Wallace-Bey et al v. America's Christian Credit Union et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
N o 25-CV-5558 (RER) (JAM)
_____________________
ROBERT W ALLACE-BEY
VERSUS
AMERICA ’ S CHRISTIAN CREDIT UNION
___________________
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
___________________
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., District Judge:
On October 1, 2025, Plaintiffs Temple of Seven Inc. and Robert Wallace-Bey,
appearing pro se, filed this action against Defendant America’s Christian Credit Union
(“ACCU”). (ECF No. 1). By Order dated October 21, 2025, the Court dismissed Temple
of Seven Inc. from the action,1 granted Plaintiff Wallace-Bey’s (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) application, and dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff failed
to show that he had standing to bring the action and granted him leave to file an amended
complaint by November 21, 2025. (ECF No. 6).
On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against ACCU alleging
claims pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.,
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title II”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000A et seq., and the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 200bb, et seq. (ECF No.
1 “[A] corporation cannot appear pro se in federal court,” including a religious corporation. Zhao v. KeZhang,
Inc., No. 18-CV-6452 (EK) (VMS), 2025 WL 2773022, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (citing Jacobs v.
Patent Enforcement Fund Inc., 230 F.3d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 2000); Clerk of Court is directed to reflect the
caption as set forth in the amended complaint and terminate Temple of Seven Inc. and Does 1-10 from this
action.
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7). As discussed below, the amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend by
December 22, 2025.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n June 11, 2025, [he] applied for a ministry account with
ACCU to support religious and charitable operations,” but that ACCU “denied the
application” because “[o]ne signer currently has an unpaid charge-off in the amount of
$230.89 with Capital One.” (ECF No. 7 at 2, 6). Plaintiff alleges that “[b]y linking Plaintiff’s
personal consumer record to the organization’s eligibility, Defendant imposed an unlawful
religious and personal barrier to financial access.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in
damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of City
Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true,
this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro
se complaint, courts must be mindful that a plaintiff’s pleadings are held “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Harris
v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain
obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Nonetheless, when a plaintiff seeks
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to proceed without paying the filing fee, the court must dismiss the action if the court
determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In addition, “[i]f the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal
question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when plaintiff and defendants are of diverse
citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
“[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any
time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the
action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697,
700-01 (2d Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court finds that the amended complaint still does not allege facts
to show that Plaintiff has standing. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied a ministry
account. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to approve the opening of the
ministry account for Temple of Seven Inc. As set forth in the Court’s prior Order, an actual
“case or controversy” is required under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, that is,
Plaintiff must show that he has “standing” to sue the defendant. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). “To establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will
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be redressed by a favorable decision.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149,
157 (2014) (citation and brackets omitted).
Here, Plaintiff lacks standing because he does not allege claims that are personal
to him; rather, the claims belong to the religious corporation, Temple of Seven Inc. As
such, Plaintiff cannot sue based on any injuries allegedly sustained by the religious
corporation. See Bingham v. Zolt, 66 F.3d 553, 561–62 (2d Cir. 1995).
However, even if Plaintiff had standing to sue, the Court finds that he does not
allege facts sufficient to state a claim under ECOA,2 Title II3 or RFRA.4 According to
Plaintiff and the ACCU’s letter dated September 29, 2025, attached as an exhibit, the
account was denied because “[o]ne signer currently has an unpaid charge-off in the
amount of $230.80 with Capital One.” (ECF No. 7 at 6). There are no facts to suggest or
support 	that 	ACCU 	discriminated 	against 	Plaintiff 	based 	on 	religion 	or 	religious
association, that ACCU is a place of public accommodation, or that ACCU is a
government actor that burdened or blocked Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion. See
Hussein v. Occupant of the Office of CEO & CFO of Bank of America, No. 24-CV-4477
(RPK) (MMH), 2025 WL 2783108, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025) (dismissing pro se
complaint alleging an ECOA claim as conclusory and for failure to state a claim); Houston
v. Wells Fargo, No. 24 Civ. 7637 (JGLC), 2025 WL 1582079, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4,
2025) (same); Antonetti v. Heavy Woods Bar, No. 25-CV-661 (LDH) (JRC), 2025 WL
2 ECOA provides that it is “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to
any aspect of a credit transaction” on the basis “of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status,
or age.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
3 Title II prohibits discrimination in the provision of “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
4 “RFRA provides that the ‘government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.’” Tanvir
v. Tanzin, 120 F.4th 1049, 1058 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)).
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3078204, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (dismissing pro se complaint alleging Title II for
failure to state a claim); Marks-Ellis v. NYU Langone Health Systems, No. 23 Civ. 9618
(KPF), 2025 WL 1784814, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2025) (dismissing pro se complaint
alleging 	Title 	II 	because 	defendant 	was 	not 	a 	place 	of 	public 	accommodation);
Bartholomew v. Mount Sinai West, No. 23-CV-3854 (PKC) (JRC), 2025 WL 2772911, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025) (dismissing pro se complaint alleging RFRA because
defendant was a private entity). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under ECOA,
Title II or RFRA.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the amended complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed, without
prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks standing, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3), and in the alternative, for failure to state a claim under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act, and the Religious Freedom and Restoration
Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and out of an abundance of caution, the Court
grants Plaintiff until December 22, 2025, to file a second amended complaint that alleges
facts to show that he has standing to commence the action and a plausible basis for the
claim to proceed under the federal law.
If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, it must be captioned
“Second Amended Complaint,” and bear the same docket number as this Memorandum
and Order, No. 25-CV-5558 (RER) (JAM).
The 	second 	amended 	complaint 	shall 	replace, 	not 	supplement, 	the 	prior
complaints. That is, the second amended complaint must stand on its own without
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reference to the complaint or the amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file a second
amended complaint within the time allowed or fails to show good cause for an extension
of time, the Court shall direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close this case.
The second amended complaint, 	if filed, shall be reviewed for 	substantive
sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and for subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and
Order along with a General Complaint form to Plaintiff and to note the mailing on the
docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied
for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1962).
Plaintiff may seek free, confidential, limited scope legal assistance from the
Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project offered by City Bar Justice Center by calling
(212) 382-4729 or online at https://www.citybarjusticecenter.org/projects/federal-pro-se-
legal-assistance-project. The Court notes that the Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance
Project is not part of, or affiliated with, the United States District Court.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: November 21, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
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