Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Jonathan F. Cadena-Gallegos,
Petitioner,
-v-
Pam Bondi, Attorney General for the United States; Kristi
Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, in their official capacities; Brian
Flanagan, Acting Deputy Field Office Director for ICE in
New York City Area, in their official capacities,
Respondents.
2:26-cv-844
(NJC)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
On February 12, 2026, Jonathan F. Cadena-Gallegos, who has resided in the United
States for around two-and-a-half years and has no criminal history, filed this Petition seeking a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the lawfulness of his detention by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”)
¶¶ 1, 34, ECF No. 1.) That detention began on January 31, 2026, when ICE stopped Mr. Cadena-
Gallegos on his way to work in Islip, New York and thereafter detained him first at 26 Federal
Plaza, New York, New York until he was transferred to the Metropolitan Detention Center
(“MDC”) on February 2, 2026, where he currently remains. (Pet. ¶ 2; Response to Order to Show
Cause (“Resp.”) at 1, ECF No. 7.) The Petition argues that ICE’s detention of Mr. Cadena-
Gallegos without notice and opportunity to be heard violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) (“Section 1225(b)(2)”) and 1226(a)
(“Section 1226(a)”), and the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The Petition seeks the
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following relief: (1) a declaration that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos’s detention violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the APA; (2) a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents
to immediately release Mr. Cadena-Gallegos; and (3) any further relief this Court deems just and
proper. (Pet. at 11–12.).1 For the reasons explained below, the Petition is GRANTED in part.
Respondents are federal government officials named in their official capacities: (1) Pam
Bondi, Attorney General for the United States; (2) Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; (3) Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and (4) Brian Flanagan, Acting Deputy Field Office Director for ICE in
New York City Area.
Respondents have no objection to this Court deciding the Petition on the papers in lieu of
a hearing. (Resp. at 1–2.) Respondents incorrectly represent in their February 13, 2026 letter that
“[a]ttached to this letter are the Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest, dated January 31, 2026, the Form
I-862, Notice to Appear[,] and [the] Form I-220A, Order of Release on Recognizance.” (Resp. at
1.) However, Respondents failed to provide any of these records, notwithstanding the Court’s
February 13, 2026 Order to Show Cause, which clearly and unambiguously ordered Respondents
to submit “all records material to resolution of this action.” (ECF No. 3.) Nor did Respondents
provide even a declaration from a witness with personal knowledge of the records they purported
1 The Petition also seeks an order prohibiting Mr. Cadena-Gallegos’s transfer from the New
York City metropolitan area and an order requiring Respondents to show cause why the writ
should not be granted within three days. (Pet. at 12.) The Court has effectively granted such
relief through the issuance of a February 13, 2026 Order to Show Cause, which required
Respondents to provide their response to the Petition by February 13, 2026 at 11:59 p.m., at the
latest, and prohibited Respondents from removing Mr. Cadena-Gallegos from the United States
or transferring him outside of the Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York,
and District of New Jersey absent further order of the Court. (See ECF No. 3.)
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to attach to their letter response or any facts related to their asserted justification for detaining
Mr. Cadena-Gallegos.
On February 14, 2026, this Court ordered Respondents to provide the referenced
documents. (Feb. 14, 2026, Elec. Order.) which they ultimately did in a corrected letter that is
identical to the February 13, 2026 letter, except that it attaches the identified records. (See ECF
No. 8.) The record lacks any declaration from any witness explaining why Mr. Cadena-Gallegos
was arrested and detained or addressing the records provided by Respondents.
Respondents assert that the facts of this case are similar to those at issue in another
habeas petition resolved by this Court: Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-6065
(E.D.N.Y.). (Resp. at 2 (explaining that Petitioner “is a citizen of another country who entered
the United States without inspection, who has not been admitted, who has been detained pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)”).) Accordingly, Respondents “adopt the Government’s
Memorandum of Law” filed by the respondents in Rodriguez-Acurio. (Id. (citing Rodriguez-
Acurio, No. 25-cv-6065, ECF No. 14.).) Nonetheless, they acknowledge that Rodriguez-Acurio
and several other habeas decisions by this Court “would control the result in this action if the
Court adheres to those decisions.” (Id.)
Respondents argue that ICE’s detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos falls under Section
1225(b)(2), which governs the mandatory detention of certain noncitizens who are “seeking
admission” to the United States. (Resp. at 1–2.) According to Respondents, Section 1225(b)(2)
requires Mr. Cadena-Gallegos’s detention, and he has no right to any additional process under
the Due Process Clause. Respondents’ position is that any noncitizen who entered the United
States without authorization at any time is subject to detention under Section 1225(b)(2),
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notwithstanding the fact that they have been residing in the interior of the country for months, if
not years.
Respondents are incorrect for the reasons explained by this Court in Rodriguez-Acurio v.
Almodovar, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-6065, 2025 WL 3314420 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025),
appeal docketed, No. 26-219 (2d. Cir. Feb. 2, 2026), and that decision is incorporated by
reference in its entirety in this Order.
Detention under Section 1225(b)(2) only applies to noncitizens who, among other things,
are “seeking admission” to the United States. Id. at *22. Here, Mr. Cadena-Gallegos is not
“seeking admission” because he clearly is not presenting himself at the border and was not
recently apprehended just after entering this country. Rather, at the time that ICE detained him,
Mr. Cadena-Gallegos had been living in the interior of the United States since around August 12,
2023. (Pet. ¶¶ 1–2.) He also has an application for asylum pending before the Varick
Immigration Court. (Pet. ¶ 3.)
Respondents offer no new arguments to support their position that any non-citizen
apprehended in the interior of the United States is subject to mandatory detention under Section
1225(b)(2). (See Resp. 1–3.) The vast majority of courts throughout this District, Circuit, and
even the country have rejected Respondents’ expansive interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). See
Barco Mercado v. Francis, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-cv-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (“[T]he administration’s new position that all noncitizens who came
into the United States illegally, but since have been living in the United States, must be
detained until their removal proceedings are completed—has been challenged in at least 362
cases in federal district courts. The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final
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basis, in 350 of those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts spread across the United States.”).
The Second Circuit has not addressed whether Section 1225(b)(2) requires the detention
of any non-citizen encountered by ICE in the interior of the United States, although several cases
raising this issue are on appeal.2 The Seventh Circuit recently suggested that Section 1225(b)(2)
does not apply to noncitizens who are already residing in the United States. Castanon-Nava v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025).3 The Fifth Circuit recently
reached the opposite conclusion. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 25-20496,
2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
This Court has conducted its own careful assessment of the law and the facts. In the
absence of Second Circuit precedent to the contrary, this Court continues to conclude, as set
forth in detail in Rodriguez-Acurio, that Respondents’ position that Section 1225(b)(2) requires
the detention of a non-citizen apprehended in the interior of the United States notwithstanding
2 See, e.g., Cunha v. Moniz, 6:25-cv-6532 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-
3141 (2d. Cir. Dec. 12, 2025); Chen v. Almodovar, 1:25-cv-8350 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025),
appeal docketed, No. 25-3169 (2d. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025); Candido v. Bondi, No. 1:25-cv-867
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-3159 (2d. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025).
3 In Castanon-Nava, the Seventh Circuit reasoned:
[T]he mandatory detention provision upon which Defendants rely, limits its scope to
an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission,” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Put another
way, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking
admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
161 F.4th at 1061 (emphasis in original, quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018)).
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the fact that the non-citizen has continuously resided in this country for months, if not years, is
unsupported by the statutory text.4
Moreover, nothing in the record shows that ICE arrested and detained Mr. Cadena-
Gallegos under Section 1225(b)(2) rather than Section 1226(a). See ECF No. 8 at 4 (reflecting
that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos was arrested on a warrant pursuant to “sections 236 and 287 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and part 287 title 8, Code of Federal Regulations,” which
correspond to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1357 and 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.1–287.12, not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)); ECF No. 8 at 8 (reflecting that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos was released on his own
recognizance on August 14, 2023 pursuant to “section 236 of the [INA],” i.e., Section 1226, “and
the applicable provisions of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations”). Respondents only
invoked Section 1225(b)(2) as the basis for Mr. Cadena-Gallegos’s detention in the course of this
litigation. (See Resp. at 1.) The Supreme Court has recognized that a “post-hoc rationalization”
first articulated in litigation carries little weight. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal, 591 U.S. 1, 21 (2020) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 420 (1971)); see also Islander E. Pipeline Co., LLC v. Connecticut Dep’t of Env’t
Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) (“It is well established that an agency’s action must be
upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”). As courts in the Southern District
of New York have recognized, “the Court cannot credit Respondents’ new position as to the
basis for [petitioner’s] detention, which was adopted post hoc and raised for the first time in this
4 Respondents rely on Saamishvili v. Flanagan, et al., No. 25-cv-6178, 2026 WL 377574, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2026), to support their expansive interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) in this
case. (Resp. at 2.) This Court respectfully disagrees with Saamshvili about the scope of Section
1225(b)(2). Additionally, the petitioner in that case was subject to an order of removal, and it is
unclear whether the removal order was final such that a different INA provision—8 U.S.C
§1231(a)(2)(A)—governed the petitioner’s detention pending removal.
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litigation.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); see also Yao v.
Almodovar, No. 25-cv-9982, 2025 WL 3653433, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (discrediting
respondents’ post-hoc justification for petitioner’s detention and finding that “ICE is properly
held to its representation, when it detained [petitioner], as to the legal basis for that action”
(emphasis added)); see Rueda Torres v. Francis, No. 25-cv-8408, 2025 WL 3168759, at *5
(S.D.N.Y., 2025 Nov. 13, 2025) (slip copy) (same).
Accordingly, ICE’s detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos is governed by the discretionary
detention framework set forth in a different provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). For the reasons explained in Rodriguez-Acurio, which are incorporated by
reference here, Mr. Cadena-Gallegos has a liberty interest in being free from detention that is
afforded procedural due process protection, notwithstanding Respondents’ invocation of
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), and other cases. See
Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *25–27 (finding that petitioner’s situation is
distinguishable from Thuraissigiam and that petitioner has a liberty interest that is afforded
procedural due process protection).5 ICE’s detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos without notice and
opportunity to be heard infringes on that liberty interest and triggers the right to procedural due
process.
The balancing test set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), applies to
procedural due process claims and requires this Court to consider: (1) the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
5 Although the Respondents do not discuss Thuraissigiam in any way, because they incorporate
their legal brief filed in opposition to the petition in Rodriguez-Acurio, this Court assumes they
seek to rely on it.
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through the procedures used; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail. Applying this
balancing test, Respondents’ detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos since January 31, 2026 violates
his Fifth Amendment rights to procedural due process for the same reasons as those set forth in
Rodriguez-Acurio.
Here, ICE’s detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos without any notice or opportunity to be
heard infringes on “the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from
imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020). Moreover, there is a
high risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used to detain Mr. Cadena-Gallegos
because Respondents failed to provide any notice or any opportunity to be heard before a
Department of Homeland Security officer or immigration judge before ICE detained him on
January 31, 2026. (See Pet. ¶ 40.) Finally, Respondents fail to address any of the Matthews v.
Eldridge factors, much less any government interests advanced by ICE’s detention of Mr.
Cadena-Gallegos without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Although the Attorney General
may have a legitimate government interest in ensuring the appearance of noncitizens at
immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community, there is absolutely nothing in
the record showing that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos presents a flight risk or danger to the community.
Respondents fail to show that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos has any criminal history whatsoever.
Moreover, Respondents submit an Order of Release on Recognizance reflecting that a DHS
officer released Mr. Cadena-Gallegos on his own recognizance on August 14, 2023 on the
conditions that he: (1) report for any hearing or interview as directed DHS or the Executive
Office for Immigration Review; (2) report in person for a check-in scheduled in a separate
document (referred to as an “OREC-56”), which Respondents failed to provide; (3) not violate
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any local, State, or Federal laws or ordinances; (4) not change his residence without written
permission from an immigration officer; and (5) assist DHS in obtaining necessary travel
documents and surrender for removal if ordered. (ECF No. 8 at 8.) The Order of Release on
Recognizance underscores that DHS determined Ms. Cadena-Gallegos posed no safety or flight
risk as of August 14, 2023. (Id.) Respondents fail to show any change in circumstances since
then. Rather, Mr. Cadena-Gallegos has lived in the United States since August 2023,has a
pending asylum application, and was “participating in removal proceedings” prior to his
detention. (Pet. ¶¶ 1–3, 34.)
Accordingly, weighing all of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors—the significant liberty
interest at stake, the high risk of erroneous deprivation, and Respondents’ failure to demonstrate
that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos’s detention was required to advance any legitimate government
interest in preventing danger to the community or ensuring appearance at removal proceedings—
Respondents’ detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos with no notice or opportunity to be heard
violates his Fifth Amendment rights to procedural due process. Thus, ICE’s detention of Mr.
Cadena-Gallegos was unlawful from its inception, notwithstanding Respondents’ efforts at post-
hoc rationalization based on its expansive interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). See Lopez
Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 486; Rueda Torres, 2025 WL 3168759, at *5.6
6 Although Respondents do not explicitly invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) as the basis for ICE’s
detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos, that provision is plainly inapplicable to him. Mr. Cadena-
Gallegos is not subject to mandatory detention pending expedited removal as an “arriving alien”
under Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at *19. Nor do
Respondents even argue, much less show, that he falls within any category of non-citizens who
are designated by the Attorney General or their delegate as eligible for mandatory detention
pending expedited removal under the statute’s Designation Provision, 8 U.S.C
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). See id. at *15. Accordingly, ICE’s detention of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos since
January 31, 2026, is pursuant to the discretionary detention scheme of Section 1226(a), not the
mandatory detention scheme of either Section 1225(b)(2) or Section 1225(b)(1).
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Upon finding a constitutional violation, a district court “may” grant a writ of habeas
corpus and “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C §§ 2241(a), 2243.
Release from detention is the “typical remedy” for “unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v.
Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). In Rodriguez-Acurio, this Court provided the legal basis for
ordering release from ICE detention as well as limited injunctive relief enjoining Respondents
from invoking Section 1225(b) as the basis for subjecting a non-citizen habeas petitioner to
mandatory detention, absent a change in relevant circumstances. See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025
WL 3314420, at *31–32.
For those same reasons, in this action, “dispos[ing] of the matter as law and justice
require,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, necessitates both the immediate release of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos
from ICE custody and narrow injunctive relief guarding against re-detention in violation of this
Court’s determination that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos is not subject to mandatory detention
under Section 1225(b). As in Rodriguez-Acurio, the limited grant of injunctive relief to guard
against re-detention by ICE without a bond hearing on the basis of Section 1225(b)(2) absent a
change in relevant circumstances falls within the “core of habeas,” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at
119, because it is necessary to ensure that the release of Mr. Cadena-Gallegos is not rendered
meaningless.
Additionally, Mr. Cadena-Gallegos “is entitled to release from the unlawful restrictions
on his liberty—which means, in the circumstances here, restoration of” the status quo ante.
Khabazha v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 25-cv-5279, 2025 WL 3281514, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025) (ordering government to release petitioner from “restrictions on his
liberty imposed as a result of his unlawful [detention] . . . including the ankle monitor and
reporting requirements”). There is no evidence in the record showing that Mr. Cadena-Gallegos
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was subject to any electronic monitoring requirements by ICE prior to his unlawful detention.
Accordingly, “dispos[ing] of the matter as law and justice require,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and
“restor[ing] . . . the status quo ante,” Khabazha, 2025 WL 3281514, at *8, requires that
Respondents release Mr. Cadena-Gallegos without any condition for electronic monitoring,
including but not limited to GPS monitoring.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all of these reasons explained in this Memorandum and Order and those
set forth in Rodriguez-Acurio, the Petition is granted in part.
Respondents must coordinate with Petitioner’s counsel and thereafter release Petitioner,
without any ankle monitor, into the physical care of their counsel or another mutually agreed
upon person at the earliest possible time agreed upon by the parties, but no later than today,
February 14, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. Respondents must release Petitioner with all of his belongings
that are in Respondents’ possession, including but not limited to identification cards, clothing,
and money. Respondents shall confirm compliance with these directives, including by
identifying the individual to whom Petitioner was released and when and how Mr. Cadena-
Gallegos’s belongings were returned to him, in a filing on the docket by February 15, 2026 at
noon.
Additionally, pending the issuance of any final removal order against Mr. Cadena-
Gallegos, Respondents are enjoined from denying Mr. Cadena-Gallegos bond in any subsequent
proceeding on the basis that he must be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), absent a change
in relevant circumstances consistent with this Order.
The Court concludes that the other arguments set forth in the Petition for granting Mr.
Cadena-Gallegos the requested relief, including arguments that the detention violates the Fifth
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Amendment right to substantive due process and the APA, are now moot and unnecessary to
resolve.
The Show Cause hearing scheduled for Tuesday, February 17, 2026 at 2:30 p.m. in the
Alfonse D'Amato U.S. Courthouse is therefore adjourned. The matter is held in abeyance.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 14, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
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