Ring v. Goli Nutrition Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MICHAEL RING, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, 	MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 	25-cv-6247 (NRM) (JRC)
GOLI NUTRITION, INC.,
Defendant.
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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Michael Ring initiated this putative class action lawsuit in New York
Supreme Court, Kings County on July 15, 2025. 	ECF No. 1-2 at 2.1 	On behalf of
himself and the putative class, he alleges that Defendant Goli Nutrition, Inc.
mislabeled one of its products, thereby misleading consumers to believe that each
bottle contained more of the product than it did. See generally ECF No. 1-2.
Defendant subsequently sought to remove the case to this Court on November
10, 2025. 	ECF No. 1. 	On November 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand to
state court. ECF No. 8. That same day, this Court sua sponte issued an order to show
cause why this case should not be remanded to state court for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), specifically as to whether Plaintiff’s claims
met the amount-in-controversy requirement for putative class actions removed to
federal court. 	Dkt. Order dated Nov. 14, 2025. 	Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s
motion and the Court’s order to show cause on November 24, 2025. ECF No. 13. That
1 Unless otherwise indicated, page numbers refer to the pagination provided
by the Electronic Case Filing System.
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same day, Defendant filed a request for a pre-motion conference on its anticipated
motion to dismiss. ECF No. 14.
The Court has reviewed the state court complaint as well as the parties’
submissions and supporting declarations and exhibits. 	For the reasons explained
below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court and DENIES
Defendant’s request for a pre-motion conference as moot.
Defendant invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
ECF No. 1. 	The parties agree that there is minimal diversity between them. 	ECF
No. 12 at 1 (noting that Plaintiff is a citizen of New York and Defendant is a foreign
corporation incorporated and with a principal place of business in Quebec, Canada);
ECF No. 10 at 6 (agreeing that “there is ‘minimal diversity’”); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2)(C) (providing that federal courts have jurisdiction over class actions
where, inter alia, “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any
defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state”). 	The parties
dispute, however, whether the $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), has
been met. 	ECF No. 13 at 1 (Defendant’s assertion that “Plaintiff has not rebutted
[Defendant]’s evidence that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million”);
ECF No. 10 at 6 (“[Plaintiff] disputes . . . [that] the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $5,000,000 . . . .” (citation modified)).
Defendant asserts that “a court should only dismiss a case for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under CAFA if it determines ‘to a legal certainty’ that the
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aggregate amount in controversy is less than $5 million.” ECF No. 13 at 2–3 (citing
Pena v. Brit. Airways, PLC (UK), 849 F. App’x 13, 14 n.1 (2d Cir. 2021) and Bank v.
Hydra Grp. LLC, 433 F. App’x 50, 50 (2d Cir. 2011)). However, the cases Defendant
cites for this proposition are distinguishable. 	Neither Pena nor Bank concerned
removal of a putative class action from state to federal court under CAFA. 	In both
cases, the plaintiffs affirmatively sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court
and, therefore, alleged that the amounts in controversy exceeded the $5 million
requirement under CAFA. See Pena, 849 F. App’x at 14 (“The district court dismissed
Pena’s complaint both for a lack of Article III standing, holding that Pena’s alleged
injuries were not sufficiently concrete and particularized to confer standing, and
because Pena’s breach of contract claim did not state a plausible claim for relief.”
(citation modified) (citation omitted)); Bank, 433 F. App’x at 50 (“The district court
found that it lacked jurisdiction because Bank’s putative class action did not satisfy
the amount in controversy requirement.”). A review of other precedent deploying the
“to a legal certainty” language cited by Defendant reveals that this rule applies when
a defendant seeks to rebut a plaintiff’s assertion that the amount-in-controversy
requirement is satisfied, not when a defendant seeks to invoke a federal court’s
diversity 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	under 	CAFA 	upon 	removal. 	See, 	e.g.,
Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. OBEX Grp. LLC, 958 F.3d 126, 135 (2d Cir. 2020)
(holding that, where the petitioner “sought an arbitral award of $134 million,” upon
review of the parties’ documents, “[i]t does not appear to a legal certainty that the
amount is really for less,” and therefore affirming the district court’s denial of the
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respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (emphasis
added)).
In seeking to require that Plaintiff demonstrate “to a legal certainty” that the
amount in controversy here is less than $5 million, Defendant fails to recognize this
distinction. 	In reality, “[u]nder CAFA, as under the traditional rule, the party
asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving it. 	To satisfy its
burden, defendant must prove to a reasonable probability . . . that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.” Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir.
2006) (emphasis added). 	A district court that denies a motion for remand may be
reversed where it “ma[kes] no findings and offer[s] no explanation as to how it
calculated the amount in controversy [] to be more than $5 million.” Id.
Here, Defendant does not meet its burden. 	The declaration of Defendant’s
President that “more than $5 million of the Product was sold in the State of New York
during the [relevant period],” ECF No. 1-3 at 2, misses the mark. Plaintiff alleges in
the state court complaint that “he and consumers paid more than they would have
paid for the Product” because of Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations and/or
omissions. 	ECF No. 1-2 at 20, ¶ 79. 	Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his means individual
damages will be based on the value attributed to the challenged claims, practices,
and/or omissions, a percentage of the total price paid, instead of the Product’s total
value.” Id. ¶ 80. Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]his difference is typically between
five ($0.05) and sixty cents ($0.60) per unit, a small fraction or percentage of the total
price.” 	Id. at 21, ¶ 82. 	Additionally, Plaintiff seeks only “[a]ctual damages.” 	Id. at
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21–22. Because Defendant has adduced only a total amount of sales, rather than the
number of units sold during the relevant time period, the Court is unable to ascertain
whether the actual or reasonably probable amount in controversy actually amounts
to 	$5 	million 	or 	more. 	“Federal 	jurisdiction 	cannot 	be 	based 	on 	surmise 	or
guesswork.” 	Hai Yang Liu v. 88 Harborview Realty, LLC, 5 F. Supp. 3d 443, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1281, 1283
(N.D. Ill. 1990)).
Moreover, Plaintiff affirmatively disputes Defendant’s assertion of damages,
representing to the Court that the amount in controversy (1) does not exceed $75,000
as between named Plaintiff and Defendant and (2) does not exceed $5 million for the
entire class. ECF No. 10 at 6. “Where the damages sought are uncertain, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff’s pleadings.” Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton
Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1994).
At this time, the Court cannot, based upon the state court complaint and the
parties’ 	submissions, 	reasonably 	assure 	itself 	that 	the 	amount-in-controversy
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) has been satisfied. 	If Defendant does
subsequently receive actual notice that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,
it may still avail itself (for up to one year after the commencement of the action) of
the removal provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. See Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624
F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he removal clock does not start to run until the plaintiff
serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary
damages sought.”); Cutrone v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 749 F.3d 137, 145
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(2d Cir. 2014) (holding that, “in CAFA cases, the removal clocks of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
are not triggered until the plaintiff serves the defendant with an initial pleading or
other document that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages sought or
sets forth facts from which an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be
ascertained”). 	Plaintiff is reminded that “deliberately fail[ing] to disclosure the
actual amount in controversy to prevent removal” constitutes bad faith that would
permit Defendant to remove this case more than one year after its commencement.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(B); see id. § 1446(c)(1). 	On the present record, however,
Defendant has plainly failed to meet its burden of establishing grounds for removal
of the action.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court is GRANTED, and this
case is remanded to New York Supreme Court, Kings County, under case number
523551/2025. Defendant’s request for a pre-motion conference is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: December 11, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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