Quinteros Marquina v. Husky House LLC et al

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
N o 25-CV-3497 (RER) (CLP)
_____________________
VICTOR QUINTEROS M ARQUINA
VERSUS
H USKY HOUSE LLC (LORRAINE H EALY), ASPCA, NYPD, STATEN I SLAND
SHERIFF’ S OFFICE, STATEN I SLAND ADVANCE, M R. & M RS. TOMMY C HIU,
SAMANTHA GONZALEZ, C YNTHIA BURNS, AND THE CITY OF N EW YORK
___________________
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
___________________
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., District Judge:
Before the Court are pro se plaintiff Victor Quinteros Marquina’s (“Plaintiff”)
motions to (1) vacate the July 16, 2025, Judgment dismissing the complaint (ECF No.
12), (2) stay any state court forfeiture proceedings pending the appeal of his criminal case
(ECF No. 15), and (3) compel defendants, among other things, to disclose “the full and
current status of each of the 24 dogs seized [from him] on July 29, 2022” (ECF No. 16).
For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s June 20, 2025, pro se complaint alleged that his July 29, 2022, arrest
and subsequent criminal prosecution along with the seizure of his twenty-four dogs and
personal property violated his constitutional rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). (ECF No.
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1 at 1–2, 5–7). By Order dated July 15, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed the complaint. (ECF No. 4). Judgment was
entered on July 16, 2025. (ECF No. 5).
On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rules 59(e)
and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and asserted purported “new and
overlooked evidence” related to his initial arrest and criminal prosecution. (ECF No. 6 at
2-3). Plaintiff also filed a proposed amended complaint on August 21, 2025. (ECF No. 8).
By Order dated September 3, 2025, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration
finding Plaintiff’s evidence was “neither new nor relevant” and the abstention doctrine
articulated 	in 	Younger 	v. 	Harris, 	401 	U.S. 	37, 	54 	(1971), 	precluded 	the 	Court’s
interference with pending state court criminal proceedings. (ECF No. 10 at 4–5). Further,
the motion and proposed amended complaint did not cure the additional deficiencies in
the original complaint, in that they failed to: (1) allege that any named Defendant was a
state actor who violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) provide any basis for municipal
liability; (3) identify any predicate act that could serve as the basis for a civil cause of
action under RICO; or (4) raise a valid claim under Title II of the ADA. (Id. at 5).1
On October 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to vacate the Judgment
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), (3), and (6). (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff’s motion to vacate is
1 On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Supplemental Evidence and Extension of
Original Complaint”, apparently in support of his August 12, 2025, motion to reconsider. (ECF No. 11). That
application relied upon a series of unsupported “Declarations of Victor Quinteros Marquina,” which swear
to certain factual allegations that purportedly support Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. at 2–20). Beyond his sworn
factual assertions, Plaintiff provides no admissible documents or other evidence to support these factual
assertions. To the extent this can be considered a separate motion, it is denied.
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predicated on purported “newly discovered evidence, fraud or misrepresentation by
defendants, and extraordinary circumstances that justify reopening this matter in the
interests of justice.” (Id. at 1). The “newly discovered evidence” consists of documents
Plaintiff believes are relevant to his arrest and state court proceedings, including
“Landlord Authorization for City Housing Assistance,” a “verified COVID-19 positive test
result,” and “ASPCA/City Investigation Documentation.” (Id. at 2; No. 12-1). Plaintiff
asserts that “new evidence presented here directly undermines the credibility of key
witnesses and defendants and supports reopening this matter so the Court may consider
the full factual context.” (ECF No. 12 at 2; ECF No. 12-1).2
On October 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Stay Forfeiture Pending Appeal,”
in which he requests that this Court stay forfeiture proceedings in state court while his
state criminal appeal is pending. (ECF No. 14). He also submitted a one-page proposed
“Second 	Amended 	Complaint” 	asserting 	claims 	related 	to 	the 	“unlawful 	seizure,
euthanasia, and adoption of Plaintiff’s 24 service animals and therapy dogs in training.”
(ECF No. 15). The proposed “Second Amended Complaint” names the same private
individuals and entities and municipal entities as the original complaint and asserts claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for the violation of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
2 On October 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Motion Regarding Ongoing Unlawful Forfeiture and
Conditional Discharge Status,” in which he again asks the Court to intervene in a state court forfeiture action
involving the twenty-four service dogs seized from his property. (ECF No. 13). That motion is predicated on
Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with New York State procedural rules, and
substantive and common law. (Id.). Rule 15(d) does not apply here, and moreover the Court sees no basis
upon which it can intervene in the ongoing state forfeiture proceedings. Therefore Plaintiff’s “supplemental
motion” is denied.
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Amendment rights. (Id.) It does not include any factual allegations about forfeiture
proceedings or the seizure and treatment of the dogs.
On November 18, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a series of “Emergency Motions.” (ECF
No. 16; ECF No. 16-1; ECF No. 16-2). For the first time in this Court, Plaintiff mentions a
“civil forfeiture hearing” that took place in October 2022. (ECF No. 16 at 2; ECF No. 16-2
at 1–3). He asserts “newly discovered evidence” regarding the care and medical
conditions of the dogs before and after seizure by law enforcement and placement with
the ASPCA, and claims that this evidence contradicts “false statements” made during the
October 2022 forfeiture hearing. (ECF No. 16 at 3–5; ECF No. 16-1 at 2, 4–5; ECF No.
16-2 at 4–6; ECF No. 16-3 at 5–31). He states: “Because Plaintiff’s criminal appeal
remains pending, forfeiture is legally incomplete and not final, and failure to disclose the
status of Plaintiff’s property violates [his constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §
1983.]” (ECF No. 16 at 2). He claims that unspecified New York State law prevents New
York courts from finalizing forfeiture proceedings while criminal proceedings, including
appeals, are pending. (ECF No. 16-1 at 3; ECF No. 16-2 at 6–7). He asserts that federal
law “requires the return of property once the government’s justification [for forfeiture]
ends” (ECF No. 16-1 at 4) and requests broad relief (ECF No. 16 at 6–7; ECF No. 16-1
at 1, 6; ECF No. 16-2 at 7; ECF No. 16-3 at 1–4).
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits a litigant to seek relief from a
final judgment for a list of enumerated reasons including “newly discovered evidence that,
with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b)”, “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” or
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“any other reason that justifies relief.” F.R.C.P. 60(b)(2), (3), and (6). The standard for
granting a motion to reconsider is strict. Reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to either controlling legal decisions or factual matters that the
court overlooked, and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered
the result before the court. Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995).
The party seeking reconsideration under 60(b)(2) must show: “(1) the newly
discovered evidence was of facts that existed at the time of trial or other dispositive
proceedings, (2) the movant was justifiably ignorant of them despite due diligence, (3) the
evidence is admissible and of such importance that it probably would have changed the
outcome, and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching.” United States v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Int’l
Bhd. Of Teamsters, 179 F.R.D. 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
“To prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(3), [a plaintiff] must
show (1) by clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant] engaged in fraud,
misrepresentation, 	or 	misconduct 	before 	this 	Court 	and 	(2) 	that 	the 	fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct substantially interfered with [the plaintiff’s] ability to
present his case.” Res. Grp. Int'l Ltd. v. Chishti, No. 25-CV-1021 (JSR), 2025 WL
2301318, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2025) (emphasis added); see Sosa v. Green, No 03-
CV-2131 (AWT), 2021 WL 1589270, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 2021) (finding no basis for
reconsideration 	under 	Rule 	60(b)(3) 	where 	opposing 	counsel’s 	misrepresentation
occurred in separate state court proceedings, not the proceeding before the federal
court).
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The Second Circuit has “described Rule 60(b)(6) as a catch-all provision that ‘is
properly invoked only when there are extraordinary circumstances justifying relief, when
the judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship, and when the asserted grounds
for relief are not recognized in clauses (1)-(5) of the Rule.’” Metzler Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793
F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1986)).
DISCUSSION
The Court has carefully considered whether Plaintiff’s motions provide grounds for
vacating the Judgment and reopening this case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), (3), or (6).
While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation, Plaintiff’s motions do not provide
grounds to vacate the Judgment or provide any of the relief Plaintiff seeks.
Either on the basis of new evidence, fraud, or “any other reason that justifies relief,”
each of Plaintiff’s motions (ECF Nos. 12–16), attack the state court criminal and ancillary
seizure/forfeiture proceedings, which Plaintiff acknowledges are ongoing (ECF No. 16-2
at 1–3). Despite his guilty plea to the underlying criminal conduct, he has appealed those
underlying proceedings. (ECF No. 16-2 at 3). 	Such an appeal is absolutely within his
rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States. However, those rights do not
provide Plaintiff with an avenue of relief in this Court. As explained in the Court’s previous
Order, the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris precludes federal courts
from interfering in pending state court criminal and ancillary proceedings, except upon a
showing of “bad faith, harassment or any other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief.” 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). Plaintiff has not asserted facts to suggest that
Younger does not apply or that a valid exception exists. Thus, this Court cannot make the
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New York State courts consider Plaintiff’s allegedly new information, nor can it stay the
state court’s seizure/forfeiture order. See Pawelsky v. Cnty. of Nassau, New York, 684 F.
Supp. 3d 73, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (confirming Younger abstention was appropriate where
plaintiff sought return of property seized prior to the indictment and criminal proceedings
were still pending because “[t]he questions of whether certain items seized were beyond
the scope of the warrant or warrant[s] or there was improper retention of the seized items
are inextricably linked to the propriety of the warrant’s execution and are best dealt with
in the context of the criminal proceeding for which the warrant was issued.”); Fouche v.
Schneiderman, No. 14-CV-752 (NGG) (LB), 2015 WL 1258288, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
2015) (adopting Report and Recommendation finding that Younger abstention was
appropriate where civil forfeiture proceeding was pending); Mackey v. Prop. Clerk of New
York City Police Dep't, 26 F. Supp. 2d 585, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying Younger
abstention where civil forfeiture proceeding was pending after criminal charges were
dismissed). Plaintiff assures the Court that the forfeiture proceeding is still open and will
remain open until his criminal proceedings have ended. (ECF No. 16-2 at 1–3). Thus, he
has an opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims in state court. Any further
review by this Court would be precluded by Younger.
The 	Court 	reiterates 	that 	it 	is 	mindful 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	perceived 	predicament.
Nevertheless, because the Court cannot provide relief here—for the reasons explained
in this and prior Orders—Plaintiff’s frequent and frivolous filings in this closed case are a
misuse of judicial resources. “The district courts have the power and the obligation to
protect the public and the efficient administration of justice from individuals who have a
history of litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to other parties
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and an unnecessary burden on the courts and their supporting personnel.” Lau v.
Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotations, citations, and alterations
omitted); see also Moore v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 7724 (GBD) (AJP), 2014 WL
6474904, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2014) (recommending that plaintiff be enjoined from
making any further filings in the case, except objections or appeals, and from instituting
any new court proceedings arising from the same underlying conduct), adopted in
relevant part by 2015 WL 456680 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015). Plaintiff is warned that future
filing in this action, other than a notice of appeal, will likely result in the imposition of
restrictions on further filing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, all of Plaintiff’s motions (ECF Nos. 12–16) are
denied. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied
for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is requested to mail a copy of this Order and the docket sheet to
Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: November 25, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
/s/ Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.
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