Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-05740 (DG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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Ibrahima Diallo,
Petitioner,
-against-
Raul Maldonado, Jr., in his official capacity as
Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center;
William Joyce, in his official capacity as Acting
Director, New York Field Office for U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi
Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, in
his official capacity as Acting Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
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DIANE GUJARATI, United States District Judge:
By Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner Ibrahima Diallo, detained at
the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York, commenced this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition” or
“Pet.”), ECF No. 1; ECF No. 2 (containing exhibits to Petition). Petitioner principally asserts
that his detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See generally Pet.; see also Reply in Support of Petition (“Reply”), ECF No. 16.1
Petitioner requests that the Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and order Petitioner’s immediate
1 	The Petition is brought in five Counts: (1) “Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (Substantive Due Process);” (2) “Violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause (Procedural Due Process);” (3) “Violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2);” (4)
“Violation of Constitutional and Statutory Rights to an Adjudication of SIJS Protection;” and
(5) “Release on Bail Pending Adjudication.”
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release. See Pet. at 20; Reply at 10.2
Respondents oppose the Petition. See Memorandum of Law in Response to the Court’s
Order to Show Cause Why the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not Be Granted and in
Opposition to the Petition, ECF No. 14; Declaration of Willam D. Morrow (“Morrow Decl.”),
ECF No. 14-1; Supplemental Declaration of William D. Morrow (“Supp. Morrow Decl.”), ECF
No. 15-1.
For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Relevant Factual Background3
Petitioner is 21 years old and a citizen of Guinea. See Pet. ¶¶ 1, 8. Petitioner entered the
United States on or about December 23, 2023 at or near Lukeville, Arizona. See Pet. ¶ 20;
Morrow Decl. ¶ 4. Petitioner asserts that at the age of 19, he “fled persecution in Guinea because
of his race/ethnicity and because of his political opposition to the regime in Guinea, which – like
preceding governments in Guinea – has long repressed the Fulani people.” See Pet. ¶ 20.
Petitioner entered the United States illegally. See Morrow Decl. ¶ 5; see also Transcript of
October 24, 2025 Hearing (“Tr.”) 21.
On December 25, 2023, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear, charging him
with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”)). See Pet. ¶ 20; Notice to Appear, ECF No. 2-1;
Morrow Decl. ¶ 6. The Notice to Appear identified Petitioner as “an alien present in the United
2 	Petitioner also seeks a variety of additional and/or alternative relief. See Pet. at 20.
3 	The information set forth in this section is drawn from the Petition and exhibits thereto; the
Declaration of William D. Morrow; the Supplemental Declaration of William D. Morrow and
exhibits thereto; and representations made at the hearing held on the Petition on October 24,
2025 and is uncontested unless otherwise indicated.
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States who has not been admitted or paroled.” See Notice to Appear at 1; see also Morrow Decl.
¶ 6. The Notice to Appear ordered Petitioner to appear before an immigration judge of the
United States Department of Justice in Newark, New Jersey on June 20, 2024. See Pet. ¶ 20;
Notice to Appear at 1; see also Morrow Decl. ¶ 6. Petitioner was released on his own
recognizance. See Order of Release on Recognizance, ECF No. 2-2; Pet. ¶ 20; Morrow Decl.
¶ 6. Respondents represent that Petitioner “was released on his own personal recognizance due
to a lack of detention bed space” and “was not then, nor has he since been, admitted to the
United States.” See Morrow Decl. ¶ 6. Petitioner asserts that he was released on his own
recognizance in accordance with section 236 of the INA – i.e., in accordance with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226. See Pet. ¶ 20 (referencing Order of Release on Recognizance).
Subsequent to Petitioner’s release, removal proceedings were commenced against
Petitioner, see Morrow Decl. ¶ 7; Pet. ¶¶ 21, 25; Petitioner’s request to change venue to the
immigration court located at 290 Broadway, New York, New York (“290 Broadway”) was
granted, see Pet. ¶ 21; ECF No. 2-4; and Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal,
and protection under the Convention Against Torture and – following the issuance of a “Special
Findings Order” from the Bronx Family Court – for Special Immigration Juvenile Status, see Pet.
¶¶ 1, 21 & n.2, 22-23; ECF Nos. 2-7, 2-8.
On June 20, 2025, Petitioner appeared in person before an immigration judge at 290
Broadway in connection with Petitioner’s removal proceedings. See Pet. ¶ 25; Morrow Decl.
¶ 11. Petitioner’s counsel appeared virtually. See Morrow Decl. ¶ 11. At the June 20, 2025
proceeding, DHS moved to dismiss Petitioner’s removal proceedings. See Pet. ¶ 25; Morrow
Decl. ¶ 11. The motion, which was opposed by Petitioner, was granted without prejudice. See
Pet. ¶ 25; Order on Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 2-9; see also Morrow Decl. ¶ 11.
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On June 20, 2025, after the appearance before the immigration judge, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took Petitioner into custody. See Pet. ¶ 26; Morrow Decl. ¶ 12.
Petitioner asserts that he was arrested in the hallway of 290 Broadway “without any notice or
warning” and that the ICE officers who arrested him “were masked and did not identify
themselves.” See Pet. ¶ 26. Petitioner also asserts that his “arrest and detention were
purportedly based on an administrative warrant” and that the warrant “was signed but did not
include a fully printed name and title nor was the certificate of service completed.” See Pet.
¶ 26; see also ECF No. 2-10. Respondents assert that “after the hearing, ICE took Petitioner into
custody and escorted him for further processing to the ICE processing area located at 26 Federal
Plaza New York, New York” and that during processing, ICE served Petitioner with a Form I-
200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien); a Form I-860 (Notice and Order of Expedited Removal),
which initiated expedited removal and which reflected that Petitioner was detained without bond
pursuant to section 235 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1225); and a Form I-286 (Notice of Custody
Determination). See Morrow Decl. ¶ 12. With respect to the Form I-286, Respondents assert:
“ICE . . . served Petitioner with a Form I-286 . . . that reflected an individualized custody
determination; this was in error, but the form did reflect that he would be detained.” See Morrow
Decl. ¶ 12; see also Tr. 24; Supp. Morrow Decl. ¶ 2; ECF No. 15-2.
Petitioner appealed the immigration judge’s June 20, 2025 decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals and in light of the pending appeal, Petitioner currently is not subject to
expedited removal. See Pet. ¶ 29; see also Morrow Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. Petitioner is detained at the
MDC. See Pet. ¶ 27; Morrow Decl. ¶ 13.
Petitioner alleges that on August 15, 2025, his counsel requested his release from
detention and that on August 16, 2025, an ICE official responded that Petitioner was subject to
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mandatory detention and therefore not eligible for release. See Pet. ¶ 30. Petitioner asserts that
he has not sought a bond hearing before an immigration judge because doing so would be futile.
See Pet. ¶ 31.4
II. 	Procedural Background
On October 13, 2025, Petitioner filed the Petition. See ECF No. 1. By Order to Show
Cause dated October 17, 2025, the Court, inter alia, directed Respondents to show cause in
writing why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. See October 17, 2025 Order to Show
Cause. On October 23, 2025, Respondents filed their brief in response to the Order to Show
Cause and in opposition to the Petition and filed the Declaration of Willam D. Morrow. See ECF
Nos. 14, 14-1. On October 24, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the Petition. See Minute Entry
for October 24, 2025 hearing; see generally Tr. On October 24, 2025, following the hearing,
Respondents filed a letter attaching the Supplemental Declaration of William D. Morrow and
exhibits thereto. See ECF No. 15.5 On October 31, 2025, Petitioner filed his reply in further
support of the Petition. See ECF No. 16. On November 3, 2025, Respondents filed a Notice of
Supplemental Authority. See ECF No. 17.
* * *
4 	Petitioner asserts that “[w]hile at liberty” prior to his June 2025 detention, he was a member
of The Door, “a 501(c)(3) organization that assists young people ages 12 to 24 in Manhattan
and the Bronx with a comprehensive array of services,” and that he “took English classes
approximately three days a week.” See Pet. ¶ 28.
5 	The request to seal the exhibits to the Supplemental Declaration of William D. Morrow, see
ECF No. 15, is granted. Although a presumption of public access ordinarily attaches to
judicial documents, sealing such documents can be justified when necessary to protect
countervailing interests. See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d
Cir. 2006). The Court finds that sealing of the exhibits, ECF Nos. 15-2 and 15-3, is warranted
due to the nature of the information contained therein.
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As reflected in the parties’ submissions and by their arguments at the October 24, 2025
hearing, Petitioner and Respondents disagree as to the statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention.
Respondents argue that Petitioner is being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“Section 1225”)
and that such detention is mandatory. Petitioner, in contrast, argues that he is being detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (“Section 1226”) and that such detention is discretionary.
Respondents acknowledge that various documents provided to Petitioner reference Section 1226
but Respondents argue that regardless, Section 1225 is the relevant provision here and that
Section 1225 has always applied to Petitioner, including in December 2023 when he was
released on his own recognizance due to a “bed space” issue.
The parties’ disagreement over which statutory section applies stems largely from a
disagreement over statutory interpretation with respect to Section 1225. The parties urge the
Court to adopt their respective interpretations.6
The Court notes that the instant action is one of the many actions in which federal district
courts across the country have in recent months been called upon to address Sections 1225 and
1226 and to contend with varying views as to how those provisions should be interpreted and/or
applied. The Court finds particularly instructive here the decision of the district court in Savane
v. Francis, No. 25-CV-06666, 2025 WL 2774452 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025), discussed further
below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized, Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2241 “authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus
6 	The Court herein assumes familiarity with the differing statutory interpretations advanced by
the parties and with the arguments in support of those interpretations.
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whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.’” See Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3)).7
DISCUSSION
As set forth below, the Court need not – and does not – resolve the statutory
interpretation question here because even accepting for present purposes Respondents’ assertion
that Petitioner is detained pursuant to Section 1225 and that Section 1225 has always applied to
Petitioner, the Petition must be granted because Petitioner is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution” – specifically, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
I. 	Applicable Law
A. 	Due Process
The Second Circuit has noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
“covers noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020). In addition, the Second Circuit
has noted that “[n]oncitizens are also entitled to challenge through habeas corpus” the legality of
their detention. See id. And the Second Circuit has applied the three-factor balancing test as
provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) in determining the adequacy of process in
the context of civil immigration confinement. See Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851 (noting that
the three Mathews factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
7 	It bears noting that Respondents do not dispute that the Court has jurisdiction over the issue of
Petitioner’s detention. See Tr. 44 (Respondents’ counsel stating that Respondents are “not
suggesting the Court does not have jurisdiction to assess the issue of detention under habeas
or order release”).
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and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail” (quoting Mathews, 424
U.S. at 335)).
B. 	Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) provides:
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in
the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an
alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in
international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter
an applicant for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides in relevant part:
[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“Section 1182(d)(5)(A)”) provides in relevant part:
The Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . in his discretion parole into the
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a
case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit
any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien
shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such
parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
As noted by the Savane court, Section 1182(d)(5)(A) “is the sole statutory authority
under which a noncitizen subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) may be paroled.” See Savane, 2025 WL
2774452, at *7; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300 (2018).
For termination of parole, as relevant here, Section 1182(d)(5)(A)’s implementing
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regulations require “written notice to the alien.” See 8 C.F.R. 212.5(e)(2)(i).8
II. 	Petitioner’s Detention Violates the Fifth Amendment
In light of Respondents’ position – accepted for present purposes – that the basis for
Petitioner’s detention is Section 1225 and that Section 1225 has always applied to Petitioner, it
follows that Petitioner’s release in December 2023 was pursuant to parole under Section
1182(d)(5)(A) and that Petitioner therefore was entitled to certain process in connection with his
detention in June 2025.
Here, the record does not reflect that Respondents complied with the statutorily required
process for revoking Petitioner’s parole. The record does not reflect that Petitioner received the
notice required in connection with revocation of parole under Section 1182(d)(5)(A). Nor does
the record reflect that Respondents made any assessment – much less an individualized
assessment – before revoking Petitioner’s parole. See Savane, 2025 WL 2774452, at *8; see also
Rojas Acevedo v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-07189, 2025 WL 3034183, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,
2025) (noting that “[r]evocation of parole under DHS’ own rules requires a case-by-case
assessment to comply with the statute, and must attend to the reasons an individual noncitizen
received parole initially” (quotation omitted)).9
8 	The various provisions of Section 1226 differ materially from the provisions of Section 1225.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (titled “Arrest, detention, and release”) provides: “On a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c)
[relating to criminal aliens] and pending such decision, the Attorney General – (1) may
continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien on – (A) bond of at least
$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or (B) conditional parole . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (titled “Revocation of bond or
parole”) provides: “The Attorney General at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized
under subsection (a), rearrest the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.”
9 	Although, as noted above, Respondents assert that they provided certain documents to
Petitioner at the time of his detention in June 2025, Respondents do not assert that they
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Applying to the facts here the reasoning of the district court in the analogous Savane
case, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s procedural due process rights were violated. Like the
Savane court, the Court here concludes that the first Mathews factor weighs heavily in
Petitioner’s favor – indeed, Petitioner invokes “the most significant liberty interest there is – the
interest in being free from imprisonment,” see Savane, 2025 WL 2774452, at *9 (quoting
Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851); that the second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s
favor – the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is high on the record
before the Court, see id.; and that as to the third Mathews factor, although Respondents have a
“weighty” interest in the efficient administration of the immigration laws, Respondents would
not be overly burdened by providing, at a minimum, the notice required – indeed, Respondents
are “required to follow their own regulations,” see id. (first quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 34 (1982); then quoting Fed. Defs. of New York, Inc. v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 954
F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2020)).10
Because Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated, he is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution” and the Petition therefore is granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241; see, e.g., Savane, 2025 WL 2774452, at *10; Rojas Acevedo, 2025 WL 3034183, at *9;
Materano v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-06137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *16, *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12,
provided the notice required pursuant to Section 1182(d)(5)(A)’s implementing regulations.
Respondents also do not appear to rely on the Form I-286 as evidence of an individualized
determination – indeed, as noted above, Respondents assert error in connection with that
form.
10 As numerous courts have noted, detention under Section 1226 without any process would
constitute a due process violation as well. See, e.g., Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis, 25-CV-
05528, 2025 WL 1927931, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025); Valdez v. Joyce, No. 25-CV-
04627, 2025 WL 1707737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025).
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2025).11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED. Respondents are
directed to release Petitioner from custody and to file a letter certifying such release no later than
5:00 p.m. on November 13, 2025.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Diane Gujarati
DIANE GUJARATI
United States District Judge
Dated: November 12, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
11 Having determined that Petitioner’s procedural due process rights were violated and that he is
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on that basis, the Court need not – and does not – address
Petitioner’s various other arguments and/or requests for relief. See Reply at 7 n.5; Tr. 33.
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