Senderowitz v. Hebrew Academy For Special Children et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
No 24-CV-00797 (RER) (PCG)
_____________________
JENNIFER SENDEROWITZ,
VERSUS
HEBREW ACADEMY FOR SPECIAL CHILDREN,
THERAPEUTIC SERVICES, INC., AND
NAOMI GOLDZWEIG
___________________
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
________________
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR., District Judge:
Plaintiff Jennifer Senderowitz worked at Hebrew Academy for Special Children
from September 1, 2013, to July 8, 2021. Defendant Naomi Goldzweig was her direct
supervisor, and they were in an intimate sexual relationship from 2014 to 2019. Plaintiff
alleges that throughout the course of her relationship with Goldzweig and after it ended,
Defendants discriminated against her based on her religion, gender, and sexuality.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants misclassified her employee status, depriving her of
overtime pay and other benefits. Plaintiff brings suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e et seq.; New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”),
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 8-107; the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.; New
York Labor Law (“NYLL”), N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3); and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Defendants move to dismiss all claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing they are either
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inadequately pleaded or time-barred. After carefully reviewing the record, and for the
reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND1
I. 	Factual Background
On August 8, 2013, plaintiff Jennifer Senderowitz (“Plaintiff” or “Senderowitz”) and
defendant Hebrew Academy for Special Children (“HASC”) entered into an employment
agreement titled “Clinician Independent Contractor Agreement.” (ECF No. 30-3, Ex. B
(“Cont.”) at 2). She was paid biweekly by defendant Therapeutic Services, Inc. (“TSI”).
(ECF No. 14, (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 19). Defendant Naomi Goldzweig (“Goldzweig,” and
collectively with HASC and TSI, “Defendants”) was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor throughout
Plaintiff’s 	employment 	with 	HASC. 	(Am. 	Compl. 	¶ 	30). 	Within 	roughly 	a 	year 	of
employment, Senderowitz was promoted twice. (Id. ¶ 27). After her second promotion,
Defendants allegedly “warned” Senderowitz to not tell anyone from “the state” of her new
position since the position belonged to someone else on paper. (Id. ¶ 28).
After that second promotion, Goldzweig allegedly began inviting Senderowitz to
social gatherings outside of work, including at Goldzweig’s home. (Id. ¶ 31). During these
interactions, 	Senderowitz 	alleges 	that 	Goldzweig 	asked 	her 	about 	her 	“lifestyle”,
specifically her friends’ “sexuality and sex life.” (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff identifies as not straight
and as Jewish, but not Orthodox. (Id. ¶ 11). In the summer of 2014, Goldzweig and
Senderowitz began an “intimate, sexual relationship.” (Id. ¶ 34). They maintained this
1 The Court acknowledges and offers its deep gratitude to Alicia Mayo, a judicial intern and third-year law
student at St. John’s University School of Law, for her assistance in researching and drafting this
memorandum and order.
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relationship from 2014 to 2019, during which Goldzweig never disclosed it to HASC’s
human resources department nor to TSI. (Id. ¶¶ 35–36).
Plaintiff alleges that on September 19, 2018, Goldzweig told her “she prayed for
Plaintiff on Yom Kippur so that Plaintiff could ‘get her head on straight,’” referring to her
sexual orientation (Id. ¶¶ 38–39). Goldzweig allegedly raised her voice at Plaintiff in the
workplace, 	made “disrespectful” comments about her in front of their colleagues,
“slammed” Plaintiff’s office door when entering and exiting her office, blocked Plaintiff
from leaving “hostile situations” in the workplace, and slapped Plaintiff across the face
multiple times in and out of the office. (Id. ¶ 40). When Senderowitz expressed a desire
to end the romantic relationship, she alleges Goldzweig “screamed” at her and called her
a “louse,” “mean,” “rotten,” and “pig.” (Id. ¶ 42).
On February 10, 2019, after the relationship ended, Goldzweig asked Senderowitz
if she was “picking up girls” and whether Senderowitz met anyone better than her.
(Id. ¶ 46). In July 2019, Plaintiff “repeatedly” told Goldzweig that she did not wish to
continue 	their 	relationship 	and 	Goldzweig 	continued 	to 	call 	Senderowitz 	a 	“pig,”
“disgusting rat,” and “fucking pig.” (Id. ¶¶ 49–50). Goldzweig also “constantly” berated the
LGBTQIA community in front of Senderowitz. (Id. ¶¶ 52–53). In or around fall 2019,
Senderowitz alleges that Goldzweig asked to see pictures of the women Senderowitz
dated and asked whether she went to lesbian bars. (Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 57). When Senderowitz
did not respond, Goldzweig brought up work-related matters as a pretext for conversation.
(Id. ¶ 58).
Around January 2020, Senderowitz alleges Goldzweig began “negatively fixating”
on her work performance without providing details on what she was unhappy with or how
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Senderowitz could improve. (Id. ¶ 59). In response, Senderowitz told Goldzweig she
would file a complaint with HASC’s human resources. (Id. ¶ 60). Goldzweig told her not
to do so because nobody “would believe [Plaintiff]”. (Id. ¶ 60). Senderowitz also alleges
that Goldzweig refused to sign her billing, preventing her from getting paid. (Id. ¶ 61).
A month later, to “mitigate” the fallout, Senderowitz explained to Goldzweig that
she was dating another woman. (Id. ¶ 62). In response, Defendant texted Senderowitz,
“you really are a lesbian,” and told Senderowitz that she was supposed to be with a man.
(Id. ¶ 63). Goldzweig also accused Senderowitz of being “nasty.” (Id. ¶ 64). Goldzweig
“forced” Senderowitz to have conversations about her sex life and made sexual advances
by asking to have sex with her and expressing a desire to touch her. (Id. ¶ 65). In one
conversation, Goldzweig asked Plaintiff who was the “man” and had the “penis” in
Plaintiff’s relationship and then talked about Goldzweig and Plaintiff’s previous sexual
relationship. (Id. ¶ 71). Goldzweig also texted Senderowitz, “I have the hots [sic] for you,
I am so wet,” and “can’t help my feelings, have had them [sic] for years.” (Id. ¶ 67).
Goldzweig then demanded to know whether Senderowitz’s new romantic partner
was Jewish and expressed disapproval when she learned the new partner was not.
(Id. ¶¶ 69–70). Goldzweig also disapproved of Senderowitz celebrating non-Jewish
holidays and eating non-Kosher food. (Id. ¶ 70). She also told Senderowitz, “I wish we
didn’t work together . . . things will keep going south until you leave.” (Id. ¶ 72).
In March 2020, Goldzweig allegedly outed Senderowitz as a lesbian to the entire
office, spreading rumors about where she lived and who she was dating. (Id. ¶ 74). This
prompted colleagues to ask Senderowitz about her dating life, where she lived, and who
she was living with—questions they had never asked her before and did not ask of
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heterosexual, Jewish Orthodox employees. (Id. ¶ 76). After the outing, Senderowitz
alleges that Goldzweig still privately contacted her to get back together. (Id. ¶ 77). Rather
than address the problem, HASC believed Goldzweig and Senderowitz were simply
“fighting like an old married couple.” (Id. ¶ 75).
Around 	mid-April 	2020, 	Senderowitz 	accepted 	Goldzweig’s 	invitation 	to 	a
Passover 	Seder 	because 	she 	was 	“nervous” 	about 	the 	potential 	work-related
ramifications of rejecting the offer. (Id. ¶ 78). Afterwards, Goldzweig allegedly pressured
Senderowitz to have sex, which they did. (Id. ¶ 79). Senderowitz later expressed to
Goldzweig that what happened was unacceptable and that they would never have sex
again. (Id.)
Nevertheless, Goldzweig continued to comment on Senderowitz’s personal life
throughout the summer of 2020. On May 23, 2020, Goldzweig said she was upset that
Plaintiff’s new girlfriend was not Jewish (Id. ¶ 83). The next day, Goldzweig told Plaintiff
to go with the “goyim” (a term she used to negatively refer to people who are not Jewish)
to eat non-kosher food, and celebrate holidays. (Id. ¶ 84). A day later, she made another
comment about Senderowitz not keeping kosher, and the next month, expressed concern
that Senderowitz would be mixed up in the “goyish” world. (Id. ¶¶ 85–86). The comments
instructing Senderowitz to eat kosher food continued, and Goldzweig allegedly did not
make these comments to Orthodox Jewish employees and heterosexual employees.
(Id. ¶ 87).
In February 2021, Goldzweig told Senderowitz that she was doing a good job and
apologized for “mixing personal and professional.” (Id. ¶ 88). Then, in March 2021,
Goldzweig stated that Senderowitz was not a team player and should work somewhere
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else. (Id. ¶ 89). In another comment to Senderowitz, Goldzweig characterized her as
hostile and difficult to work with and told her that it didn’t matter what anyone else thought
because Goldzweig was “the boss” and the top of HASC’s supervisory hierarchy.
(Id. ¶ 90). A month later, Senderowitz informed HASC’s school psychologist about these
ongoing issues, but the psychologist did nothing in response. (Id. ¶ 97–98).
On June 1, 2021, Senderowitz told Goldzweig that she would leave work if
Goldzweig continued her behavior because it was going to cause her mental breakdown.
(Id. ¶ 100). When Senderowitz said she would file legal claims, Goldzweig threatened to
sue Senderowitz for defamation. (Id. ¶ 101). Senderowitz pleaded with Goldzweig to
simply treat her professionally, as she did others at HASC. (Id.) Then, on June 24, 2021,
after Goldzweig heard that Senderowitz may not work at HASC that coming summer, she
told Senderowitz she “better not ‘screw [ Goldzweig].’” (Id. ¶ 102).
A week later, on July 1, 2021, Goldzweig walked into Senderowitz’s office and
noticed a decorative box on her shelf. (Id. ¶ 103). Goldzweig asked where she got it, and
when Senderowitz did not answer, stated “Oh, your new girlfriend [got that for you]? Then
she doesn’t know the real you,” and walked out, slamming the door. (Id.) Later that day,
Goldzweig advised Senderowitz to give up her job if she didn’t accept what Goldzweig
“needed.” (Id. ¶ 104). Plaintiff understood this to be a threat to her employment if she did
not accept Goldzweig’s sexual advances and harassment. (Id.)
On July 8, 2021, Senderowitz told Goldzweig she was leaving work at 3:00 P.M.
for an appointment and confirmed she had completed all twelve hours of her supervision
for the week. (Id. ¶ 107). Goldzweig told her that she needed to stay in the office even if
she was not being paid for the time. (Id.) Senderowitz returned to her office and began
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packing her things to leave. (Id. ¶ 109). Goldzweig asked why she was leaving, what her
intentions 	were, 	and 	whether 	she 	was 	going 	to 	tell 	“people” 	about 	their 	sexual
relationship. 	(Id. 	¶ 	110). 	HASC’s 	Human 	Resources 	Associate 	Cheryl 	Follman
(“Follman”), a neighbor of and regular visitor to Goldzweig’s home, entered Senderowitz’s
office to inquire what was happening. (Id. ¶¶ 111, 114).
During the July 8 conversation, Follman expressed that Senderowitz was a
“beloved employee,” “very good at her job,” and “valued by staff and children.” (Id. ¶ 111).
Plaintiff informed Follman that Goldzweig called Plaintiff a “bitch” and “pig” daily.
(Id. ¶ 112). Follman recommended that Senderowitz take the weekend to reconsider any
decision to leave HASC and suggested that Goldzweig might be having a bad day. (Id.)
Senderowitz explained that Goldzweig’s treatment had been ongoing for five years.
(Id. ¶ 113). Follman did not investigate Senderowitz’s allegations of discrimination and
harassment. (Id. ¶ 117). On or after July 8, Senderowitz was locked out of her HASC
email and could not access her work files. (Id. ¶ 118). Follman sent her the files so
Senderowitz could finish her reports but did not re-open access to her HASC email
account. (Id.)
After July 8, 2021, Goldzweig reached out to Plaintiff multiple times on Plaintiff’s
personal phone to say she didn’t want Plaintiff to be terminated, that Plaintiff would be
missed at work, and asked why Plaintiff left work. (Id. ¶¶ 119–20). On July 29, 2021,
Goldzweig asked if Senderowitz was home, went to Senderowitz’s house after she didn’t
respond, and “left things” by her door. (Id. ¶ 121). The last time Goldzweig reached out
to Senderowitz was on March 8, 2022. (Id. ¶ 122).
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Throughout 	this 	timeline, 	HASC 	reduced 	Senderowitz’s 	hours 	but 	allegedly
expected her to do at least the same level of supervisory work despite the pay cut.
(Id. ¶¶ 91, 93). Senderowitz alleges she received wage statements that only provided the
amount of money on her check but did not include the dates of work covered by that
payment, name of the employer, rate of payment and basis thereof, or other required
information. (Id. ¶ 95). Goldzweig sometimes “fought for [Plaintiff] to be paid fairly,” but
only when she and Plaintiff were on “good terms.” (Id. ¶ 92).
In response to these ongoing incidents, Senderowitz suffered from anxiety, panic
attacks, insomnia, depression, exhaustion, feelings of worthlessness, and a feeling that
it “would be easier to die” than to endure such a work environment. (Id. ¶ 105, 109).
II. 	Procedural History
On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against HASC and TSI
with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. ¶ 7). The EEOC
issued a right to sue letter on or about July 19, 2023. (Id.) On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff
filed her initial complaint in New York State Court. See generally (ECF No. 1-4, Ex. D).
Defendants removed the case to this Court. (ECF No. 1). On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff
filed 	an 	amended 	complaint. 	(Am. 	Compl.). 	On 	November 	18, 	2024, 	HASC 	and
Goldzweig, and then TSI, filed their respective motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 30 (“HASC
Mem.”); ECF No. 33-1 (“TSI Mem.”)). Plaintiff opposed both motions (ECF No. 31 (“Pl.’s
Opp’n HASC”); ECF No. 34 (“Pl.’s Opp’n TSI), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 32
(“HASC Reply”); ECF. No. 35 (“TSI Reply”)).
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LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007);
see also Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Court’s function
is . . . to merely determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient.”). However,
“fact-specific questions cannot be resolved on the pleadings.” Int'l Code Council, Inc. v.
UpCodes Inc., 43 F.4th 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation modified). A claim is factually
plausible when it allows the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The facts
alleged in the complaint are assumed true for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Id. at 678–79, and a court must “draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff,” Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237
(2d Cir. 2007).
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court may consider documents
incorporated by reference and documents that are “integral” to the complaint. Di Folco v.
MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). To consider documentary
evidence as “integral” on a motion to dismiss, it must be clear on the record that no
material dispute exists regarding the document’s authenticity, accuracy, and relevance.
Id. Ultimately, a prerequisite is a plaintiff’s reliance on the “terms and effect” of a document
in 	drafting 	the 	complaint. 	Chambers 	v. 	Time 	Warner, 	Inc., 	282 	F.3d 	147, 	153
(2d Cir. 2002).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Plaintiff’s FLSA “Misclassification” Claim Is Dismissed
In her sixth cause of action, Senderowitz asserts a claim for “Misclassification in
Violation” of the FLSA. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 159–62). There is, however, no independent FLSA
claim for “misclassification” separate from a claim for violation of the other benefits FLSA
provides—e.g., compensated overtime pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). In other words,
even if a plaintiff could prove that she was misclassified as exempt, she could not recover
under the FLSA unless she established some other FLSA violation. The only allegation
of an FLSA violation the Court can glean from the Amended Complaint is for unpaid
overtime compensation. (Am. Compl., ¶ 94 (“Furthermore, Plaintiff frequently worked
more than forty hours per week. However, she was only ever paid at her regular hourly
rate for all hours worked.”)).2 To the extent Plaintiff claims a violation of the FLSA’s
overtime provision, her claim is inadequately pleaded and is dismissed.
“[I]n order to state a plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege 40 hours of work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in
excess of the 40 hours.” Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106,
114 (2d Cir. 2013). “Plaintiffs must provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency
of their unpaid work to support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty
hours in a given week.” Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723
2 The FLSA requires employers whose employees work “longer than forty hours” in a workweek to
compensate those employees “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he
is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Covered employees who are improperly denied overtime may sue to
recover “unpaid overtime compensation” and “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. §
216(b); Herrera v. Comme des Garcons, Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2023).
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F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Kuck v. Planet Home Lending, LLC, 354 F. Supp.
3d 162, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Chime v. Peak Sec. Plus, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 183, 196
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). The Second Circuit has “taken care not to foreclose relief to plaintiffs
who neglected to keep careful records” and does not necessarily require plaintiffs “to
provide a week-by-week recounting of the hours they worked.” Herrera v. Comme des
Garcons Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 115 (2d Cir. 2023); see also id. at 114 (while a plaintiff “need
not keep careful records of the number of hours worked each week or calculate and plead
their hours with mathematical precision,” it is insufficient to simply allege undefined
overtime hours “in some or all workweeks.” (quoting Dejesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC,
726 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2013))).
Senderowitz’s allegation that she “frequently worked more than forty hours per
week” (Am. Compl. ¶ 94) without specific supporting facts is the kind of conclusory
allegation that fails to meet the pleading standard. See Gomez v. Nat'l Fin. Network, Inc.,
No. 20-CV-1968 (GRB) (AKT), 2021 WL 8084337, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2021)
(granting motion to dismiss because plaintiff did not allege specific hours worked, rate of
pay, or one specific week of overtime work); adopted by 20-cv-01968 (Order dated
8/30/2021); Spiteri v. Russo, No. 12-CV-2780 (MKB) (RLM), 2013 WL 4806960, at *56
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013), (same) aff'd sub nom. Spiteri v. Camacho, 622 F. App'x 9
(2d Cir. 2015). While Plaintiff explains that “Defendant HASC set a maximum number of
hours that Plaintiff was able to be paid for performing supervisory duties” (id. ¶ 93), she
does not specify the supervisory hour limit, nor how it relates to her overall hours worked.
Even in her allegation that on July 8, 2021, Goldzweig demanded that she work unpaid
hours after “she had completed all 12 hours of her supervision for the week” (id. ¶ 107)
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(emphases added), there is no information about the total number of hours she worked
that week. Senderowitz also suggests there may have been many weeks in which she
worked fewer than forty hours, as “the allotted number of [supervisory] hours would
fluctuate throughout the year.” (Id. ¶ 93). “The specificity requirement is no minor hurdle,”
Herrera, 84 F.4th at 117–18, and Plaintiff does not clear it here.
Because Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible FLSA overtime claim with sufficient
specificity, her FLSA claim is dismissed.3
II. 	Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Assert A NYLL § 195(3) Claim
In her seventh cause of action, Senderowitz asserts a claim for statutory penalties
for the failure to issue wage statements under NYLL section 195(3). (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 163–66). The NYLL requires employers to “furnish each employee with a statement
with every payment of wages” that includes various, specified information. N.Y. Lab. Law
§ 195(3). After the Supreme Court’s TransUnion decision,4 the Second Circuit determined
that plaintiffs cannot “rely on technical violations of the Labor Law but must allege actual
injuries suffered as a result of the alleged . . . wage notice and wage statement violations.”
Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc., 113 F.4th 300, 305 (2d Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).
3 Plaintiff’s allegation that she was not paid at all for certain hours worked (Am. Compl. ¶ 107), are not
covered by FLSA and better suited to state law breach of contract or NYLL claims, which she does not
plead. See Mackenzie v. Waypointe Partners Mgmt. LLC, No. 22 Civ. 7951 (VSB), 2025 WL 388296, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2025) (“Unlike the NYLL, which does cover unpaid-wage claims, the FLSA only covers
claims for minimum wages and overtime wages. Plaintiff may not ‘bring what is akin to a nonpayment or
breach of contract claim’ under the FLSA.” (first citing Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201–02, then citing Barone v.
Inspire Summits LLC, 20-CV-5978 (NGG) (CLP), 2022 WL 3139124, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2022))).
Because Plaintiff’s FLSA claim is dismissed, the Court need not reach TSI’s argument that Plaintiff fails
to plead the existence of an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA. (TSI Mem. at 15–22).
4 Transunion v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426 (2021) (holding that a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement simply because “a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”)
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While a plaintiff need not show an injury greater than their unpaid wages, there must be
“some causal connection between the lack of accurate notices and the downstream
harm.” Id. at 308–09. This may be satisfied by demonstrating that through its failure “to
provide the required wage statements, the employer was able to hide [its] violations of
wage and hour laws and thus prevent the employee from determining and seeking
payment for the precise amount of [their] unpaid wages.“ Roma v. David Carmili,
Physician, P.C., No. 23-CV-4072 (KAM) (CLP), 2024 WL 5152211, at * 5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
18, 2024) (collecting cases). A plaintiff may also establish standing by showing they would
have advocated for themselves and “avoided some actual harm or obtained some actual
benefit if actual notices had been provided.” Guthrie, 113 F.4th at 308 n.4 (citing Metcalf
v. TransPerfect Translations Int'l, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 10104 (ER) (KHP), 2023 WL 2674743,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2023)); see, e.g., Roma, 2024 WL 5152211, at * 5 (holding that
defendants’ failure to provide plaintiff with an accurate wage statement, which prevented
her from verifying and correcting issues with her pay until years later, was an adequately
alleged concrete injury).
Senderowitz argues Defendants failed to provide any wage statements in violation
of section 195(3), and she was thus “materially harmed.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 95). The Court
might speculate that the “material harm” is her unpaid wages, but she neither specifies
that harm nor makes a causal connection between a lack of accurate wage statements
and any concrete injury in the form of unpaid wages or otherwise. Senderowitz certainly
cannot argue that Defendants’ failure to provide these statements prevented her from
being aware of pay issues or advocating for herself, as she plainly asserts that both she
and Goldzweig advocated for her to be “paid fairly” on numerous occasions. (Am. Compl.
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¶¶ 92, 115). As noted, Plaintiff’s allegations that she was not paid for hours worked on at
least one occasion if not more are best suited to state law claims, but do not implicate
NYLL section 195(3). Without the required harm and causal connection of the wage
statement violations, Senderowitz lacks standing for wage statement violations under
NYLL section 195(3), and these claims are dismissed.
III. 	Plaintiff’s ERISA Claims Are Untimely
In her eighth cause of action, Senderowitz asserts ERISA claims for her intentional
misclassification 	as 	an 	“independent 	contractor” 	and 	the 	resulting 	denial 	of 	her
participation in “retirement plans and other benefits comprised by ERISA that were offered
to employees who were not misclassified as independent contractors.” (Am. Compl.
¶ 168). The statute of limitation for ERISA claims is based on “the most nearly analogous
state statute.” Perlman v. Gen. Elec., 2024 WL 4635235, at *1 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting
Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99, 104 (2013)). Though Plaintiff
fails to identify which section of ERISA gives rise to her claim, her claim is most
appropriately construed as one for benefits under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). See
Schulman v. Herbert E. Nass & Assocs. SEP IRA Plan, No. 10 Civ, 9613 (RA), 2013 WL
4860119, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013) (analyzing a similar claim). The statute of
limitations for such a claim is six years, accruing “upon a clear repudiation by the plan
that is known, or should be known, to the plaintiff.” Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 149
(2d Circ. 2008); Costa v. Astoria Fed. S&L Ass'n, 995 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y.
2014); see also Schulman, 2013 WL 4860119, at *4 (“For individuals who claim that they
were misclassified, this repudiation occurs ‘when the beneficiary first learns that she is
considered an independent contractor and is therefore not entitled to benefit, regardless
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of whether she later files a formal claim for benefits.’”) (quoting Brennan v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 275 F. Supp. 2d 406, 409–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
Senderowitz did not attach her employment contracts with either defendant to her
Amended Complaint. Nevertheless, a court may take such documents into consideration
when deciding a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment. Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72
(2d Cir. 1995). Here, the contracts between Plaintiff and Defendants HASC and TSI are
integral to the Amended Complaint because they rely on the “terms and effect” of the
contracts 	as 	the 	basis 	for 	Plaintiff’s 	misclassification 	claims. 	See 	Id. 	(holding 	an
agreement as integral to the complaint because it heavily relied on a document’s terms
and effect).
Plaintiff knew or should have known that she would be denied participation in
ERISA retirement or other benefits plans based on the terms of the employment contracts
she signed. (See Cont. at 2). The six-year statute of limitations for her ERISA claims
began to run when she signed the employment contracts in 2013. While Senderowitz
claims that she did not learn of her misclassification upon hire (Pl.’s Opp’n HASC at 25–
26), she does not provide a specific date when she learned that she was an “employee”
instead of an independent contractor. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege any additional
benefits application nor attempt to change her status from independent contractor to
employee. 	The employment 	contracts Plaintiff 	signed state she was hired as an
independent contractor. (Cont. at 2). Plaintiff asserts she knew this from the outset
(Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Opp’n HASC at 11–12), and she is bound by that admission. See
Brennan, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[I]t is undisputed that . . . plaintiffs
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knew from their first day of work that they were working as freelancers and would not be
entitled to benefits. Indeed, plaintiffs' assertion of this fact is a judicial admission by which
they are bound.”). While Senderowitz characterizes Defendants’ inclusion of the initial
contract as a “self-serving” selection (Pl.’s Opp’n HASC at 11; Pl.’s Opp’n TSI at 9), she
does not claim she ever tried to renegotiate the terms or signed a contract with different
terms.
The repudiation accrued in 2013, but Plaintiff failed to file her claim within the six-
year statute of limitations. Thus, Plaintiff’s ERISA claims are time-barred.
IV. 	Plaintiff’s Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Survive Dismissal
Senderowitz 	claims 	that 	HASC 	and 	TSI 	subjected 	her 	to 	a 	hostile 	work
environment and discriminated and retaliated against her in the terms and conditions of
her employment because of her religion, sex, gender, and sexual orientation, in violation
of Title VII (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 123–32), and that all defendants similarly violated NYSHRL
and NYCHRL (id. ¶¶ 133–53). She also claims that Goldzweig is liable for aiding and
abetting this discrimination under NYSHRL. (Id. ¶¶ 154–58).
TSI argues that it cannot be held liable for any of Senderowitz’s discrimination or
retaliation claims because she does not adequately plead that it was her employer within
the meaning of the anti-discrimination laws (TSI Mem. at 10–14), or that she was an
employee (id. at 18–22). Separately, HASC argues that all Senderowitz’s discrimination
and retaliation claims are untimely (HASC Mem. at 14–17) or inadequately pleaded (id. at
17–33). As discussed below, Defendants’ arguments are rejected.
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A. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads TSI as a Joint Employer
TSI seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims because she
failed to allege the plausible existence of an employer-employee relationship. (TSI Mem.
at 	10–14). 	Plaintiff 	argues 	the 	determination 	of 	whether 	an 	employer-employee
relationship existed should be reserved for summary judgement because of its fact-
intensive nature. (Pl.’s Opp’n TSI at 9). Regardless, the Second Circuit makes clear that
TSI’s status as a formal or informal employer must be plausible. See Felder v. U.S. Tennis
Assoc., 27 F.4th 834, 838, 845 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that a discrimination plaintiff must
plausibly 	illustrate, 	not 	merely 	speculate, 	that 	parties 	contemplated 	an 	employer-
employee relation that would permit liability). Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that TSI
was her employer.
Employer liability exists against an entity that is not formally a plaintiff’s employer
if the “single employer” or “joint employer” doctrines apply. Shiflett v. Scores Holding Co.,
601 Fed. Appx. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Mktg., LLC., 425
F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2005)). To determine whether two entities are a single employer
courts examine “(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations,
(3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.” Id. (citing
Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240-41 (2d Cir. 1995)). To evaluate
whether a plaintiff is jointly employed by two employers, courts ask whether an alleged
joint employer had “significant control over the terms and conditions of [Plaintiff’s]
employment.” Felder, 27 F.4th 838. The Second Circuit identifies a joint employer as an
informal employer which has the “power to pay an employee's salary, hire, fire, or
otherwise control the employee's daily employment activities.” Id. at 844.
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Here, Senderowitz creates a plausible inference through at least four allegations.
First, she alleges that TSI controlled her hiring, payroll, and billing. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19).
See Arculeo, 425 F.3d at 198 (holding that the joint employer doctrine imposes employer
liability on entities that “handle certain aspects on the employer-employee relationship
jointly”); see also Felder, 27 F.4th at 837, 838–39 (establishing that examples of a joint
employer exercising significant control are such employer’s involvement in plaintiff’s
hiring, firing, promotion, training, supervising, handling of records and issuing paychecks).
Second, Senderowitz alleges that her employment, per HASC’s instructions, came
through TSI. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15). Third, she alleges that TSI issued her paychecks
biweekly, maintained Plaintiff’s employment records, and set her rate of payment with
HASC’s input. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19). Fourth, Senderowitz alleges that TSI identified itself as
her employer for insurance purposes. (Id.) Construing the evidence most favorably to
Plaintiff, she sufficiently demonstrates that TSI hired her, TSI paid her with rates it
determined while considering HASC input, and then HASC controlled her daily activities
and hours. Cf. Contra Toledo v. Brend Restoration Serv. Inc., No. 21 Civ. 882 (GBD)
(SN), 2023 WL 3381249, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (dismissing plaintiff’s discrimination claim
because, even when construing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
evidence showed that another entity hired her, that entity's co-owner paid her in cash
each day, and that entity’s foreman controlled plaintiff’s daily activities). Thus, TSI can
face liability on Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims as her employer.5
5 Because the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded employer liability under the joint employer
doctrine, it need not reach TSI’s argument regarding the failure to sufficiently plead liability under the single
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B. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads That She Was an Employee
The Second Circuit uses a two-part test to determine whether an individual is an
employee, rather than an independent contractor, within the meaning of Title VII. United
States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing O'Connor v. Davis, 126
F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1997)). “First, the plaintiff must show she was hired by the putative
employer” by establishing “that she received remuneration in some form for her work.” Id.
Then, a court looks to “the thirteen factors articulated by the Supreme Court . . . to
determine whether an employment relationship exists.”6 Id. (citing Eisenberg v. Advance
Relocation and Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 113–14 (2d Cir.2000)). “In Title VII cases,
the Second Circuit places the greatest emphasis on the extent to which the hiring party
controls the manner and means by which the worker completes his or her assigned tasks.”
Hassanein v. Gino's Italian Rest. on 5th, No. 16-CV-3365 (AMD) (ST), 2017 WL 4350515,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017) (citation modified) (citing New York, 359 F.3d at 92). Even
if an individual enters an agreement as an independent contractor, a court’s assessment
of these factors may still render them an employee under Title VII. Eisenberg, 237 F.3d
at 115 (2d Cir. 2000).
employer doctrine. Plaintiff will, however, be permitted to engage in discovery on single employer liability.
6 Derived from federal common law of agency, these include: “[1] the hiring party's right to control the
manner and means by which the product is accomplished[;].... [2] the skill required; [3] the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; [4] the location of the work; [5] the duration of the relationship between the
parties; [6] whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; [7] the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; [8] the method of payment; [9] the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; [10] whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; [11] whether the hiring party is in business; [12] the provision of employee benefits; [13] and
the tax treatment of the hired party.” Hassanein v. Gino's Italian Rest. on 5th, No. 16-CV-3365 (AMD) (ST),
2017 WL 4350515, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017) (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)).
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For the same reasons that Senderowitz adequately pleads that TSI is her joint
employer, she adequately pleads that she is TSI’s employee. Her allegations that TSI
controlled her hiring, payroll, and billing (Am. Compl. ¶ 19); was the actual employer, per
HASC instructions (id. ¶ 15); issued her biweekly paychecks biweekly, maintained her
employment records, and set her rate of payment with HASC’s input (id. ¶ 19); and
identified itself as her employer for insurance purposes (id.), together demonstrate that
TSI was her putative employer and she received renumeration for her work from TSI. As
explained above, HASC and TSI were plausibly Senderowitz’s joint employers, jointly
controlling the “manner and means” of her work. Hassanein, 2017 WL 4350515, at *6.
Accordingly, Senderowitz was plausibly an employee of TSI.
C. Plaintiff’s Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Are Not Time-Barred
While admitting Plaintiff’s allegation of being “constructively terminated” is timely,
HASC nevertheless argues that all of Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims,
including her constructive discharge claim, are time-barred because she has “failed to
plausibly allege constructive discharge as an adverse action [and] [a]bsent a timely
adverse action [] Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.” (HASC Mem. at 14–15). The
Court disagrees for two reasons.
First, Senderowitz has plausibly alleged a constructive discharge on July 8, 2021,
(Am Compl. ¶¶ 105–18), and such a discharge constitutes an adverse employment
action, Notaro v. Fossil Indus., Inc., 820 F.Supp.2d 452, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Pa.
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004)). Constructive discharge occurs when
“an employer discriminates against an employee to the point such that [her] working
conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to resign.” 	Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel of City of
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N.Y., 867 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555
(2016)). A plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) “the employer’s intent to create an intolerable
environment that forces the employee to resign”, and (2) that “a reasonable person would
have found the work conditions so intolerable that [they] would have felt compelled to
resign”. Id. at 308. (quoting Adams v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 560 Fed. Appx. 47, 49
(2d Cir. 2014)).
Senderowitz plausibly alleges both elements, supported by the same set of facts.
Goldzweig intended to create an intolerable environment where a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign when she allegedly: frequently insulted Senderowitz
in front of colleagues and outed her as a lesbian (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 74); subjected her
to unwelcomed, sexualized communication and petitions for sex when the two were no
longer in a sexual relationship (id. ¶¶ 67, 79); made disparaging remarks to her about her
sexuality and the LGBTQIA community (id. ¶¶ 38-39, 52); slapped Senderowitz at the
workplace (id. ¶ 40); made derogatory comments about Senderowitz’s religious practice
(id. 	¶¶ 	70, 	84, 	86–87); 	periodically 	interfered 	or 	threatened 	to 	interfere 	with 	her
compensation and negatively evaluated her work performance despite a successful track
record (id. ¶¶ 59, 61); told Senderowitz she wished they didn’t work together because
“things will keep going south until you leave” (Am. Compl. ¶ 72); insisted Senderowitz
accept her unwelcomed advances and harassment (what Goldzweig “needed”), or “give
up” 	her 	job 	(id. 	¶ 	104); 	labeled 	Senderowitz 	as 	“difficult, 	disrespectful, 	and
unapproachable” whenever she tried to resist harassment from or engagement with
Goldzweig (id.); and directed Senderowitz to remain at work without being paid (id. ¶ 107).
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A reasonable person is unlikely to tolerate such treatment, including working
without pay. That directive plausibly served a “final straw,” effectively forcing Senderowitz
to either quit or consider quitting, as she went to pack her things and both Goldzweig and
Follman asked why she was leaving. (Id. ¶ 107–12). These facts are sufficient at the
pleading stage. See Green v. Town of East Haven, 952 F.3d 394, 405 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“The fact that this substantive standard is an objective one, however, does not
necessarily mean that what a reasonable person in the plaintiff's shoes would have felt
compelled to do is determinable as a matter of law, for an objective question is often fact-
specific.”); see also Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 162 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that an employer deliberately created intolerable conditions where the plaintiff alleged
that employer predicted that plaintiff would no longer be with the company weeks before
plaintiff was informed of an “intolerable reduction” in payment).
Second—since Plaintiff plausibly alleges a constructive discharge claim within the
limitations period, as explained below—she may anchor her other related allegations of
discrimination, hostile work environment, or retaliation as timely, or at the very least,
allege them as background to those claims.
To sue in federal court, Title VII claimants must first file charges of discrimination
with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged occurrence of an unlawful employment
practice. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(e)(1); Buon, 65 F.4th at 77 (citing Pikulin v. City Univ. of
N.Y., 176 F.3d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1999)). If the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, then
claimants must file a related lawsuit within ninety days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1); Tiberio
v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2011). The
continuing violations doctrine is a relevant exception to this limitation, and it applies so
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long as one discriminatory act falls within the limitation period. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002); see also Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345,
359 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[C]ontinuing violation may be found where specific and related
instances of discrimination are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so
long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice.”) (citation modified). This “extends
the limitation periods for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under an ongoing
policy of discrimination even if those acts, standing alone, would have been barred by the
statute of limitations.” Bright v. Coca Cola Refreshements [sic] USA, Inc., No. 12-CV-234
(BMC), 2014 WL 5587349, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014) (quoting Annis v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245–46 (2d Cir. 1988)), aff'd, 639 F. App'x 6 (2d Cir. 2015).
The doctrine often applies to hostile work environment claims because they “comprise of
a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.”
Anderson 	v. 	Nassau 	Cnty. 	Dep’t 	of 	Corr., 	558 	F.Supp.2d 	283,
297–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130,134
(2d Cir. 2003)); see also King v. Aramark Servs., Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 559-61 (2d Cir. 2024)
(“. . . a hostile environment is formed and shaped by an assemblage of discriminatory
acts . . . .”). Furthermore, a plaintiff may “rely on her time-barred allegations of defendant's
misconduct ‘as background evidence in support of [her] timely [constructive discharge]
claim.’” Barker v. Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, LLC, No. 19-CV-2710 (PKC) (SMG),
2024 WL 4287242, at * 5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2024) (first quoting Cummings v.
Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, No. 11-CV-1299 (DRH) (ETB), 2011 WL 6371753, at *14
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011), then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). Such background may
include discrete and non-discrete acts so long as a single discriminatory act falls withing
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the limitation period. Sooroojballie v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 816 Fed. Appx. 536, 543
(2d Cir. 2020).
Here, Senderowitz filed her EEOC charge on May 2, 2022, and received a right to
sue letter on July 19, 2023. Plaintiff’s July 8, 2021, constructive discharge is timely, as it
occurred after July 6, 2021 (300 days prior to her EEOC charge). Senderowitz also
alleges that Goldzweig called her a “bitch” and “pig” and other insults daily, which would
include her last day, July 8, 2021, during their final altercation at HASC. (Am. Compl.
¶ 112). Thus, Goldzweig’s otherwise untimely derogatory statements, gestures, physical
contact, and other acts from 2013 to 2021 may form part of an ongoing discriminatory
practice, rendering them timely under the continuing violations doctrine. King, 96 F.4th at
559–61. And even if these other acts could not be rendered timely, they provide
“background evidence” in support of Senderowitz’s timely constructive discharge claim.
Barker, 2024 WL 4287242, at * 5.
D. Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims are Plausibly Alleged
a. 	Discrimination Claims
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, 	terms, 	conditions, 	or 	privileges 	of 	employment, 	because 	of 	such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Buon
v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2023). At the motion to dismiss phase, a plaintiff must
satisfy only two elements: “(1) the employer discriminated against the employee (2)
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Buon, 65 F.4th at 78 (citing
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015)). Under this
framework, a plaintiff must show that they faced an adverse employment action and
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allege “facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination
by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87. Such a
showing “need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory
motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, at 311 (2d Cir. 2015). Showing
that an employee outside of a plaintiff’s protected group is similarly situated in “all material
respects” and was treated more favorably than plaintiff is sufficient to give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Id. at 312.
Goldzweig’s actions, including the constructive discharge, plausibly suggest that
Senderowitz’s sexual orientation, gender, and religion were motivating factors because
Goldzweig’s comments were regularly riddled with negative references to Senderowitz’s
protected characteristics. See Gordon v. APS Contractors Inc., No. 21-CV-259 (WFK)
(JRC), 2024 WL 4029520, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2024) (holding that a plaintiff
sufficiently alleged an inference of discrimination where plaintiff’s supervisor made a
“bigoted 	comment” 	directed 	at 	plaintiff’s 	protected 	class). 	Furthermore, 	Plaintiff’s
allegation that she was treated differently than her Orthodox Jewish, heterosexual
colleagues in terms of the discriminatory behaviors and questions Goldzweig subjected
her to on a daily basis, provide “‘relevant background evidence’ by shedding light on
Defendant's motivation and thus bolster 	[her] 	claim 	that 	Defendants treated [her]
differently because of” her sexual orientation, gender, and religion. Vega, 801 F.3d at 88
(quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112).
Defendants HASC and Goldzweig also assert that there is no inference of
discriminatory motive because the alleged discrimination arose from a failed relationship.
(Mem. HASC at 26–27). But the fact that Senderowitz and Goldzweig ended an intimate
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relationship that Goldzweig at times wanted to reinitiate does not, on its own, preclude an
inference of discrimination. See Stepheny v. Brooklyn Hebrew Sch. for Special Child.,
356 F.Supp.2d 248, 263 (E.D.N.Y 2005) (“If the jilted lover seeks retribution through
actions that are not gender- or race-based, Title VII is not implicated. If the conduct is
gender- or race-based, it is.”). Surely, some of Goldzweig’s comments and actions arose
from her frustrations about their failed relationship. But such feelings do not immunize a
defendant from liability for discriminatory behavior that is facially neutral, let alone
behavior that explicitly refers negatively to a plaintiff’s sexual identity and religion. Id.
Furthermore, Senderowitz proffers various facts—including disparaging comments about
her 	sexual 	identity 	and 	religion, 	alongside 	physical 	abuse 	through 	slapping—that
occurred before, during, and after their relationship. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37, 40); cf.
Stepheny at 263 (E.D.N.Y 2005) (holding that a defendant’s use of “white bitch” did not
infer race-based discrimination because defendant only used the non-neutral term in the
context of failed and “frustrated amorous tryst” with a plaintiff). Goldzweig’s comments
were facially discriminatory and not tied exclusively to Senderowitz ending their intimate
relationship. So, neither here can Defendants insulate themselves from liability simply
because Senderowitz and Goldzweig were in an intimate relationship at some point.
Goldzweig’s facially discriminatory comments speak for themselves and cast their
shadow even over her offensive, albeit facially neutral, words and actions.
b. 	Hostile Work Environment Claims
To sufficiently plead a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that the conduct “(1) ‘is objectively severe or pervasive—that is, . . . creates an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’; (2) creates an
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environment ‘that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive’; and (3)
‘creates such an environment because of the plaintiff's [protected characteristic]. . . .’”
Amaya v. Ballyshear, 295 F. Supp. 3d 204, 223–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Patane v.
Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007)). An objectively hostile work environment
plausibly exists when “the workplace is so permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” Judkins v. Brooklyn
Hosp. Ctr., No. 20-CV-6222 (LDH) (MMH), 2023 WL 2652279, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2023) (quoting Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 320–21); see also Reynoso v. All Foods, Inc., 908
F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In the context of a 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need
only plead facts sufficient to support the conclusion that she was faced with harassment
... of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her
employment altered for the worse.” (citation modified) (quoting Patane, 508 F.3d at 113)).
“[C]ourts should examine the totality of the circumstances, including: the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the victim's job
performance.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20
(2d Cir. 2014) (citation modified). Furthermore, “sex-based hostile work environment
claims may be supported by facially sex-neutral incidents and ‘sexually offensive’ acts
may be facially sex-neutral.” Id. (citing Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir.
2002)).
There is no dispute that Senderowitz subjectively perceived her work environment
at HASC to be hostile or abusive. The same facts that support her other Title VII claims—
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including those captured by the continuing violations doctrine—extend to a plausible
allegation that the environment was subjectively hostile or abusive. Senderowitz alleges
that she was insulted on a constant, ongoing, daily basis with either facially neutral terms
or 	derogatory 	comments 	about 	her 	sexuality 	and 	religious 	practice 	(Am. 	Compl.
¶¶ 38–39, 45, 49–50, 52–53, 65–67, 70–71, 73, 84, 86, 104, 109, 112, 122, 138). Physical
abuse in the form of slapping, alongside outing her to other staff and threatening
professional consequences if Senderowitz reported Goldzweig’s abuse (Id. ¶¶ 40, 59–60,
90), only bolster her claim. Plaintiff alleges this harassment caused her to become
nervous about her job security and feel she was “going to have a mental breakdown,” and
otherwise suffer serious anxiety, depression, exhaustion, and even suicidal thoughts. (Id.
¶¶ 59, 100, 105, 109). Taken as a whole, Senderowitz plausibly alleges that the abusive
environment created by Goldzweig, and allegedly ignored by HASC and TSI, altered her
working conditions and was not an environment a reasonable employee could tolerate.
c. 	Retaliation Claims
Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee “because [s]he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [s]he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).To state a retaliation claim at this stage,
under reduced prima facie standards, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “that (1) defendants
discriminated or took an adverse action against [them], (2) because [they] has opposed
any unlawful employment practice.” McKinnies v. City of New York, 2024 WL 4333703,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2024) (quoting Vega, 801 F.3d at 90); see also Farmer v. Shake
Shack Enters., LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Duplan v. City of
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New York, 888 F.3d 612, 625 (2d Cir. 2018)). The adverse employment action in the
retaliation context is one which “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination,” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (citing Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)), and must be “‘materially adverse’, meaning
that it causes ‘significant’ harm,” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis 601 U.S. 346, 348 (2024).
(quoting White, 548 U.S. at 68); see also Hinds v. PSEG Long Island LLC, No. 23-CV-
08701 (RER) (LGD), 2026 WL 266010, at *7 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026) (explaining
Second 	Circuit 	courts’ 	application 	of 	the 	Muldrow 	standard 	to 	discrimination 	and
retaliation claims). Opposition to the adverse action is broadly defined and not limited to
formal complaints, Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 318, and “even without direct evidence of
causation, ‘a plaintiff can indirectly establish a causal connection to support a . . .
retaliation claim by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the
adverse employment action,’” Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir.
2013) (alteration omitted).
As noted, Plaintiff plausibly alleges an adverse employment action through her
constructive discharge. Being discharged would deter a reasonable employee from
complaining about discrimination, and in fact, Senderowitz’s background allegations
demonstrate that Goldzweig’s actions often did deter her from making formal complaints
to others beyond her direct supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 62–96, 102–05). Further, Goldzweig took
each of these actions after Senderowitz complained to Goldzweig about her ongoing
discriminatory harassment, and HASC terminated Senderowitz’s access to her email and
constructively discharged her after she complained to Follman about Goldzweig’s
discriminatory harassment. (Id. ¶ 118; Pl.’s Opp’n HASC at 22). Senderowitz therefore
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adequately alleges that Defendants took these adverse actions in retaliation for her
complaints to Goldzweig and Follman about unlawful discrimination.
Thus, Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination, hostile
work environment, and retaliation claims are denied.
E. Plaintiff’s NYCHRL and NYSHRL Claims Shall Proceed
NYCHRL and NYSHRL both provide that an employer may not discriminate based
on race, national origin, or disability, among other protected characteristics. N.Y. Exec.
Law § 296; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1); Cooper v. Franklin Templeton Inv., 2023 WL
3882977, at *2 (2d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Both laws also prohibit retaliation against
an employee who has opposed their discrimination. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (7); N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 8–107(7). In both the discrimination and retaliation contexts, the State and
City laws impose a more lenient standard. Deveaux v. Sketchers USA, Inc., No. 19-CV-
9734 (DLC), 2020 WL 1812741, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) (clarifying that, rather than
demonstrate an adverse employment action, a “plaintiff need only show differential
treatment—that she is treated ‘less well’—because of a discriminatory intent”) (quoting
Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013));
Bright, 2014 WL 5587349, at *4 (explaining that NYSHRL and NYCHRL retaliation claims
only require the plausible allegation that an employer’s conduct is “reasonably likely to
deter a person from engaging in protected activity”) (quoting Sotomayor v. City of New
York, 	862 	F.Supp.2d 	226, 	262 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2012)). 	Furthermore, 	“the 	reach 	of 	the
continuous violation doctrine under NYCHRL is broader than either federal or state law,”
Ctr. for Indep. of Disabled v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 125 N.Y.S.3d 697, 703 (1st Dep't
2020), where there is “a consistent pattern or a continuing policy of discriminatory or
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retaliatory acts,” Gordon v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 24-CV-3411 (JAM), 2024 WL
5217932, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2024).
Because 	Senderowitz 	meets 	the 	higher 	standard 	under 	Title 	VII 	for 	her
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims, she sufficiently alleges
such claims under New York State and City law as well. See Styka v. My Merchants
Servs. LLC, No. 14-CV-6198 (ENV) (VMS), 2016 WL 3866550, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 13,
2016) (“A well-pled Title VII discrimination or retaliation claim is sufficient to support a
corresponding claim under the NYSHRL, as well as under the NYCHRL, which provides
even broader protection than its federal and state counterparts.”).
Lastly, under NYSHRL, an individual is liable for unlawful discriminatory practice if
they “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under
[NYSHRL], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (6). Senderowitz plausibly
alleges such individual liability against Goldzweig.
HASC argues that Plaintiff’s aider and abettor claim against Goldzweig fails
because the claim is based solely on her own alleged conduct. (Mem. HASC at 30–31).
However, courts in this Circuit differ on whether a defendant may be held liable for aiding
and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by their employer even where her own
actions serve as the predicate for the employer's vicarious liability. Compare Conklin v.
Cnty. of Suffolk, 859 F.Supp.2d 415, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that a defendant may
be held liable for aiding and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by her employer
even when her actions predicate the employer's vicarious liability, so long as the employer
may be held liable) with Boyce v. Weber, No. 19 Civ. 3825 (JMF), 2020 WL 5209526, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020) (“Put simply, it is oxymoronic to say that an individual
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defendant can aid and abet his own primary conduct.”). The Second Circuit has yet to
resolve this split. In that context, the Court declines to foreclose Plaintiff’s opportunity to
plead such a claim when courts in this district have allowed it, especially to prevent “lone
wolf” bad actors from escaping liability because none of their co-workers individually
committed discriminatory acts. Johnson v. Cnty. of Nassau, 82 F.Supp.3d 533, 537
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third cause of action against HASC and TSI and her fifth
cause of action against Goldzweig survive dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiff’s FLSA, NYLL, and ERISA claims are dismissed,
while her discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims under Title VII
against Defendants HASC and TSI, along with her NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims against
all Defendants, may proceed.
SO ORDERED.
RAMÓN E. REYES, JR.
United States District Judge
Dated: February 17, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
/s/ Ramón E. Reyes, Jr.
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