Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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R.A.R.R.,
Petitioner,
- against -
JUDITH ALMODOVAR, et al.,
Respondents.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-6597 (PKC)
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
Petitioner R.A.R.R. (“Petitioner”) filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Section 2241”) on November 26, 2025, seeking immediate release
from the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 	(Pet., Dkt. 1.) 	Petitioner
names as Respondents Judith Almodovar, in her official capacity as the Acting Field Office
Director of the New York Field Office for ICE within the United States Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”); Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as the Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem,
in her official capacity as the Secretary of Homeland Security within DHS; Pamela Bondi, in her
official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; Sirce E. Owen, in her official capacity
as Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review; and Raul Maldonado Jr., in
his official capacity as the Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), where
Petitioner was detained at the time he filed his Petition (collectively, “Respondents”). (Id. ¶¶ 12–
17.) The Court held oral argument on the Petition on December 19, 2025, during which it granted
the Petition and ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, indicating that “a written Memorandum &
Order [would] follow” to “more fully explain[]” its reasoning. (12/19/2025 Dkt. Order.)
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BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
A. 	Petitioner’s Arrival in the United States
Petitioner is a 19-year-old immigrant from El Salvador. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 1.) Growing up in
El Salvador, Petitioner faced a number of hardships, including “abandonment by his father, rural
poverty, and water insecurity.” (Id. ¶ 18 (citing Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 4).) These circumstances
“inspired him to engage in human rights and environmental activism to support his community,”
(id. (citing same)), including working with “a human rights group that advocated for environmental
justice, access to water, labor rights, and health care access,” (Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 4). The
group “held public protests and meetings and submitted a petition to the mayor of a town.” (Id.)
The leader of the group, whom Petitioner considered a “mentor and positive male role model,”
died in 2021, after which Petitioner “assumed [a] leadership[] role[] within the group.” (Psych.
Eval., Dkt. 1-7, at 2.) The Salvadoran government, under President Nayib Bukele, “demonstrated
that they did not like the efforts of [Petitioner’s] human rights group and would surveil the group
and intimidate them.” (Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 4.) Eventually, “fearful of government reprisals,”
Petitioner decided to seek asylum in the United States. (Psych. Eval., Dkt. 1-7, at 2.)
In January 2024, at the age of 17, Petitioner entered the United States. 	(Pet., Dkt. 1,
¶¶ 1–2.) 	After crossing the physical border into the United States, Petitioner was detained by
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and designated an unaccompanied alien child (“UAC”).
(Id.; see Reply in Opp’n (“Opp’n”), Dkt. 11, at 1 (representing that Petitioner was “encountered
near Brownsville, Texas” after entering “surreptitiously” and then screened as a UAC by CBP).)
Due to his status as a UAC, he was transferred to the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(“ORR”), which placed Petitioner in a children’s shelter. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 2; see Opp’n, Dkt. 11,
at 13 (referring to the shelter as a “secure facility”).) 	In February 2024, after determining that
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Petitioner was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk, ORR released Petitioner to an
ORR-approved sponsor,1 R.A.R.R.’s cousin in Texas. 	(Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 2, 20.) 	As part of this
release, ORR provided Petitioner with a “release form” indicating his UAC status.2 (Id. ¶ 20.) In
April 2024, Petitioner moved to Long Island, New York, to reunite with his mother’s partner,
whom Petitioner considers a stepfather. (Id.; R.A.R.R. Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 3.) Since his move to
Long Island, Petitioner had “been taking classes to obtain his high school equivalency degree and
working cleaning offices.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 21 (citing R.A.R.R. Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 4).) He has no
criminal record in the United States or El Salvador. (Id. (citing Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 8).)
B. 	Petitioner’s Re-Detention by ICE
On August 26, 2025, while Petitioner was en route to work with his co-worker, they were
pulled over by ICE agents on Long Island at around 6:00 a.m. (R.A.R.R. Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶¶ 5–6;
Rey Decl., Dkt. 11-1, ¶ 12.) Petitioner provided ICE with his ORR release paperwork, but ICE
concluded that he had “no legal status in the United States” and detained him. 	(Rey Decl.,
Dkt. 11-1, ¶ 12; R.A.R.R. Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶¶ 7–9; Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 22–24.)
ICE agents brought Petitioner to an ICE office, where he was “chained at the hands and
feet” and locked in a small room with twelve other people, “one on top of the other.” (R.A.R.R.
Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 9.) 	He was then transported to 26 Federal Plaza in New York, where he was
detained for around two days. (Id.) There, he was made to sleep on the floor with “many other
1 Petitioner was released to his sponsor in accordance with 45 C.F.R. § 410.1200, which
details ORR’s review and approval of sponsors. (See Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 10 (“ORR releases a UAC
to [a] ‘vetted and approved’ sponsor” (citing 45 C.F.R. § 410.1200)).)
2 Petitioner’s “Verification of Release” form confirms Petitioner was released pursuant to
Section 462 of the Homeland Security Act of 2022, 6 U.S.C. § 279, and Section 235 of the William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232. (Verification of Release, Dkt. 1-3.)
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people,” and given only pasta and water to eat “for breakfast, lunch, and dinner.” (Id.) Petitioner
was then transferred to the MDC. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 23 (citing Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 8).) Petitioner
states that “[i]t has not been easy to get used to life in jail.” (R.A.R.R. Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 10.) He
reports experiencing panic symptoms, nightmares, and difficulty sleeping. 	(Id.; Psych. Eval.,
Dkt. 1-7, at 5.) 	His detention separates him from his family and prevents him from attending
school. (R.A.R.R. Decl., Dkt. 1-2, ¶ 11.)
II. 	Procedural Background
Petitioner’s immigration proceedings are ongoing.3 (See Rey Decl., Dkt. 11-1, ¶¶ 15–28.)
As relevant here, on October 7, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion for custody redetermination in
immigration court through his immigration counsel. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 25.) The Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denied the motion based on the IJ’s purported lack of jurisdiction under the recent Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)
(per curiam). (Id.) In that case, the BIA held that IJs “lack authority to hear bond requests or to
grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.”4 29 I&N at 216.
3 The Court’s jurisdiction over this matter is limited to Petitioner’s constitutional
challenges to his detention, and the Court has no jurisdiction over the underlying removal
proceedings. 	See L.G.M. v. LaRocco, 788 F. Supp. 3d 401, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (first citing
Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 399–400 (2d Cir. 2025) (finding petitioner’s First and Fifth
Amendment challenges to her detention distinct from challenges to her removal proceedings and
therefore properly within the district court’s jurisdiction) (collecting cases); and then citing
Mahdawi v. Trump, 136 F.4th 443, 452 (2d Cir. 2025) (same)). 	Accordingly, the Court recites
only the facts related to Petitioner’s bond and custody determinations, as well as those details
regarding Petitioner’s removal proceedings, that are necessary for consideration of his Petition.
4 The BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado is binding on IJs, but not on Article III
courts. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024) (“[I]t is the province of the
courts—not the agency—to authoritatively interpret the statute.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). 	The courts have overwhelmingly disagreed with the BIA’s statutory construction in
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, as discussed further below. This Court similarly finds Matter of Yajure
Hurtado to be entirely unpersuasive and thus gives it no deference.
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The IJ in Petitioner’s case did not reach the question of whether Petitioner was a flight risk or a
danger to the community. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 25 (citing IJ Bond Denial, Dkt. 1-6).)
The next day, on October 8, 2025, Petitioner filed another motion through counsel for a
custody redetermination or, in the alternative, a hearing pursuant to Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N
Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). 	(Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 26 (citing Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 14).) 	As Petitioner
explains, “Joseph hearings are a mechanism to challenge whether a noncitizen is properly subject
to mandatory detention without a bond hearing.” (Id.) Petitioner argued that the IJ had jurisdiction
to hold a bond hearing pursuant to the TVPRA, given Petitioner’s designation as a UAC. 	(Id.
(citing Muñoz Decl., Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 14; 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B)).) On October 15, 2025, the IJ held
a hearing on the motion and stated that he intended to deny the request. (Id. (citing Muñoz Decl.,
Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 14).) 	With the IJ’s permission, Petitioner withdrew the request and refiled it on
November 	12, 	2025, 	again 	“highlight[ing] 	why 	[Petitioner] 	was 	not 	subject 	to 	no-bond
detention . . . and instead should receive the protections mandated by the [TVPRA].” (Id. (citing
same).) 	At the time Petitioner filed the instant action, he had not yet received a response. 	(Id.
(citing same).)
Petitioner filed this Petition on November 26, 2025. 	(See generally id.) 	In addition to
seeking “a Writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release [Petitioner] from
custody,” Petitioner seeks declaratory relief for Respondents’ alleged violations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702
and 706; the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)
and 1232(c)(2)(B); and the Suspension Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution. (Id.
at 25.)
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Respondents filed their opposition on December 11, 2025. 	(See Opp’n, Dkt. 11.)
Petitioner replied on December 17, 2025, (Pet. Reply, Dkt. 14), at which point the Petition was
fully briefed. The Court held a hearing on the Petition on December 19, 2025. (See 12/19/2025
Dkt. Order.) At the hearing, the Court granted the Petition from the bench, ordered Petitioner’s
immediate release from custody, and stated that a written Memorandum & Order more fully
explaining its reasoning would follow. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear habeas cases. Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (explaining that Section 2241 “authorize[s] any person to claim
in federal court that he or she is being held ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws . . . of the United States’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3))); see also Ostrer v. United States,
584 F.2d 594, 596 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[A] district court has inherent power to enter an order
affecting the custody of a habeas petitioner who is properly before it contesting the legality of his
custody.”). This “inherent power . . . extends to admitting petitioners to bail in the immigration
habeas context.” L.G.M., 788 F. Supp. 3d at 404 (quoting Elkimya v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 484
F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (itself citing Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations omitted))). 	A petitioner under Section 2241 “bears the burden of proving that he is
being held contrary to law; and because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must
satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Skaftouros v. United States, 667
F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992); Walker v. Johnston,
312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941)).
DISCUSSION
The Petition raises two core issues. 	The first is whether Petitioner’s detention was
authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (“Section 1225(b)”), as Respondents argue, or 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1226(a) (“Section 1226(a)”), as Petitioner argues. 	The second issue is whether the TVPRA
entitled Petitioner to additional protections based on his designation as an unaccompanied minor
or UAC, even though he is now older than 18.
I. 	Petitioner’s Section 1226(a) Arguments
Petitioner alleges procedural and substantive violations of his due process rights because
his detention was only authorized by Section 1226(a), which entitles him to an individualized
custody determination that he did not receive. (See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 56–67.) Respondents argue
that Petitioner’s detention is authorized not by Section 1226(a) but rather by Section 1225(b),
which requires mandatory detention while the noncitizen’s removal proceedings are pending
(absent exceptions inapplicable here). (See Pet. Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 7.) The briefing on this issue
from both sides is extensive.
The overwhelming majority of courts in this District and across the country have found
that noncitizens like Petitioner—who were detained by ICE after living in the United States for
years—were “already in the country” and therefore could only be detained pursuant to
Section 1226(a). See, e.g., Ye v. Maldonado, et al., No. 25-CV-6417 (AMD), 2025 WL 3521298,
at *3–6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2025) (holding that petitioner who had been re-arrested by ICE after an
illegal entry into the country years earlier was detained under Section 1226(a) rather than
Section 1225(b)); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-CV-6065 (NJC), --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
2025 WL 3314420, at *12–25 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (same); O.F.B. v. Maldonado,
No. 25-CV-6336 (HG), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3277677, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025)
(same); Sarmiento Guerrero v. Noem, No. 25-CV-5881 (EK), 2025 WL 3214787, at *3–6
(E.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 18, 	2025) 	(same); 	Hyppolite 	v. 	Noem, 	No. 	25-CV-4304 	(NRM), 	2025
WL 2829511, at *7–12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (same); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-CV-5208
(OEM), 2025 WL 2829434, at *4–8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025) (same); J.U. v. Maldonado,
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No. 25-CV-4836 (OEM), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2772765, at *4–9 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2025)
(same).
Although Petitioner entered the United States as a UAC, he, like the petitioners in the
above-cited cases, was released pursuant to Section 462 of the Homeland Security Act of 2022,
and is thus similarly situated to these petitioners for purposes of the Section 1225/Section 1226
and procedural due process analysis. (See Rey Decl., Dkt. 11-1, ¶ 4.) The Court agrees with the
reasoning of these decisions and finds it wholly applicable to the instant matter. The Court finds
no reason—and Respondents have provided none—to rule contrary to “over 160 different judges
sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States.” Barco Mercado v. Francis,
No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025). It thus holds that
ICE’s August 26, 2025 detention of Petitioner was only authorized pursuant to Section 1226(a).
Having determined that Petitioner was detained subject to Section 1226(a) and entitled to
a custody determination, the next question is whether his detention under that statute was lawful.
Courts in the Second Circuit apply Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine the
whether the process afforded in civil immigration detention is constitutionally adequate. Velasco
Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020). The Mathews test requires the Court to balance:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). While Petitioner
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his detention overall is unlawful in order to
be granted habeas relief, once a custodial determination is required, it is Respondents who “bear
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the burden of proving the need for continued detention.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 155 (2d
Cir. 2024).
Petitioner’s private interest is “the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in
being free from imprisonment.” Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). The
risk that Petitioner’s liberty was erroneously deprived under the process afforded to him is
unacceptably high. 	See Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 494–95 (noting that “[a]t a
minimum, . . . [Section] 1226(a) requires a valid exercise of DHS’s discretion,” and that when
DHS’s sole explanation for a petitioner’s detention is that the detention was mandatory, that “is
precisely the opposite of an exercise of discretion”). 	Finally, any government interest in
Petitioner’s ongoing detention is low, particularly as Respondents have provided no legal or factual
argument to displace or alter ORR’s prior determination that Petitioner presents neither a danger
to the community nor a flight risk. 	See Valdez v. Joyce, No. 25-CV-4627, 2025 WL 1707737,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025) (noting “ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration
proceedings’ and ‘preventing danger to the community” as valid government interests (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690)). If anything, Petitioner’s conduct since his release from Health and
Human Services (“HHS”)/ORR custody in February 2025—e.g., attending school, working, and
not committing any crimes—only reinforces ORR’s initial determination that Petitioner presents
neither a risk of flight nor any danger to his community.
Accordingly, the Court holds that Respondents’ “detention of Petitioner with no process at
all, much less prior notice, no showing of changed circumstances, or an opportunity to respond,
violate[d] his [procedural] due process rights.”5 Ye, 2025 WL 3521298, at *8 (citations omitted).
5 As previously noted, Petitioner alleges that his detention violates both his procedural and
substantive due process rights. 	(See Pet., Dkt. 1.) 	Having found Petitioner releasable on
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The Court also finds that Respondents’ failure to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing upon his
request, as provided for by Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, violated the INA.
See id. at *9; O.F.B., 2025 WL 3277677, at *8. Petitioner has met his burden of showing, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that his detention has been unlawful.
II. 	Petitioner’s TVPRA Claims
While the unlawful nature of Petitioner’s detention under Section 1226(a) alone warrants
his release, Petitioner also argues that he was entitled to additional protections under the TVPRA
because he entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor. 	(See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 55.)
Respondents contend that Petitioner is no longer a minor and thus no different from any other adult
noncitizen. (See Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 3 (“No part of the statutory scheme established by Congress
suggests that DHS must in perpetuity treat former-UACs differently from other adult aliens.”).)
Since few courts have had the occasion to consider whether the TVPRA applies in these
circumstances and the effect, if any, on a petitioner’s habeas claims, the Court also and separately
assesses whether Petitioner should be released based on the TVPRA.
The TVPRA governs the detention of unaccompanied minors. 	See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232 (“Section 1232”); see also Lopez v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (discussing Section 1232); see also Garcia Ramirez v. ICE, ---
F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 18-CV-0508 (RC), 2025 WL 3563183, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2025)
(discussing legal framework around Section 1232). It provides, in relevant part, that “the care and
custody of all unaccompanied alien children, including responsibility for their detention, where
appropriate, shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of [HHS],” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1); that “an
procedural due process grounds alone, the Court declines to analyze Petitioner’s substantive due
process claim.
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unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Secretary of [HHS] shall be promptly placed in
the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child,” taking into consideration “danger
to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight,” id. § 1232(c)(2)(A)6; and that “if a minor
described in subparagraph (A) reaches 18 years of age and is transferred to the custody of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary shall consider placement in the least restrictive
setting available after taking into account the alien’s danger to self, danger to the community, and
risk of flight,” id. § 1232(c)(2)(B). 	ORR is the specific office within HHS that is tasked with
caring for UACs under the applicable statutes and regulations. See supra n.1.
There is no dispute that Petitioner was entitled to the protections of the TVPRA when CBP
first encountered him in the United States. (See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 19 (discussing Petitioner’s transfer
to ORR custody and subsequent placement in a children’s shelter); Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 11–13
(noting that CBP deemed Petitioner to be a UAC after he crossed the border and transferred him
to ORR custody, consistent with the TVPRA).) The question is whether the TVPRA still applies
now that Petitioner is 19, having turned 18 while living with his mother’s partner. 	Petitioner
contends that he never ceased being under ORR custody and that his re-detention in August 2025
was the transfer to DHS custody that triggered the DHS’s obligation under Section 1232(c)(2)(B)
to consider placing him in the “least restrictive [custodial] setting” available. (Pet. Reply, Dkt. 14,
at 3, 12.) 	Respondents counter that Petitioner’s release to a sponsor (Petitioner’s cousin) when
Petitioner was 17 removed him from ORR custody, such that no “transfer” from ORR to DHS
occurred when Petitioner turned 18 and, correspondingly, that Section 1232(c)(2)(B) was never
triggered. (Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 3, 11.)
6 In this regard, the procedures established for UACs parallels the Section 1226(a)
procedures that apply to adults who enter the United States and are released, sometimes on their
own recognizance, pending their immigration proceedings.
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A. 	Custodial Continuum
As previously discussed, and as both parties concede, Petitioner was transferred into ORR
custody very shortly after CBP encountered him in the United States in January 2024. (Pet., Dkt. 1,
¶ 19; Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 11.) ORR then placed him in a children’s shelter. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 2.) ORR
later released Petitioner to a family member “verified” by ORR and pursuant to a “Sponsor Care
Agreement.” (Verification of Release, Dkt. 1-3; Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 20; Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 13.) Finally,
Petitioner moved to Long Island “with the permission of his sponsor.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 20.) It was
while Petitioner was living in Long Island and, Petitioner argues, under the Sponsor Care
Agreement that ICE re-detained him. (See Pet. Reply, Dkt. 14, at 12 (stating that Petitioner was
living under ORR custody “while on release during the Sponsor[] Agreement” (citation omitted)).)
But according to Respondents, “Petitioner had not been in the custody of ORR since February 25,
2024[,]” when Petitioner was allowed to live with his cousin under the Sponsor Care Agreement.
(Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 13.)
The Court rejects Respondents’ argument and finds that Petitioner remained in HHS/ORR
custody from the time he was placed with his cousin in Texas until he was re-detained by ICE
while living with his mother’s partner in Long Island. 	This is consistent with the holdings in
Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, and Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183, both of which the Court finds
persuasive and on point. As the court explained in Lopez, “‘custody’ need not be limited to a jail
cell.” Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *2 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 350 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 	ORR retains “responsibility” for “the care and custody of all
unaccompanied alien children” (subject to threshold exclusions inapplicable here), regardless of
their physical placement. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1) (emphasis added). “ORR makes all placement
decisions involving UACs to ensure they are not released on their own recognizance.” 	Lopez,
2018 WL 2932726, at *6 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(C), (D), (b)(2)). Between 2021 and 2024,
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an average of over 100,000 UACs per year were released to sponsors. Released to Sponsors, ORR:
Unaccompanied Alien Children Data (Dec. 22, 2025), https://acf.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data.
In 2024, 82.1% of these released UACs were referred for post-release services provided by ORR.
Id. 	And indeed, as mandated by the relevant government regulations, ORR offers these post-
release services for certain UACs no longer in its physical custody, including everything from
facilitating attendance at immigration proceedings to assistance with school enrollment, access to
medical insurance, and counseling. 45 C.F.R. § 410.1210(b).
Respondents attempt to distinguish Lopez, arguing that the petitioner in Lopez aged out
while he was still in ORR custody, whereas Petitioner turned 18 while living with his mother’s
partner and was thus, Respondents maintain, no longer in ORR’s custody. But the distinction that
Respondents would have the Court draw would breed perverse results: UACs who are still in
physical ORR custody when they turn 18 because they present a risk of flight or danger that
precludes their release would get the legal protections of Section 1232(c)(2)(B), i.e., “placement
in the least restrictive setting available” after being transferred to DHS custody, but the UACs who
were released from physical ORR custody before the age of 18 because they present little or no
risk of flight or danger would not. This reading of Section 1232(c)(2)(B) is plainly contrary to the
relevant statutes and the clear purpose of Section 1232 to provide enhanced protections for UACs.
See Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *9 (“For Section 1232(c)(2)(B) to protect only minors who attain
majority while in the physical custody of [ORR], but not those over whom the [ORR] exercises
custodial and legal control pursuant to sponsorship agreements, would run counter to the spirit and
purpose of the [statute].”).
The Court therefore finds that although ORR relinquished physical custody of Petitioner
upon his release to his ORR-vetted and approved sponsor, ORR retained legal custody of Petitioner
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throughout his sponsored release. Petitioner was thus in ORR legal custody up until the day he
was re-detained by ICE, at which point Petitioner’s custody was effectively transferred from ORR
to ICE, which triggered the requirement under Section 1232(c)(2)(B) that ICE conduct an
assessment of the “least restrictive [custodial] setting” for Petitioner. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B);
see Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *9 (“The protections of Section 1232(c)(2)(B) therefore extend
beyond those over whom the [ORR] exercises physical custody; they apply to UACs who turn
eighteen while in the legal custody of the [ORR] and on release pursuant to sponsorship
agreements.”). 	By 	failing 	“to 	follow 	procedures 	mandated 	by 	Section 	1232(c)(2)(B),”
Respondents violated the TVPRA and the APA. Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183, at *1.
B. 	Temporal Limits to TVPRA Protection
Regardless of his custodial status, Respondents also argue that once Petitioner turned 18,
he was no longer entitled to the protections of the TVPRA and Section 1232(c)(2)(B). According
to Respondents, “[n]o part of the [TVPRA] suggests that DHS must in perpetuity treat former-
UACs differently from other adult aliens.” (Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 3.) Petitioner counters that “the
statute does not place any time limits on ICE’s duties under the statute, either on the front end or
the back end,” and that “ICE is not relieved of its obligation to follow [Section 1232(c)(2)(B)] at
the end of the day on the age-out’s eighteenth birthday.” (Pet. Reply, Dkt. 14, at 11–12 (quoting
Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183, at *29).)
The Court agrees with Lopez and Garcia Ramirez that the removal of TVPRA protections
on the day a UAC turns 18 appears to run directly counter to the statute, which imposes duties on
ICE starting on that very day. 	8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B) (requiring a consideration of “least
restrictive setting[s]” once the UAC “reaches 18 years of age” (emphasis added)); see Lopez, 2018
WL 2932726, at *13 (“If UACs become ‘arriving aliens’ on the day they turn eighteen, subjecting
them to rearrest and near-indefinite detention, then [Section 1232(c)(2)(B)] of the TVPRA would
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lose the force of law.”); Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183, at *16 (“ICE cannot re-arrest and
detain without affording age-outs the protection due under Section 1232(c)(2)(B) merely because
some short time has passed since that protection was afforded.” (citation omitted)). Indeed, as the
court in Garcia Ramirez explained, allowing Respondents to thwart Congress’s intent “by
complying with Section 1232(c)(2)(B) one day—considering an age-out for placement in the least
restrictive setting . . . —only to claw back that consideration the next day (despite no material
change in the age-out’s circumstances)” would deprive the age-out of “the consideration they were
owed under the statute.” Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183, at *16. The Court agrees that this
would be “untenable.” Id.
Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, this is not a grant of protection “in perpetuity.”
(Opp’n, Dkt. 11, at 3.) It is a grant of protection for as long as the circumstances warranting the
UAC’s original release to a sponsor remain unchanged. 	See Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *12
(noting that the government had failed to show any change in circumstances since it had
determined UAC’s release to his mother was “appropriate”); Garcia Ramirez, 2025 WL 3563183,
at *7 (agreeing that “Defendants’ practice of re-arresting and detaining age-outs after their initial
release—without any material change in circumstances— . . . violates Section 1232(c)(2)(B)”); cf.
Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting the government’s
representation that “DHS generally only re-arrests an alien pursuant to § 1226(b) after a material
change in circumstances”), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th
Cir. 2018). Respondents’ case law only reinforces this. In Mendez Ramirez v. Decker, the court
concluded that petitioner had lost his UAC status because he had been released to the custody of a
parent and thus no longer met the statute’s definition of “unaccompanied alien child.” 	612 F.
Supp. 3d 200, 210–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (emphasis added). In Jose L.P. v. Whitaker, the court also
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concluded that the petitioner had lost his UAC status due to release to a parent; ICE later detained
him because he was suspected of gang activity. 431 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549–50 (D.N.J. 2019).7
Here, Respondents have made no showing of changed circumstances, and their basis for
detaining Petitioner now is merely his alleged “removability.” 	(See generally Opp’n, Dkt. 11.)
Absent a showing that the deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is warranted due to danger to the
community or risk of flight—i.e., circumstances materially different from those that supported
Petitioner’s prior release into the community to live with his sponsor—Petitioner’s re-detention
violated his procedural due process rights. 	See Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *11 (discussing
procedural due process considerations given, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, and Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention without an individualized custody determination
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the INA, and the APA, and his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (Pet., Dkt. 1), is GRANTED. 	The Court
reiterates that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful under both Section 1226 and Section 1232.
While Respondents have already effectuated Petitioner’s release from ICE custody, (see
Dkt. 16), the Court reminds Respondents that “Petitioner must not be re-detained by Respondents
without notice and an opportunity to be heard at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker, at which Respondents will have the burden of showing that Petitioner’s re-
detention is authorized under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a) and 1232(c)(2)(B).” (12/19/2025 Dkt. Order.)
7 The court in Mendez Ramirez took issue with the Lopez court’s analysis, or lack thereof,
of the impact of Lopez’s release to a parent. See Mendez Ramirez, 612 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (arguing
that the Lopez court had failed to consider the statutory impact of Lopez’s release to his parent).
This is not an issue in this case because Petitioner was not released to a parent.
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The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with this
Memorandum & Order and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: February 6, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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