Reddy v. Alstom

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHARON C. REDDY,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ALSTOM,
Defendant.
1:25-CV-9439 (LTS)
TRANSFER ORDER
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Sharon C. Reddy, of Queens Village, Queens County, New York, filed this pro se
action asserting claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the New York State and City Human
Rights Laws. She sues her employer, Alstom, of Jamaica, Queens County, New York. For the
reasons discussed in this order, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York.
DISCUSSION
Under the applicable venue provision for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA, such claims may be brought:
in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice
is alleged to have been committed, the judicial district in which the
employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and
administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would
have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the
respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be
brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal
office.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII’s venue provision); see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (incorporating
by reference, among other things, Title VII’s venue provision for employment claims under the
Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (same for claims under Title I of the ADA).
Plaintiff, who alleges that she is Indian and suffers from a spinal injury, also alleges that
Alstom, her employer, is located in Jamaica, Queens County, New York, and, apparently, that her
place of employment is her home in Queens Village, Queens County, New York. (ECF 1, at 2-4.)
Queens County lies within the Eastern District of New York, see 28 U.S.C. § 112(c), not this
judicial district.1
Plaintiff further alleges that she:
was hurt on the job when a homeless man coming off the train was coming
towards [her], causing [her] to back up and hit a bench. [Plaintiff] flew across the
platform and since ha[s] sustained several injuries. After being off from work for
some time, [she] returned to work with a doctor’s note saying [she] should be on
light duty. [Alstom’s human resources department] and [Plaintiff’s] manager told
[her] there is no light duty in the workplace and if [Plaintiff] wanted to keep [her]
job[,] [she] should get a note saying [that she] can return to work with full duty.
[W]hile [Plaintiff] was working full duty with [her] injuries, other employees who
were in [her] department who were injured on the job were given light duty. All
were African Americans.
(ECF 1, at 5.)
Because Plaintiff seems to allege that the alleged unlawful employment practices
occurred in Queens County, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, this court, and the other two federal district courts within the State of New York, see
§ 112(a)-(d), are all proper venues for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act,
and the ADA. In addition, as the place in which the employment records relevant to such
1 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following
New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx
(New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland;
(6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).
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practices appear to be maintained and administered, in which Plaintiff would have worked but
for the alleged unlawful employment practices, and possibly, in which Alstom’s principal office
is located, are all in Queens County, for those reasons, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, as opposed to this court, is a proper venue for such claims as well.
Claims under Section 1981, however, are governed by the general venue provision at 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b). See Rosol v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 1:25-CV-5183 (JMF), 2025 WL 1808897,
at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2025); Evans v. Absolute Results, No. 1:21-CV-0280 (LLS), 2021 WL
603227, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2021); Vukic v. Universal Prot. Serv. LLC, No. 1:20-CV-0646
(CM), 2020 WL 8970536, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020). The same is true with respect to state-
law claims. Under Section 1391(b), unless otherwise provided by law, a federal civil action may
be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in
which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is
situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such
action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under that provision, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district
where the person is domiciled, and any other entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, if a
defendant, resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” § 1391(c)(1), (2).
Plaintiff seems to allege that Alstom, her employer, resides in Jamaica, Queens County,
New York (ECF 1, at 2), which lies within the Eastern District of New York, see § 112(c). Thus,
under Section 1391(b)(1), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
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as opposed to this court, would appear to be a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under Section
1981 and under state law.
In addition, Plaintiff seems allege that, while a substantial portion of the events giving
rise to her claims under Section 1981 occurred in Queens County, in the Eastern District of New
York, at least some of those events (those occurring in a train station) may have occurred in this
judicial district. (ECF 1, at 5.) Thus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, and also possibly this court, are proper venues for Plaintiff’s claims under Section
1981 and under state law.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if an action is filed in a federal district court where
venue is proper, a court may transfer the action to any other federal district court where it might
have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following
ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of
operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling
witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law;
(8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the
interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412,
458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599
F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors).
Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate for this action. Alstom,
Plaintiff’s employer and the sole defendant, is alleged to reside and be located within the Eastern
District of New York, and a substantial portion of the alleged events took place in that judicial
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district. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would also be
located within that judicial district. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, which is a proper venue for all of Plaintiff’s claims, appears to be a more convenient
forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to that court. See § 1404(a);
D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad
discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of
convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”).
CONCLUSION
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Whether Plaintiff should be
permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the
transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this
court.
The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an
appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	January 14, 2026
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
New York, New York
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge
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