Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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REAGAN EMILIO SANCHEZ ATZ,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- against- 	26-CV-00214 (OEM)
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
TODD LYONS in his official capacity as Acting
Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KENNETH GENALO, in his official capacity as Field
Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations
of the New York Office of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; PAMELA BONDI, in her
official capacity as U.S. Attorney General; and
RAUL MALDONADO, JR., in his official capacity
as Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center,
Respondents.
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
Petitioner Reagan Emilio Sanchez Atz (“Petitioner”) petitions this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the lawfulness of his ongoing detention
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Petitioner Reagan Emilio Sanchez Atz’s
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. 1 (the “Petition” or “Pet.”). 	ICE arrested
Petitioner on September 25, 2025, in Poughkeepsie, New York, and he is currently detained at the
Metropolitan Detention Center (the “MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York. 	Id. ¶ 1. 	Petitioner
challenges his arrest and detention as violations of the Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. For the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
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BACKGROUND
Although the parties’ papers do not affirmatively state Petitioner’s nationality, Petitioner
appears to be a citizen and native of Guatemala. 	See Declaration of Frank Franco ¶ 10, Dkt. 15-
1 (“Franco Decl.”). He entered the United States on three different occasions in July 2022, and
each time he was neither paroled, released, or otherwise permitted to enter the United States. Id.
¶¶ 3-5. Less than two months later, on September 24, 2022, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (the
“CBP”) again encountered Petitioner at or near the Southern border. 	Id. ¶ 6. 	CBP labeled
Petitioner a “Recidivist” and alerted other federal agencies of this designation by placing him on
a watch list. Id. Petitioner was removed to pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 265. Id. ¶ 6. Following his
removal on September 24, 2022, Petitioner entered the United States at a time and place unknown
to authorities. Id. ¶ 7.
Since his entry sometime after September 24, 2022, Petitioner has resided in Poughkeepsie,
New York. 	Pet. ¶ 21. 	On September 25, 2025, ICE officers were conducting surveillance in
Poughkeepsie related to a third-party with an outstanding order or removal when they observed a
male subject matching the physical description of the third-party target get into a car outside of the
third-party target’s last known address. Franco Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. The officers then conducted a traffic
stop,1 which led to the discovery of Petitioner’s Guatemalan consular card. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. A records
check positively matched Petitioner as the individual on the recidivist watch list whom
immigration authorities had previously encountered in July and September 2022. Id. ¶ 10.
In light of his prior illegal entries and Title 42 removal, the ICE officers determined that
there was a high likelihood that Petitioner would escape before a warrant could be obtained. Id
1 The circumstances of the traffic stop are disputed. Petitioner alleges that the officers pointed guns at him, pulled
him out of his car, and immediately handcuffed him. Pet. ¶ 25. Petitioner additionally alleges that an ICE officer
then reached into his car and searched his wallet without his consent. Id. Respondents, by contrast, allege that the
officers merely approached the vehicle and requested identification. Franco Decl. ¶ 10.
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¶ 11. 	Accordingly, the officers administratively arrested Petitioner without a warrant. 	Id.
Following Petitioner’s arrest, he was transferred to ICE’s Newburgh Sub-Office for further
processing. Id. ¶ 12. There, ICE served Petitioner with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear (“NTA”)
for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Id. ¶ 13. The NTA charged him as inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and as an alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled. Id.
From September 25, 2025, until October 1, 2025, Petitioner was detained at Orange County
Jail in Goshen, New York. Id. ¶ 25. On October 1, 2025, ICE transferred Petitioner to the MDC,
where he has remained since. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 14, 2026, Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See generally Pet. That same day, Petitioner also filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, requesting his immediate release from custody and
an order enjoining Respondent’s from detaining him pending the Court’s final adjudication of the
Petition. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Dkt. 2.
On January 15, 2026, the Court issued an order to show cause why the Petition should not
be granted, thereby directing Respondents to file a return by January 20, 2026, and ordering the
parties to appear before the Court for a hearing on January 23, 2026, at 10:30 a.m. See Order to
Show Cause, Dkt. 9 (the “Order to Show Cause”). The Court additionally ordered Respondents
not to remove Petitioner from this District “until further order of this Court.” Id.
Respondents subsequently filed a motion for an extension of time to file a response to the
Petition, see Letter from Respondents to the Court (Jan. 16, 2026), Dkt. 14, which the Court
granted on January 19, 2026. In granting the extension, the Court also rescheduled the hearing to
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January 26, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. See Order, dated January 19, 2026. The Court later rescheduled
the hearing to January 27, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. due to inclement weather. See Order, dated January
22, 2026.
Respondents filed their response on January 22, 2026. 	See Memorandum of Law in
Response to Order to Show Cause Why a Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not Be Issued, Dkt. 15
(the “Opposition” or “Opp’n”). On January 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a
reply. 	See Letter from Petitioner to the Court (Jan. 23, 2026), Dkt. 16. 	The Court granted
Petitioner leave to file a reply on January 26, 2026, see Order, dated January 26, 2026, and
Petitioner filed his reply that same day, see Reply in Further Support of Petitioner for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Dkt. 17.
The Court held a hearing on the Order to Show Cause on January 27, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.
See generally Transcript of Civil Cause for Order to Show Cause Before the Honorable Orelia E.
Merchant United States District Judge (the “Transcript” or “Tr.”).
DISCUSSION
Although Petitioner argues that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment,2 the Petition
raises two principal issues: (1) whether Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (“§ 1226”) or
8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“§ 1225”) and (2) whether Petitioner’s due process rights have been violated.
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
The Court is bound by a long line of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between
those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the
United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
2 As the Court grants the Petition on other grounds, it does not reach the Fourth Amendment claim.
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(2001) (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one
who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018) (stating that § 1225(b) governs “aliens seeking admission into the country,” whereas
§ 1226(a) governs “aliens already in the country” who are subject to removal proceedings). Thus,
the Court’s position on whether § 1226 or § 1225 applies in scenarios where a petitioner was
detained after entering the country has not changed since deciding other 28 U.S.C. § 2241
immigration cases recently. 	See, e.g., J.U. v. Maldonado, 25-CV-04836, 2025 WL 2772765
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, 25-CV-5208, 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,
2025); Lira Caceres v. Shanahan, 26-CV-00016, 2026 WL 233215 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2026); Singh
v. Maldonado, 26-CV-00019, 2026 WL 233216 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2026).
While this case is factually distinct from cases previously before this Court in that
Petitioner entered the country illegally on multiple occasions and was removed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 265, see Franco Decl. ¶ 6, these factual distinctions have no bearing on the statutory
authority for Petitioner’s current detention. Regardless of Petitioner’s past unsuccessful entries,
Petitioner has nonetheless “effected an entry” into the United States since his Title 42 removal in
September 2022, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (quoting
Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 693), and therefore was “already in the country” when he was arrested, see
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Moreover, the statute pursuant to which Petitioner was removed, 42
U.S.C. § 265, is a public health statute that suspends entries and imports from designated places
to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 265. It contains no
language indicating that its removal authority has immigration implications. 	Id. 	Furthermore,
Respondents do not cite any case or authority to support the proposition that Petitioner’s past
illegal entries and Title 42 removal mandate his current detention. See generally Opp’n.
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The fact that Petitioner did not have contact with immigration officials upon entering the
country after September 24, 2022, Franco Decl. ¶ 7, does not change the Court’s view that § 1226
is applicable here. 	In having no entry point contact, Petitioner is similar to many other habeas
petitioners who did not have contact with immigration officials upon entry and were still deemed
subject to § 1226. 	See, e.g., R.P.L. v. Maldonado, 25-CV-6886 (HG), 2025 WL 3731864, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025) (“[Petitioner’s] arrest on September 18, 2025, is his first encounter with
immigration authorities.”); Cuy Comes v. DeLeon, 25 Civ. 9283 (AT), 2025 WL 3206491, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Prior to this interaction and subsequent detention, [petitioner] had no
contact with immigration authorities in the United States.”); Campos v. DeLeon, 25-CV-10099
(LJL), 2025 WL 3514120, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2025) (same); Rocano Buestan v. McShane, 25-
CV-8544 (JGLC), 2025 WL 3496361, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025) (same).
Accordingly, this Court joins the overwhelming majority of courts to find that detention of
the nature at issue here cannot be upheld under § 1225. See Barco Mercado v. Francis, 25-CV-
6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases).
Mandatory detention under § 1225 is not a valid basis for Petitioner’s detention, and Petitioner is
therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226. See J.U., 2025 WL 2772765, at *4
(noting the mutual exclusivity of § 1225 and § 1226).
B. Due Process
The Court now turns to whether ICE’s detention of Petitioner violates his due process
rights. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevents the government from depriving any
person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST . AMEND . V. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “‘It
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is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context
of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 306 (1993)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Valdez v. Joyce, 803 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(“Even noncitizens have a liberty interest 	in continued freedom 	from 	civil 	immigration
confinement.” (citing Lopez v. Sessions, 18 Civ. 4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
June 12, 2018) (holding that “Petitioner’s re-detention, without prior notice, a showing of changed
circumstances, 	or 	a 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	respond, 	does 	not 	satisfy 	the 	procedural
requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”)).3
The Second Circuit has held that the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor balancing test
applies when determining the adequacy of process in the context of civil immigration confinement.
Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976)). 	The determination of what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment
requires consideration of: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”;
(2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable 	value, 	if 	any, 	of 	additional 	or 	substitute 	procedural 	safeguards”; 	and 	(3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
3 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention comports with due process because he is “treated for constitutional
purposes as if stopped at the border[.]” Opp’n at 21. However, this “entry fiction” doctrine, id. at 22, is neither
relevant to the statutory analysis set out above nor applicable to the due process analysis. As other courts in this
Circuit have explained, the entry fiction doctrine “dictates what constitutional rights are due to a noncitizen who is
physically present in the United States (for example, because of detention or parole) but hasn’t been lawfully
admitted.” J.G.O. v. Francis, 25-CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025). Whatever
procedure Congress authorized is, under this doctrine, due process. Id. Here, however, the question is what process
Congress authorized, so “even assuming that the entry fiction would apply,” it does not affect the “statutory analysis.”
Id.
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The first two factors favor Petitioner because his “[f]reedom from imprisonment” is at
stake, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, and there is a significant risk of erroneous deprivation of that
freedom without additional safeguards, see Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 218 (noting a “high” risk
“of erroneous deprivation in the context of re-detention absent a change in circumstances,
procedure, or evidentiary findings.” (citing Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *11)). 	Therefore, the
instant Mathews inquiry turns on the third factor: Respondents’ interest.
Respondents’ interest in detaining “individuals under 8 [] U.S.C. [§] 1226(a) is valid where
it advances a legitimate governmental purpose,” such as “ensuring the appearance of aliens at
future immigration proceedings and preventing danger to the community.” Valdez, 803 F. Supp.
3d at 218 (first quoting Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854; then quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
Here, Respondents concede that Petitioner does not have a criminal history, but they argue that he
presents a flight risk given his “prior history of evading immigration laws” and “attempting to
reenter the country after being removed[.]” Tr. at 27:1-12. In other words, Respondents contend
that there “is no reason to believe that someone who continually does not follow directives to leave
the country will follow directives to appear at a place and time.” Id. at 27:23-28:1. The Court,
however, fails to see the logic in that contention. 	Not only has Petitioner built a life in
Poughkeepsie with his father by working in construction, Pet. ¶ 23, but his past failed attempts at
entering the country do not necessarily mean he will not appear for removal proceedings.
Accordingly, Respondents’ argument that Petitioner is a flight risk lacks merit and, because
Respondents have failed to present any evidence or even allege that Petitioner is a danger to the
community, Respondents have failed to show a significant interest in Petitioner’s detention.
Taken together, Petitioner’s ongoing detention violates his due process rights. See Valdez,
803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *15. Given the deprivation of Petitioner’s
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liberty, the absence of any deliberative process in the form of a bond hearing, and the statutory and
constitutional rights implicated, a writ of habeas corpus is the only form of relief and the most
appropriate remedy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is granted. Respondents are ordered to immediately
release Petitioner from custody. By February 6, 2026, Respondents shall certify compliance with
this order by filing on the docket and noting specifically that Petitioner has been released.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
February 6, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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