USA v. Leonardi, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------X
ANTHONY LEONARDI,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 	21-CR-0452(JS)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
---------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: 	Anthony Leonardi, Pro se
#69373-509
FCI Danbury
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
33½ Pembroke Station
Route 37
Danbury, Connecticut 	06811
For Respondent : 	Andrew P. Wenzel, Esq.
United States Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of New York
610 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, New York 	11722
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Presently 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	the 	pro 	se 	Section 	2255
habeas petition of Anthony Leonardi (“Petitioner” or “Leonardi”),
seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (hereafter,
the 	“Petition”). 	(See 	Petition, 	ECF 	No. 	238.) 	The 	Government
opposes the Petition.1 	(See Opp’n, ECF No. 239.) 	For the following
reasons, the Petition is DENIED in its entirety.
1 	Although given the opportunity to do so, Petitioner did not file
a 	reply. 	(See 	Aug. 	26, 	2024 	Elec. 	Briefing 	Sch. 	Order 	(“The
defendant is directed to file and serve his Reply, if any, to the
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
2/18/2026 1:23 pm
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 1 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
BACKGROUND
I. 	The Underlying Crimes2
Generally 	speaking, 	Petitioner 	was 	one 	of 	the 	main
participants 	in 	a 	bi-costal 	conspiracy 	that 	transported 	large
quantities of controlled substances (hereafter, “Narcotics”3) from
the 	West 	Coast 	to 	the 	East 	Coast, 	which 	were 	then 	resold 	on 	the
East 	Coast 	including 	throughout 	Suffolk 	County. 	Petitioner
facilitated 	every 	facet 	of 	the 	conspiracy 	from 	purchasing, 	to
transporting, 	to 	storing, 	to 	distributing 	the 	Narcotics, 	in
addition 	to 	possessing 	large 	quantities 	of 	cash 	and 	firearms, 	as
well as various drug paraphernalia.
On June 27, 2020, local law enforcement executed several
search 	warrants 	relating 	to 	the 	conspiracy; 	specifically 	as 	to
Petition, 	from 	the 	search 	of 	his 	home, 	police 	recovered:
approximately $50,000 in cash; a loaded assault rifle; a substance
commonly used to increase the quantity of heroin; and, other drug
Government’s 	Response 	on 	or 	before 	11/1/2024.”); 	see 	also 	id.
providing 	notice 	to 	parties 	“that 	if 	the 	Court 	does 	not 	receive
any submissions, it will deem the [habeas] motion fully briefed as
of the Reply date set forth above”); cf. Case Docket, in toto.)
2 	The 	facts 	are 	drawn 	from 	the 	Superseding 	Indictment 	(see 	ECF
No. 	7) 	and 	the 	Presentence 	Investigation 	Report 	(“PSR”) 	(see 	ECF
No. 	200 	(sealed)), 	that 	the 	Court 	adopted, 	as 	amended, 	during
sentencing. 	(See 	Feb. 	5, 	2024 	Min. 	Entry, 	ECF 	No. 	215 	(sealed);
Sent’g Hr’g Tr. (sealed), Ex D, attached to Opp’n.)
3 	The Narcotics 	involved included heroin, 	fentanyl, cocaine, 	and
cocaine base. 	(See PSR ¶1.)
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 2 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
paraphernalia. 	That 	same 	day, 	Petitioner 	was 	arrested 	by 	local
authorities, arraigned, and then released on his own recognizance.
That did not deter Petitioner’s illegal activities.
Notwithstanding a state court order directing Petitioner
to 	abstain 	from 	additional 	criminal 	conduct, 	while 	on 	bail 	after
his 	June 	2020 	arrest, 	Petitioner 	continued 	selling 	Narcotics.
Specifically, after retrieving six kilograms of cocaine and three
kilograms 	of 	fentanyl, 	which 	drugs 	had 	been 	hidden, 	Petitioner
sold a large portion of these recovered Narcotics for approximately
$240,000.4 	Throughout the entirety 	of the conspiracy, 	Petitioner
and 	his 	co-conspirators 	were 	responsible 	for 	the 	distribution 	of
approximately 	15 	kilograms 	of 	heroin, 	30 	kilograms 	of 	fentanyl,
100 	kilograms 	of 	cocaine, 	181 	kilograms 	of 	marijuana, 	and 	2.7
kilograms of methamphetamine.
On 	September 	29, 	2021, 	a 	federal 	grand 	jury 	returned 	a
two-count 	indictment 	(the 	“Indictment”) 	charging 	Petitioner 	with
conspiracy 	to 	distribute 	Narcotics5 	and 	using 	firearms 	in
connection 	with 	his 	Narcotics 	trafficking.6 	The 	charges 	carried
a 	statutory 	mandatory 	minimum 	term 	of 	incarceration 	of 	15 	years.
4 	The proceeds of that sale have never been recovered.
5 	The 	conspiracy 	count 	alleges 	the 	violation 	of 	21 	U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i), 	841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 	841(b)(1)(A)(iii),
841(b)(1)(A)(vi), and 846.
6 	The 	firearms 	count 	alleges 	the 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 3 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
On 	October 	13, 	2021, 	Petitioner 	was 	arrested 	on 	these 	federal
charges. 	He 	initially 	entered 	a 	plea 	of 	not 	guilty. 	(See 	Oct.
13, 2021 Min. Entry, ECF No. 23.)
II. 	Petitioner’s Guilty Plea
A. 	The Plea Agreement
Thirteen months later, on November 14, 2022, Petitioner
entered a change of plea. 	(See Nov. 14, 2022 Min. Entry, ECF No.
145.) 	His 	guilty 	plea 	was 	as 	to 	Count 	One, 	the 	Narcotics
distribution 	conspiracy 	count, 	and 	pursuant 	to 	a 	plea 	agreement
(hereafter, 	the 	“Plea 	Agreement”). 	(See 	Plea 	Agmt., 	Ex. 	A, 	ECF
No. 239-1, attached to Opp’n.) 	As to that Count, Petitioner agreed
that, at his allocution, he would admit “he conspired to sell one
kilogram 	or 	more 	of 	a 	substance 	containing 	heroin, 	400 	grams 	or
more of a substance containing fentanyl, five kilograms or more of
a 	substance 	containing 	cocaine, 	and 	280 	grams 	or 	more 	of 	a
substance containing cocaine base.” 	(Id. ¶1.)
In 	the 	Plea 	Agreement, 	the 	Government 	estimated
Petitioner’s: 	(1) 	Criminal 	History 	Category 	was 	a 	“III”; 	and,
Offense 	Level, 	assuming 	various 	acceptances 	of 	responsibility
reductions, 	was 	“35”; 	this 	yielded 	a 	Guidelines 	range 	of 	210 	to
262 	months’ 	imprisonment. 	Of 	relevance, 	the 	Plea 	Agreement
informed 	Petitioner 	the 	Guidelines 	estimate 	was 	not 	binding 	upon
the 	Probation 	Department 	or 	the 	Court. 	Petitioner 	stipulated 	to
the 	Guidelines 	estimate. 	In 	exchange, 	the 	Government 	agreed 	to
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 4 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
dismiss 	Count 	Two, 	i.e., 	the 	firearms 	charge, 	brought 	against
Petitioner.
B. 	The Plea
1. 	The Standard Plea Form
Before his plea hearing commenced, Petitioner completed
a 	Standard 	Plea 	Form, 	which 	was 	signed 	by 	Petitioner 	and 	his
counsel. 	(See Plea Form, Ex. B, ECF No. 239-2, attached t Opp’n.)
Among 	other 	things, 	in 	it, 	Petitioner 	indicated 	he: 	(a) 	was 	not
under the influence of any drugs or alcohol; (b) was of clear mind
and 	understood 	what 	was 	occurring; 	(c) 	understood 	his
constitutional rights that he would be waiving by pleading guilty;
(d) had discussed with his counsel, inter alia, (i) the Indictment,
(ii) the maximum sentence for the Count to which he was pleading,
(iii) 	the 	Sentencing 	Guidelines, 	which 	were 	not 	mandatory, 	and
(iv) 	the 	Section 	3553(a) 	sentencing 	factors 	the 	Court 	would
consider 	in 	fashioning 	a 	sentence; 	and 	(v) 	the 	binding 	effect 	of
the 	Plea 	Agreement. 	(See 	id.) 	Moreover, 	Petitioner 	indicated
both his satisfaction with his counsel and his belief that counsel
had done a good job. 	(See id. ¶¶ 44-45.)
[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 5 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
2. 	The Plea Hearing7
At the outset of the plea hearing, the Court determined,
inter alia, 	Petitioner: was competent and clear-headed even though
he 	had 	taken 	prescribed 	sleep 	medication 	the 	night 	before 	the
hearing, 	which 	did 	not 	affect 	his 	ability 	to 	understand 	the
proceeding; 	understood 	that 	he 	had 	an 	absolute 	right 	to 	go 	to
trial; 	understood 	that, 	at 	trial, 	it 	would 	be 	the 	Government’s
burden to prove Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and
understood that if he pled guilty, Petitioner would be waiving his
constitutional right to trial, as well as other rights. (Plea Hr’g
Tr. 	at 	3-8.) 	The 	Court 	advised 	Petitioner 	that 	“[a] 	judgment 	of
guilty 	will 	be 	entered 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	your 	guilty 	plea, 	which
judgment can never be challenged,” although he may “have the right
to 	appeal 	with 	respect 	to 	[his] 	sentencing”, 	to 	which 	Petitioner
affirmed 	his 	understanding. 	(Id. 	at 	8:11-16.) 	Petitioner 	also
confirmed 	his 	familiarity 	with 	the 	Plea 	Agreement, 	and 	that 	both
he 	and 	his 	counsel 	had 	signed 	said 	Plea 	Agreement. 	(Id. 	at
10:7-11.) 	It 	was 	also 	confirmed 	on 	the 	record 	that 	Petitioner
stipulated 	to 	the 	Guideline 	the 	Government 	agreed 	to
7 	Petitioner’s change of 	plea was taken 	by the Magistrate 	Judge,
who recommended its acceptance. 	(See Referral Order, ECF No. 143;
Consent Order for Plea, ECF No. 144; Nov. 14, 2022 Min. Entry, ECF
No. 	145; 	Plea 	Hr’g 	Tr., 	Ex. 	C, 	ECF 	No. 	239-3, 	at 	18, 	attached 	to
Opp’n.)
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 6 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
recommendation of no more than 15 years’ incarceration. 	(See id.
at 10:16-19.)
The 	Court 	had 	the 	Government 	identify 	the 	elements 	of
the 	crime 	to 	which 	Petitioner 	would 	be 	pleading 	guilty, 	and 	then
confirmed 	with 	Petitioner 	both 	his 	knowledge 	of 	same, 	as 	well 	as
that 	he 	had 	discussed 	said 	elements 	and 	charge 	with 	his 	counsel.
(See 	id. 	at 	10-11.) 	Then, 	the 	Court 	explained 	the 	applicable
statutory 	penalty, 	i.e., 	that 	the 	“maximum 	penalty 	under 	Count 	1
is life plus a fine of $10 million”, which Petitioner affirmed he
understood. 	(Id. 	at 	11:23-25.) 	Continuing, 	regarding 	the
fashioning of a sufficient sentence, the Court informed Petitioner
it would rely upon the advisory Guidelines, and the Section 3553(a)
sentencing 	factors, 	which 	factors 	it 	delineated. 	(See 	id. 	at
12-13.) 	Petitioner 	stated 	his 	understanding 	regarding 	both 	of
those components of sentencing. 	(See id. at 12.)
As 	he 	indicated 	in 	his 	Standard 	Plea 	Form, 	upon
questioning, 	Petitioner 	told 	the 	Court 	he 	was 	satisfied 	with 	his
legal 	representation 	up 	until 	that 	point 	and 	he 	believed 	his
attorney 	had 	done 	a 	good 	job 	for 	him. 	(See 	id. 	at 	14:3-8.)
Moreover, 	Petitioner 	acknowledged: 	he 	was 	making 	his 	guilty 	plea
voluntarily 	and 	of 	his 	own 	free 	will; 	no 	one 	had 	forced 	or
threatened 	him 	to 	plead 	guilty; 	he 	had 	not 	been 	promised 	a
particular 	sentence; 	he 	did 	not 	have 	any 	agreements 	beyond 	those
contained in the Plea Agreement; and he was pleading guilty because
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 7 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
that 	was 	the 	case. 	(Id. 	at 	14:12-24.) 	Additionally, 	as 	part 	of
his 	Plea 	Agreement, 	Petitioner 	agreed 	he 	would 	not 	appeal 	or
otherwise 	challenge 	his 	conviction 	or 	sentence 	if 	the 	Court
sentenced 	him 	to 	a 	term 	of 	imprisonment 	of 	293 	months 	or 	less.
(See id. at 9:24-10:2.)
The 	Court 	asked 	Petitioner 	to 	explain 	what 	made 	him
guilty 	of 	the 	Count 	One 	charge; 	Petitioner 	allocated 	to 	his
agreement 	with 	others 	to 	transport 	and 	distribute 	Narcotics 	from
outside 	to 	inside 	New 	York 	State 	and 	which 	he 	then 	distributed
within 	Suffolk 	County. 	(See 	id. 	at 	15-16.) 	Further, 	Petitioner
explicitly 	agreed 	with 	the 	specific 	amounts 	of 	Narcotics,
articulated by the Government, to be part of the charged conspiracy
which were attributable to Petitioner. 	(See id. at 16:17-17:20.)
Thereafter, the Court found, in entering a guilty plea, Petitioner
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, and understood
the consequences of pleading guilty; it also found a factual basis
for Petitioner’s plea. 	(See id. at 19: 23-20:2.) 	Hence, the Court
recommended Petitioner’s guilty plea to Count One of the Indictment
be 	accepted. 	(See 	id. 	at 	20: 	3-5.) 	On 	November 	28, 	2022, 	the
undersigned 	accepted 	Petitioner’s 	Plea. 	(See 	Order 	Accepting
Guilty Plea, ECF No. 151.)
[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 8 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
III. Petitioner’s Sentencing
A. 	The PSR
After 	his 	plea, 	the 	Probation 	Department 	(hereafter,
“Probation”) prepared a PSR regarding Petitioner. 	While Probation
agreed 	with 	the 	Government’s 	estimate 	that 	Petitioner 	was 	at
Criminal 	History 	Category 	III, 	its 	calculation 	of 	Petitioner’s
Offense 	Level 	differed. 	First, 	based 	upon 	the 	weight 	of 	the
Narcotics 	involved, 	Probation 	began 	with 	a 	base 	offense 	level 	of
38 	points. 	It 	agreed 	with 	the 	two-point 	firearms 	enhancement
estimated 	by 	the 	Government. 	However, 	it 	also 	added 	a 	two-point
“stash 	house” 	enhancement 	and 	a 	two-point 	“supervisor 	role”
enhancement 	to 	its 	calculation 	before 	downwardly 	adjusting 	its
calculation 	by 	three 	points 	for 	acceptance 	of 	responsibility;
Probations’ 	resulting 	Total 	Offense 	level 	was 	41 	points. 	Hence,
with a Criminal Category of III and Total Offense Level of 41, the
applicable Guideline range of imprisonment was 360-months-to-life.
(See PSR ¶¶23-34, 84.) 	However, in consideration of Petitioner’s
difficult 	formative 	years 	and 	to 	avoid 	unwarranted 	disparities
with 	co-defendants, 	Probation 	recommended 	a 	below-Guidelines
sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. 	(See Prob. Dep’t Recommend.,
ECF No. 200-1 (sealed), at 3.)
B. 	The Sentencing Memos
In 	Petitioner’s 	Sentencing 	Memo, 	defense 	counsel
objected to Probation’s calculation of Petitioner’s Total Offense
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 9 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
Level. 	(See Def.’s Sent’g Memo, ECF No. 217 (redacted); unredacted
version 	on 	file 	with 	the 	Court.) 	In 	particular, 	Petitioner
objected 	to 	the 	“supervisor 	role” 	enhancement, 	arguing 	he 	“took
all 	direction 	from 	his 	son, 	James 	Sosa, 	the 	organizer 	of 	th[e]
conspiracy” 	and 	“did 	not 	make 	any 	individualized 	decisions 	in
furtherance 	of 	th[e] 	conspiracy”. 	(Id. 	at 	(unnumbered) 	3.) 	As
such, 	a 	sentence 	within 	the 	Guidelines 	range 	was 	“significantly
more 	severe 	than 	justice 	requires”. 	(Id.) 	Counsel 	sought 	the
Court’s 	“compassion 	and 	mercy” 	and 	advocated 	for 	a 	non-Guideline
sentence 	of 	120 	months’ 	imprisonment. 	(Id. 	at 	(unnumbered) 	11.)
Petitioner’s 	Sentencing 	Memo 	was 	accompanied 	by 	three 	letters 	of
support.
Conversely, 	although 	also 	seeking 	a 	non-Guidelines
sentence, 	in 	its 	Sentencing 	Memo, 	the 	Government 	requested 	a
sentence 	of 	15 	years’ 	(i.e., 	180-months) 	imprisonment. 	(See 	ECF
No. 209 at 1, 10.) 	It acknowledged the Plea Agreement estimate of
Petitioner’s 	Offense 	Level 	did 	not 	include 	the 	“stash 	house”
enhancement or the “supervisor role” enhancement. 	(See id. at 2.)
But, 	the 	Government 	agreed 	with 	Probation’s 	calculations,
especially 	as 	to 	the 	“supervisor 	role” 	enhancement. 	(See 	id. 	at
3.) 	Indeed, 	it 	asserted 	its 	investigation 	revealed 	Petitioner
“was 	one 	of 	the 	main 	participants 	in 	a 	sprawling 	multi-state
narcotics 	conspiracy”, 	participating 	“in 	every 	facet 	of 	this
conspiracy, 	including 	the 	purchase, 	transport 	storage 	and
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 10 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
distribution 	of 	narcotics, 	money 	and 	firearms.”8 	(Id.)
Nonetheless, “because these two enhancements were not included in
the 	[P]lea 	[A]greement 	between 	the 	parties, 	the 	[G]overnment
w[ould] 	only 	advocate 	for 	the 	Court 	to 	consider 	and 	sentence
[Petitioner] 	based 	on 	the 	Guideline 	range 	contemplated 	in 	the
[P]lea [A]greement of 210-262 months’ incarceration.” 	(Id.)
The 	Government 	then 	advanced 	several 	arguments 	in
support of the applicable Section 3553(a) sentencing factors. 	(See
id. 	at 	3-10.) 	In 	particular, 	it 	pressed 	the 	seriousness 	of
Petitioner’s 	drug-distribution-conspiracy 	offense, 	highlighting:
the scope of Petitioner’s involvement with the sale of Narcotics;
Petitioner’s possession of firearms to protect his drug ventures;
and, 	the 	inclusion 	of 	fentanyl 	in 	the 	Narcotics 	Petitioner 	sold.
(See 	id. 	at 	3-8.) 	In 	sum, 	the 	Government 	argued: 	“Drug
trafficking 	ruins 	communities, 	feeds 	addictions, 	damages 	lives,
and 	invites 	violence.” 	(Id. 	at 	8.) 	As 	to 	Petitioner’s 	history
and 	characteristics, 	the 	Government 	underscored: 	since 	he 	was
19-years-old, 	Petitioner 	“has 	continuously 	had 	contact 	with 	the
criminal 	justice 	system”, 	i.e., 	for 	30 	years; 	and, 	“most
8 	By 	way 	of 	examples, 	the 	Government 	asserted 	Petitioner: 	drove
cash 	on 	numerous 	occasions 	from 	Suffolk 	County 	to 	California 	for
the purchase of Narcotics; drove purchased Narcotics back to Long
Island; 	received 	mailed 	packages 	of 	Narcotics 	at 	his 	home 	in
Suffolk County; enlisted others to help transport large quantities
of 	Narcotics 	cross-country; 	and, 	once 	obtained, 	personally 	sold
Narcotics to other local, large-scale drug dealers. 	(Id. at 1-2.)
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 11 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
egregiously, 	[Petitioner’s] 	criminal 	conduct 	continued 	while 	he
was out on bail on his state case”, continuing “selling kilograms
of drugs.” 	(Id.)
Further, in addition to addressing respect for the law,
providing just punishment, and deterrence considerations (see id.
at 9), the Government expounded upon the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities. 	(See id. at 9-10.) 	In doing so, it called
attention 	to 	the 	sentences 	the 	Court 	imposed 	upon 	several 	of
Petitioner’s 	co-defendants 	given 	each 	co-defendant’s 	role 	in 	the
drug-distribution-conspiracy 	and 	respective 	culpability. 	For
example, 	co-defendants 	Cyntje 	and 	Maxwell 	engaged 	in 	lesser
culpable 	activities, 	and 	each 	received 	a 	72-month-incarceration
sentence. 	By comparison, co-defendant Wiggins, whose involvement
in 	the 	drug-distribution-conspiracy 	“is 	the 	most 	similarly
situated to [Petitioner]”, having “a lengthy criminal history and
repeatedly 	distributed 	large 	quantities 	of 	drugs”, 	received 	a
15-year-imprisonment 	sentence. 	(Id. 	at 	10.) 	But, 	according 	to
the 	Government, 	Petitioner 	“had 	a 	greater 	role 	in 	the 	conspiracy
and 	[wa]s 	more 	culpable 	than 	Wiggins.” 	(Id.) 	Given 	these
comparators, 	the 	Government 	maintained 	a 	below-Guidelines, 	15-
year-imprisonment sentence for Petitioner would be sufficient, but
not 	greater 	than 	necessary 	to 	serve 	the 	goals 	of 	the 	Section
3553(a) sentencing factors. 	(See id.)
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 12 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
C. 	The Sentencing Hearing
On 	February 	5, 	2024, 	the 	parties 	appeared 	for
Petitioner’s sentencing. 	Like the Court did at his change-of-plea
hearing, 	this 	Court 	confirmed 	Petitioner 	was 	clear-headed 	and
understood what was to transpire. 	(Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 3:18-4:1.)
Similarly, 	this 	Court 	asked 	Petitioner 	whether 	he 	was 	satisfied
with the services of his counsel; Petitioner stated he was. 	(See
id. at 4:2-4.)
The 	Court 	proceeded 	to 	address 	the 	Guidelines
calculations. 	Acknowledging 	the 	inaccuracy 	of 	its 	calculations,
the 	Government 	asked 	the 	Court 	to 	adopt 	those 	of 	Probation 	with
one modification, i.e., adjusting Petitioner’s Base Offense Level
to 36 points. 	(See id. at 6.) 	In addition, as to the “supervisor
role” 	enhancement, 	the 	Government 	clarified 	its 	position 	was 	not
that Petitioner was a “main leader”, but “[h]e was in a supervisory
managerial 	capacity” 	having 	been 	heavily 	involved 	in 	all 	aspects
of the drug-distribution-conspiracy. 	(Id. at 6-7.) 	Petitioner’s
counsel 	objected 	to 	the 	“supervisor 	role” 	enhancement, 	arguing
Petitioner’s 	actions 	taken 	in 	furtherance 	of 	the 	conspiracy 	were
at the direction of his son, who was its leader. 	(See id. at 8.)
Ultimately, 	this 	Court 	adopted 	the 	Guidelines 	delineated 	in 	the
PSR, 	with 	the 	base-offense-level 	modification 	requested 	by 	the
Government. 	(See id.; see also Statement of Reasons, ECF No. 221
(sealed), at §§ III, VIII.)
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 13 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
This Court also informed Petitioner it had reviewed the
PSR, 	his 	counsel’s 	Sentencing 	Memo, 	the 	letters 	of 	support 	from
family 	and 	friends, 	and 	the 	Government’s 	Sentencing 	Memo. 	(See
id. 	at 	5.) 	Further, 	it 	heard 	from 	both 	defense 	counsel 	and 	the
Government regarding their respective positions on the sentence to
be imposed. 	In addition to the arguments raised by defense counsel
in 	his 	Sentencing 	Memo, 	counsel 	also: 	advocated 	for 	leniency 	in
sentencing based upon Petitioner having been housed in MDC Brooklyn
for approximately two-and-one-half years prior to sentencing (see
id. 	at 	10-11); 	initially 	sought 	some 	parity 	in 	sentencing 	with
co-defendant Wiggins, who counsel argued was similarly situated to
Petitioner 	(see 	id. 	at 	11); 	but, 	proceeded 	to 	seek 	a 	lower
imprisonment 	sentence 	than 	Wiggins’ 	15 	years, 	since, 	contrary 	to
Wiggins, Petitioner did not attempt to tamper with a case witness
and 	proffered 	cooperation 	with 	law 	enforcement 	(see 	id. 	at 	12).
Additionally, Petitioner addressed the Court. 	(See id. at 16-18.)
After 	careful 	consideration 	of 	the 	Section 	3553(a)
sentencing 	factors, 	this 	Court 	imposed 	a 	substantially
below-Guidelines 	sentence 	of 	180 	months’ 	imprisonment 	on 	Count
One, which sentence the Government requested, and which was below
Probation’s 240-month recommendation. 	(See id. at 25; cf. id. at
24 (discussing Probation’s recommendation).) 	Petitioner was also
sentenced 	to 	five 	years’ 	supervised 	release. 	(See 	id.) 	On
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 14 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
February 	7, 	2024, 	the 	Court 	entered 	judgment 	on 	Petitioner’s
conviction. 	(See ECF No. 220.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Applicable Law
A. 	The Section 2255 Standard Generally
“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against
imprisonment 	of 	those 	held 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	law.” 	Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). 	To obtain relief under Section
2255, 	a 	petitioner 	must 	show 	“that 	the 	sentence 	was 	imposed 	in
violation 	of 	the 	Constitution 	or 	laws 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	or
that 	the 	court 	was 	without 	jurisdiction 	to 	impose 	such 	sentence,
or 	that 	the 	sentence 	was 	in 	excess 	of 	the 	maximum 	authorized 	by
law, 	or 	is 	otherwise 	subject 	to 	collateral 	attack.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2255(a); see also United States v. Hoskins, 905 F.3d 97, 102 (2d
Cir. 	2018). 	Therefore, 	a 	collateral 	attack 	on 	a 	conviction 	or
sentence 	is 	available 	“for 	a 	constitutional 	error, 	a 	lack 	of
jurisdiction 	in 	the 	sentencing 	court, 	or 	an 	error 	of 	law 	or 	fact
that constitutes ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in
a 	complete 	miscarriage 	of 	justice.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Bokun, 	73
F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 	428 	(1962)); 	accord 	Cuoco 	v. 	United 	States, 	208 	F.3d 	27, 	30
(2d 	Cir. 	2000); 	Rodriguez 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	11-CV-2957, 	2013
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 15 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
WL 6171618, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 41
(2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2017).
When determining whether to grant relief, Second Circuit
precedent 	“instructs 	that 	§ 	2255 	review 	is 	‘narrowly 	limited 	in
order to preserve the finality of criminal sentences and to effect
the 	efficient 	allocation 	of 	judicial 	resources.’” 	Hoskins, 	905
F.3d 	at 	102 	(quoting 	Graziano 	v. 	United 	States, 	83 	F.3d 	587, 	590
(2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Yick
Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Because
collateral 	challenges 	are 	in 	tension 	with 	society’s 	strong
interest in the finality of criminal convictions, the courts have
established 	rules 	that 	make 	it 	more 	difficult 	for 	a 	defendant 	to
upset 	a 	conviction 	by 	collateral, 	as 	opposed 	to 	direct, 	attack.”
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted)). 	Additionally, 	in 	advancing
a 	federal 	habeas 	corpus 	writ, 	the 	petitioner 	has 	the 	burden 	of
proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 	See Negron
v. 	United 	States, 	520 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	296, 	301 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2021) 	(“A
§ 2255 	movant 	bears 	the 	burden 	to 	prove 	the 	claims 	in 	his 	§ 	2255
motion 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence.” 	(citing 	Triana 	v.
United 	States, 	205 	F.3d 	36, 	40 	(2d 	Cir. 	2000) 	(further 	citation
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 16 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
omitted)); 	accord 	Skaftouros 	v. 	United 	States, 	667 	F.3d 	144, 	158
(2d Cir. 2011).
B. 	Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims
Claims 	of 	ineffective 	assistance 	of
counsel are evaluated under the framework set
forth 	in 	Strickland 	v. 	Washington, 	466 	U.S.
668 	(1984). 	“First, 	the 	[petitioner] 	must
show 	that 	counsel’s 	performance 	was
deficient.” 	Strickland, 	466 	U.S. 	at 	687.
“Second, 	the 	[petitioner] 	must 	show 	that 	the
deficient 	performance 	prejudiced 	the
defense.” Id.
Herring 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	20-CV-9752, 	2025 	WL 	3124678, 	at 	*4
(S.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 	6, 	2025); 	see 	also 	Cabral 	v. 	United 	States, 	No.
12-CR-0336, 2022 WL 307809, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (stating,
“to 	prevail 	on 	his 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	claim,
[petitioner] must ‘(1) demonstrate that his counsel’s performance
‘fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of 	reasonableness’ 	in 	light 	of
‘prevailing 	professional 	norms,’’ 	and 	(2) 	‘‘affirmatively 	prove
prejudice’ 	arising 	from 	counsel’s 	allegedly 	deficient
representation’” 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Cohen, 	427 	F.3d 	164,
167 (2d Cir. 2005); further citation omitted)). 	As to the first,
“performance” 	prong, 	a 	petitioner 	must: 	(a) 	“show 	that 	his
counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of
reasonableness 	under 	prevailing 	professional 	norms”, 	with 	the
court’s review being highly deferential and indulging in a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable 	professional 	assistance”; 	and 	(b) 	“overcome 	the
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 17 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
presumption 	that, 	under 	the 	circumstances, 	the 	challenged 	action
might 	be 	considered 	sound 	trial 	strategy.” 	United 	States 	v.
Peterson, 	896 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	305, 	312 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2012) 	(quoting
Strickland; internal quotation marks omitted). 	As to the second,
“prejudice” 	prong, 	a 	petitioner 	“must 	demonstrate 	that, 	‘but 	for
counsel’s 	unprofessional 	errors, 	the 	result 	of 	the 	proceeding
would 	have 	been 	different.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Stickland). 	In 	that
vein, 	a 	petitioner 	is 	required 	to 	show 	“[t]he 	likelihood 	of 	a
different 	result 	[was] 	substantial, 	not 	just 	conceivable.”
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And, “[i]n assessing prejudice, courts ‘must consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury.’” 	Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 389 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
Continuing,
[i]n 	the 	specific 	context 	of 	guilty 	pleas,
Strickland’s 	prejudice 	component 	“focuses 	on
whether 	counsel’s 	constitutionally
ineffective 	performance 	affected 	the 	outcome
of 	the 	plea 	process.” 	Hill, 	474 	U.S. 	at 	59.
One way to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement
is 	to 	“show 	that 	there 	is 	a 	reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would 	not 	have 	pleaded 	guilty 	and 	would 	have
insisted 	on 	going 	to 	trial.” 	Id.; 	see 	also
Kovacs 	v. 	United 	States, 	744 	F.3d 	44, 	51–52
(2d 	Cir. 	2014) 	(discussing 	various 	ways 	that
prejudice 	may 	be 	shown 	in 	the 	guilty 	plea
context, 	including 	a 	forgone 	decision 	to
proceed 	to 	trial 	or 	a 	more 	advantageous 	plea
offer). 	In 	addition, 	a 	petitioner 	may 	show
prejudice by demonstrating that he would have
received 	and 	accepted 	a 	guilty 	plea 	with 	a
lower sentence but for counsel’s errors. 	See
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 18 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

19
Missouri 	v. 	Frye, 	566 	U.S. 	134, 	147 	(2012);
see 	also 	Lafler 	v. 	Cooper, 	566 	U.S. 	156, 	174
(2012) (finding prejudice where the defendant
showed 	that, 	but 	for 	counsel’s 	deficient
performance, 	there 	was 	a 	reasonable
probability that the court would have accepted
a guilty plea with a sentence less than a third
of 	the 	length 	of 	the 	sentence 	he 	received
after 	trial). 	Thus, 	with 	respect 	to 	plea
bargaining, 	a 	defendant 	must 	show 	that 	“the
outcome 	of 	the 	plea 	process 	would 	have 	been
different with competent advice.” 	Lafler, 566
U.S. at 163.
United 	States 	v. 	Derounian, 	No. 	16-CR-0412, 	2024 	WL 	3623522, 	at
*14 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	1, 	2024). 	The 	Derounian 	Court 	also 	noted, 	as
to 	a 	petitioner’s 	purported 	insistence 	on 	proceeding 	to 	trial, 	a
“petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the
plea 	bargain 	would 	have 	been 	rational 	under 	the 	circumstances.”
Id. 	at 	*14 	n.17 	(quoting 	Padilla 	v. 	Kentucky, 	559 	U.S. 	356, 	372
(2010)). 	And, of significance, the Second Circuit “requires some
objective 	evidence 	other 	than 	[petitioner’s] 	assertions 	to
establish 	prejudice.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Pham 	v. 	United 	States, 	317
F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2003); further citation omitted).
“Because 	both 	parts 	of 	the 	Strickland 	test 	must 	be
satisfied for a petitioner to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, failure to satisfy one part of the test frees a district
court 	from 	assessing 	whether 	the 	petitioner 	satisfied 	the 	other
part 	of 	the 	test.” 	Velez 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	05-CV-0537, 	2006
WL 1952191, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2006) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 699 (instructing a court need not “address both components
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 19 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

20
of 	the 	[two-part 	Strickland] 	inquiry 	if 	the 	defendant 	makes 	an
insufficient 	showing 	on 	one”)); 	see 	also 	Derounian, 	2024 	WL
3623522, 	at 	*12 	(“A 	court 	must 	reject 	a 	petitioner’s 	ineffective
assistance 	of 	counsel 	claim 	if 	it 	fails 	to 	meet 	either 	prong.”
(citing 	Gonzalez 	v. 	United 	States, 	722 	F.3d 	118, 	130 	(2d 	Cir.
2013)).
C. 	Consideration of Petitioner’s Pro Se Status
“When 	a 	defendant 	attacking 	his 	. 	. 	. 	sentence 	is
proceeding 	pro 	se, 	the 	court 	must 	‘read 	[the 	defendant’s]
submissions 	broadly 	so 	as 	to 	determine 	whether 	they 	raise 	any
colorable 	legal 	claims.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Williams, 	No.
20-CR-0404, 2025 WL 660213, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2025) (quoting
United States v. Parisi, 529 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2008); further
citation 	omitted). 	Hence, 	since 	Petitioner’s 	submissions 	were
filed 	pro 	se, 	the 	Court 	has 	liberally 	construed 	them 	“‘to 	raise
the 	strongest 	arguments 	that 	they 	suggest.’” 	Kirkland 	v.
Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burgos
v. 	Hopkins, 	14 	F.3d 	787, 	790 	(2d 	Cir. 	1994)). 	Nonetheless, 	this
does not excuse Petitioner “‘from comply[ing] with relevant rules
of 	procedural 	and 	substantive 	law.’” 	Traguth 	v. 	Zuck, 	710 	F.2d
90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593
(5th 	Cir. 	1981)). 	Furthermore, 	“if 	it 	plainly 	appears 	from 	the
motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings
that 	the 	moving 	party 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	relief, 	the 	[district
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 20 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

21
court] 	must 	dismiss 	the 	[habeas] 	motion.” 	Seabrook 	v. 	United
States, No. 22-841, 2023 WL 7489961, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2023)
(quoting 	Puglisi 	v. 	United 	States, 	586 	F.3d 	209, 	213 	(2d 	Cir.
2009)).
II. 	Application
A. 	The Petition
1. 	Petitioner’s Position
In 	seeking 	to 	have 	his 	sentence 	vacated, 	Petitioner
raises four claims: 	(a) an assertion that his plea was not taken
knowingly or intelligently (see Petition at 5); (b) the purported
incorrect 	calculation 	of 	drug 	quantities 	(see 	id. 	at 	6); 	(c) 	a
claim 	Petitioner 	did 	not 	receive 	a 	copy 	of 	either 	his 	PSR 	or 	the
Sentencing 	Memorandum 	his 	counsel 	submitted 	prior 	to 	sentencing
(see 	id. 	at 	8); 	and 	(d) 	Petitioner’s 	counsel 	allegedly 	failed 	to
advocate 	on 	behalf 	of 	Petitioner 	(see 	id. 	at 	9). 	As 	an 	initial
observation, at best, Petitioner’s claims are conclusory; they are
bald allegations, unsupported by specific facts and/or incredible
given 	the 	record 	before 	the 	Court. 	Further, 	the 	bare-boned
Petition 	is 	not 	supported 	by 	any 	memorandum 	of 	law. 	Since 	it 	is
plain 	from 	the 	Petition 	and 	the 	record 	of 	prior 	proceedings 	in
this case involving this Petitioner that Petitioner is not entitled
to 	habeas 	relief, 	this 	conflation 	of 	observations 	supports 	the
conclusion 	that 	a 	summary 	dismissal 	is 	warranted. 	See 	Seabrook,
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 21 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

22
2023 	WL 	7489961, 	at 	*2. 	Nonetheless, 	the 	Court 	proceeds 	with 	a
thorough assessment of the Petition.
2. 	The Government’s Position
The 	Government’s 	views 	the 	four 	grounds 	for 	habeas
relief 	presented 	by 	Petitioner 	as, 	in 	essence,
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 	claims. 	(See 	Opp’n 	at 	6.)
According to the Government:
First, 	counsel 	allegedly 	never 	showed 	the
defendant the plea agreement prior to the plea
and told the defendant that if he accepted the
offer, 	he 	“would 	qualify 	for 	the 	First 	Step
Act 	because 	[of] 	the 	removal 	of 	the 	gun
charge.” 	Second, 	counsel 	failed 	to 	notice
that the drug weight guidelines were allegedly
incorrect. 	Third, 	counsel 	allegedly 	never
showed 	the 	defendant 	his 	PSR. 	And 	fourth,
counsel allegedly never challenged certain of
the enhancements in the PSR.
(Id.) 	It maintains each basis Petitioner puts forth in support of
habeas 	relief 	is 	meritless, 	warranting 	its 	summary 	denial. 	(See
id.) 	For the reasons elucidated herein, the Court agrees.
B. 	The Court’s Ruling
As a threshold matter, the Court has determined a hearing
on 	the 	Petition 	is 	not 	required 	in 	this 	instance; 	on 	the 	record
presented, Petitioner has not made out a prima facie case that he
is 	entitled 	to 	habeas 	relief. 	See 	generally 	Puglisi 	v. 	United
States, 586 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b);
Ulbricht v. United States, No. 14-CR-0068, 2022 WL 2116685, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. 	June 	13, 	2022) 	(recognizing 	“a 	decision 	without 	a
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 22 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

23
testimonial hearing is proper where [among other situations,] the
allegations of the motion, accepted as true, would not entitle the
petitioner to relief”) (citation modified). 	To begin, Petitioner
never 	stated 	that, 	but 	for 	his 	defense 	counsel’s 	purported
ineffective assistance, Petitioner would not have pled guilty; nor
is 	there 	any 	affidavit 	from 	Petitioner 	to 	that 	effect. 	(See
Petition, in toto); see also Puglisi, 586 F.3d at 215-16. 	Indeed,
Petitioner has not supported any of his grounds for habeas relief
with 	an 	affidavit. 	(See 	id.); 	see 	also 	Puglisi, 	586 	F.3d 	at
216-17. 	Further, 	Petitioner 	fails 	to 	support 	his
ineffective-assistance 	claims 	with 	any 	other 	objective 	evidence.
(See 	id.); 	Puglisi, 	586 	F.3d 	at 	216. 	Where 	it 	is 	apparent 	a
petitioner has not presented a colorable basis for relief and the
record conclusively shows the petitioner is not entitled to habeas
relief, 	a 	court 	may 	dismiss 	the 	habeas 	petition 	without 	an
evidentiary 	hearing. 	Cf. 	Puglisi, 	586 	F.3d 	at 	213; 	see 	also
Seabrook, 	2023 	WL 	7489961, 	at 	*2 	(affirming 	dismissal 	of 	habeas
petition 	without 	hearing 	where 	petition 	was 	without 	merit).
Accordingly, given its review of the Petition and the record, this
Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing and proceeds to rule
upon the parties’ submissions.
For 	each 	of 	the 	four 	grounds 	Petitioner 	puts 	forth 	in
support 	of 	his 	Section 	2255 	habeas 	Petition, 	he 	is 	unable 	to
satisfy the requisite prejudice prong. 	That is because, given the
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 23 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

24
specific facts of this case, Petitioner is unable to convince the
Court 	that 	a 	decision 	to 	have 	rejected 	his 	Plea 	Agreement 	would
have been rational under the circumstances. 	See Derouian, 2024 WL
3623522, 	at 	*14 	and 	n.17. 	Indeed, 	under 	the 	facts 	of 	this 	case,
Petitioner’s 	various 	claims 	that 	he 	would 	have 	rejected 	the 	Plea
Agreement 	but 	for 	advice 	of 	counsel—regardless 	of 	the 	different
ways 	he 	presents 	those 	claims--defy 	credulity. 	Rather, 	as 	the
Government aptly explains:
the 	plea 	agreement 	that 	counsel 	secured 	for
[Petitioner] 	allowed 	[Petitioner] 	to 	plead
guilty 	to 	an 	offense 	with 	a 	ten-year 	[(i.e.,
120 	months)] 	mandatory 	minimum 	and 	a 	cap 	on
the 	government’s 	recommendation 	of 	15 	years’
imprisonment. 	Counsel’s 	negotiation 	also
prompted the government to dismiss the second
count 	of 	the 	indictment, 	using 	a 	firearm 	in
furtherance of drug trafficking, as covered by
the 	plea. 	This 	second 	charged 	crime 	would
have required [Petitioner] to be sentenced to
an additional five years’ incarceration to run
consecutive to his drug conviction. 	This was
an 	extremely 	favorable 	disposition 	for
[Petitioner], considering that the parties, in
the 	plea 	agreement, 	jointly 	believed 	the
guideline 	range, 	after 	acceptance 	of
responsibility, 	to 	be 	210 	– 	262 	months
imprisonment. 	Had 	[Petitioner] 	rejected 	the
plea agreement and gone to trial, which he now
contends 	he 	wants, 	[Petitioner] 	would 	have
been calculated as a base offense level of 44,
and his guideline range of imprisonment would
have been life.
[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 24 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

25
(Opp’n at 99 (emphasis added).) 	Moreover, in light of the extensive
evidence the Government had against Petitioner--e.g., surveillance
video 	of 	Petitioner 	transporting 	Narcotics; 	GPS 	monitoring 	of
Petitioner’s 	vehicle 	travelling 	to 	California; 	postal 	records
showing 	Narcotics 	being 	delivered; 	wiretap 	communications; 	the
recovery 	of 	huge 	quantities 	of 	cash, 	drugs 	and 	guns 	from
Petitioner’s 	home 	and 	the 	homes 	of 	his 	co-conspirators; 	and
eyewitness 	testimony 	of 	Petitioner’s 	involvement 	in 	the 	subject
conspiracy 	(see 	Plea 	Hr’g 	Tr. 	at 	18)--Petitioner’s 	contention 	he
would 	have 	fared 	better 	if 	he 	proceeded 	to 	trial 	is 	patently
unavailing. 	Such a bald claim is simply irrational; it certainly
does 	not 	warrant 	habeas 	relief 	under 	any 	of 	the 	four 	grounds
Petitioner asserts.
Likewise, other than his bald assertions,
Petitioner has failed to proffer any objective
evidence 	demonstrating 	prejudice. 	See
Norville 	[v. 	United 	States], 	151 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
[329,] 	336 	[(S.D.N.Y. 	2015)] 	(addressing
prejudice 	prong 	of 	the 	Strickland 	test;
instructing 	a 	petitioner 	must 	affirmatively
prove 	prejudice 	by 	showing 	“there 	is 	a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional 	errors, 	the 	result 	of 	the
proceeding 	would 	have 	been 	different” 	and
“some 	objective 	evidence 	other 	than
[petitioner’s] 	assertions 	is 	required 	to
establish 	prejudice” 	(quoting 	Pham 	v. 	United
States, 	317 	F.3d 	178, 	182 	(2d 	Cir.2003))
(citation 	modified). 	In 	the 	absence 	of
establishing prejudice, Petitioner’s claim of
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel [] fail[s].
9 	The Government advances 	this argument as to 	Ground One, but 	it
equally applies to all four grounds advanced by Petitioner.
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 25 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

26
Hardy 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	17-CR-0372, 	2026 	WL 	252003, 	at 	*9
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026). 	Even if that were not true, as explained
below, 	because 	Petitioner 	is 	unable 	to 	establish 	the 	performance
prong 	of 	the 	Strickland 	test 	as 	to 	each 	Ground 	he 	advances 	for
habeas relief, his Petition would be denied nonetheless.
1. 	As to Ground One: 	The Plea Claim
This Court has previously explained:
To 	succeed 	on 	an 	ineffective 	assistance
of counsel claim in the context of [a] guilty
plea, “the petitioner must show that the plea
agreement 	was 	not 	knowing 	and 	voluntary,
because 	the 	advice 	he 	received 	from 	counsel
was not within acceptable standards.” 	Parisi
v. 	United 	States, 	529 	F.3d 	134, 	138 	(2d 	Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). 	If 	a 	petitioner 	shows 	that 	he 	was
subjected 	to 	objectively 	unreasonable
representation, he must still show that he was
prejudiced. 	In other words, he must show that
“there 	is 	a 	reasonable 	probability 	that, 	but
for 	counsel’s 	errors, 	he 	would 	not 	have
pleaded 	guilty 	and 	would 	have 	insisted 	on
going 	to 	trial.” 	Hill 	v. 	Lockhart, 	474 	U.S.
52, 59 (1985). 	Crucially, “[a] defendant who
pleads 	guilty 	unconditionally 	while
represented 	by 	counsel 	may 	not 	assert
independent 	claims 	relating 	to 	events
occurring 	prior 	to 	the 	entry 	of 	the 	guilty
plea.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Coffin, 	76 	F.3d 	494,
497 (2d Cir. 1996).
Cabral, 2022 WL 307809, at *6 (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner argues his plea was not taken knowingly
or intelligently because he never received documentation from his
attorney regarding the Plea Agreement “until well after the fact.”
(Petition 	at 	5.) 	He 	also 	claims 	his 	counsel 	advised 	him 	that 	by
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 26 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

27
accepting 	the 	Government’s 	plea 	offer, 	Petitioner 	would 	qualify
for 	the 	First 	Step 	Act. 	(See 	id.) 	Both 	arguments 	are 	belied 	by
the record.
First, 	as 	the 	transcript 	of 	his 	change-of-plea 	hearing
makes 	abundantly 	clear, 	Petitioner’s 	plea 	was 	made 	knowingly,
intelligently, 	and 	voluntarily. 	(See 	Plea 	Hr’g 	Tr. 	3-6; 	11-14.)
His plea-related colloquy with the Court, made under oath, confirms
as 	much, 	including 	confirming 	he 	was 	familiar 	with 	the 	Plea
Agreement, 	which 	both 	he 	and 	his 	counsel 	signed. 	(See 	id. 	at
10:7-11.) 	Petitioner’s 	sworn 	statements 	made 	during 	his 	plea
“carry a ‘strong presumption of verity.’” 	Cabral, 2022 WL 307809,
at *5 (quoting Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74); see also Yushavyev v.
United 	States, 	532 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	455, 	471 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2008) 	(quoting
Blackledge). 	Thus, 	Petitioner’s 	self-serving 	statements 	in 	his
Petition, 	which 	are 	contradicted 	by 	his 	sworn 	statements 	at 	the
change-of-plea 	hearing--as 	well 	as 	at 	the 	sentencing 	hearing--
fails to establish his counsel was deficient in his performance.
Second, 	it 	is 	unclear 	how 	the 	alleged 	non-receipt 	of 	a
hard copy of his Plea Agreement had any affect on the knowing and
intelligent entry of Petitioner’s plea. 	Petitioner has not pointed
to, nor is the Court aware of, any authority requiring a criminal
defendant 	to 	have 	received 	a 	hard 	copy 	of 	a 	plea 	agreement 	prior
to entering a plea. 	Cf. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004)
(“An attorney . . . has a duty to consult with the client regarding
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 27 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

28
important 	decisions 	. 	. 	. 	.” 	(emphasis 	added)). 	Conversely 	and
in 	any 	event, 	the 	record 	clearly 	established 	Petitioner’s:
familiarity 	with 	the 	Plea 	Agreement, 	having 	reviewed 	said
Agreement with his attorney; and having executed the Agreement, as
did his attorney. 	(See id. at 10:7-11; see also generally Standard
Plea Form at 8.) 	Moreover, Petitioner had the opportunity to raise
the 	alleged 	non-receipt 	of 	a 	hard 	copy 	of 	the 	Plea 	Agreement 	at
his change-of-plea hearing, but he did not do so. 	(See Plea Hr’g
Tr. 	13:18-21 	(“THE 	COURT: 	Do 	you 	have 	any 	questions 	at 	all 	that
you want to ask me about the charge, your rights, or anything else
relating 	to 	this 	matter? 	THE 	DEFENDANT: 	No, 	ma’am.” 	(emphasis
added)).) 	Therefore, any complaint on that basis lacks merit.
In 	any 	event, 	even 	if 	Petitioner’s 	tardy-receipt 	claim
is 	true, 	i.e., 	he 	did 	not 	receive 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	Plea 	Agreement
until 	November 	11, 	2023, 	approximately 	a 	year 	after 	his
change-of-plea 	(see 	Petition 	at 	5), 	Petitioner 	has 	failed 	to
demonstrate 	how 	such 	alleged 	tardiness 	caused 	defense 	counsel’s
performance 	to 	fall 	outside 	the 	broad 	range 	of 	prevailing
professional 	norms, 	thereby 	impeding 	Petitioner’s 	right 	to
effective assistance of counsel. 	And, Petitioner’s November 2023
receipt 	of 	the 	Plea 	Agreement 	occurred 	before 	Petitioner’s
February 5, 2024 sentencing, during which hearing the Court--once
more--inquired of Petitioner whether he was satisfied with defense
counsel’s 	representation 	and 	during 	which--once 	more--Petitioner
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 28 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

29
stated 	he 	was 	satisfied. 	The 	Court 	reiterates 	that 	such
statements, made under oath, are afforded a strong presumption of
truthfulness, which presumption Petitioner has woefully failed to
overcome. 	See 	Hardy, 	2026 	WL 	252003, 	at 	*9 	(finding 	sworn
statement made in open court carried strong presumption of truth;
rejecting 	petitioner’s 	ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 	claim
where 	petitioner 	stated, 	at 	his 	sentencing 	hearing, 	he 	was
satisfied with his defense counsel).
Finally, 	as 	to 	the 	branch 	of 	Petitioner’s 	Ground 	One
regarding 	his 	attorney’s 	alleged 	advice 	regarding 	qualifying 	for
First Step Act credit, upon the record presented, it is unavailing.
As 	highlighted 	by 	the 	Government, 	in 	both 	the 	Standard 	Plea 	Form
and 	at 	his 	change-of-plea 	hearing, 	Petitioner 	confirmed 	“that
other 	than 	the 	agreement 	on 	the 	record, 	no 	one 	had 	made 	any
promises that caused him to plead guilty, and no one had made him
any 	promises 	as 	to 	what 	his 	sentence 	would 	be.” 	(Opp’n 	at 	9
(citing Standard Plea Form at 8; Plea Hr’g Tr. at 14).) 	Petitioner
has 	failed 	to 	overcome 	the 	presumptive 	truthfulness 	of 	those
representations 	made 	at 	his 	change-of-plea 	hearing. 	See, 	e.g.,
Oklu 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	12-CR-0177, 	2016 	WL 	1383530, 	at 	*3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2016) (“It is well-established that ‘allegations
a 	defendant 	makes 	in 	a 	Section 	2255 	petition 	cannot 	overcome 	his
contrary 	statements 	under 	oath 	during 	a 	plea 	allocution, 	which
must 	be 	given 	presumptive 	force 	of 	truth.’” 	(quoting 	Norville,
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 29 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

30
151 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	336; 	further 	citation 	omitted) 	(citation
modified).
At 	bottom, 	Petitioner 	has 	not 	shown: 	(a) 	any 	purported
failure to provide him with documents regarding his Plea Agreement
interfered with his knowing and intelligent entry of a guilty plea;
and 	(b) 	how 	his 	counsel’s 	First 	Step 	Act 	qualification 	advice
rendered 	Petitioner’s 	plea 	to 	be 	unknowing 	or 	unintelligent.
Rather, 	upon 	the 	record 	presented, 	as 	to 	Ground 	One, 	there 	is 	an
absence 	of 	any 	evidence 	of 	defense 	counsel’s 	performance 	being
constitutionally deficient assistance.
2. 	As to Ground Two: 	The Drug Quantity Claim
Petitioner 	baldly 	asserts 	the 	Probation 	Department
improperly calculated his offense level, based upon the weight of
drugs 	involved; 	as 	a 	result, 	the 	Probation 	Department 	assessed
Petitioner’s offense level too high, i.e., at an offense level of
36 rather than at offense level 30. 	(See Petition at 6.) 	As the
Government 	acknowledges, 	Petitioner’s 	“second 	claim 	is 	not 	an
ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	claim.” 	(Opp’n 	at 	10.)
Moreover, 	the 	Government 	argues 	Petitioner 	“waived 	his 	right 	to
challenge 	the 	guideline 	calculation”, 	which 	waiver 	was 	made
knowingly, competently, and voluntarily. 	(Id.) 	The Court agrees
with the Government on both points.
The Second Circuit instructs:
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 30 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

31
Waivers of the right to appeal a sentence
are presumptively enforceable. 	United States
v. 	Gomez–Perez, 	215 	F.3d 	315, 	319 	(2d
Cir.2000). 	“Knowing 	and 	voluntary 	appellate
waivers 	included 	in 	plea 	agreements 	must 	be
enforced 	because, 	if 	they 	are 	not, 	the
covenant not to appeal becomes meaningless and
would cease to have value as a bargaining chip
in the hands of defendants.” 	United States v.
Granik, 	386 	F.3d 	404, 	412 	(2d 	Cir.2004)
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	As 	a
result, we find waivers unenforceable only in
very 	limited 	situations, 	“such 	as 	when 	the
waiver 	was 	not 	made 	knowingly, 	voluntarily,
and 	competently[;] 	when 	the 	sentence 	was
imposed 	based 	on 	constitutionally
impermissible factors, such as ethnic, racial
or 	other 	prohibited 	biases[;] 	when 	the
government 	breached 	the 	plea 	agreement[;] 	or
when the sentencing court failed to enunciate
any 	rationale 	for 	the 	defendant’s 	sentence.”
Gomez–Perez, 	215 	F.3d 	at 	319 	(internal
citations omitted).
United 	States 	v. 	Arevalo, 	628 	F.3d 	93, 	98 	(2d 	Cir. 	2010); 	United
States v. Kimmons, No. 19-4374-CR, 2022 WL 2344088, at *1 (2d Cir.
June 	29, 	2022) 	(summary 	order) 	(relying 	upon 	Arevalo, 	dismissing
appeal based upon defendant’s waiver of right to appeal contained
in his plea agreement).
Here, 	Petitioner’s 	Plea 	Agreement 	contained 	an 	appeal
waiver, 	which 	stated 	in 	relevant 	part 	that 	Petitioner 	agreed 	not
to “otherwise challenge, by petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
or 	any 	other 	provision, 	the 	conviction 	or 	sentence 	in 	the 	event
that 	the 	Court 	imposes 	a 	term 	of 	imprisonment 	of 	293 	months 	or
below.” 	(Plea Agmt. ¶4.) 	As established, Petitioner was sentenced
to 180 months’ imprisonment, thereby triggering the applicability
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 31 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

32
of 	the 	appeal 	waiver, 	which 	included 	precluding 	a 	challenge
pursuant to Section 2255. 	(See supra at 14.) 	And, as discussed,
Petitioner 	knowingly 	and 	voluntarily 	entered 	a 	guilty 	plea 	in
accordance 	with 	the 	Plea 	Agreement. 	(See 	supra 	at 	6-8.) 	In
ensuring 	that 	was 	the 	case, 	at 	his 	change-of-plea 	hearing, 	the
Court 	specifically 	raised 	the 	Plea 	Agreement, 	including 	the
inclusion 	of 	the 	appeal 	waiver, 	and 	confirmed 	Petitioner’s
familiarity 	with 	said 	Agreement 	and 	that 	it 	was 	signed 	by 	both
Petitioner 	and 	his 	counsel. 	(See 	Plea 	Hr’g 	Tr. 	9:24-10:11.)
Therefore, any assertion the appeal waiver provision was not agreed
to 	knowingly 	and 	voluntarily 	is 	patently 	unavailing. 	Further,
Petitioner 	has 	not 	challenged 	the 	validity 	of 	his 	appeals 	waiver
on 	any 	of 	the 	other 	prescribed 	grounds 	identified 	by 	the 	Second
Circuit 	for 	finding 	an 	appeals 	waiver 	to 	be 	unenforceable. 	See
Kimmons, 2022 WL 2344088, at *1 (quoting Arevalo, 628 F.3d at 98).
“[H]is 	appellate 	waiver 	is 	thus 	enforceable, 	barring 	the 	instant
claim.” 	Id.
3. 	As to Ground Three: 	The Receipt-of-Copies Claim
Petitioner makes unsubstantiated claims that his counsel
did 	not 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	copies 	of 	the 	PSR 	or 	counsel’s
Sentencing Memorandum prior to Petitioner’s sentencing and “never
told 	[Petitioner] 	about 	the 	leadership 	enhancements 	or 	the 	level
41 calculation.” 	(Petition at 8.) 	He also half-heartedly states
counsel 	“didn’t 	really 	try 	to 	argue 	these 	issues 	either.” 	The
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 32 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

33
Government counters that Petitioner’s “claim that counsel did not
permit 	him 	to 	review 	the 	PSR 	or 	sentencing 	memorandum 	prior 	to
sentencing is belied by the record and meritless.” 	(Opp’n at 12.)
Once more, the Court concurs with the Government.
Assuming, 	arguendo, 	Petitioner 	did 	not 	receive 	hard
copies 	of 	the 	PSR 	or 	his 	counsel’s 	Sentencing 	Memo 	before
Petitioner’s 	sentencing, 	Petitioner 	has 	failed 	to 	establish 	such
purported 	inaction 	arises 	to 	the 	level 	of 	unconstitutional
assistance 	of 	counsel. 	As 	previously 	stated, 	Petitioner 	has 	not
pointed 	to, 	nor 	is 	this 	Court 	aware 	of, 	any 	requirement 	that 	a
criminal 	defendant 	receive 	a 	hard 	copy 	of 	either 	document 	before
being 	sentenced. 	Instead, 	the 	crucial 	issue 	is 	whether
Petitioner’s 	counsel 	reviewed 	the 	PSR 	with 	Petitioner; 	there 	is
nothing in the record establishing that did not occur. 	Moreover,
the Court informed Petitioner he had the right and could “speak to
the Court directly” regarding issues he believed the Court should
consider before he was sentenced. 	(Sent’g Hr’g Tr. 4:9-13.) 	Yet,
as the Government correctly states: 	“At no point did [Petitioner],
who 	was 	given 	the 	opportunity 	to 	address 	the 	[C]ourt, 	state 	that
he 	had 	not 	seen 	the 	PSR.” 	(Opp’n 	at 	12.) 	Moreover, 	when
specifically 	asked 	whether 	he 	was 	satisfied 	with 	the 	services 	of
his 	attorney, 	Petitioner 	stated 	he 	was. 	(See 	Sent’g 	Hr’g 	Tr.
4:2-4.) 	Petitioner’s “in-court statements are afforded a ‘strong
presumption of verity,’” Delutro v. United States, No. 11-CV-2755,
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 33 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

34
2014 WL 4639198, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (quoting Gonzalez,
722 F.3d at 130–31), “and create a ‘formidable barrier’ to habeas
relief.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Blackledge, 	431 	U.S. 	at 	74). 	Weighing
Petitioner’s 	sworn 	attestation 	that 	he 	was 	satisfied 	with 	his
attorney’s 	services 	against 	his 	current 	bald 	assertions 	to 	the
contrary, the Court finds Petitioner’s claims presented in Ground
Three meritless. 	See, e.g., Gist v. United States, No. 16-CR-0656,
2021 	WL 	3774289, 	at 	*25 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	24, 	2021) 	(“The 	Supreme
Court has long held that ‘[s]olemn declarations in open court carry
a 	strong 	presumption 	of 	verity. 	T[hus, 	t]he 	subsequent
presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is
subject 	to 	summary 	dismissal 	. 	. 	. 	.’” 	(quoting 	Blackledge, 	431
U.S. 	at 	74 	(citing 	Machibroda 	v. 	United 	States, 	368 	U.S. 	487,
495-96 (1962))). 	Hence, habeas relief is denied on this basis.
4. 	As to Ground Four: 	The Failure-to-Advocate Claim
Finally, 	Petitioner 	complains 	his 	counsel 	did 	not
advocate 	on 	his 	behalf 	and 	“never 	made 	any 	of 	the 	objections
[Petitioner] requested.” 	(Petition at 9.) 	The Government responds
that this claim is meritless, asserting “counsel properly objected
to 	several 	enhancements, 	including 	the 	leadership 	enhancement”,
and 	such 	advocacy 	resulted 	in 	the 	Court 	“accepting 	the 	guideline
range in the plea agreement, which did not include the leadership
enhancement or stash house enhancement.” 	(Opp’n at 12.) 	Moreover,
in his Sentencing Memo, defense counsel: raised “objections to the
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 34 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

35
Guidelines range set forth in the PSR” (id. (citing Def.’s Sent’g
Memo 	at 	3-4)); 	“put 	forth 	arguments 	to 	mitigate 	[Petitioner’s]
instant 	criminal 	conduct”; 	and, 	advanced 	mitigation 	arguments,
“emphasiz[ing] several points, including [Petitioner’s] acceptance
of 	responsibility” 	and 	relevant 	personal 	history. 	(Id. 	(citing
Def.’s Sent’g Memo at 8-9).)
Given 	the 	record 	before 	the 	Court, 	Petitioner’s
hindsight-based 	dissatisfaction 	is 	unavailing 	to 	establish
ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	warranting 	habeas 	relief.
Contrary 	to 	Petitioner’s 	current, 	self-serving 	contentions, 	his
counsel did advocate on Petitioner’s behalf in a manner that fell
well 	within 	the 	broad 	range 	of 	competent 	representation 	found 	to
be 	constitutional. 	The 	Court’s 	review 	of 	defense 	counsel’s
Sentencing Memo confirms the arguments advanced by the Government
here. 	(See Def.’s Sent’g Memo, in toto.)
And, prior to imposing its sentence, this Court informed
the parties it had reviewed, among other things, defense counsel’s
Sentencing Memo. 	(See Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 5:10-12.) 	Hence, there
was 	no 	need 	to 	reiterate 	arguments 	raised 	therein. 	Nonetheless,
this 	Court 	also 	heard 	from 	defense 	counsel 	who: 	joined 	in 	the
Government’s 	request 	that 	the 	Court 	apply 	the 	Guidelines 	range
agreed 	to 	by 	the 	parties 	in 	the 	Plea 	Agreement; 	advocated 	for 	a
rejection 	of 	the 	“supervisor 	role” 	enhancement; 	requested 	the
Court take into consideration the conditions-of-confinement which
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 35 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

36
Petitioner 	endured 	while 	housed 	at 	MDB 	Brooklyn 	prior 	to 	his
sentencing; 	and, 	highlighted 	the 	need 	to 	avoid 	sentencing
disparity with Petitioner’s co-defendants. 	(See Sent’ Hr’g Tr. at
8, 	11-12.) 	Given 	this 	advocacy 	and 	the 	resulting 	substantially
below-Guidelines 	sentence 	of 	180 	months’ 	imprisonment,
Petitioner’s 	claim 	rings 	hallow. 	He 	certainly 	cannot 	“show 	that
his 	counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms”, especially in
light 	of 	the 	Court’s 	required 	highly 	deferential 	review 	of 	that
performance 	and 	defense 	counsel’s 	entitlement 	to 	a 	“strong
presumption” that his representation fell within the wide range of
reasonable 	professional 	assistance 	acceptable 	for 	constitutional
purposes. 	Peterson, 	896 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	312; 	see 	also, 	e.g.,
Herring, 	2025 	WL 	3124678, 	at 	*4; 	see 	also 	Norville, 	151 	F. 	Supp.
3d at 336 (“An attorney’s performance is given a strong presumption
of effectiveness, as courts recognize a ‘wide range of professional
assistance.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 at 689)). 	Indeed, defense
counsel 	sought 	leniency 	for 	Petitioner, 	and 	that 	is 	exactly 	what
he 	received 	from 	this 	Court. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	finds
Petitioner’s Ground Four to be baseless.
-*-*-*-
To 	the 	extent 	not 	explicitly 	stated 	herein, 	the 	Court
has considered Petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds them to
be 	without 	merit. 	At 	bottom, 	given 	the 	record 	of 	this 	case, 	and
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 36 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

37
having considered the relevant case law, the Court finds Petitioner
is unable to satisfy the applicable Stickland test and is otherwise
precluded 	from 	advancing 	his 	arguments 	by 	the 	enforceable 	appeal
waiver 	in 	his 	Plea 	Agreement. 	In 	sum, 	habeas 	relief 	is 	not
warranted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, 	for 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY
ORDERED 	that 	Petitioner’s 	Petition 	seeking 	to 	vacate, 	set 	aside,
or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 238)
is DENIED in its entirety;
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED, 	because 	there 	can 	be 	no 	debate
among reasonable jurists that Petitioner is not entitled to relief,
the 	Court 	does 	not 	issue 	a 	Certificate 	of 	Appealability. 	See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); 	see 	also 	Middleton 	v. 	Att’ys 	Gen., 	396 	F.3d
207, 	209 	(2d 	Cir. 	2005); 	Baker 	v. 	United 	States, 	No. 	97-CR-0877,
2022 	WL 	2803556, 	at 	*2 	(E.D.N.Y. 	July 	18, 	2022) 	(“On 	the 	whole,
Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of his
constitutional 	rights, 	and 	the 	[court’s 	decision] 	thus 	does 	not
warrant a Certificate of Appealability.”); and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, the Clerk of the Court is directed
to 	mail 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and 	Order 	to 	Petitioner 	at 	his
address 	of 	record, 	including 	the 	notation 	“LEGAL 	MAIL” 	on 	the
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 37 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>

38
mailing 	envelope, 	and 	mark 	as 	“CLOSED” 	the 	corresponding 	civil
case, Case No. 24-CV-5918.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: 	February 18, 2026
Central Islip, New York
Case 2:21-cr-00452-JS Document 251 Filed 02/18/26 Page 38 of 38 PageID #:
<pageID>