes v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing (In re Holmes), No. 19-23497 (SHL), 2020 WL 4279576,
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 13

13
at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020); see also Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 128 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have never recognized a blanket fraud exception to Rooker–
Feldman.”).
52. Finally, “[a] plaintiff who d[id] not own the property subject to foreclosure does
not have standing to challenge that foreclosure.” Jones v. Kaufman, No. 25-CV-
4407 (CS), 2025 WL 1755122, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2025); see also NDF1,
LLC v. Cunningham, No. 24-CV-00002 (NCM) (JAM), 2025 WL 3295069, at
*11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (same).
53. Thus, Count Four, and any similar relief requested in Count Two, must also
be dismissed as to Movants.
For the reasons stated above, Debtor’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 39) is DENIED and
Movants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED in its entirety.
The Clerk of Court is requested to transmit a copy of this Order to the Debtor by
first class mail, postage prepaid.
###
Case 25-90026-1-pgr Doc 62 Filed 02/27/26 Entered 02/27/26 14:28:58 Desc Main
Document Page 13 of 13