Chavez v. City of New York

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DANIEL CHAVEZ,
Plaintiff,
– against –
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
23-cv-07754 (NCM) (TAM)
NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Daniel Chavez brings suit against his former employer, the City of New
York (“City” or “defendant”), for failure to accommodate his religious beliefs in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17. See generally Compl.,
ECF No. 1. Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim. 1 For the reasons
stated below, defendant’s motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 2 Between August 2019
and February 2022, plaintiff was employed by the New York City Department of
1 	The Court hereinafter refers to the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 38, as the “Motion”; Plaintiff’s Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 39, as the
“Opposition”; and the Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 40, as the “Reply.”
2 	Facts not contradicted by citations to admissible evidence are deemed admitted.
See Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (“If the opposing
party . . . fails to controvert a fact so set forth in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement,
that fact will be deemed admitted.”).
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Correction (“DOC”). Def. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Def. 56.1”) ¶¶ 1, 76, ECF No.
38-1; Plaintiff’s 56.1 Counterstatement of Material Facts (“Pl. 56.1”) ¶¶ 1, 72, ECF No. 39-
1. 3 Plaintiff held two positions at the DOC. From the start of his employment until May
2020, he served as the Executive Director for Instructional Design and Enrollment
Management, where he was responsible for the design and development of the curriculum
for uniformed and non-uniformed staff among other duties. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 2–3; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶
2–3.
He then worked as the Assistant Commissioner for Training and Development
until February 2022 and was responsible for creating and implementing training for
numerous uniformed and non-uniformed DOC staff and for enrollment management,
which entailed tracking the enrollment of corrections staff in trainings. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 9–10;
Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 9–10. Throughout the entirety of his employment with the DOC, plaintiff’s
office was located at the Correction Academy in Queens, New York and in the GMDC
Learning Building on Rikers Island. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 4, 11; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 4, 11.
As the Executive Director, plaintiff worked primarily in-person and sometimes
remotely, approximately once per month. Opp’n Ex. 7 (“Chavez Tr.”) 24:15–25:12, ECF
3 	Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York requires a party moving for summary
judgment to submit “a separate . . . statement, in number paragraphs, of material facts”
as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried.” Local R. 56.1(a). A party opposing
summary judgment must submit “a correspondingly numbered paragraph . . . responding
to, each numbered paragraph in the statement of the moving party.” Local R. 56.1(b).
Here, defendant’s 56.1 statement of facts contains 76 paragraphs, see Def. 56.1 at 12, and
plaintiff’s counterstatement of facts contains 72 paragraphs, see Pl. 56.1 at 10. While some
of plaintiff’s numbered paragraphs correctly correspond to defendant’s statement, many
are not synchronized. The Court uses its best judgment to identify corresponding
statements and counterstatements of facts throughout this Order, and “summarizes the
facts as they appear through the parties’ briefing and the record as a whole.” Gourley v.
Yarmack, No. 21-cv-01163, 2023 WL 5625439, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023).
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No. 39-8. His role entailed interacting with other DOC staff but not with people in
custody. Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Chavez Tr. 25:13–17. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,
plaintiff worked remotely from March 2020 through the end of April 2020. Def. 56.1 ¶ 6;
Pl. 56.1 ¶ 6. At the end of April 2020, plaintiff returned to work in-person. Def. 56.1 ¶ 7;
Pl. 56.1 ¶ 7. In plaintiff’s role as Assistant Commissioner, he interacted with people in
custody, though not frequently. Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 12. His interactions with DOC
staff were both in-person and remote. Def. 56.1 ¶ 13; see Pl. 56.1 ¶ 13.
City employees, including DOC employees—uniformed and nonuniformed—and
contractors were ordered to comply with the vaccine mandate and receive the COVID-19
vaccine starting on October 20, 2021. Def. 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 15. The vaccine mandate
required most City employees, including non-uniformed DOC employees like plaintiff, to
provide proof by October 29, 2021 at 5:00 p.m. that they received a single dose vaccine or
the first dose of a two-dose vaccine. Damera Decl. Ex. B (“Vaccination Order”) at 3, ECF
No. 38-4. 4 The vaccine mandate required City employees who did not provide the
requisite proof of vaccination to be excluded from their assigned work location and placed
on leave without pay starting on November 1, 2021. Def. 56.1 ¶ 24; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 24.
DOC employees who wished to be exempt from the mandate were required to apply
for a reasonable accommodation with the DOC Office of Equal Employment Opportunity
(“EEO”). See Damera Decl. Ex. C (“FAQs”) at 8, ECF No. 38-5. On October 27, 2021,
plaintiff submitted a reasonable accommodation request to be exempt from the vaccine
mandate on the basis of religion. Opp’n Ex. 6 (Request for Reasonable Accommodation
(“RA Request”)) 1–2, ECF No. 39-7. Plaintiff requested to continue working in person and
4 	Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers
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submit to weekly testing. RA Request 1–2. “Submission of a weekly negative test result”
was “the only allowable accommodation from vaccination without causing an undue
hardship and/or disruption” to the DOC. See FAQs 9.
Approximately three weeks later, the DOC denied plaintiff’s RA Request. Def. 56.1
¶ 55; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 55; see Damera Decl. Ex. G (“RA Denial”) at 2, ECF No. 38-9. The RA
Denial stated that allowing plaintiff to work while unvaccinated would pose an undue
hardship because DOC was charged with ensuring the health and safety of those in its care
and custody as well as maintaining safe working conditions for employees. Def. 56.1
¶¶ 56–61; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 54–56, 59; see RA Denial 2. The DOC could not require incarcerated
individuals to receive the vaccine, and the frequency of an employee’s contacts with the
incarcerated population was considered in determining undue hardship. Def. 56.1 ¶ 62;
Pl. 56.1 ¶ 62.
On November 18, 2021, plaintiff appealed the RA Denial to a Citywide Appeals
Panel 	(“Citywide 	Panel”) 	who 	considered 	appeals 	filed 	by 	employees 	whose
accommodation requests were denied by their respective agency. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 33, 63; Pl.
56.1 ¶ 59. Plaintiff included a letter of support by the DOC Chaplain Justin von Bujdoss
with his appeal. Def. 56.1 ¶ 64; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 61. Chaplain von Bujdoss wrote that plaintiff’s
“beliefs have a historical precedent with respect to the belief that free will and the exercise
of free will is a divinely apportioned, unique characteristic of being in relationship with
god.” Damera Decl. Ex. H (“Appeal File”) at 7, ECF No. 38-10. He further wrote that,
“[a]ccording to this theological perspective the God-given ability to reason and discern
what is appropriate with respect to liberty and individual agency is a central tenet to what
it means to be a human participant in a divinely created world.” Chaplain von Bujdoss
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Letter 7. The Citywide Panel reviewed plaintiff’s documentation and denied plaintiff’s
appeal. Def. 56.1 ¶ 67; see Pl. 56.1 ¶ 41; Appeal File 13.
On January 31, 2022, plaintiff was informed that he was required to submit proof
of COVID-19 vaccination no later than February 11, 2022 otherwise he would be separated
from City service. Def. 56.1 ¶ 75; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 71. On February 11, 2022, plaintiff failed to
submit proof of vaccination and was terminated as a result. Def. 56.1 ¶ 76; see Pl. 56.1 ¶
72.
LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for summary judgment is well settled. Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant
meets their initial burden, the non-moving party must provide evidence establishing a
genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Facts are in genuine dispute when “the jury could reasonably find for” the non-moving
party based on the evidence in the record. Borley v. United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir.
2021). The Court is to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-
movant’s favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, but the non-movant must still do more than
merely assert conclusions that are unsupported by arguments or facts. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Court need only consider admissible evidence, and it need not leave every
evidentiary stone unturned. Looney v. Macy’s Inc., 588 F. Supp. 3d 328, 340 (E.D.N.Y.
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2021). “The rules governing the admissibility of evidence on a summary judgment motion
are the same as those governing admissibility at trial, and the district court has broad
discretion in choosing whether to admit evidence.” Glowczenski v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 928
F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 594 F. App’x
723 (2d Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
It is “an unlawful employment practice under Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964] for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship,
for the religious practices of [its] employees[.]” Zacharowicz v. Nassau Health Care
Corp., 177 F. App’x 152, 153 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). 5 To succeed on a religious discrimination claim for
failure to accommodate, “a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing that
(1) [he] held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2)
[he] informed [his] employer of this belief; and (3) [he] was disciplined for failure to
comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch.
Dist., 129 F.4th 182, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2025) (citing Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)).
After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer “is required to
show that it offered [him] a reasonable accommodation or that doing so would cause
undue hardship.” Marte v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 22-cv-03491, 2022 WL 7059182, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2022) (citing Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir.
2006)).
5 	Throughout this opinion, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,
and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
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Plaintiff claims that defendant violated Title VII by denying him a religious
accommodation that would have exempted him from the COVID-19 vaccine mandate.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on this claim. Defendant argues that it is
entitled to summary judgment because (1) plaintiff’s RA Request did not demonstrate that
he had a sincerely held religious belief that entitled him to a vaccine exemption, and (2)
granting plaintiff his requested exemption would have imposed an undue hardship on the
DOC. Mot. 7. Defendant has failed to provide evidence to establish that a reasonable jury
could not find for plaintiff as to both arguments.
A. Sincerity and Religious Nature
Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot prevail on his failure to accommodate claim
because he has not offered evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that
plaintiff’s alleged religious beliefs are sincere, nor has plaintiff offered evidence that he
advised his employer that his alleged religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccine
mandate. Mot. 10.
A plaintiff bringing a Title VII failure to accommodate religious beliefs claim must
establish that the beliefs at issue are sincerely held and religious. Matos v. Discovery
Commc’ns, LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 307, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). The “sincerity analysis seeks
to determine an adherent’s good faith in the expression of h[is] religious beliefs.”
Gardner-Alfred v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., 143 F.4th 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting
Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984)). Title VII defines religion as
“includ[ing] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Matos, 750
F. Supp. 3d at 318. The “core purpose of this analysis is to differentiate between those
beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are animated by motives of
deception and fraud.” Gardner-Alfred, 143 F.4th at 63 (quoting Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157).
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Defendant argues that the Citywide Panel rightfully concluded that plaintiff’s
choice to refuse the COVID-19 vaccine was unrelated to sincerely held religious beliefs
and instead based on a personal preference to not take the vaccine. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 47, 67–
68; Mot. 11. Defendant adds that the materials plaintiff submitted in support of his RA
Request and the record writ large establish that plaintiff’s beliefs were arguably
philosophical or personal—nonreligious but “cloaked in religious garb”. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 47,
68; Mot. 12–13. Defendant also claims that plaintiff’s religious beliefs are insincere
because he acted inconsistently with those beliefs when he received vaccinations while
serving in the United States Army. Def. 56.1 ¶ 73; Mot. 12.
In response, plaintiff argues that his “beliefs are safeguarded as long has [he]
conceives of his beliefs as religious in nature.” Opp’n 8. Plaintiff’s RA Request stated: “[a]s
a Christian, free will and choice . . . are fundamental to who I am as a person, and what
constitutes the purpose of my life and existence. . . . I must account to God for my actions
and choices, and to do so I must have made my own choices, so that I may account for
them.” RA Request 2. Plaintiff explains that he believes “God created [him] with the
ability to endure infectious diseases by providing [him] with a natural immune system.”
RA Request 2. Additionally, while plaintiff concedes that he was vaccinated when serving
in the Army, he notes that he received those vaccinations in 1997 when he joined and
denies receiving any other vaccines in the last “ten to fifteen years”. Opp’n 11. Finally,
plaintiff argues that the determination of the sincerity of his religious beliefs is almost
entirely a credibility assessment inappropriate for adjudication at summary judgment. Pl.
56.1 ¶ 45; Opp’n 8. The Court agrees.
Defendant has failed to establish that there is no genuine dispute as to whether
plaintiff’s religious beliefs are sincere. Plaintiff’s own statements constitute evidence of
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what his religious beliefs are, that his beliefs conflict with getting the vaccine, and that he
has not received any vaccination for the last ten to fifteen years; plaintiff’s consultation
with Chaplain von Bujdoss concerning his religious beliefs prior to submitting his RA
Request constitutes further evidence, too. See Opp’n 10–12; Chavez Tr. 64:15–21. Plaintiff
has therefore offered evidence that, if believed, could be a basis by which a juror could
find in favor of the nonmovant.
Defendant relies mainly on plaintiff’s previous vaccinations to establish that
plaintiff’s religious beliefs are insincere. While evidence that plaintiff has previously
received vaccinations is certainly relevant to evaluating the sincerity of plaintiff’s beliefs,
this evidence does not preclude a jury from nonetheless crediting plaintiff’s testimony
about his religious beliefs. See Gardner-Alfred, 143 F.4th at 63. This is especially so given
that plaintiff alleges he last received vaccinations at least 10 years ago. See Chavez Tr.
68:5–70:2. Defendant’s “evidence of [plaintiff’s] potentially inconsistent behavior is, at
best, impeachment evidence that a jury could rely on to discredit [plaintiff’s] testimony,
but it is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support a grant of summary judgment, because
at this stage of the proceedings, the court may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence.” Gardner-Alfred, 143 F.4th at 64 (quoting Moll v. Telesector Res.
Grp., Inc., 94 F.4th 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2024)). In Gardner-Alfred, the defendant presented
evidence of plaintiff’s inconsistencies to argue that plaintiff’s objection to the COVID-19
vaccine was secular not religious. Id. at 63. However, the Court held that even if plaintiff
had secular objections to the vaccine, a reasonably jury could also find that plaintiff had
sincere religious beliefs that conflicted with the vaccine requirement. Id. at 63–64. Thus,
a factfinder could determine that either plaintiff was fraudulent in her beliefs, or that she
possessed religious and secular objections to the vaccine. Id. Similarly here, evidence that
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plaintiff acted inconsistently with his religious beliefs at least 10 years ago is not a
sufficient basis to resolve plaintiff’s sincerity as a matter of law, especially given plaintiff’s
more recent statements of his beliefs and the letter of support from Chaplain von Bujdoss.
See Chavez Tr. 65:14–66:15 (discussing weekly conversations with Chaplain von Bujdoss).
Defendant also points to Chaplain von Bujdoss’s letter, which stated plaintiff’s
beliefs “have a historical precedent” and are a “theological perspective.” Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 64–
66. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s beliefs are not religious but instead a personal
preference. Reply 8. However, “theological” means “of or relating to theology”—itself
meaning “the study of religious faith, practice, and experience.” Theology, Webster’s
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/theology (last visited Feb. 3,
2026). A reasonable jury could understand Chaplain von Bujdoss’s statements that
plaintiff’s beliefs are theological and in line with historical precedent to support the
conclusion that plaintiff’s beliefs are religious and sincerely held.
Further, contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff has presented evidence that
he informed his employer of how his religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccine mandate.
See RA Request 2. In his RA Request, plaintiff explains that consistent with his beliefs as
a Christian, God has given him the “ability to fight infectious diseases by providing [him]
with a natural immune system.” RA Request 2. Plaintiff explains that being injected with
the vaccine, which is “not something then that can be taken out . . . is not walking in faith”
or rather inconsistent with his religious beliefs. Chavez Tr. 49:23–50:4. Drawing all
permissible inferences in plaintiff’s favor, his objection can easily be construed to include
putting a vaccine into his body (which he believes is already able to fight infectious
diseases). See DeMaria v. N.Y.S. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 23-cv-03627, 2025 WL 2298452,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025) (finding that “the assembled evidence would permit a
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reasonable juror to find for [plaintiff]”—evidence such as plaintiff’s statements “that his
faith directs all of his choices and actions and who he is” and that “to receive a COVID-19
vaccine would be to sin”).
Based on the evidence before the Court, a reasonable jury could find that, even if
plaintiff had some nonreligious objection to the vaccine, he nevertheless also had religious
objections to the vaccine and his religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccine mandate.
B. Undue Hardship
Defendant next argues that the Court should grant summary judgment because
plaintiff’s requested accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on the
DOC’s operations. Mot. 14. Defendant contends that allowing plaintiff to remain
unvaccinated would have posed a health and safety risk to other DOC employees and
those in the DOC’s custody. See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 56, 59–60; Mot. 14–15. Defendant also argues
that it has no obligation to engage in an interactive process with plaintiff because any
accommodation would have posed an undue hardship. Mot. 19–21. In response, plaintiff
argues that his requested accommodation—weekly COVID-19 testing—would not have
imposed an undue hardship on defendant’s operations and an interactive process was
necessary. Opp’n 3.
The question properly before the Court at this stage is whether a reasonable jury
could find that providing plaintiff an accommodation that exempted him from the vaccine
mandate would have imposed an undue hardship on defendant’s operations. “Undue
hardship” is not an element of a plaintiff’s Title VII claim, rather it is a defense. Brandon
v. Bd. of Educ. Of City of St. Louis, No. 22-cv-00635, 2025 WL 1360684, at *32 (E.D. Mo.
May 8, 2025) (first citing E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 772
n.2 (2015); and then citing Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 472 (2023)). It is the employer
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who must demonstrate undue hardship by showing that the burden of accommodation is
substantial in the overall conduct of their operations. Groff, 600 U.S. at 472. “Title VII
requires an assessment of a possible accommodation’s effect on the conduct of the
employer’s business.” Id. Here, defendant has not established as a matter of law that
accommodating plaintiff will pose an undue hardship.
The undue hardship analysis is context specific, and the Court must consider “all
relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accommodations at issue and
their practical impact,” id. at 470, “in light of the nature, size and operating cost of an
employer,” Beckles v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 23-cv-8663, 2025 WL 2208418, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025) (quoting Beickert v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-cv-5265, 2023
WL 6214236, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2023)), and the nature of the employee’s job and
specific duties, Lake v. HealthAlliance Hosp. Broadway Campus, 738 F.Supp.3d 208,
220–21 (N.D.N.Y. 2024).
The rapid spread of COVID-19 in correctional facilities and the ensuing harm to
correctional staff and incarcerated individuals is not doubted by the Court. See People ex
rel. Stoughton v. Brann, 67 Misc. 3d 629, 122 N.Y.S.3d 866 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020).
However, 	defendant 	does 	not 	offer 	any 	evidence 	why 	plaintiff’s 	requested
accommodation, weekly COVID-19 testing, poses a substantial burden in the conduct of
defendant’s operations. At bottom, defendant relies on general assertions of health and
safety risk to DOC employees and individuals who are incarcerated. This is not adequate
to meet its burden. Defendant provides no evidence of plaintiff’s job responsibilities that
mandate in-person interaction with the incarcerated population and DOC staff, or explain
that plaintiff’s job responsibilities could not be fulfilled remotely. Indeed, plaintiff states
that his interactions with those in DOC custody is limited, Pl. 56.1 ¶ 12, and that some of
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his work is done remotely, Pl. 56.1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff also states that he had meetings and
provided trainings via Zoom. Chavez Tr. 30:5–14, 31:2–8. Moreover, even if plaintiff’s job
responsibilities require him to work in person, defendant has not stated why, given the
nature and frequency of plaintiff’s interactions with uniformed and non-uniformed staff
and the approximate number of staff plaintiff regularly meets with in-person, weekly
testing would have been insufficient or lead to substantial costs. See, e.g., Peterson v.
Snohomish Reg’l Fire and Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211 (9th Cir. 2025) (finding undue hardship
to accommodate vaccine exemptions due to health and safety costs if fire department
employees were unvaccinated where fire chief’s declaration cited fire department
employees responded to 18,000 emergency calls, 85% of which were for medical services,
and transported nearly 7,000 people to hospitals); see also Lake, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 213,
220 (holding plaintiff’s religious accommodation request would have caused undue
hardship because as an x-ray technician, plaintiff’s job at the hospital was intrinsically
“patient facing”); cf. Beckles, 2025 WL 2208418, at *3 (holding that because “[a]
reasonable accommodation can never involve the elimination of an essential function of
a job,” a special education teacher’s request to work remotely was not reasonable given
that her students required hands-on instruction).
To sustain its burden of establishing an undue hardship defense, defendant is
required 	to 	provide 	evidence 	of 	the 	health 	and 	safety 	costs 	it 	would 	incur 	by
accommodating plaintiff. For example, in Peterson, the defendants explained that
exposing fire department staff to the virus would burden its operations because
firefighters would go on sick leave, and the department would have limited staff to assign
to work shifts. Peterson, 150 F.4th at 1220–21. Here, defendant does not present evidence
concerning staffing costs, such as increased absences or staff shortages related to COVID-
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19 outbreaks. Nor does defendant present evidence showing how accommodating
someone with plaintiff’s specific job responsibilities would compound and exacerbate
those costs.
The argument that the DOC cannot have unvaccinated people come into contact
with “uniformed Members of Service assigned to non-jail Commands [because they] are
regularly redeployed to the jails to cover staffing shortages” does not change the Court’s
conclusion. RA Denial 2. Undoubtedly, safety within any work environment “is of
absolute importance,” and must inform the analysis under Groff. See Beickert, 2023 WL
6214236, at *5; see also Chavez v. S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 723 F. Supp. 3d
805, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“Several post-Groff decisions have held that an employer can
establish undue hardship by showing that accommodation posed a health and safety risk
to other employees[.]”). Defendant’s safety concerns are particularly weighty given its
obligation to ensure the safety of its incarcerated population. Nevertheless, defendant has
not carried its burden of demonstrating that plaintiff’s RA Request would have created an
undue hardship as a matter of law. Even if the Court were to accept defendant’s
conclusory concern of staffing shortages, “adverse impact on other employees, standing
alone, does not satisfy the undue burden test.” Groff, 600 U.S. at 472 (“So an
accommodation’s effect on co-workers may have ramifications for the conduct of the
employer’s business, but a court cannot stop its analysis without examining whether that
further logical step is shown in a particular case.”). More to the point, defendant does not
present evidence that plaintiff’s unvaccinated status would require other employees to
assume his essential duties involving close contact with the incarcerated population or
coworkers to mitigate infection risks, nor does defendant offer evidence of a substantial
increase 	in 	economic 	costs 	through 	lost 	staff 	hours, 	increased 	overtime, 	or 	a
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redistribution of responsibilities. Moreover, defendant’s reliance on general assertions of
the risks of COVID-19 and the efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine does not amount to the
specific evidence needed to demonstrate undue hardship. 6
Defendant also cannot point to an interactive process (whereby defendant and
plaintiff met to discuss alternative accommodations) in order to establish that defendant
engaged in 	a context-specific 	assessment. Though 	no such 	interactive process 	is
necessary, had defendant nevertheless engaged in one, such conduct could have bolstered
defendant’s 	argument that it engaged 	in 	the type of specialized, 	context-specific
assessment courts require. See e.g., Russo, 129 F.4th at 184 (highlighting that school
6 	To bolster its argument that granting plaintiff’s RA Request would pose health and
safety risks, defendant points to the fact that the risks of COVID-19 have been recognized
by courts throughout the Second Circuit. Mot. 14–17. However, courts in this circuit have
acknowledged the risks of COVID-19 specifically when discussing the essential job
responsibilities of employee seeking accommodations and the unique features of each
employee’s work environment. See, e.g., Lake, 738 F. Supp. 3d 208 (holding that hospital
would incur financial and operational burdens on its business because it could not feasibly
prevent plaintiff, who was often the only x-ray technician working night shifts, from
coming into contact with and potentially exposing patients and other employees).
Defendant 	also 	relies 	on 	CDC 	recommendations 	and 	the 	Second 	Circuit’s
acknowledgement of those recommendations to argue for the vaccine’s efficacy in
preventing COVID-19. Mot. 18–19. But general assertions about the vaccine’s efficacy
does not “demonstrate [defendant’s] contemporaneous rationale for denying [plaintiff’s]
religious accommodation request[.]” Byam v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 23-cv-03999,
2024 WL 4198475, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2024) reconsideration denied, 2024 WL
4504712 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2024) (rejecting defendant’s argument based on citations to
CDC materials outside the record and contrasting defendant’s unsuccessful argument
with a successful argument in a different case based on “abundant, unrefuted evidence of
COVID-19’s effect on [a hospital system’s] patients, employees, and ability to fulfill its
mission”); cf. Buchanan v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 23-cv-10192-FDS, 2024 WL
5202787, at *5 (D. Mass., Dec. 23, 2024) (finding undue burden when, among other
things, defendant “required staff members to isolate medically if exposed to [COVID-19]”
and defendant’s evidence of staffing shortages due to these “mandatory isolation
periods”).
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district met with plaintiff twice to discuss a potential exemption); Hall v. Sheppard Pratt
Health Sys., Inc., 155 F.4th 747 (4th Cir. 2025) (emphasizing employer-employee meeting
during which employer discussed potential alternative accommodations with employee).
This is particularly relevant here where it is unclear from the evidence in the record that
defendant engaged in an individualized assessment of plaintiff’s RA Request. Defendant
thoroughly explains the reasonable accommodation review process, Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 27–50,
yet defendant fails to provide how the evaluation standards were applied to plaintiff’s RA
Request specifically.
The Court does not opine on the efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine or the wisdom
of the vaccine mandate. The question is whether defendant could offer an accommodation
to plaintiff without substantially increasing defendant’s costs. Despite defendant’s burden
of establishing that there is no genuine dispute of fact as to this question, defendant has
not presented sufficient evidence. More than barebone arguments are necessary at this
stage. See Borowski v. Mordino, No. 16-cv-00999, 2020 WL 6083425, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 15, 2020) (“It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most
skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work . . . and put flesh on its bones.”
(quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990))). Defendant fails to meet
its burden here.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant’s summary judgment motion is DENIED.
In accordance with the Court’s Individual Practice Rule IV.A, the parties shall file a
proposed joint pretrial order by March 6, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	February 6, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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