Novikov v. 141 Mansion Ave Restaurant LLC et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------------------------------X
REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
25-CV-1581 (ENV) (SDE)
OLEG NOVIKOV,
Plaintiff,
-against-
141 MANSION AVE RESTAURANT LLC (D/B/A
MANSION), 141 MANSION AVENUE LLC, 141
MANSIONAVE OWNERS LLC, MARIA
PETROVSKI, ROVSHAN ABBASOV, AND
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------------------X
SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Oleg Novikov (“Plaintiff” or “Novikov”) brings claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) 29 U.S.C. § 206 and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) § 652, as well as
claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment under New York law, against Defendants 141
Mansion Ave Restaurant LLC (“Mansion Restaurant”), Mansion Avenue LLC (“Mansion LLC”),
141 Mansionave Owners LLC (“Mansion Owners”), Maria Petrovski (“Petrovski”), and Rovshan
Abbasov (“Abbasov”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants failed to properly
compensate him for the work he provided to them. 	See Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”),
Dkt. No. 13. ¶ 12. Presently before the undersigned, on referral from United States District Judge
Eric N. Vitaliano, is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss”), Dkt. Nos. 21, 21-1, 21-2; Order dated 9/8/2025.
For the reasons detailed below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the FLSA and dismiss Plaintiff’s
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
remaining claims, all of which are based in state law, without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.1
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and assumed as true for the
purpose of evaluating the Motion to Dismiss. See, e.g., Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent
Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Plaintiff Novikov describes himself as a “seasoned restaurateur.” Am. Compl. ¶ 12. In late
2023, Defendant Petrovski approached Plaintiff, seeking his assistance to develop “Mansion,” a
new Italian restaurant set to open in Staten Island. 	Id. ¶ 13. 	On or around January 12, 2024,
Plaintiff and the Defendants “verbally agreed” that Plaintiff would provide services for Defendants
including “design, consultation, promotion, and restaurant management” in exchange for 10%
equity ownership in the restaurant. 	Id. ¶ 15. 	After Plaintiff’s “scope of work expanded,”
Defendant Petrovski “personally promised” that Plaintiff would instead receive “20% ownership
in the business.” Id. ¶ 16. The equity interest was intended to be worth $15,000 per month for the
duration of seven months, totaling $105,000, the equivalent of Plaintiff’s typical professional fee
for a comparable restaurant project. 	Id. ¶ 17. This amount was memorialized in later writings,
including a message where Plaintiff said, “we initially agreed with you, not with Dima [Ms.
Petrovski’s husband], on $15,000 a month for 7 months (total $105,000),” an assertion which
Petrovski did not dispute. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
1 The “John Doe” Defendant has not yet been identified and served in this action. Nevertheless, the undersigned
recommends dismissal of John Doe, as the arguments pertaining to the Defendants already party to this action apply
equally to the John Doe Defendant.
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
According to the Amended Complaint, from approximately January 12, 2024 to July 26,
2024, Plaintiff visited Mansion Restaurant “almost every day,” working approximately four days
per week, between five to ten hours per day “as determined by the Defendants.” 	Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.
Plaintiff “designed the interior décor and theme of the restaurant,” created the menu, “executed
menu placement and food operations,” and performed “manual labor like cleaning and setting up
the restaurant to serve Defendants’ customers.” 	Id. ¶ 21. 	Plaintiff was “required by the
Defendants” to “physically perform” the work as opposed to “simply providing consulting
services.” 	Id. ¶ 22. 	For example, Plaintiff contributed by “bringing in the construction team,
personally conducting renovations, hiring and managing all Mansion Restaurant’s staff, recruiting
a chef from Florida, establishing and developing the restaurant’s social media and marketing,” and
“using his reputation as a professional restauranter to promote the restaurant.” 	Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
According to Plaintiff, the work he performed was worth “at least $150,000.00, excluding
interest.” Id. ¶ 24.
Mansion was fully booked on its opening day in early August 2024. 	Id. ¶¶ 25–26. 	On
August 13, 2024, Plaintiff messaged Defendant Petrovski seeking the amount verbally agreed to
between the parties, saying “Masha, hi, can we close this gestalt? When will you be able to settle
up with me for the project? I’m in New York for one week.” Id. ¶ 27. Defendant Petrovski replied
that she would not resolve financial matters over the phone, and that Plaintiff should discuss all
financial questions including compensation for “setting up for the project and name the figure you
have in mind” with her husband. Id. ¶ 29. 	The next day, August 14, 2024, Defendants made a
“small, partial payment” of an unspecified amount to Plaintiff, with Plaintiff understanding further
payment would soon follow. 	Id. ¶ 30. To date, Plaintiff never received any further payment or
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
equity interest in the company, and, according to the Amended Complaint, the Defendants “have
denied [Plaintiff] his role in the business.” Id. ¶ 32.
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on March 21, 2025, alleging Defendants failed to pay him for
his services in violation of the FLSA and NYLL, and that such failure constitutes breach of
contract, or, in the alternative, unjust enrichment under New York law. See Complaint, Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 13, 2025, including additional factual detail and
allegations. See Am. Compl. On September 5, 2025, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss,
attaching Plaintiff’s Opposition and Defendants’ subsequent Reply. 	See Mot. to Dismiss;
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 21-3; Defendants’
Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n (“Defs.’ Reply), Dkt. No. 21-5. 	On September 8, 2025, Judge Vitaliano
referred the Motion to Dismiss to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. See Order
Dated 9/8/2025.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must include in their
complaint sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim has “facial plausibility” when a plaintiff “pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 	Id. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient, id.;
rather, a plaintiff must provide sufficient factual support that, if true, would “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants under the FLSA and NYLL, as well as claims
under New York state law for breach of contract, or, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. For the
reasons outlined below, the undersigned respectfully recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s FLSA claims. As the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter is premised on the
existence of a federal question, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, the undersigned recommends dismissing
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims for lack of jurisdiction.
I. 	PLAINTIFF’S FLSA CLAIMS
Plaintiff brings claims against all Defendants for failing to compensate him pursuant to the
FLSA. The FLSA allows employees to recover for unpaid minimum wages from their employers.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206. To state a cognizable claim for relief under the FLSA, Plaintiff must plausibly
allege, among other things, that he was in an “employer-employee” relationship with Defendants
within the meaning of the statute. 	Here, Plaintiff fails to do so and, thus, the undersigned
respectfully recommends granting the motion and dismissing those claims.2
A. Legal Standard for an Employer-Employee Relationship Under the FLSA.
An essential element of Plaintiff’s FLSA claims is the existence of an “employer-employee
relationship.” Perez Perez v. Escobar Constr., Inc., 23-CV-1240, 2024 WL 3594325, at *2 (2d Cir.
July 31, 2024) (summary order); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206. To plead such a relationship, Plaintiff
must allege facts “sufficient to plausibly show that one or more of the Defendants was [his]
2 The NYLL’s definition of “employer” is “nearly identical” to that of the FLSA, and “the analysis of the employment
relationship under both statutes is based on the same factors.” Jimenez v. Green Olive Inc., 744 F. Supp. 3d 221, 247
(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Mahoney v. Amekk Corp., 14-CV-4131, 2016 WL 6585810, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2016)) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6601445 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2016); see
also N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 162. Thus, if the Court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYLL claims,
they would nevertheless need to be dismissed for the lack of an employer-employee relationship within the meaning
of the statute.
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
employer.” 	Perez Perez, 2024 WL 3594325, at *2. 	An “employer” under the FLSA is “any
person,” including a corporation, “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). To employ under the FLSA includes “to suffer or
permit to work.” Id. § 203(g). Pursuant to these broad definitions, the Supreme Court has long
held that “employment status under the FLSA should be based on economic reality rather than
technical concepts.” Perez Perez, 2024 WL 3594325, at *2 (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)) (cleaned up).
The Second Circuit has devised an “economic reality” test to determine whether an
employer-employee relationship exists, with the ultimate inquiry being whether or not “the alleged
employer possessed the power to control the workers in question.” Ruixuan Cui v. E. Palace One,
Inc., 17-CV-6713, 2019 WL 4573226, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019) (quoting Herman v. RSR
Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)). The four factors considered are whether the
alleged employer “(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of
payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” 	Perez Perez, 2024 WL 3594325, at *2
(quoting Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984)). No one factor is
dispositive; courts treat the employer-employee relationship as a “flexible concept” to be assessed
on a “case-by-case basis by review of the totality of the circumstances.” Perez Perez, 2024 WL
3594325, at *2 (quoting Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141–142 (2d Cir.
2008)); accord Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013).
Although the definition of an “employee” is flexible, the FLSA excludes certain categories
of employees from its wage requirements, such as independent contractors and employees who
work in an “executive” capacity, meaning they own at least 20% equity interest in the company
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
and are “actively engaged in its management.” Mackenzie v. Waypointe Partners Mgmt. LLC, 22-
CV-7951, 2025 WL 388296, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2025) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)); see also
Kasseris v. ZA & D Serv. Station, Inc., 23-CV-06281, 2026 WL 84037, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12,
2026) (“The FLSA’s minimum and overtime wage protections apply only to employees, not to
independent contractors.”). Some courts have found that relationships more akin to “partnerships,”
such as where the alleged employee had a managerial role and shared in profits, do not qualify as
employer-employee relationships under the FLSA. See Bowen v. Fabiana, 24-CV-3322, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72699, at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 2025) (collecting cases).
B. Plaintiff Fails to Plausibly Allege That Defendants Are “Employers” Under the
FLSA.
The allegations in the Amended Complaint, even if true, are insufficient to establish
Defendants are Plaintiff’s employers within the meaning of the statute.
Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are “employers within the meaning of [the FLSA]”
because they are all “person(s) acting directly or indirectly in the interest of Mansion Restaurant
in relation to Mansion restaurant employees.” 	Am. Compl. ¶ 44. 	However, this conclusory
statement alone is not enough to satisfy the Second Circuit’s “economic reality” test factors. See,
e.g., Xue Lian Lin v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., 08-CV-6519, 2009 WL 976835, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2009) (defendants did not qualify as employers where plaintiffs merely alleged
that “Defendants employed Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA” and did not allege facts
regarding Defendants’ “power to control plaintiffs’ hours, wages, or other terms and conditions of
employment”); Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, 20-CV-885, 2020 WL 8732875, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 2020) (defendants did not qualify as employers where there were “no non-conclusory
allegations that they had the power to hire him [], supervised or controlled work schedules or
payments [], or maintained employment records”); Acharya v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 18-CV-08010, 2019
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
WL 6830203, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2019) (defendant did not qualify as employer where, inter
alia, plaintiff failed to plead that they had “hiring and firing power, or controlled the Plaintiff’s
work schedule or employment conditions”).
Plaintiff expands his allegations a bit by stating that he worked “approximately four days
a week for between five to ten hours a day, as determined by the Defendants” and at “Defendants’
direction.” 	Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 20. 	But while the degree that Defendants “supervised and
controlled employee work schedules or conditions” is an important inquiry, see Carter, 735 F.2d
at 12, Plaintiff includes no specifics as to the nature of the direction and supervision he received,
nor from which Defendant. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions – unspecific to any one Defendant –
that Defendants directed or controlled their employees are inadequate to establish that each
Defendant is an employer under the FLSA. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 22-
CV-8957, 2024 WL 3086161, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2024) (finding employer status not met
where 	plaintiffs 	allegations 	regarding 	“Defendants’ control 	over 	Plaintiffs’ conditions 	of
employment are cast almost exclusively in terms of conclusory allegations applicable to all
“Defendants””); Weng v. HungryPanda US, Inc., 19-CV-11882, 2022 WL 292799, at *6–7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2022) (finding employer status not met where, inter alia, plaintiff failed to
specify which individual defendant exercised control over his work environment).
Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges he “was required by the Defendants to physically
perform the work rather than simply provide consulting services,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 22, the
allegations as written are too unspecific to conclude that it was any Defendant, rather than Plaintiff,
who determined when and how much work Plaintiff would put into the restaurant. 	See, e.g.,
Aguilar v. New Dairydel, Inc., 22-CV-3700, 2023 WL 5835829, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2023)
(finding employer status not met where, inter alia, the plaintiff attributed “the decision-making
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
power over employee wages to all Defendants, without specifically alleging [the individual
defendant’s] individual role, if any, in setting those conditions”); Ruixuan Cui, 2019 WL 4573226,
at *7 (finding employer status not met where, inter alia, “Plaintiff does not describe any
interactions he has had with the individual defendants, nor does he set forth any observations he
has 	made 	of 	their 	conduct”). 	Further, 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	provide 	that 	other 	critical
characteristics of Plaintiff’s relationship to Defendants, such as Plaintiff’s managerial-like role,
see Am. Compl. ¶ 22, and an agreement to receive equity rather than salary, see id. ¶¶ 15–17, are
at odds with characteristics of employees generally recognized under the FLSA. In Godoy v. Rest.
Opportunity Ctr. of N.Y., Inc., the Court dismissed the FLSA claims of workers who were promised
equity interest in a restaurant rather than a salary, as their arrangement was “closer to [a]
partnership” than the employer-employee relationships envisioned by the economic reality test.
615 F. Supp. 2d 186, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
As is the case here, the plaintiffs in Godoy “were not, as yet, partners of the business they
were working with Defendants to create” but nonetheless “devoted [] hundreds of hours of work”
with the expectation that “it would gain them equity in this new restaurant and result in ongoing
employment once the restaurant was in operation.” Id.; see also Bowen, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72699, at *18–19 (citing Godoy to reason that plaintiff was not an employee under the FLSA as
she was relied on to “manage or handle some of [the company’s] most significant matters” and she
“shared in [the company’s] profits as an owner”); Mackenzie, 2025 WL 388296, at *3 (finding
plaintiff was an employee under the FLSA and noting that, unlike the plaintiffs Godoy, plaintiff
“invested cash for his equity and was promised an annual salary as compensation for his work”).
Thus, the totality of Plaintiff’s circumstances are, as alleged, closer to a partnership and inadequate
to demonstrate Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA.
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
Importantly, Plaintiff’s allegations are also insufficient to demonstrate that Defendant
Petrovski and Defendant Abbasov (the “Individual Defendants”) acted as his employers under the
FLSA. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Petrovski was “one of the Mansion’s owners and Mansion
Manager[,]” that Defendant Abbasov was “one of Mansion’s owners[,]” and that the restaurant is
“owned and controlled solely by the Petrovski family.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 37. However, merely
alleging “[o]wnership, or a stake in a company, is insufficient to establish that an individual is an
“employer” without some involvement in the company’s employment of the employees.” Irizarry,
722 F.3d at 110; see also Ruixuan Cui, 2019 WL 4573226, at *7 (“[M]erely pleading that an
individual is the “chief executive officer” [] does not establish that the individual is an “employer”
within the meaning of the FLSA[.]”); Bao Guo Zhang v. Shun Lee Palace Restaurant, Inc., 17-
CV-840, 2021 WL 634717, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021) (That a defendant “was a shareholder
and owner of” a restaurant, “by itself, does not establish employer status,” nor does Plaintiffs’
beliefs that defendant was a “boss.”); Bravo v. Shamailov, 221 F. Supp. 3d 413, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (“[O]wnership, standing alone, is insufficient to make [the chief executive officer] an
“employer” under the FLSA and NYLL.”).
For these reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends granting the motion to dismiss
because the allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to plausibly establish an employer-
employee relationship within the meaning of the FLSA.
II. 	The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims
Should the Court adopt the undersigned’s recommendation to dismiss the FLSA claims,
the undersigned recommends dismissing all of Plaintiff’s other claims, which are based in New
York State law, for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither party raised this issue when arguing
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,3 the Court is under an obligation at all stages to consider the
existence of jurisdiction. See Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff brings his claims in federal court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. 	See
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10. Federal courts possess supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that
“are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Kolari v. New York-
Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 121–122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
However, a federal court has discretion to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over a
state law claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
Id. at 122 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
Courts in the Second Circuit generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after a
plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed. See Diaz v. D’Angel Auto Body Repair, Inc., 24-
CV-4220, 2024 WL 4168628, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2024) (“Because no federal claim remains
that is subject to a merits determination by this Court, it would be inappropriate to adjudicate
[plaintiff’s] state law claims.”); Payamps v. M & M Convenience Deli & Grocery Corp., 16-CV-
4895, 2018 WL 3742696, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2018) (“Courts have generally found that
where an FLSA claim is dismissed, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining
state-law claims is appropriate.”). Pursuant to this practice, courts typically dismiss a plaintiff’s
NYLL and other state law claims after dismissing a plaintiff’s FLSA claims. 	See, e.g., Qi v.
Bayside Chicken Lovers Inc., 21-CV-6018, 2023 WL 2632494, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2023)
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s NYLL claims after dismissing their
3 In anticipation of addressing this issue, the Court asked the parties for supplemental briefing, which was submitted
on January 22, 2026. See Order dated 1/15/2026; Dkt. Nos. 24–25.
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
FLSA claims) (collecting cases); Momin v. Quantierra Advisors LLC, 21-CV-612, 2022 WL
2002282, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2022) (same).
Moreover, courts in this circuit are particularly reluctant to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction where a matter is in the early stages of litigation, as is the case here where discovery
has yet to begin.4 	See McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 11-CV-342, 2012 WL 1514777, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012) (“[W]hen all federal claims are eliminated in the early stages of litigation,
the balance of factors generally favors declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over remaining
state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice.”); Killoran v. Westhampton Beach Sch.
Dist., 21-CV-3264, 2022 WL 4484630, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2022) (“[A] federal court should
generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if, as is the case here,
the complaint’s federal claims are dismissed in the litigation’s early stages and there is no diversity
jurisdiction.”); Momin, 2022 WL 2002282, at *4 (“Any concerns about judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness” regarding dismissing a plaintiff’s state law claims “are limited because
this case is still at an early stage of the litigation.”). The parties’ supplemental briefings agree on
this point. See Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.
Even without federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims can remain in federal court
if the parties enjoy complete diversity. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	However, Plaintiff and multiple
defendants all appear to be domiciled in New York, meaning that the parties are not diverse. See
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 409 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“Diversity is not complete if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”). Neither
side argues to the contrary in their supplemental briefing, agreeing that the parties rely on the
existence of a federal question as a basis for jurisdiction. See Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.
4 In May 2026, the Court adjourned the initial conference in this matter and stayed discovery sine die pending a
decision on the Motion to Dismiss. See Order dated 5/6/2026.
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
Thus, as the undersigned recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s FLSA claims, the undersigned
also recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned respectfully recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to
Plaintiff’s FLSA claims for failure to plausibly allege an employer-employee relationship within
the meaning of the FLSA. 	As this Court’s jurisdiction was premised on the federal question
presented by the FLSA claims, should the Court adopt the undersigned’s recommendation, the
undersigned respectfully recommends declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims and dismissing them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the
Court within 14 days of service. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If any party
fails to file timely objections to this Report and Recommendation, it will waive any right to further
judicial review of the decision. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also
Kotlyarsky v. United States Dep’t of Just., 22-2750, 2023 WL 7648618 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2023);
Small v. Sec’y of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
January 29, 2026
/ S/ SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ
SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
Case 1:25-cv-01581-ENV-SDE Document 26 Filed 01/29/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>