Li v. Albarran et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
RUI LI,
Petitioner,
v.
SERGIO 	ALBARRAN, 	Acting 	Field
Office 	Director, 	San 	Francisco 	Field
Office, 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement; 	TODD 	LYONS, 	Acting
Director, 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement; MARKWAYNE MULLIN,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; TODD BLANCHE, Acting U.S.
Attorney 	General; 	and 	ANTHONY
TORRES, 	Commissioner 	of 	the 	CNMI
Department of Corrections, in their official
capacities,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00011
DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is Petitioner Rui Li’s (“Li”) petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed on
May 20, 2026. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Li alleges that the Respondents’ failure to provide a bond hearing
after his arrest and detention violates both: 1) 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations,
as he is not an “alien seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A); and 2) his Fifth Amendment right to due process because of his prolonged
detention. (Id. ¶¶ 54–67.) Accordingly, Li requests that the Court “[i]ssue a Writ of Habeas Corpus
F I L E D
Clerk
District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands
By________________________
(Deputy Clerk)
JUN 12 2026
Case 1:26-cv-00011 Document 17 Filed 06/12/26 Page 1 of 15

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ordering Respondents to schedule a bond hearing before an IJ and ordering that the IJ may not
summarily deny bond at such hearing[.]” (Id. at 10.)
The day after the petition was filed, the Court issued an order to show cause why the
petition should not be granted, setting briefing deadlines and a hearing on the matter. (ECF No. 2.)
The Court granted Respondents’ unopposed motion to extend the briefing deadlines and hearing
date, in order to allow Respondents sufficient time to gather and review Li’s immigration records.
(ECF Nos. 4–5.) Respondent Anthony Torres, Commissioner of the CNMI Department of
Corrections, timely filed his response by the extended deadline (ECF No. 8), as did Respondents
Sergio Albarran, Acting Field Office Director, San Francisco Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Todd Lyons, Acting Director, ICE; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Todd Blanche, Acting U.S. Attorney General
(collectively, the “Federal Respondents”) (US’ Resp., ECF No. 11)—the Federal Respondents
attached six exhibits to supplement their response. (ECF Nos. 11-1–11-6.) Li filed his reply (Reply,
ECF No. 12), supported by two exhibits (ECF Nos. 12-1–12-2). The day before the hearing, the
Federal Respondents filed an additional two exhibits (ECF Nos. 15-1–15-2), which the Court
considers for the purposes of this order. On June 3, 2026, the Court held a hearing1 on the petition
and took the matter under submission. (Mins., ECF No. 16.)
For the following reasons, the Court now GRANTS Li’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
because he is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
/ /
1 Respondent Torres did not appear, as the Court had earlier granted his unopposed motion to waive both
his own and his counsel’s appearance at the hearing. (See ECF Nos. 9–10.)
Case 1:26-cv-00011 Document 17 Filed 06/12/26 Page 2 of 15

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I. 	BACKGROUND
Li is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, currently detained at the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) Department of Corrections under the physical custody
of the Respondents. (Pet. ¶ 1.) On August 22, 2024, Li was paroled into the United States pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) under the CNMI-only parole program; his parole was valid until
September 5, 2024. (See Pet. ¶ 2; US’ Resp. 8; NTA 1, ECF No. 11-2.)
Around 	November 	2024, 	Li 	submitted 	an 	I-589 Application 	for Asylum 	and 	for
Withholding of Removal to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).
(Pet. ¶ 15.) USCIS issued Li an Employment Authorization Document around June 2025. (Id. ¶
16.) ICE detained Li on February 13, 2026, and he has remained in detention since. (Pet. ¶ 3; see
US’ Resp. 9.) At the time of Li’s detention, USCIS had not yet adjudicated his application for
asylum. (Pet. ¶ 16.)
One day after he was detained, Li was placed into removal proceedings upon the filing of
a notice to appear (“NTA”) with the immigration court. (See US’ Resp. 9; NTA 1.) The NTA
identified Li as an “arriving alien” and charged him with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (NTA 1, 4; US’ Resp. 9.) Around March 18, 2026, Li applied for release on
bond. (Pet. ¶ 6.) The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Li’s request for lack of jurisdiction without
citing any legal authority for the decision. (IJ Order, ECF No. 11-3; US’ Resp. 9.) Petitioner
contends the legal position of the IJ and of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is that a
non-citizen who has not been admitted into the United States is subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that an IJ has no authority to release such a non-citizen
on bond. (Pet. ¶¶ 7–8.)
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In his removal proceedings before the IJ, Li is applying for relief in the form of withholding
of removal and/or relief under the Convention Against Torture for fear of being returned to China.
(Pet. ¶ 17; US’ Resp. 9.) Li does not contest that he is removable, nor does he challenge any part
of the process by which his removability is determined. (See Mins.; Reply 4.) Li’s individual
removal hearing was originally set for June 4, 2026 (see Pet. ¶ 20; US’ Resp. 9), but as the Court
understands, the individual hearing has since been continued to June 30, 2026 because of the
reassignment of Li’s immigration case to a new IJ (Reply 1; see 	ECF Nos. 12-1–12-2), and to
allow Li’s immigration counsel additional time to prepare for the individual hearing (see ECF Nos.
15-1–15-2). As such, there is currently no removal order, preliminary or final, in Li’s immigration
proceedings. (See Pet. ¶ 19.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The petition seeks a writ of habeas corpus. Title 28 of the United States Code § 2241
provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “In federal
habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of
evidence.” L.S. v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25CV3598-LL-BJW, 2026 WL 143150, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026) (citing Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004);
Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1228, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
For the reasons detailed below, the Court determines that the provisions of the Immigration
and 	Nationality 	Act—as 	amended 	by 	the 	Illegal 	Immigration 	Reform 	and 	Immigrant
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Responsibility Act—do not preclude this Court’s jurisdiction to decide Li’s statutory challenge to
his mandatory detention, and that he is entitled to a bond hearing as a noncitizen subject to
discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Because the Court grants Li’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus on this basis, it does not reach his constitutional challenge to his prolonged
detention.
A. The Court has jurisdiction to consider Li’s statutory challenge to his
mandatory detention.
The Federal Respondents argue that as a threshold matter, Li’s claims and requested relief
are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). This Court
disagrees.
1. 	Section 1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction because Li’s mandatory
detention does not “arise from” any of the three actions listed in that
statutory provision.
Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim
by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien[.]” The
language of this provision does not “sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’
the three listed actions of the Attorney General.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018).
Rather, “[t]he provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take:
her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”
Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)). “‘There are of course many . . .
decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process’ not implicated by § 1252(g), ‘such
as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the
deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the
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adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order.’” Id. (quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 482).
Section 1252(g) was directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon
prosecutorial discretion.” AADC, 525 U.S. at 485 n.9.
The Federal Respondents argue that Li is challenging “the government’s decisions to
charge him with removability and detain him, which arise from the decision and action to
commence removal proceedings against him.” (US’ Resp. 11 (internal alterations, quotations, and
citation omitted).) The Federal Respondents argue specifically that the Court should apply the
reasoning of the District Court of Hawaii in Wang v. Derr, No. CV25-00231 JAO-RT (D. Haw.
July 16, 2025). (Id. at 13–14; see Wang, ECF No. 11-5.) In Wang, the petitioner had been detained
on June 2, 2025, and he challenged his designation as an “arriving alien,” which subjected him to
mandatory detention without a bond hearing. (Wang 2, 5.) The Wang petitioner filed his original
petition for writ of habeas corpus the day he was arrested and detained, and filed his amended
petition a few days later. (Id. at 4–5.) The district court issued its decision on July 16, 2025, finding
that “when detention begins with the commencement of removal proceedings, courts lack
jurisdiction to review a challenge to the detention based on § 1252(g).” (Id. at 17.)
The Court finds Wang distinguishable. Unlike the petitioner in Wang, Li does not challenge
his designation as an arriving alien in this Court. He is only challenging the legality of the
government’s decision to apply 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provisions—
which apply to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking admission.” Li’s claim raises a
discrete, “purely legal question” about whether he falls within the class of individuals defined at
section 1225(b)(2)(A) that “does not challenge the Attorney General’s discretionary authority.”
See Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 996 (internal citations omitted); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp.
3d 1297, 1312 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (finding § 1252(g) did not bar district court’s jurisdiction to
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decide whether § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provisions applied to plaintiffs). Federal courts
have jurisdiction to consider such legal questions “even if the answer . . . forms the backdrop
against which the Attorney General later will exercise discretionary authority.” See Ibarra-Perez,
154 at 996 (internal citations omitted). Thus, because the Federal Respondents’ “broad reading of
§ 1252(g) would lead to a result that is not contemplated in the statute and that has been disavowed
by the Supreme Court,” the Court concludes that Li’s claim does not concern discretionary action
that is jurisdictionally barred by section 1252(g). See Rodriguez, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 1313 (quoting
Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997–98).
2. 	Similarly, section 1252(b)(9) does not bar jurisdiction because Li
challenges the legality of his mandatory detention, not any part of
the process by which his removability will be determined.
Section 1252(b)(9) mandates that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States . . . shall be available
only in judicial review of a final order . . . .” Unlike section 1252(g), section 1252(b)(9) is not a
“jurisdiction-stripping statute that . . . foreclose[s] all judicial review of agency actions.” J.E.F.M.
v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2016). “Instead, the provision[] channel[s] judicial review
over final orders of removal to the courts of appeals.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “By its terms,
the jurisdiction-stripping provision does not apply to federal habeas corpus petitions that do not
involve final orders of removal.” Nadarajah v. Gonzalez, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Jennings, 528 U.S. 281 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)); J.E.F.M.,
837 F.3d at 1032 (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s prior holding in Nadarajah). “Therefore, in cases
that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the
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district court, and on appeal to [the Ninth Circuit], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Nadarajah, 443
F.3d at 1076.
Under Jennings and Nadarajah, the Court has jurisdiction to review Li’s statutory
challenge not withstanding section 1252(b)(9). In Jennings, habeas petitioner Alejandro Rodriguez
had been detained under for over three years before “he filed a habeas petition in the District Court
for the Central District of California, alleging that he was entitled to a bond hearing to determine
whether his continued detention was justified.” 583 U.S. at 289–90. On the jurisdictional issue,
the Supreme Court wrote:
For present purposes, it is enough to note that [the habeas petitioners] are not asking
for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain
them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even challenging any
part of the process by which their removability will be determined. Under
these circumstances, § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.
Id. at 294–95.
Here, section 1252(b)(9) does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction over Li’s statutory challenge
because there has been no final order of removal, and because his legal claim does not involve
reviewing an order of removal, challenging the decision to detain him in the first place or seek
removal, or any part of the process by which removability will be determined. See Nadarajah, 443
F.3d at 1076; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294–95. Instead, Li’s challenge is to the legality of his
placement in mandatory detention proceedings, and the lack of a bond hearing. Again, the district
court’s reasoning in Wang v. Derr is distinguishable because in that case, the petitioner challenged
his designation as an arriving alien. (Wang 2, 5, 30.)
B. Having resolved the jurisdictional issues, the Court holds that Li is not
subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is
instead subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing.
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The Federal Respondents contend that Li is properly detained under section 1225(b)(2)(A)
and is not entitled to a bond hearing due to his status an “arriving alien”—defined under 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1.2 and 1001.1(q)—who was paroled into the country. (US’ Resp. 6–8.) Further, the Federal
Respondents’ position is that Li is an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” within
the meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A). (Id. at 18–19.)
The Court now holds that section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens like Li. In
so holding, the Court adopts the reasoning of the hundreds of district courts and three circuit
courts2 that have just recently found “applicants for admission” are not subject to mandatory
detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A) unless they are also “seeking admission.” See Lopez-
Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2026); Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami,
175 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026); Da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026). Because Li is
not seeking admission, the discretionary detention provisions at section 1226(a) govern, and he is
entitled to a bond hearing. Before detailing its analysis, the Court provides a brief overview of the
relevant detention statutes.
1. 	Overview 	of 	Pre-removal 	Detention 	Statutes, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§
1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a)
Both 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) govern pre-removal detention
proceedings. However, while section 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention, section 1226(a)
permits detention or release on bond or probation. See Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 720.
Additionally, in Jennings, the Supreme Court summarized that “U.S. immigration law authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country” under 8 U.S.C. §
2 The Ninth Circuit has not yet spoken on the issue.
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1225(b)(2). See 583 U.S. at 289. “It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already
in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings” under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). See id.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) reads:
[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . . .
Section 1226(a) states that “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.” Pending such decision, the Attorney General may detain the alien, or release him on bond
or conditional parole. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). “This process includes the right to a bond hearing before
an immigration judge.” See Rodriguez, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)).
As to cases that are subject to mandatory detention, courts within the Ninth Circuit have
interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to contain three requirements: “an ‘examining immigration
officer’ must determine that the individual is (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking
admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” E.g., Elias v. Knight,
817 F. Supp. 3d 970, 982 (D. Idaho 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Other circuit courts
agree. See e.g., Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1269.
2. 	Li is not “seeking admission” and thus section 1225(b)(2)(A) does
not apply.
Here, as confirmed during the hearing on the petition, both parties agree that Li is an
“applicant for admission” within the meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A). However, they disagree
on whether Li is “seeking admission,” and thus, whether he is subject to mandatory detention. The
Federal Respondents, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings, argue that “aliens
seeking admission and applicants for admission [are] virtually indistinguishable[,]” such that all
applicants for admission are subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A). (See US’
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Resp. 18–19.) Li disagrees with the Federal Respondents’ characterization of Jennings, and argues
he is not seeking admission within the meaning of the statute because he is already present in the
United States, and because he is applying for relief in the form of withholding of removal in his
immigration proceedings rather than for admission. (See Pet. ¶¶ 30, 67; Reply 4–5.)
The Court rejects the Federal Respondents’ interpretation, which conflates the terms
“applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission,” and in so doing, fails to give effect to
each word of the statute. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Instead, the Court follows the reasoning of other district and circuit courts which
have interpreted the terms “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission” as separate
requirements that an individual must meet before being subject to mandatory detention under
section 1225(b)(2)(A). As the Second Circuit explained in Da Cunha, “if the government were
right that ‘applicant for admission’ is a subset of ‘seeking admission,’ there would have been no
reason for Congress to use both.” 175 F.4th at 77. Based on a plain textual reading, the Second
Circuit determined that section 1225(b)(2) applies only to noncitizens who are present and have
not been admitted, and are requesting lawful entry into the United States after inspection and
authorization. Id. at 74. The Second Circuit further explained that other statutory provisions,
legislative history and purpose, in addition to prior decades of executive practice and ensuing
Congressional silence supported its reading. See id. at 78–93. Lastly, Da Cunha expressly rejected
the reading of Jennings presented by the Federal Respondents in this matter; in Jennings, “the
Court left no doubt as to its view regarding the differences between Sections 1225 and 1226, . . .
because it repeated later in the opinion that Section 1226 ‘applies to aliens already present in the
United States.’” Id. at 84 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303).
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Here, Li is not seeking admission. The Second Circuit and other Ninth Circuit district
courts have interpreted the term seeking admission to mean presently pursuing lawful entry into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. See Moya v.
Blanche, No. 2:26-cv-00675-APG-DJA, 2026 WL 1481604, at *6 (D. Nev. May 27, 2026) (citing
Da Cunha, 175 F.4th at 74). In Da Cunha, the Second Circuit found that the petitioner—who had
entered the country unlawfully twenty years ago and was now seeking only relief from removal—
was not “seeking admission” and thus section 1225(b)(2)(A) did not apply. Da Cunha, 175 F.4th
at 74. Similarly here, Li was paroled—not admitted—into the United States in 2024, has remained
in the country ever since, and is now seeking only relief from removal in his immigration
proceedings. Thus, he is not seeking admission and section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply.
3. 	Li’s status—as an “arriving alien” whose parole under the CNMI-
only program had terminated—does not affect the Court’s analysis.
A substantial part of the Federal Respondents’ response relies on Li’s status as an “arriving
alien” as defined under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2 and 1001.1(q). (See US’ Resp. 8.) The regulatory provisions
define an arriving alien as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the
United States at a port-of-entry” and specifies that “[a]n arriving alien remains an arriving alien
even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Act, and even after any such parole is
terminated or revoked.” See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q). The Federal Respondents implicitly invoke
the “entry fiction” doctrine with respect to parolees, which provides that an alien paroled into the
United States pending a determination of his admissibility is not considered “within the United
States” for the purposes of immigration law. See Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (alien
arrived at U.S. port-of-entry, held in custody, then released on parole pending determination of her
citizenship claim); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded
by statute on other grounds (explaining the entry fiction doctrine).
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The Court sees no reason why Li’s designation as an arriving alien for purposes of the
removal proceedings should affect its analysis. The relevant inquiry is whether Li is “an applicant
for admission” and “an alien seeking admission” within the meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A),
which prescribes mandatory detention. The term arriving alien is not defined in the INA statute.
Both parties agree that Li is an applicant for admission, and under the federal regulations, arriving
aliens are a sub-category of applicants for admission. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q). The Federal
Respondents assert that “[i]mmigrants classified as arriving aliens are [also] deemed to be seeking
admission into the United States[,]” but cite no legal authorities to support this conclusion. (See
US’ Resp. 10.) “[P]arole status speaks only to whether [Li] has been admitted, not whether he was
seeking admission at the time of his detention . . . as that term is used in Section 1225(b)(2)(A).”
See Sarmiento Guerrero v. Noem, 815 F. Supp. 3d 181, 188–89 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). Following this
logic, district courts throughout the country— including Ninth Circuit district courts, have declined
to consider the termination of an individual’s parole as necessarily requiring mandatory detention.
See, e.g., id.; Moya, 2026 WL 1481604, at *6–*7 (“termination of [petitioner’s] parole do[es] not
mandate his detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F.Supp.3d
274, 311 (E.D.N.Y., 2025) (finding termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole did not require
mandatory detention; O.F.B. v. Maldonado, 810 F. Supp. 3d 394, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same).
Here, as the Court has already explained, because Li is seeking relief from removal—not
admission into the country, he is not seeking admission within the meaning of section
1225(b)(2)(A). Neither his designation as an arriving alien nor the termination of his parole
impacts the Court’s conclusion.
Lastly, the Federal Respondents argue that the exceptionality of the CNMI-only parole
program requires mandatory detention of out-of-status parolees, in order to protect national
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security and the safety of community members. (See US’ Resp. 6–7.) The Federal Respondents
further argue that “[w]ithout [this] strict adherence, the islands would be absent a defense against
high-risk entrants from China, and would have to forgo any ambition to have a CNMI-Only Parole
program that gains the advantage of visitors, but lessens their ability to enter the community or to
stress the national immigration system with custody redetermination bond hearings.” (Id. at 7–8.)
However sensible this line of reasoning may be for policy purposes, the Court is unaware of and
the Federal Respondents have not provided any statutory or regulatory basis for treating
noncitizens paroled under the CNMI-only program differently from other noncitizens paroled
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Like other parolees whom courts across the country have
been found to be subject to discretionary, rather than mandatory detention, Li was paroled under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See US’ Resp. 3.) See, e.g., id.; Moya, 2026 WL 1481604, at *6–*7;
Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F.Supp.3d at 311; O.F.B., 810 F. Supp. 3d at 402.
Further, 	contrary 	to 	the 	Federal 	Respondents’ representations, 	statutory 	provisions
governing the CNMI visa waiver program do indeed provide the government with “defense against
high-risk entrants.” (See US’ Resp. 7.) Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(l)(2), aliens applying for a visa
waiver to enter the CNMI also waive their own rights—such as their right to contest any action for
removal, other than on the basis of an application for withholding of removal or under the
Convention Against Torture.3 Finally, the executive branch’s prior long-standing practice of
placing noncitizens like Li in discretionary rather than mandatory detention—for five presidential
administrations and over three decades (see Pet. ¶ 30; Reply 6–7)—undermines the Federal
Respondents’ concerns.
3 Consistent with these statutory provisions, Li is not contesting his removal but is applying for relief in the
form of withholding of removal and/or relief under the Convention Against Torture based on his fear of
being returned to China. (See Reply 4; Pet. ¶ 4.)
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4. 	Section 1226(a) applies and Li is entitled to a bond hearing.
Because Li is not seeking admission and section 1225(b)(2)(A) cannot justify his continued
detention without a bond hearing, section 1226(a)—which governs the detention of noncitizens
arrested within the country—applies. See Moya, 2026 WL 1481604, at *7; Jennings, 583 U.S. at
303 (“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.”). Accordingly, he is entitled
to a bond hearing before an IJ. See Moya, 202 WL 1481604, at *7 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Li was paroled into the United States under the CNMI-only parole program, and his parole
has terminated. Nevertheless, for the foregoing reasons, he is not “seeking admission” within the
meaning of the statutory provisions that would subject him to mandatory pre-removal detention.
Thus, the Court GRANTS Li’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for an
individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. Within fourteen (14) days of this order,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Respondents are directed to arrange an individualized bond hearing
before a neutral immigration judge in which the Government bears the burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that Li is a danger to the community or a flight risk if released. If
no hearing occurs within fourteen days of this order, Li shall be released from Respondents’
custody.
The Court further ORDERS Respondents to file a status report by July 3, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of June, 2026.
____________________________________
R AMONA V. M ANGLONA
Chief Judge
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