USA v. Benitez et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 	12-CR-0336(JS)
ALVARO CABRAL,
Defendant.
---------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For the Government: Bradley T. King, Esq.
United States Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of New York
610 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, New York 	11722
For the Defendant: 	Alvaro Cabral, Pro se
#56830-018
FCI Sheridan
Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 5000
Sheridan, Oregon 	97378
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Currently 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	the 	pro 	se 	motion 	of
Defendant 	Alvaro 	Cabral 	(“Defendant” 	or 	“Cabral”) 	seeking 	a
sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act (the “FSA”, the
“Act” 	or 	the 	“First 	Step 	Act”), 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3582(c)(1)(A)
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(hereafter, 	the 	“Motion”).1 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	236.2) 	The 	Government
opposes the Motion. 	(See Opp’n, ECF No. 239.3,4) 	For the following
reasons, the Motion is DENIED without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
The 	Court 	presumes 	the 	parties’ 	familiarity 	with 	the
facts of this case, which are provided in the Court’s February 5,
2021 	Memorandum 	& 	Order 	denying 	Defendant’s 	first 	motion 	for
compassionate release (hereafter, the “February 2021 M&O”).5 	(See
February 2021 M&O, ECF No. 221, at 2-8 (redacted); see also id. at
ECF No. 222 (unredacted, sealed version); Opp’n at 1-3.) 	For the
1 	To 	the 	extent 	Defendant’s 	Motion, 	the 	Government’s 	Opposition
or this decision uses the terminology “compassionate release”, the
Court 	notes 	that 	phrase 	is 	not 	contained 	in 	the 	First 	Step 	Act;
rather it is one coined by the courts to characterize a reduction
in 	sentence 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Act. 	See, 	e.g., 	United 	States 	v.
Shakur, 498 F. Supp. 3d 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also United
States 	Brooker, 	976 	F.3d 	228, 	237 	(2d 	Cir. 	2020) 	(stating 	the
phrase “compassionate release is a misnomer” as the First Step Act
“in fact speaks of sentence reductions”).
2 	Herein, 	the 	Court 	will 	cite 	to 	the 	internal 	page 	numbers 	of
Defendant’s Motion.
3 	The 	Government’s 	Opposition 	lacks 	internal 	pagination;
therefore, 	the 	Court 	will 	cite 	the 	page 	numbers 	generated 	by 	the
Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system.
4 	Although 	afforded 	the 	opportunity 	to 	do 	so, 	Defendant 	did 	not
file 	a 	Reply 	to 	the 	Government’s 	Opposition. 	(See 	July 	8, 	2025
Electronic 	Order 	Setting 	Briefing 	Schedule; 	cf. 	Case 	Docket, 	in
toto.)
5 	The February 2021 M&O also ruled upon Defendant’s Section 2255
habeas petition, which the Court denied.
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reader’s convenience, the Court briefly states the following. 	As
part 	of 	a 	feud 	with 	a 	rival 	gang, 	Defendant, 	a 	member 	of 	the
violent Netas street gang, helped plan and carry out the execution
style murder of two teenagers. 	Eventually, Defendant pled guilty
to 	two 	counts 	of 	a 	superseding 	indictment 	and 	was 	convicted 	of
firearm-related 	murder 	pursuant 	to 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	924(j)(1). 	(See
Judgment, ECF No. 127.)
At 	his 	sentencing, 	“[t]he 	Court 	agreed 	that 	Defendant
did not pull the trigger but could not ‘assume that he said no’ to
the 	shootings.” 	(February 	2021 	M&O 	at 	7 	(citations 	omitted).)
Hence, 	the 	Court 	took 	Defendant’s 	role 	in 	the 	shooting 	into
consideration 	when 	it 	sentenced 	Defendant 	below 	the 	recommended
Guidelines; 	it 	also 	considered 	other 	factors, 	including
Defendant’s 	age 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	shootings, 	as 	well 	as 	his
physical and mental health, and his troubled childhood. 	(See id.
at 	4-8.) 	Ultimately, 	while 	Defendant 	was 	subject 	to 	a 	term 	of
imprisonment 	of 	life 	(see 	Presentence 	Investigation 	Report
(“PSR”), 	ECF 	No. 	104 	(sealed), 	¶¶ 105, 	106), 	and 	notwithstanding
the 	Probation 	Department’s 	recommendation 	of 	40 	years’
imprisonment (see Recommendation, ECF No. 104-1 (sealed)) and the
Government’s advocacy of a 30-year term of imprisonment (see Opp’n
at 5; see also Gov’t Sent’g Memo, ECF No. 123), the Court imposed
a sentence of 28 years’ imprisonment, which it characterized as “a
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tremendous 	break”. 	(See 	February 	2021 	M&O 	at 	id. 	at 	8 	(quoting
Sent’g Tr.).)
As 	stated, 	in 	February 	2021, 	the 	Court 	denied
Defendant’s first motion for compassionate release. 	(See February
2021 M&O at 22-27.) 	In that first motion, Defendant put forth as
purported extraordinary and compelling reasons to release him: the
spread 	of 	COVID-19 	among 	the 	prison 	population; 	his 	positive
institutional record; and, certain medical conditions he suffered.
(See 	id. 	at 	22.) 	The 	Court 	found 	none 	of 	the 	proffered
circumstances 	to 	be 	extraordinary 	or 	compelling. 	(See 	id. 	at
25-26.) 	As 	to 	the 	relevant 	Section 	3553(a) 	Factors, 	while 	the
Court 	found 	Defendant’s 	“history 	and 	characteristics” 	“arguably
favor 	an 	early 	release”, 	that 	factor 	was 	“outweighed 	by 	the
combined 	force 	of 	several 	other 	factors.” 	(Id. 	at 	26 	(citation
omitted).) 	More specifically, the Court stated:
“The 	nature 	and 	circumstances 	of 	his 	offense
of 	conviction 	-- 	to 	which 	he 	pleaded 	guilty
-- are serious.” 	United States v. Asaro, No.
17-CR-0127, 	2020 	WL 	1899221, 	at 	*7 	(E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 	17, 	2020). 	As 	the 	Court 	stated 	during
sentencing, 	Defendant 	participated 	in 	the
“senseless” 	and 	“deliberately 	planned”
execution-style 	murders 	of 	the 	Victims 	that
resulted in “incalculable” grief. 	(Sent’g Tr.
at 	38:4-16.) 	For 	ten 	years 	following 	the
murders, 	Defendant 	remained 	at 	liberty 	and
“was 	able 	to 	go 	about 	his 	business, 	have
children, 	lead 	a 	life, 	and 	move 	on,” 	but 	did
not 	rehabilitate 	himself 	and 	did 	not 	express
remorse. 	(Id. 	at 	39:18-25.) 	Moreover, 	the
Court varied downwardly to sentence Defendant
below 	the 	advisory 	Guidelines 	range 	and
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Probation’s 	recommendation 	(see 	Background
§ III, 	supra) 	so 	he 	could 	“take 	advantage 	of
whatever opportunities are presented to him in
jail” (Sent’g Tr. at 40:18-19.)
While the Court is pleased that Defendant
has 	taken 	significant 	steps 	towards
rehabilitation, the Court “intended then, and
intends 	now, 	for 	[Defendant] 	to 	serve 	the
totality 	of 	that 	sentence.” 	[United 	States
v.] Mateus, [No. 14-CR-0504,] 2020 WL 5096062,
at 	*4 	[(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	28, 	2020)].
Accordingly, 	the 	original 	sentence 	remains
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
“reflect 	the 	seriousness 	of 	the 	offense” 	and
“provide just punishment for the offense.” 	18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
(Id. at 26-27 (footnote omitted).)
Defendant 	is 	currently 	40-years-old 	and 	is 	serving 	his
sentence 	at 	the 	medium 	security 	Federal 	Correctional 	Institution
(“FCI”) Sheridan in Oregan; he has an anticipated release date of
June 2, 2036. 	See Fed. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”): Find an Inmate,
Alvarco 	Cabral 	(BOP 	Reg. 	No. 	56830-018),
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	9, 	2025)
(identifying 	Defendant’s 	location 	as 	“Sheridan 	FCI”). 	He 	now
moves, a second time, for an unspecified sentence reduction.
II. 	The Instant Motion
Defendant filed the instant Motion on July 2, 2025.6 	He
indicates 	U.S.S.G. 	§ 	1B1.13(b)(6), 	the 	so-called 	“unusually 	long
6 	While dated April 3, 2025, the Motion was mailed June 26, 2025
(see 	mailing 	Envelope, 	ECF 	No. 	236-2), 	and 	received 	by 	and 	filed
with 	the 	Court 	on 	July 	2, 	2025 	(see 	id. 	(stamped 	“RECEIEVED” 	on
July 2, 2025); see also Motion at 1 (same); but see Cert. of Serv.,
ECF 	No. 	236-1 	at 	ECF 	p.7 	(stating 	Motion 	was 	placed 	in 	FCI
Sheridan’s inmate mailbox on May 15, 2025).)
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sentence” 	reason, 	as 	the 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason 	for
his requested sentence reduction. 	(See Motion at 5-6.) 	Defendant
proceeds to assert “the new law 5H1.1 dealing with age at time of
crime”—which, for Defendant, was 19-years-old--is the law that has
changed 	since 	his 	first 	compassionate 	release 	motion, 	warranting
his instant request for a sentence reduction. 	(See id.; see also
Support 	Memo, 	ECF 	No. 	236-1 	at 	ECF 	pp. 	18-19.)) 	In 	passing,
Defendant 	also 	mentions 	his 	health 	and 	rehabilitative 	efforts
presumably 	as 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons; 	however, 	he
does 	not 	meaningfully 	develop 	either 	of 	these 	positions. 	(See
Support Memo at ECF p.18.) 	Nor does Defendant address the Section
3553(a) Factors.
Unsurprisingly, 	the 	Government 	opposes 	Defendant’s
Motion. 	(See Opp’n.) 	In essence, it asserts Defendant’s reliance
upon 	U.S.S.G. 	§ 	1B1.13(b)(6), 	the 	“unusually 	long 	sentence”
reason, 	is 	misplaced 	since 	Defendant 	cannot 	point 	to 	any 	“change
in law”. 	(Opp’n at 5.) 	Instead, the statute under which Defendant
was 	adjudicated 	guilty, 	“Section 	924(j)(1), 	then, 	as 	now,
authorizes 	a 	sentence 	of 	‘death 	or 	imprisonment 	for 	any 	term 	of
years or for life,’ in cases involving firearms-related murders.”
(Id. 	(stating 	further 	“there 	has 	been 	no 	change 	to 	the 	relevant
statute[]”).) 	Further, the Government contends, because Defendant
was 	subject 	to 	an 	“advisory 	Guidelines 	range 	[of] 	life
imprisonment, 	and 	the 	[D]efendant 	received 	a 	sentence 	far 	lower
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than 	the 	Guidelines 	range 	of 	life 	imprisonment 	. 	. 	. 	there 	is 	no
basis 	for 	compassionate 	release.” 	(Id. 	(collecting 	cases 	where
advisory Guidelines would not change length of sentences to which
defendants would be exposed).)
As 	to 	“[D]efendant’s 	reliance 	upon 	recently-amended
Sentencing 	Guideline 	Section 	5H1.1, 	which 	provides 	that 	‘[a]
downward 	departure 	also 	may 	be 	warranted 	due 	to 	the 	defendant’s
youthfulness at the time of the offense’,” the Government contends
such 	reliance 	is 	“meritless” 	and 	“misplaced” 	in 	this 	instance.
(Id. 	at 	6.) 	That 	is 	so 	since 	this 	Court 	has 	“already 	downwardly
departed 	from 	the 	advisory 	Guidelines 	range 	applicable 	to 	the
[D]efendant,” which was a substantial departure, and which already
took into account Defendant’s age at the time of the murders. 	(Id.
(citing February 2021 M&O at 7-9, 19).)
Finally, 	in 	addressing 	the 	relevant 	Section 	3553(a)
Factors, 	the 	Government 	maintains 	consideration 	of 	same,
especially 	“the 	seriousness 	of 	the 	offense, 	the 	need 	to 	promote
respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence, and protect the
public 	from 	further 	crimes 	of 	the 	[D]efendant”, 	demonstrates
Defendant 	should 	not 	be 	released 	early. 	(Opp’n 	at 	6.) 	It
underscores 	the 	seriousness 	of 	Defendant’s 	crime, 	detailing 	the
series of events which precipitated the merciless, execution-style
murder 	of 	two 	teenagers, 	emphasizing 	Defendant’s 	“knowing
culpability” 	and 	lack 	of 	remorse. 	(Id. 	at 	5-6.) 	The 	Government
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also 	asserts 	Defendant’s 	history 	and 	characteristics 	weigh
strongly 	against 	granting 	his 	Motion 	especially 	since 	“after 	his
participation 	in 	the 	murders, 	the 	[D]efendant 	became 	a 	dedicated
recidivist, amassing multiple convictions in the intervening eight
years that resulted in his being [in] Criminal History Category IV
at his sentencing.” 	(Id.) 	It further argues “the need to provide
adequate deterrence under Section 3553(a)(2)(B) supports continued
incarceration”, 	since 	“[p]rematurely 	ending 	this 	[D]efendant’s
sentence 	would 	send 	the 	wrong 	message 	to 	those 	still 	engaged 	in
violent gang activity, undermining efforts to deter such conduct.”
(Id.) 	Finally, the Government claims protecting the public remains
a 	viable 	consideration 	and 	weighs 	against 	releasing 	Defendant
early. 	(See id.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Applicable Law
“A 	court 	may 	not 	modify 	a 	term 	of 	imprisonment 	once 	it
has 	been 	imposed 	except 	pursuant 	to 	statute.” 	United 	States 	v.
Rabuffo, No. 16-CR-0148, 2020 WL 2523053, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 14,
2020) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Gotti, 	433 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	613, 	614
(S.D.N.Y. 	2020)). 	The 	FSA, 	which 	modified 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3582(c),
allows 	a 	court 	to 	modify 	a 	defendant’s 	sentence 	upon 	a 	motion 	of
either 	(i) 	the 	Director 	of 	the 	BOP, 	or 	(ii) 	the 	defendant 	“after
the 	defendant 	has 	fully 	exhausted 	all 	administrative 	rights 	to
appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s
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behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request
by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Thrower, 495
F. Supp. 3d 132, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). 	“The statute imposes three
independent, 	necessary 	requirements 	for 	release: 	exhaustion 	of
remedies, existence of an extraordinary and compelling reason for
sentence 	reduction, 	and 	that 	the 	§ 	3553(a) 	[F]actors 	warrant
reduction.” 	United States v. Hunter, No. 21-1773, 2022 WL 2288688,
at 	*1 	(2d 	Cir. 	June 	24, 	2022) 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Keitt, 	21
F.4th 	67, 	71 	(2d 	Cir. 	2021) 	(per 	curiam)); 	United 	States 	v.
Rodriguez, 	147 	F.4th 	217, 	222 	(2d 	Cir. 	2025) 	(same). 	“A
defendant’s 	failure 	to 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies 	is 	a
threshold matter preventing the [c]ourt from considering a Section
3582 	application[, 	i.e., 	a 	motion 	for 	compassionate 	release].”
United States v. Robinson, No. 10-CR-0789, 2022 WL 16924176, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 	14, 	2022) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Alvarez, 	No.
89-CR-0229, 2020 WL 4904586, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020)). 	And,
“[i]f any one requirement is not satisfied, the district court may
deny 	the 	motion 	without 	considering 	the 	remaining 	requirements.”
Hunter, 2022 WL 2288688, at *1 (citing Keitt, 21 F.4th at 72–73);
see 	also, 	e.g., 	United 	States 	v. 	Mighty, 	No. 	24-3043-CR, 	2025 	WL
3456894, 	*2 	(2d 	Cir. 	Dec. 	2, 	2025) 	(summary 	order) 	(“Because
extraordinary and compelling circumstances and the Section 3553(a)
factors must both support relief, concluding that either condition
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is lacking is sufficient to deny relief . . . .” (citing Keitt, 21
F.3d at 73)).
Where exhaustion is satisfied, in their consideration of
motions 	brought 	pursuant 	to 	the 	FSA, 	courts 	are 	to 	consider
whether a sentence “reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements 	issued 	by 	the 	Sentencing 	Commission”, 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A); 	see 	also 	U.S.S.G. 	§ 	1B1.13 	(“Policy 	Statement
1B1.13”), 	and 	whether 	the 	relevant 	Section 	3553(a) 	Factors 	favor
such 	a 	reduction. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Donato, 	No. 	95-CR-0223,
2024 	WL 	1513646, 	*5 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	18, 	2024); 	see 	also 	Keitt, 	21
F.4th 	at 	71; United 	States 	v. 	Torres-Teyer, 	No. 	01-CR-0021, 	2025
WL 2776048, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025) (stating a “defendant
must show [] extraordinary and compelling reasons that, consistent
with Policy Statement 1B1.13, warrant a sentence reduction . . . .
” (citing United States v. Feliz, No. 16-CR-0809, 2023 WL 8275897,
at *2-4 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2023); further citation omitted)).
However, “‘[r]ehabilitation . . . alone shall not be considered an
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason.’” 	United States v. Brooker,
976 	F.3d 	228, 	235–37 	(2d 	Cir. 	2020) 	(emphasis 	and 	alteration 	in
original) 	(quoting 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	994(t)); 	see 	also 	U.S.S.G. 	§
1B1.13(d). 	Even where extraordinary and compelling reasons exist,
the Court must “consider all the Section 3553(a) [F]actors to the
extent 	they 	are 	applicable, 	and 	may 	deny 	such 	a 	motion 	if, 	in
its 	discretion, 	compassionate 	release 	is 	not 	warranted 	because
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Section 	3553(a) 	[F]actors 	override, 	in 	any 	particular 	case, 	what
would 	otherwise 	be 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	circumstances.”
United 	States 	v. 	Davies, 	No. 	17-CR-0057, 	2020 	WL 	2307650, 	at 	*2
(E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020) (citation omitted); see also Pimentel, 2025
WL 783730, at *2; United States v. Jones, No. 22-2008-CR, 2023 	WL
8613867, 	at 	*2 	(2d 	Cir. 	Dec. 	13, 	2023) 	(same). 	“[A] statement
that 	the 	district 	court 	has 	considered 	the 	statutory 	factors 	is
sufficient.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Torres, 	No. 	21-2511-CR, 	2022 	WL
17087048, 	at 	*3 	(2d 	Cir. 	Nov. 	21, 	2022) 	(summary 	order) 	(quoting
United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d 311, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2003)).
“The 	defendant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	showing 	that 	the
circumstances 	warrant 	a 	sentence 	reduction.” 	United 	States 	v.
Sellick, 	No. 21-2328, 	2022 	WL 	16936829, 	at 	*1 	(2d 	Cir. 	Nov.
15, 	2022) 	(summary 	order) 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Jones, 	17
F.4th 	371, 	375 	(2d 	Cir. 	2021)); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v.
Friedlander, 	No. 	20-CR-0441, 	2022 	WL 	2305370, 	at 	*3 	(E.D.N.Y.
June 	24, 	2022) 	(“A 	defendant 	‘bears 	the 	burden 	of 	showing 	that
his 	release 	is 	justified.’” 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Patterson,
No. 06-CR-0080, 2020 WL 3451542, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2020)).
“A district court’s discretion in deciding a compassionate release
motion—as 	in 	all 	sentencing 	matters—is 	broad.” 	Rodriguez, 	147
F.4th 	at 	222 	(quoting 	Brooker, 	976 	F.3d 	at 	237) 	(citation
modified).
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II. 	Application
A. 	Exhaustion
Defendant 	asserts 	he 	requested 	compassionate 	release
from the warden, presumably of FCI Sheridan, the facility where he
is 	housed. 	(See 	Motion 	at 	3; 	see 	also, 	“Inmate 	Request” 	dated
“04/15/25”, ECF No. 236-1 at ECF p.11, attached to Motion.) 	There
is no indication in the record as to the warden’s response. 	(See
Case Docket, in toto.) 	The Government mistakenly believes “there
is 	no 	evidence 	. 	. 	. 	that 	[Defendant] 	notified 	the 	warden 	of 	the
facility 	in 	which 	he 	is 	housed 	of 	his 	request 	for 	a 	reduction 	in
sentence.” 	(Opp’n 	at 	4.) 	On 	that 	faulty 	contention, 	the
Government 	claims 	Defendant 	has 	failed 	to 	meet 	his 	exhaustion
requirement. 	The 	Court 	disagrees 	and, 	instead, 	finds 	the
exhaustion requirement has been satisfied; therefore, it proceeds
“to 	consider 	the 	merits” 	of 	his 	Motion. 	See 	generally 	United
States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2021).
B. 	Defendant’s Proffered Extraordinary and
Compelling Circumstances
In 	accordance 	with 	Policy 	Statement 1B1.13, 	the 	Court
considers 	Defendant’s 	claims 	of 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling
circumstances 	warranting 	a 	sentence 	reduction. 	For 	the 	reasons
articulated 	below, 	it 	finds 	Defendant’s 	proffered 	circumstances
unavailing.
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1. 	Defendant’s “5H1.1 Youthful Offender New Law” Claim
Generously 	construed, 	Defendant 	advances 	an 	argument
that the amendment to the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement
at 	Guidelines 	Section 	5H1.1 	supports 	his 	claim 	for 	a 	sentence
reduction. 	The Court disagrees.
Recently, 	Honorable 	Katherine 	Polk 	Failla 	of 	the
Southern 	District 	of 	New 	York 	considered 	and 	rejected 	a 	similar
argument. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Haylock, 	No. 	19-CR-0846, 	2024 	WL
4691023, 	at 	*7 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 	6, 	2024) 	(“Mr. 	Haylock 	argues 	that
his 	age 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	offense 	conduct 	amounts 	to 	an
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason 	for 	compassionate 	release.”)
She explained:
The 	amended 	U.S.S.G. 	§ 	1B1.13[, 	i.e., 	Policy
Statement 	1B1.13,] 	does 	not 	list 	youth 	among
its 	list 	of 	suggested 	extraordinary 	and
compelling 	reasons, 	although 	in 	certain
circumstances it may fall within the catch-all
provision in that section. 	As it happens, in
the 	Guidelines 	amendments 	that 	became
effective 	November 	1, 	2024, 	the 	Sentencing
Commission 	amended 	the 	policy 	statement 	at
U.S.S.G. 	§ 	5H1.1 	to 	note 	that 	“[a] 	downward
departure 	also 	may 	be 	warranted 	due 	to 	the
defendant’s 	youthfulness 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the
offense 	or 	prior 	offenses.” 	U.S.S.G.,
Amendment 	829. 	At 	this 	time, 	however,
Amendment 	829 	has 	not 	been 	made 	retroactive,
and according to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13,
Limitation 	on 	Changes 	in 	Law.—
Except 	as 	provided 	in 	subsection
(b)(6), 	a 	change 	in 	the 	law
(including 	an 	amendment 	to 	the
Guidelines Manual that has not been
made 	retroactive) 	shall 	not 	be
considered 	for 	purposes 	of
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determining 	whether 	an
extraordinary and compelling reason
exists under this policy statement.
However, 	if 	a 	defendant 	otherwise
establishes 	that 	extraordinary 	and
compelling 	reasons 	warrant 	a
sentence 	reduction 	under 	this
policy 	statement, 	a 	change 	in 	the
law 	(including 	an 	amendment 	to 	the
Guidelines Manual that has not been
made retroactive) may be considered
for 	purposes 	of 	determining 	the
extent of any such reduction.
Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c)) (emphasis added).
Judge 	Failla 	further 	explained 	that, 	in 	another 	case
where 	she 	had 	not 	consider 	Amendment 	829, 	she 	had 	“surveyed 	the
relevant case law and concluded that ‘[t]hough the Second Circuit
has not specifically opined on the issue, courts within the Second
Circuit have accepted, and rejected, youth as a valid basis for a
sentence 	reduction 	under 	§ 	3582(c)(1)(A)(i).’” 	Id. 	(quoting
United 	States 	v. 	Rosario, 	No. 	96-CR-0126, 	2024 	WL 	3521851, 	at 	*7
(S.D.N.Y. 	July 	24, 	2024) 	(collecting 	cases)). 	The 	Judge 	then
highlighted 	district 	court 	cases 	in 	which 	compassionate 	release
motions 	based 	upon 	the 	defendants’ 	respective 	young 	ages 	were
denied 	because 	the 	defendants’ 	actions 	were 	calculated 	and
deliberate 	and 	not 	the 	product 	of 	duress. 	See 	id. 	(collecting
cases).7 	With that backdrop, Judge Failla ruled: 	“For avoidance
7 	This 	Court 	has 	ruled 	likewise. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Farmer,
No. 	04-CR-0209, 	2025 	WL 	3033762, 	*5-6 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Oct. 	30, 	2025)
(finding defendant’s youth at the time he committed murder was not
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of 	doubt, 	and 	on 	the 	chance 	that 	the 	Sentencing 	Commission 	may
later 	make 	Amendment 	829 	retroactive 	or 	add 	youth 	to 	the 	factors
listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, . . . , on this record, Mr. Haylock’s
age 	does 	not 	constitute 	an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason
warranting 	a 	further 	sentence 	reduction.” 	Id. 	(emphasis 	added).
Among other reasons for rejecting Haylock’s age as an extraordinary
and compelling circumstance warranting a sentence reduction—which
the 	Judge 	described 	as 	being 	the 	“most 	important[]” 	reason—was
“th[e] Court already took Mr. Haylock’s age into consideration in
imposing a substantially-below-Guidelines sentence.” 	Id.
The Court finds Judge Failla’s reasoning to be sound and
adopts it herein. 	And, the application of Judge Failla’s rationale
to 	the 	instant 	case 	compels 	the 	same 	outcome.8 	Indeed, 	as 	the
an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason 	warranting 	a 	sentence
reduction) (collecting cases).
8 	The 	Court 	has 	considered 	the 	cases 	put 	forth 	by 	Defendant 	and
find 	them 	unpersuasive 	since 	each 	is 	distinguishable 	from
Defendant’s 	case. 	(See 	Petitioner 	Suppl., 	ECF 	No. 	236-1 	at 	ECF
p.6 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Willimas, 	No. 	20-CR-0293, 	2024 	WL
3845447 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	16, 	2024) 	(in 	context 	of 	stating 	reasons
for 	sentence 	imposed, 	discussing 	Section 	3553(a) 	Factors 	and
rejecting 	defendant’s 	argument 	that 	court 	should 	consider
defendant’s youthfulness when calculating the applicable criminal
history 	category); 	United 	States 	v. 	Chan, 	645 	F. 	Supp.3d 	71
(E.D.N.Y. 	2022) 	(finding 	defendant’s 	“youth 	at 	the 	time 	of 	his
offense 	to 	be 	an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason 	warranting
relief 	under 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances 	presented”, 	and
defendant’s 	age 	also 	factored 	into 	court’s 	consideration 	of 	the
disparity 	in 	sentencing 	between 	defendant’s 	minor-aged
co-defendants, 	who 	were 	not 	subjected 	to 	life 	sentences, 	and
defendant, 	who 	had 	turned 	18-years-old 	just 	prior 	to 	involvement
in 	the 	subject 	double 	murder, 	thereby 	resulting 	in 	his 	being
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Government 	astutely 	argues: 	“Although 	the 	[D]efendant 	faced
significant hardships in life, including mental health issues and
parental abuse, these factors were already properly considered at
sentencing.” 	(Opp’n 	at 	6 	(citing 	February 	2021 	M&O 	at 	7-8, 	19.)
That is so; thus, without more, to grant the instant Motion on the
same 	basis 	would 	be, 	in 	essence, 	an 	improper 	and 	unwarranted
“windfall” to Defendant. 	That will not do; Defendant has already
benefited 	from 	consideration 	of 	the 	age 	factor 	he 	now 	advances.
Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s so-called “5H1.1 Youthful
Offender New Law” argument unavailing.
2. 	Other (Purportedly) Claimed Reasons
Because 	Defendant 	is 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	the 	Court 	has
construed 	his 	Motion 	liberally 	and 	interpreted 	it 	to 	raise 	the
strongest 	arguments 	his 	Motion 	suggests. 	See, 	e.g., 	Maisonet 	v.
Metro. 	Hosp. 	& 	Health 	Hosp. 	Corp., 	640 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	345, 	347
(S.D.N.Y. 	2009) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted); 	see 	also
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir.
2006). 	However, 	“[a]lthough 	[courts] 	accord 	filings 	from 	pro 	se
subjected 	and 	sentenced 	to 	a 	mandatory 	life 	sentence) 	(emphasis
added); United States v. Cruz, No. 94-CR-0112, 2021 WL 1326851 (D.
Conn. Apr. 9, 2021) (finding defendant “has demonstrated, through
a 	combination 	of 	factors, 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons
. . . 	for 	a 	reduction 	in 	his 	sentence”, 	i.e., 	defendant’s: 	youth
at the time of the underlying offense; exceptional rehabilitation;
suffering an underlying medical condition that increased his risk
of 	severe 	illness 	if 	he 	contracted 	COVID-19; 	and 	family
circumstance (emphasis added)).)
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litigants a high degree of solicitude, even a litigant representing
himself 	is 	obliged 	to 	set 	out 	‘identifiable 	arguments’ 	in 	his
principal brief.” 	Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631,
632–33 	(2d 	Cir. 	2016) 	(quoting 	Donofrio 	v. 	City 	of 	N.Y., 	563 	F.
App’x 92, 93 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order).
To 	the 	extent 	the 	Court 	can 	discern 	an 	argument 	based
upon 	Defendant’s 	health, 	it 	is 	insufficient 	to 	show 	an
extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. 	Here,
Defendant simply identifies his health as a factor to be considered
when the Court imposes a sentence. 	(See Support Semo at ECF p.18.)
The 	record 	establishes 	the 	Court 	did 	so. 	(See, 	e.g., 	February
2021 M&O at 22, 25-26.) 	Moreover, there is no indication that any
of Defendant’s medical issues are not being adequately attended to
by 	the 	BOP. 	See, 	e.g., 	United 	States 	v. 	Gerald, 	No. 	13-CR-0141,
2024 	WL 	4694004, 	at 	*6 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 	6, 	2024) 	(denying
compassionate 	release 	where 	“there 	is 	no 	indication 	Defendant’s
hypertension and other identified medical conditions are not well-
controlled with medication and necessary medical care provided by
[the federal correctional facility]” and there is nothing “in the
record 	showing 	Defendant 	is 	not 	fully 	ambulatory 	and 	engaging 	in
all normal activities of daily living”); see also United States v.
Yong, 	No. 	95-CR-0825, 	2024 	WL 	3648259, 	at 	*6 	(E.D.N.Y. 	(Aug. 	5,
2024) 	(denying 	compassionate 	release 	where 	record 	presented 	no
reason to conclude defendant’s hypertension was not being properly
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addressed by the BOP) (collecting cases). 	Indeed, upon the record
presented, Defendant has failed to show his medical condition “so
incapacitate[d] 	him 	as 	to 	warrant 	a 	reduction 	of 	his 	sentence.”
United 	States 	v. 	Lisi, 	440 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	246, 	251 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2020)
(“BOP’s 	guidance, 	read 	in 	conjunction 	with 	the 	Application 	Notes
to [Policy Statement 1B1.13], indicate that a defendant’s medical
condition must be one of substantial severity and irremediability,
and 	[defendant] 	has 	not 	shown 	that 	he 	suffers 	from 	such
conditions.”); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Delacruz 	Santana, 	No.
16-CR-0337, 2024 WL 4449443, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2024) (denying
compassionate release where defendant “d[id] not indicate that his
ability 	to 	provide 	self-care 	. 	. 	. 	ha[d] 	been 	substantially
diminished 	by 	his 	illnesses” 	and 	stating, 	“[w]here 	such 	evidence
is lacking, courts within the Second Circuit have routinely denied
compassionate 	release 	motions” 	(collecting 	cases)). 	Therefore,
Defendant’s current health issues do not rise to the level of being
extraordinary and compelling.
Relatedly, 	to 	the 	extent 	Defendant 	implies 	harsh
conditions due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, which conditions arise to
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	warranting 	a 	sentence
reduction, 	such 	implication 	is 	unpersuasive. 	Defendant 	makes 	no
more 	than 	general, 	unsubstantiated 	complaints 	regarding 	the
conditions 	to 	which 	he 	was 	exposed 	while 	housed 	at 	U.S.P. 	Lompoc
and 	FCI 	Sheridan. 	(See 	Support 	Memo 	at 	ECF 	p.18.) 	However, 	to
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the 	extent 	the 	Pandemic 	has 	made 	Defendant’s 	incarceration 	more
punitive than anticipated, this Court has repeatedly stated:
“[T]hese hardships do not set [him] apart from
the 	rest 	of 	the 	BOP 	inmate 	population 	and
therefore 	do 	not, 	alone, 	constitute
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	for 	his
release.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Johnson, 	No.
98-CR-0860, 	2021 	WL 	1207314, 	at 	*4 	(E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2021)); see also, e.g., United States
v. Veliu, No. 17-CR-0404, 2022 WL 2484240, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2022) (“[T]he conditions
of 	confinement 	during 	the 	pandemic 	[do 	not]
give 	rise 	to 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling
circumstances. 	Although 	the 	Court
acknowledges 	that 	‘the 	pandemic 	has 	made
prison 	conditions 	harsher 	than 	usual, 	those
are circumstances that all inmates have had to
endure. 	While 	the 	Court 	does 	not 	minimize
those 	difficulties, 	they 	do 	not 	rise 	to 	the
level 	of 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling.’”)
(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Johnson, 	No.
18-CR-0907, 	2021 	WL 	4120536, 	at 	*3 	(S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 	9, 	2021)); 	United 	States 	v.
Pinto-Thomaz, 	454 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	327, 	329
(S.D.N.Y., 2020) (observing “it is hard to see
how” 	the 	BOP’s 	implementation 	of 	various
protocols in attempting to contain the spread
of 	COVID-19 	“ma[d]e 	the 	situations 	of
[defendants] 	‘extraordinary’ 	in 	terms 	of 	the
statutory 	requirement, 	for 	in 	these 	respects
[the defendants] are no different from a host
of 	other 	prisoners”). 	Standing 	alone, 	the
harshness of conditions Defendant faced during
the Pandemic were the same as those endured by
his 	fellow 	inmates; 	in 	that 	sense, 	they 	were
not 	extraordinary. 	See, 	e.g., 	United 	States
v. 	Martinez, 	No.03-CR-1049, 	2022 	WL 	3019833,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2022) (“[G]eneralized
COVID-19 	concerns 	are 	not 	regarded 	as
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	for
compassionate release.” (citations omitted)).
Nor, 	given 	the 	record, 	is 	this 	a 	case 	where,
considering 	several 	circumstances 	in
totality, the harshness factor should weigh in
favor 	of 	finding 	an 	extraordinary 	and
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compelling 	reason 	for 	granting 	compassionate
release.
Yong, 	2024 	WL 	3648259, 	at 	*7; 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Santana,
No. 	15-CR-0457, 	2025 	WL 	1940370, 	at 	*4 	(E.D.N.Y. 	July 	15, 	2025)
(same); United States v. Latney, No. 18-CR-0606, 2025 WL 1126474,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2025) (same); United States v. Brown, No.
18-CR-0604, 2024 WL 4790165, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2024) (same);
United States v. Hernandez, No. 04-CR-0939, 2024 WL 4450851, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. 	Oct. 	9, 	2024) 	(same); 	United 	States 	v. 	Moss, 	No.
14-CR-0147, 2024 WL 3718909, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2024) (same);
United 	States 	v. 	Wagner, 	No. 	17-CR-0106, 	2024 	WL 	2801981, 	at 	*6
(E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2024) (same).
Moreover, 	because 	the 	COVID-19 	Public 	Health 	Emergency
ended 	on 	May 	11, 	2023, 	it 	is 	no 	longer 	necessary 	for 	the 	BOP 	to
engage 	in 	across-the-board 	special 	operations. 	See 	Wagner, 	2024
WL 2801981, at *5 (citations omitted). 	Indeed, “the Court presumes
the 	BOP 	has 	returned 	to 	operating 	[Defendant’s 	current 	facility]
without COVID-19-related precautions, rendering this consideration
of little weight.” 	Id. (citing Jones, 17 F.4th at 375 (confinement
in 	facility 	“where 	[COVID-19] 	counts 	are 	currently 	low” 	was 	not
“extraordinary 	and 	compelling” 	circumstance)); 	see 	also 	Latney,
2025 WL 1126474, at *5 (same; quoting Wagner). 	Upon consideration
of 	Defendant’s 	implicit 	harshness 	argument, 	the 	Court 	finds 	it
unavailing.
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To the extent Defendant attempts to advance an argument
for 	a 	reduced 	sentence 	based 	upon 	his 	rehabilitative 	efforts, 	it
is 	also 	unpersuasive. 	The 	Court 	begins 	by 	emphasizing 	that,
notwithstanding its broad discretion in considering “all possible
reasons 	for 	compassionate 	release,” 	“rehabilitation 	alone 	shall
not 	be 	considered 	an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason.”
Brooker, 	976 	F.3d 	at 	237-38 	(citing 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	944(t) 	(cleaned
up)); see also Policy Statement 1B1.13(d) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 	994(t), 	rehabilitation 	on 	the 	defendant 	is 	not, 	by 	itself, 	an
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason 	for 	purposes 	of 	this 	policy
statement.”). 	Moreover, 	“[w]hat 	constitutes 	rehabilitation 	is
left to the [c]ourt’s discretion, but courts in this district have
considered the following factors: [1] the defendant’s ‘maintenance
of 	familial 	and 	societal 	relationships; 	[2] 	letters 	of 	support
both 	from 	community 	members 	and 	prison 	staff; 	[3] 	conduct 	and
disciplinary 	records 	while 	incarcerated; 	. . . 	[4] 	any
achievements and education obtained while incarcerated; . . . [5]
gains in maturity[;] and [6] other clear signs that a defendant’s
incarceration 	has 	had 	rehabilitative 	value’.” 	United 	States 	v.
Vasquez, No. 96-CR-1044, 2024 WL 2385264, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 23,
2024) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Byam, 	No. 	12-CR-0586, 	2024 	WL
1556741, 	at 	*8 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	10, 	2024)) 	(emphasis 	added); 	see
also, 	e.g., 	United 	States 	v. 	Qadar, 	No. 	00-CR-0603, 	2021 	WL
3087956, 	at 	*10 	(E.D.N.Y. 	July 	22, 	2021) 	(same). 	“At 	minimum,
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‘rehabilitation requires the court to examine whether a defendant
has 	taken 	responsibility 	for 	his 	. 	. 	. 	actions 	and 	acted 	to
reintegrate [him]self into a productive society.’” 	Byam, 2024 WL
1556741, 	at 	*7 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Blake, 	89 	F. 	Supp. 	2d
328, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
Here, 	Defendant 	has 	failed 	to 	put 	forth 	evidence 	of
rehabilitation 	that 	warrants 	a 	sentence 	reduction. 	Compare
Latney, 	2025 	WL 	1126474, 	at 	*7-8 	(even 	where 	defendant 	(1)
presented 	evidence 	of 	maintaining 	familiar 	relationships, 	(2)
provided 	letters 	of 	support 	from 	a 	prison 	chaplain, 	an 	attorney,
and fellow inmates, and (3) submitted a letter of contrition, which
showed 	“significant 	strides 	in 	his 	rehabilitation”, 	this 	Court,
nonetheless, 	found 	defendant’s 	“commendable 	rehabilitation 	[wa]s
not 	enough”). 	In 	comparison 	to 	the 	efforts 	exhibited 	by 	Latney,
Defendant’s rehabilitative efforts pale; for example, there is no
letter 	of 	contrition 	or 	multiple 	letters 	of 	support 	from 	family,
friend, 	fellow 	inmates, 	or 	prison 	staff. 	Nor 	has 	Defendant
presented 	the 	Court 	with 	other 	clear 	signs 	his 	incarceration 	has
had rehabilitative value. 	And, in any event, “[m]aintaining good
conduct in prison is not uncommon, and indeed is expected.” 	United
States v. Garcia, No. 19-CR-0210, 2022 WL 672758, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2022); see also United States v. Baptiste, No. 15-CR-854,
2024 	WL 	3425818, 	at 	*2 	(S.D.N.Y. 	July 	16, 	2024) 	(“[A] 	productive
institutional record while incarcerated is what is expected and is
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not a basis for a sentence reduction here.” (citation modified));
see also, e.g., Alvarez, 2020 WL 4904586, at *7 (recognizing “model
prison 	conduct 	is 	expected”). 	At 	bottom, 	upon 	the 	record
presented, 	Defendant’s 	rehabilitative 	efforts 	are 	neither
extraordinary nor compelling.
C. 	The Section 3553(a) Factors
“[A] district court may deny a motion for compassionate
release 	in 	‘sole 	reliance’ 	on 	the 	Section 	3553(a) 	[F]actors,
without determining ‘whether the defendant has shown extraordinary
and compelling reasons that might (in other circumstances) justify
a 	sentence 	reduction.’” 	Jones, 	2023 	WL 	8613867, 	at 	*2; 	see 	also
Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73 n.4 (noting “a district court may rely solely
on 	the 	§ 	3553(a) 	factors 	when 	denying 	defendant’s 	motion 	for
compassionate release”); United States v. Andrews, No. 23-8046-CR,
2025 	WL 	2938044, 	at 	*3 	(2d 	Cir. 	Oct. 	16, 	2025) 	(summary 	order)
(same; 	quoting 	Keitt); 	Jones, 	17 	F.4th 	at 	374 	(“[A] 	district
court’s 	‘reasonable 	evaluation 	of 	the 	Section 	3553(a) 	[F]actors’
is 	‘an 	alternative 	and 	independent 	basis 	for 	denial 	of
compassionate 	release.’” 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Robinson, 	848
F. 	App’x 	477, 	478 	(2d 	Cir. 	2021)); 	United 	States 	v. 	Mayes, 	No.
23-6077-CR, 2024 WL 2990909, at *1 (2d Cir. June 14, 2024) (summary
order) (same; quoting Jones).
The 	[Section 	3553(a) 	F]actors 	include 	“the
nature 	and 	circumstances 	of 	the 	offense 	and
the 	history 	and 	characteristics 	of 	the
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defendant,” 	as 	well 	as 	the 	need 	for 	the
sentence 	imposed 	“to 	reflect 	the 	seriousness
of 	the 	offense, 	to 	promote 	respect 	for 	the
law, 	and 	to 	provide 	just 	punishment 	for 	the
offense;” 	“to 	afford 	adequate 	deterrence 	to
criminal conduct;” “to protect the public from
further 	crimes 	of 	the 	defendant;” 	and 	“to
provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional 	treatment 	in 	the 	most 	effective
manner.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).
United States v. Johnson, 671 F. Supp. 3d 265, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2023).
The 	Court 	finds 	the 	seriousness 	of 	Defendant’s 	offense
is 	the 	factor 	weighing 	most 	heavily 	in 	favor 	of 	denying 	his
compassionate 	release 	Motion. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Baker, 	No.
97-CR-0877, 	2025 	WL 	2733358, 	at 	*9-10 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Sept. 	25, 	2025)
(finding, where defendant “killed [another] in cold blood in order
to 	obstruct 	justice 	weighing 	most 	heavily 	in 	favor 	of 	denying”
sentence reduction); United States v. Duarte, No. 99-CR-0192, 2025
WL 	1434886, 	*8 	(S.D.N.Y. 	May 	19, 	2025) 	(finding 	“the 	heinousness
and gravity of [defendant’s] criminal conduct”, i.e., ordering the
execution of a DEA informant to prevent informant from testifying
against defendant, was the Section 3553(a) Factor weighing heavily
against defendant’s release; stating the “selfishness and violent
nature 	of 	[defendant’s] 	crime 	merits 	life-long 	imprisonment”);
United 	States 	v. 	Marmolejos, 	No. 	99-CR-1048, 	2021 	WL 	3862851, 	*5
(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	30, 	2021) 	(Chen, 	J., 	sitting 	by 	designation) 	(in
denying 	motion 	to 	reduce 	a 	life 	sentence, 	where 	offense 	was
murder-for-hire 	and 	not 	a 	crime 	of 	passion, 	stating 	it 	was
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“primarily 	the 	‘nature 	and 	circumstances’ 	of 	Marmolejos’s
offenses, [that] weigh[ed] against release or sentence reduction”
and that granting a reduction would not reflect the seriousness of
the offense). 	The seriousness of Defendant’s offense continues to
outweigh 	his 	youthfulness 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	murders, 	as 	well 	as
Defendant’s 	difficult 	childhood, 	factors 	this 	Court 	weighed 	when
originally 	sentencing 	Defendant 	to 	a 	substantially 	below-
Guidelines 	sentence. 	(See 	Statement 	of 	Reasons, 	ECF 	No. 	128
(sealed), § VI.D.)
Moreover 	and 	relatedly, 	“[t]his 	Court 	has 	repeatedly
observed in gang-related cases: ‘[G]ang members need to know their
violent, illegal activities are intolerable, and those who choose
to 	join 	gangs 	need 	to 	know 	they 	will 	be 	prosecuted, 	sentenced 	to
substantial 	sentences, 	and 	required 	to 	serve 	those 	sentences.’”
Gerald, 2024 WL 4694004, at *7 (quoting United States v. Lake, No.
14-CR-0264, 2023 WL 8810620, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2023); citing
Wagner, 2024 WL 2801981, at *8 (quoting Lake)); see also Henriquez,
2024 	WL 	4450851, 	at 	*6 	(same). 	“It 	is 	no 	different 	here.” 	Id.;
see 	also 	Henriquez, 	2024 	WL 	4450851, 	at 	*6 	(stating, 	“[t]he 	same
holds 	true—and, 	more 	so—here, 	especially 	when 	recognizing 	the
underlying 	crime 	was 	an 	execution-style 	murder” 	which
“demonstrated 	disrespect 	for 	the 	law 	and, 	more 	significantly,
disrespect for human life”); Wagner, 2024 WL 2801981, at *8; Brown,
2024 	WL 	4790165, 	at 	*7 	(stating 	“for 	individual 	and 	general
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deterrence purposes, it is necessary that those who participate in
the illegal drug trade, which plagues Long Island communities, be
sent a clear and unambiguous message that if they do, they will be
prosecuted, sentenced to substantial sentences, and be required to
serve every day of those sentences” (citation modified)).
At bottom, to the extent there are any sentencing factors
which 	weigh 	in 	Defendant’s 	favor, 	such 	favorable 	factors 	are
outweighed 	by 	the 	combined 	force 	of 	the 	nature 	and 	circumstances
of the offense, and the need for the sentence imposed to: reflect
the 	seriousness 	of 	the 	offense; 	promote 	respect 	for 	the 	law;
provide 	just 	punishment 	for 	the 	offense; 	and, 	afford 	adequate
deterrence 	to 	criminal 	conduct. 	See 	United 	States 	v. 	Riley, 	777
F. 	Supp.3d 	165, 	173 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2025) 	(where 	defendant 	was 	found
guilty of two murders in aid of racketeering and being an accessory
to a third murder, in considering Section 3553(a) Factors, finding
“[t]he 	nature 	and 	circumstances 	of 	[defendant’s] 	offenses, 	their
seriousness, and the need to promote respect for the law, provide
just 	punishment, 	and 	adequately 	deter 	criminal 	conduct 	weigh[ed]
against 	a 	sentence 	reduction”). 	Modifying 	Defendant’s 	term 	of
incarceration, 	given 	his 	serious 	criminal 	conduct, 	i.e., 	the
“calculated, 	cold-blooded 	murders—planned 	to 	send 	a 	message” 	to
rival gang members (Opp’n at 7), would disserve the above important
sentencing factors.
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Rather, 	in 	its 	discretion, 	the 	Court 	finds,
even if Defendant had presented extraordinary
and 	compelling 	circumstances 	warranting
compassionate 	release, 	which 	he 	has 	not, 	the
Section 	3553(a) 	Factors 	would 	override 	those
circumstances. 	The Court’s below-Guidelines,
[28-year] 	sentence 	of 	imprisonment 	continues
to 	be 	appropriate 	to, 	inter 	alia: 	promote
respect 	for 	the 	law; 	reflect 	the 	seriousness
of 	the 	offense; 	provide 	just 	punishment;
adequately deter criminal conduct; and protect
the 	public 	from 	the 	Defendant, 	thereby
satisfying 	the 	applicable 	Section 	3553(a)
Factors.
United 	States 	v. 	Hopkins, 	No. 	18-CR-0606, 	2024 	WL 	4388454, 	at 	*4
(E.D.N.Y. 	Oct. 	2, 	2024). 	In 	sum, 	Defendant’s 	substantial
below-Guidelines sentence of 28 years’ incarceration continues to
be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes 	of 	§ 	3553(a).” 	(Statement 	of 	Reasons, 	§ 	VIII
(uncapitalized).)
-*-*-*-
To the extent not explicitly addressed herein, the Court
has 	considered 	Defendant’s 	remaining 	arguments 	for 	a 	sentence
reduction and finds them to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, 	for 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion seeking a sentence reduction (ECF
No. 236) is DENIED in its entirety and without prejudice; and
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, the Clerk of the Court is directed
to 	mail 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Memorandum 	and 	Order 	to 	Defendant 	at 	his
address 	of 	record, 	including 	the 	notation 	“LEGAL 	MAIL” 	on 	the
mailing envelope.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: 	December 12, 2025
Central Islip, New York
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