Campbell v. Caban et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LAWRENCE G. CAMPBELL,
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
24 CV 5345 (RPK) (CLP)
Plaintiff,
-against-
EDWARDS A. CABAN, et al.,
Defendants.
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POLLAK, United States Magistrate Judge:
On July 30, 2024, pro se plaintiff Lawrence G. Campbell (“Campbell” or “plaintiff”), a
licensed attorney in the State of New York, commenced this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and New York state law, against defendants Mayor Eric L. Adams (“Adams”), NYC Police
Commissioner Edwards A. Caban (“Caban”), New York City Police Department (“NYPD”),
Detective Nandpaul Persaud, Shield #5930 (“Persaud”), Police Officer Stephen Rice, Shield
#2527 (“Rice”), Police Officer Angel Arroyo, Shield #25875 (“Arroyo”), and Police Officer
Reinhold Moeslinger, Shield #2384 (“Moeslinger”) (collectively, “defendants”). (Compl.).1
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, claims of false arrest, unlawful search, and malicious prosecution
after defendants executed a search warrant at his place of business and arrested him for unlawful
possession of cannabis. (Id.) He seeks a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctive relief, and
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
Currently pending before this Court on referral from the Honorable Rachel P. Kovner,
United States District Judge, is plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against defendants and
their counsel for allegedly causing unnecessary delay in the course of litigation. (Mot.;2 see also
1 Citations to “Compl.” refer to plaintiff’s Complaint, filed July 30, 2024. (ECF No. 1).
2 Citations to “Mot.” refer to plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, filed March 25, 2025. (ECF No. 19). Any
page numbers cited therein refer to the ECF-generated page numbers in the PDF document.
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Docket Order, dated March 26, 2025). For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully
recommended that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions be denied.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background for Campbell v. Caban
In the instant Complaint, filed on July 30, 2024, plaintiff alleges that on July 28, 2023,
police officers entered his place of business, a licensed cannabinoid hemp retailer, located in a
mobile home parked at the intersection of Linden Boulevard. and 135th Street in Queens, New
York, and placed him under arrest for criminal possession and sale of cannabis. (Compl. ¶¶ 59-
68, Ex. 5). The search and arrest were conducted pursuant to a search warrant. (Id. at Ex. 5).
Plaintiff alleges the products he was selling were not marijuana but “hemp,”3 which is legal to
sell in New York State with a valid license. (Id. ¶¶ 66-68). Plaintiff claims he holds a valid
Cannabinoid Hemp Retail License from the New York State Office of Cannabis Management
and thus may legally sell cannabinoid hemp flower products. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 61, 66-70, 72, Exs. 2, 6,
8).
II. 	Prior Case: Campbell v. Adams
Plaintiff had previously filed a different case in this district pertaining to a different set of
facts. On August 28, 2023, plaintiff commenced an action against defendants Mayor Eric L.
Adams; NYC Police Commissioner Edwards A. Caban; New York City Police Department; City
of New York; New York City Police Department; Police Officer Anthony Patti, Badge # 106;
3 While marijuana is a federally controlled substance, “hemp” is not. See 21 U.S.C § 802(16)(B)(i)
(clarifying that the “terms ‘marihuana’ and ‘marijuana’ do not include . . . hemp, as defined in [7 U.S.C § 1639o]”);
7 U.S.C § 1639o(1) (defining “hemp” to mean “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the
seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing
or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol [THC] concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight
basis”); see also N.Y. Cannabis Law §§ 90 (defining hemp similarly to 7 U.S.C § 1639o(1)), 93 (requiring retailers
selling cannabinoid hemp in its final form to consumers to obtain a cannabinoid hemp retailer license from the New
York State Cannabis Control Board).
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and Sergeant Raymond V. Persaud, Badge # 3771. Campbell v. Adams et al, No. 23 CV 6435
(E.D.N.Y.). In this previous action, plaintiff alleged that, in August 2022, NYPD officers came
to his business, searched and seized his “lawful products without a warrant,” and arrested his
employee, and that he was forced to close the location because his employee was afraid to be
rearrested by NYPD officers. Id. (ECF No. 1 (Complaint)). On August 29, 2023, plaintiff
sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants in that action “from searching, seizing
Hemp and arresting licensed and unlicensed hemp retailers” until final disposition on the merits.
Id. (ECF No. 5 (Motion for Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order)). On December 18, 2023, the Honorable Rachel P. Kovner, United States
District Judge, denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in Campbell v. Adams,
noting that he failed to show a likelihood of actual and imminent harm. Id. (Docket Order, dated
December 18, 2023). On September 30, 2024, Judge Kovner dismissed plaintiff’s amended
complaint in Campbell v. Adams for failure to state a claim. Id. (ECF No. 30).4
III. 	Procedural Background
After filing the instant Complaint on July 30, 2024, plaintiff filed proof of service for
defendants Adams and Caban on August 19, 2024, and for defendants Persaud, Arroy,
Moeslinger, and Rice on August 28, 2024. (ECF Nos. 6, 7).5 On September 17, 2024, counsel
for defendants Adams and Caban filed a motion seeking a 60-day extension of time to respond to
the Complaint. (ECF No. 9). Counsel made it clear that he was moving for an extension only on
behalf of defendants Adams and Caban, whom he represented, but separately requested that the
4 Plaintiff’s subsequent arrest on July 28, 2023 – which is the subject of the current lawsuit – was not at
issue in the previous case, Campbell v. Adams. Notably, in defendants’ opposition to plaintiff’s preliminary
injunction motion in Campbell v. Adams, defendants did not seek to access any sealed records regarding plaintiff’s
July 28, 2023 arrest. Id. (ECF No. 20).
5 All citations to ECF documents for the remainder of this Order were filed in this case, Campbell v. Caban
et al, No. 24 CV 5345 (E.D.N.Y.).
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Court consider sua sponte extending the time to answer for all other defendants “in the interest of
judicial economy.” (Id. at 2). On October 7, 2024, the Court granted the motion and extended
the time to answer to November 18, 2024 “as to all defendants.” (ECF No. 11).
On November 15, 2024, counsel for defendants Adams, Caban, and Moeslinger filed a
second motion for extension of time to answer until December 18, 2024, again noting that he was
seeking relief only on behalf of defendants Adams, Caban, and Moeslinger, whom he
represented, but requesting the Court sua sponte extend the time to answer for all other
defendants. (ECF No. 12). In its Order dated November 18, 2024, the Court granted a 30-day
extension “as to all defendants” but advised “that no further extension requests will be granted
absent a showing of good cause.” (ECF No. 13).
On December 17, 2024, defense counsel filed a letter motion advising that he now
represented all the individual defendants – Adams, Caban, Moeslinger, Rice, Arroyo, and
Persaud – and requesting that the Court (1) issue an order compelling plaintiff to produce an
executed unsealing release of “District Attorney, Criminal Court, and police records pertaining to
plaintiff’s underlying arrest and prosecution,” pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law
(“N.Y.C.P.L.”) § 160.50; and (2) grant a third extension of time to answer, until 30 days after the
date defendants received plaintiff’s executed unsealing release. (ECF No. 14). Defendants
explained that plaintiff refused to grant defendants’ request to unseal certain of plaintiff’s
records, which made it difficult to respond to the allegations in the Complaint. (Id.) On
December 20, 2024, the Court granted in part defendants’ extension request. (ECF No. 15).
Given the unsealing issue, the Court found good cause to extend the deadline to answer pending
resolution of defendants’ motion to compel the unsealing of plaintiff’s records. (Id.) The Court
scheduled a status conference to discuss the motion to compel. (Id.)
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At the motion hearing and status conference held on January 23, 2025 before the
undersigned, the parties discussed the N.Y.C.P.L. § 160.50 unsealing release. (See Minute
Entry, dated January 27, 2025; ECF No. 16). In an Order following the conference, the Court
stated that “[a]s discussed at the conference, plaintiff shall sign the N.Y.C.P.L. § 160.50 release”
and determined, accordingly, that defendants’ letter motion to compel (ECF No. 14) was moot.
(ECF No. 16). The Court also granted defendants’ request (ECF No. 14) to answer or otherwise
respond to the Complaint within 30 days of receiving the executed release. (Id.) Plaintiff
allegedly provided the executed release on February 20, 2025. (See ECF No. 18 at 1).
The Court held a status conference on March 13, 2025, at which the Court set discovery
deadlines. (See Minute Entry, dated March 13, 2025; ECF No. 17). On March 24, 2025,
defendants’ counsel emailed plaintiff proposing a briefing schedule for defendants’ anticipated
motion to dismiss. (Saleemi Decl.,6 Ex. A at 2). Plaintiff responded to the email less than an
hour later, stating that he could not agree to a briefing schedule because he “plan[ned] on moving
for rule 11 sanctions in the next day or so with a request for a hearing at the end of April.” (Id.)
Plaintiff did not describe what conduct of defendants he sought sanctions for, nor did he
elaborate how that conduct allegedly violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(See id.) A few hours later, defendants filed their proposed briefing schedule on the docket,
informing the Court that plaintiff had stated in an email that he did not consent to the schedule
but instead intended to move for Rule 11 sanctions. (ECF No. 18 (quoting plaintiff’s March 24th
email)). Later that evening, the Honorable Rachel P. Kovner endorsed defendants’ briefing
schedule for the motion to dismiss. (Docket Order, dated March 24, 2025).
6 Citations to “Saleemi Decl.” refer to defendants’ Declaration of Mamoon Saleemi in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, filed on April 18, 2025. (ECF No. 23).
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The following day, on March 25, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion seeking Rule 11
“sanctions against Defendants and defendants [sic] counsel, in addition to any other relief that
the Court finds proper, for knowingly and continuously making representations and requests to
the Court for [the] improper purpose of causing unnecessary delay.” (Mot. at 3). The motion
was referred to the undersigned on March 26, 2025. (Docket Order, dated March 26, 2025). On
April 18, 2025, after a 14-day extension, defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff’s sanctions
motion. (Opp.;7 Saleemi Decl.). Plaintiff did not file a reply.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Pro se plaintiff moves for Rule 11 sanctions against defendants and their counsel for
allegedly causing unnecessary delay. (Mot. at 3).
I. 	Rule 11 Substantive Requirements
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure focuses on preventing specific
enumerated types of misconduct by litigants or their counsel. Under Rule 11(b), an attorney or
litigant who presents “a pleading, written motion, or other paper” to the court must certify that a
reasonable inquiry was performed under the circumstances, and that the pleading, “to the best of
the person’s knowledge, information, and belief”:
(1) . . . is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing
new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or . .
. will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual
contentions are warranted on the evidence or . . . are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.
7 Citations to “Opp.” refer to defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions, filed on April 18, 2025. (ECF No. 24).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The Supreme Court has held that the Rule’s central purpose is “to deter
baseless filings in district court and . . . streamline the administration and procedure of the
federal courts.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990), superseded on
other grounds as recognized in De La Fuente v. DCI Telecommc’ns, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 250,
257 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Thus, Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys and litigants filing papers with
the court “to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any
papers filed with the court are well-grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed for any
improper purpose.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule, however, is limited in
scope to filing a “pleading, written motion, or other paper” in federal court. Rule 11(d)
specifically exempts from coverage other “disclosures and discovery requests, responses,
objections and motions under Rules 26 through 37.” There are other rules that provide for
sanctions in connection with issues arising in connection with those papers. In light of the
relatively narrow scope of Rule 11, sanctions should be limited to what suffices to deter
repetition of the prohibited conduct. Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c)).
Rule 11(c) authorizes a court to sanction an attorney or unrepresented party for deviating
from the requirements of the Rule. In the Second Circuit, it is well established that “the decision
whether to impose sanctions is not mandatory, but rather is a matter for the court’s discretion.”
Lorber v. Winston, 993 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Perez v. Posse Comitatus,
373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004)). Courts in this Circuit have also held that orders granting Rule
11 sanctions should be “made with restraint.” Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194
F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Since the “inquiry must be ‘reasonable under the circumstances,’ liability for Rule 11
violations requires only a showing of objective unreasonableness on the part of the [individual] .
. . signing the papers.” In re Australia & New Zealand Banking Grp. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 712 F.
Supp. 2d 255, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 579 F.3d
143, 150 (2d Cir. 2009)); Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d at 65 (noting that “the standard for triggering
the award of fees under Rule 11 is objective unreasonableness”). Thus, this inquiry is “not based
on the subjective beliefs of the person making the statement.” Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C.,
347 F.3d 370, 387 (2d Cir. 2003).
Whether Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate is “distinct from the underlying merits of a
claim.” East Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus, 252 F.R.D. 175, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also
Lawrence v. Wilder Richman Sec. Corp., 467 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D. Conn. 2006) (observing
that the objective unreasonableness standard distinguishes “between a position which is merely
losing, and one which is both losing and sanctionable” (quoting Securities Indus. Ass’n v.
Clarke, 898 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 1990))). Furthermore, a Rule 11 motion should not be used
“to test the legal sufficiency or efficacy of allegations in the pleadings,” since other motions “are
available for those purposes.” See East Gluck Corp. v. Rothenhaus, 252 F.R.D. at 179 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee’s note). Thus, “not all unsuccessful legal arguments are
frivolous or warrant sanction,” Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990), and courts
must “resolve all doubts in favor of the signer.” Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341,
1350 (2d Cir. 1993).
II. 	Rule 11(c)(2) Safe Harbor Notice Requirement
As a preliminary matter, before bringing a motion for sanctions under Rule 11, Rule
11(c)(2) provides a “safe harbor” provision to allow parties opposing a Rule 11 sanctions motion
to correct or withdraw challenged filings. Thus, a separate motion describing the specific
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conduct alleged to have violated the rule must be served on the opposing party well before it is
filed with the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). After service of the notice, the target of the Rule
11 motion has 21 days to withdraw or correct the filing. Id.; see also American Home Assurance
Co. v. Merck & Co., No. 03 CV 3850, 2004 WL 2149103, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24,
2004). Motions that fail to comply with the safe harbor provision have been denied
outright. See, e.g., Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating
sanctions award for failure to satisfy safe harbor provision); Photocircuits Corp. v. Marathon
Agents, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 449, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting party’s argument that it could
circumvent the safe harbor requirement by the court’s grant of leave to file motion for sanctions).
Rule 11(c) is strictly construed, and an informal letter or notice does not satisfy its safe
harbor provision. E.g., Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory,
Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[a]n informal warning in the form of a
letter without service of a separate Rule 11 motion is not sufficient to trigger the 21-day safe
harbor period”); see also Chong v. Kwo Shin Chang, 599 F. App’x 18, 19 (2d Cir. 2015)
(summary order) (concluding that informal e-mail “without service of a separate Rule 11
motion” was insufficient to satisfy Rule 11(c)); Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC,
No. 17 CV 8834, 2022 WL 2078012, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2022) (concluding that letter that
did not mention Rule 11, nor adequately explain factual and legal basis for seeking sanctions,
was insufficient to satisfy Rule 11(c)); SFM Realty Corp. v. Lemanski, No. 20 CV 209, 2021
WL 21987, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021) (concluding that letter indicating “intent to file” motion
for sanctions was insufficient to satisfy Rule 11(c)); Zsa Zsa Jewels, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
LLC, 419 F. Supp. 3d 490, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding that letter unaccompanied by the
notice of motion or any other document was insufficient to satisfy Rule 11(c)); 5A Wright &
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Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1337.2 (4th ed.) (noting that, “[a]s the Advisory Committee
Note to the 1993 amendment [of Rule 11] indicates, the safe harbor period begins to run only
upon service of the proposed Rule 11 motion upon the party against whom sanctions are sought,”
and that “informal notice—rather than formal service—of a potential violation is insufficient to
trigger the beginning of the twenty-one day safe harbor period”).
III. 	Pro Se Litigants and Rule 11
Although “[i]t is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,” Triestman
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), proceeding pro se is no excuse for failure to comply with relevant procedural
rules. Olle v. Columbia Univ., 332 F. Supp. 2d 599, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that “a
litigant’s pro se status ‘does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law’” (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983))).
Accordingly, a pro se litigant seeking to move for sanctions must comply with all requirements
of Rule 11, including the safe harbor notice. Brown v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 20
CV 2424, 2024 WL 4476045, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2024) (denying pro se plaintiff’s Rule
11 motion for sanctions for failure to comply with safe harbor notice requirements); Adams v.
Taylor, 643 F. Supp. 3d 392 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (denying pro se plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion for
sanctions because Rule 11 was not the proper vehicle for plaintiff to seek relief, and also for
failure to comply with Rule 11 procedural requirements, including safe harbor notice). In
Odermatt v. Mount Sinai Hospital, the court denied the pro se plaintiff’s improper Rule 11
motions as procedurally defective for failing to comply with the safe harbor notice requirement,
but construed the motions as service of the notice that started the clock on the mandatory safe
harbor period. No. 24 CV 5250, 2025 WL 2650139, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2025). The court
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declined to consider the Rule 11 motions “unless and until [the plaintiff] elect[ed] to refile it after
the aforementioned [safe harbor notice] process and [21-day] time period concludes.”
Ultimately, the court held that “the Rule 11 Motions fail on the merits.” Id. at *4-5.
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Court Recommends Denying the Sanctions Motion for Lack of Safe Harbor Notice
As a preliminary matter, the Court must assess whether plaintiff’s motion for sanctions
complies with the strict procedural requirements of Rule 11 to provide notice of his intent to
move for sanctions. Here, plaintiff filed his Rule 11 motion before serving it on defendants and
failed to provide defendants with written notice of his intent to bring such a motion 21 days in
advance of filing. Rather, plaintiff merely stated in an email to defendants’ counsel on March
24, 2025, that he declined to consent to defendants’ proposed briefing schedule and intended to
file a motion for sanctions. (Saleemi Decl., Ex. A at 2). His email failed to indicate what
specific conduct was alleged to have violated the Rule, nor did it include any factual or legal
basis upon which he was seeking Rule 11 sanctions. (See id.) Apart from the insufficiency of
any notice served by email, “without service of a separate Rule 11 motion,” Chong v. Kwo Shin
Chang, 599 F. App’x at 19, he filed his motion the next day, on March 25, 2025, leaving
defendants no time to consider or respond to the motion.
As the case authority cited supra demonstrates, a bare email expressing an intention to
file a sanctions motion, sent a mere day before filing the motion itself, fails to satisfy the clear
safe harbor notice requirements of Rule 11(c)(2). See, e.g., Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun
Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d at 175 (holding that “[a]n informal warning in the
form of a letter without service of a separate Rule 11 motion is not sufficient to trigger the 21-
day safe harbor period”). Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff’s
motion be denied for lack of safe harbor notice.
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II. 	The Court Recommends Denying the Sanctions Motion on the Merits
It is well-established that pro se plaintiffs must be held to a more lenient standard than
parties with counsel, including in procedural matters. Indeed, as noted above, at least one court
in this Circuit has generously construed a pro se plaintiff’s motion for sanctions as itself a notice
to defendants for safe harbor purposes, ordering the plaintiff merely to refile the exact same
motion in accordance with the rest of Rule 11’s process and timing requirements. See Odermatt
v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2025 WL 2650139, at *3. However, as noted earlier, a litigant’s pro se
status does not completely excuse noncompliance with the rules; in this case, plaintiff Campbell
is a licensed attorney in New York State, not an entirely unsophisticated party, who should have
familiarized himself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to commencing this action.
Nevertheless, even if the court were inclined to follow the Odermatt court’s example and permit
plaintiff to refile his motion, the Court would still recommend dismissing the sanctions motion
on the merits.
In his meandering, somewhat incomprehensible motion, plaintiff alleges that defendants
filed multiple motions and requests for the “unnecessary purpose of causing delay,” and
therefore sanctions should issue against defendants and their counsel. (Mot. at 9). Plaintiff
challenges (1) defendants Adams’ and Caban’s September 17, 2024 request for a 60-day
extension of time to respond to the Complaint (ECF No. 9); and (2) defendants’ December 17,
2024 motion to compel plaintiff to execute a N.Y.C.P.L. § 160.50 unsealing release (ECF No.
14). (Mot.).8 He also references filings and arguments made in his entirely separate case,
8 Plaintiff raises other arguments, including arguments challenging the constitutionality of the New York
Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act (“MRTA”), and that defendants may not enjoy qualified immunity as a
result of the unconstitutionality of the MRTA. (See, e.g., Mot. at 7). The Court declines to consider these
arguments as more appropriately addressed in a motion to dismiss.
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Campbell v. Adams, No. 23 CV 6435 (E.D.N.Y.), in an attempt to argue that defendants’
motions and requests in this case violate Rule 11(b). (Mot. at 4-5).
A. 	The September 17, 2024 Extension Request
First, the Court considers the September 17, 2024 extension request. (ECF No. 9). In
their request for a 60-day extension to answer the Complaint, defendants Adams and Caban
represented that they were moving for an extension only on behalf of themselves, but requested
that the Court additionally consider sua sponte extending all other defendants’ time to answer,
“in the interest of judicial economy.” (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff’s arguments make it clear that he has no basis for moving for sanctions based on
the filing of the letter. Citing the earlier case that was dismissed by Judge Kovner, plaintiff
argues that defendants, in opposing plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion, never denied his
allegations that “1) his business had been subject to illegal searches and seizures [in] August
2022, 2) that his [sic] was again subject to illegal searches and seizures pursuant to a search
warrant in July of 2023, and 3) that he was wrongfully arrested in July 2023.” (Mot. at 5).
Plaintiff posits that because defendants failed to deny the allegations, the allegations must be
deemed admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6). (Id.) Plaintiff concludes
that, “because in previous litigation the attorney for defendant Adams, Caban, and the ‘City’
admitted to arresting [a] licensed hemp retailer and seizing their hemp which is a violation of
state law and federal,” there is thus no reasonable defense to the present lawsuit, and therefore
“the numerous requests for extensions for time to answer made by Counsel for the defendants in
the current litigation has [sic] been presented to the Court for the improper purpose of causing
unnecessary delay.” (Mot. at 6).
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This is not an appropriate basis on which to move for sanctions. If plaintiff believes he
has an argument based on collateral estoppel, that should be made to the district court once
defendants have appeared and answered.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the September 17, 2024 extension request was made for
the unnecessary purpose of causing a delay and preventing plaintiff from obtaining a default
judgment against the unrepresented defendants, because defense counsel represented only
defendants Adams and Caban and thus was not permitted to request that the Court sua sponte
extend the time to answer for all other, unrepresented defendants. Plaintiff cites no case law for
the proposition that it is improper for counsel to file a motion requesting relief for the parties
they represent and that the court sua sponte grant the same relief to other, unrepresented parties.
Indeed, he cannot, because no such case exists. Rather, the court has the inherent power to
manage its own docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b); see also Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47
(2016) (holding that “district courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and
courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases”). The Court was
well within its right to determine that an extension of time for all defendants, represented or not,
would be in the interest of judicial economy. Furthermore, plaintiff has not demonstrated that
defendants’ request was made in bad faith or for any improper purpose. As such, the Court finds
that defendants’ September 17, 2024 extension request was neither frivolous nor improper and
thus cannot be a basis for Rule 11 sanctions.
B. 	The December 17, 2024 Motion to Compel
Second, the Court considers the defendants’ December 17, 2024 motion to compel
plaintiff to execute an unsealing release pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L. § 160.50. (ECF No. 14).
Plaintiff argues that the motion to compel was presented to the court for the improper purpose of
causing unnecessary delay because (1) defense counsel could have answered the Complaint by
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stating that defendants lacked knowledge or information as to the allegations, pursuant to Rule
8(b)(5), and thus did not need to move to compel plaintiff to execute the Section 160.50 release;
(2) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require parties to make disclosures before the
Rule 26(f) conference; and (3) defendants in fact were able to answer the Complaint without the
release “because previous counsel for defendants Adams, Caban, and ‘the City’ already
responded to the same allegations without an executed waiver in previous litigation with
plaintiff” when they filed their opposition to plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in
Campbell v. Adams in 2023. (Mot. at 9-14). Each of plaintiff’s arguments fails.
First, as pertains to plaintiff’s Rule 8(b)(5) argument, defendants “were under no
obligation to submit a partial or speculative answer without access to the basic underlying facts
central to the case.” (Opp. at 8). In fact, courts regularly grant motions to compel execution of
N.Y.C.P.L. § 160.50 releases in civil rights litigation involving false arrest claims, before
defendants have answered the complaint. See e.g., Brown v. City of N.Y., No. 23 CV 5924,
2024 WL 244642, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2024) (compelling plaintiff to produce Section
160.50 release so City could conduct investigation required by Rule 11 before filing answer);
Murray v. N.Y.C. D.O.C., No. 21 CV 6718, 2023 WL 2647866, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023)
(dismissing complaint when plaintiff failed to provide Section 160.50 release necessary to
answer complaint). The Court declines to sanction defendants or their counsel for routine
litigation conduct and tactics.
Second, courts have consistently ruled that producing an unsealing release is not
considered discovery because, by filing a civil rights lawsuit challenging their underlying arrest
and prosecution, a plaintiff implicitly waives the privacy rights granted by N.Y.C.P.L. § 160.50.
See, e.g., Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2000); Cabble v. Rollieson, No. 04 CV
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9413, 2006 WL 464078, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2006); Hafif v. Mansour, No. 22 CV 1199,
2024 WL 5715911, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024). Thus, plaintiff’s argument that defendants’
motion to compel the Section 160.50 release was improper prior to the 26(f) meeting, is meritless
and not a basis for imposing Rule 11 sanctions.
Third, plaintiff may not rely on allegations made in a preliminary injunction motion in an
entirely separate lawsuit premised on different underlying facts and against a slightly different
set of defendants, in order to claim that the defendants in this lawsuit should have been able to
respond to the allegations in this Complaint without the unsealing release. As defendants note in
their Opposition, the preliminary injunction motion in Campbell v. Adams sought to enjoin
defendants “from searching, seizing Hemp and arresting licensed and unlicensed hemp retailers.”
(Opp. at 8). Defendants opposed that motion on the basis that plaintiff had not demonstrated
irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on the merits. (Id.) Since plaintiff’s July 28, 2023
arrest was not at issue in that prior litigation, see supra note 4, the defendants in Campbell v.
Adams did not need plaintiff’s sealed arrest warrant to oppose the preliminary injunction motion.
(Opp. at 8). Here, by contrast, defendants’ request for a Section 160.50 unsealing release is both
procedurally and substantively proper because plaintiff’s July 28, 2023 arrest is now at issue.
Any argument by plaintiff to the contrary is meritless.
In light of the above, the Court respectfully recommends denying plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions be
denied for failure to comply with Rule 11’s safe harbor notice requirement, and on the merits.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Court, with a copy to the undersigned, within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report. See 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (providing the method
for computing time). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. See, e.g., Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir.
2008).
The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Report and Recommendation to all other
parties either electronically through the Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system or by mail. The
Court will send a copy of this Order to the pro se plaintiff by mail.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 3, 2025
/s/ Cheryl L. Pollak
Cheryl L. Pollak
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
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