USA v. Perez Baten

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
N o 25-CR-0130 (RER)
_____________________
U NITED STATES OF AMERICA
VERSUS
M AYNOR PEREZ BATEN
___________________
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
___________________
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., District Judge:
Defendant Maynor Perez Baten (“Defendant”) moves to dismiss the indictment
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (illegal reentry after removal), arguing that the statute violates the
Fifth 	Amendment’s 	equal 	protection 	guarantee 	under 	the 	discriminatory-purpose
framework set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
After carefully reviewing the record, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
denies the motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Defendant is charged in a one-count indictment with illegal reentry after removal,
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). (ECF No. 1 at 1). According to the indictment
and the materials submitted in connection with the motion, Defendant was previously
removed from the United States pursuant to an order of removal entered by an
Immigration Judge. (Id. at 2). He is alleged to have thereafter reentered the United States
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without having obtained permission from the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General. (Id. at 3). On February 20, 2025, a criminal complaint
was filed charging Defendant with illegal reentry, and a warrant issued for his arrest. (ECF
No. 1-2). Defendant was subsequently arrested and released on bond. (ECF No. 3-5).
On April 14, 2025, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York returned the indictment.
(ECF No. 10). Defendant now moves to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds.
(ECF No. 20).
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is unconstitutionally “tainted” because it
descends from a predecessor statute enacted with “explicit and vicious racial animus
against Latinos,” and because Congress has “never grappled with the law’s sordid
history” in a manner sufficient to remove that taint. (ECF No. 20 at 2). According to
Defendant, the original illegal reentry provision was enacted in 1929 “at the height of the
eugenics 	movement,” 	and 	that 	same 	discriminatory 	purpose 	allegedly 	animated
Congress’s reenactment of the provision as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. (id.) Although Section 1326 is facially neutral, Defendant argues that it “remains
tethered to the racial animus that permeated its creation,” (id. at 3), because Congress
has never expressly repudiated the statute’s origins and because, in Defendant’s view,
“the later reenactment of the reentry law was not neutral” (id. at 12). Defendant further
emphasizes the statute’s disparate impact, asserting that Section 1326 “disparately—
indeed virtually exclusively—affects Latinos,” (id. at 15), and citing data indicating that,
“in 	fiscal 	year 	2024, 	approximately 	99% 	of 	unlawful 	reentry 	defendants 	were
Hispanic/Latino” (id. at 16). Based on this asserted combination of discriminatory purpose
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and disparate impact, Defendant maintains that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is presumptively
unconstitutional under Arlington Heights, shifting the burden to the Government to show
that Congress would have enacted and reenacted the provision absent any discriminatory
purpose and that the statute has been freed of its discriminatory taint. (Id. at 4).
The Court is mindful that the historical record reflects troubling aspects of the
illegal-reentry statute’s origins, and that Congress’s subsequent reenactments and
amendments 	did 	not 	expressly 	confront 	that 	history. 	The 	Second 	Circuit 	has
acknowledged as much. In United States v. Suquilanda, the Circuit recognized that “racial
animus infected the opinions and votes of some members of the 1952 Congress.” 116
F.4th 129, 143 (2d Cir. 2024).
However, 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	squarely 	rejected 	the 	conclusion 	Defendant
advances here. As the Circuit explained, “the fact that there were some members of
Congress who made racist remarks or held discriminatory beliefs is not necessarily
sufficient to cast the intent of Congress as a whole as discriminatory, or even to
demonstrate racial animus as to § 1326 in particular.” Id. (quoting United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968)). The Circuit further emphasized the “presumption of
legislative good faith,” which “is not changed by a finding of past discrimination,” and held
that Congress’s failure to expressly repudiate the 1929 Act’s racist origins in 1952 does
not itself establish unconstitutional intent. Id. at 144 (quoting Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S.
579, 603 (2018)). The Circuit also observed that Congress has since amended Section
1326 on multiple occasions without any showing of contemporaneous discriminatory
purpose. Id. “[B]ecause the legislative history presented does not demonstrate that racial
discrimination was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ behind the enactment of the 1952 Act,”
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the Second Circuit concluded that an equal-protection challenge to the statute fails as a
matter of law. Id. at 144–45.
Here, Defendant acknowledges that this motion “is presently foreclosed” by
Suquilanda, (ECF No. 20 at 2), and does not contend that the factual record before this
Court 	is 	materially 	different 	(Id. 	at 	4). 	In those 	circumstances, 	the 	conclusion 	is
inescapable. “[D]istrict courts are “bound to follow controlling Second Circuit precedent
unless that precedent is overruled or reversed.” United States v. Kelly, 609 F. Supp. 3d
85, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), aff'd, 128 F.4th 387 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Unicorn Bulk Traders
Ltd. v. Fortune Mar. Enters., Inc., No. 08-CV-9710 (PGG), 2009 WL 125751, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009)). Bound by Suquilanda, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: December 19, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
/s/ Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.
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