Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
REINEL MEDEROS-ORTEGA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00802-KG-JFR
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Reinel Mederos-Ortega’s Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 10. Petitioner proceeds pro se.
See Doc. 1 at 1. For the reasons below, the Court grants the petition.
I. Background
Petitioner, a Cuban citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 2022. Doc. 10
at 2. He applied for asylum, alleging he “suffered severe persecution and torture in Cuba.” Doc.
1 at 2. In August 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner after
he was “released from county jail on a pending criminal charge.” Id. An immigration judge
denied his asylum application and ordered him removed on October 27, 2025. Id. Petitioner
appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and that appeal remains
pending. Id. at 4.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
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available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court concludes that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Petitioner’s
detention, and (B) the proper remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden
of proof.
A. Section 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) establishes distinct detention regimes
depending on whether a noncitizen is “seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018). First, § 1225 governs noncitizens detained at a port of
entry or shortly after entry, who are treated as “[noncitizens] seeking admission into the
country.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Absent
exceptions not relevant here, § 1225 “mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu
Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.).
By contrast, § 1226(a) sets forth “the default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already in
the country.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Section § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and detention of
noncitizens, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General...pending a decision on whether [they
are] to be removed.” Under federal regulations, noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) are entitled
to individualized bond hearings at the “outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court finds that § 1226 governs here.1 See Barco Mercado v. Francis,
1 The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth Circuit decision holding that “[w]hile
[noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they are...seeking admission.” Buenrostro-
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2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide and
noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across
fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432; Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL 45288, at *2 (D.N.M.).
ICE detained Petitioner four years after his initial entry into the United States and did not
apprehend him at or near the border. While an immigration judge entered a final order of
removal, Petitioner has appealed the order to the BIA. Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory
detention provision does not apply because Petitioner effected an entry into the United States by
living here for years. Petitioner’s detention absent a bond hearing violates the INA.
B. The remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
Petitioner’s prolonged detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and
so he is entitled to a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof. Because
§ 1226(a) governs here, Petitioner’s “continued detention without [an individualized bond
hearing] constitutes an ongoing violation of [his] right to due process.” Cortez-Gonzalez v.
Noem, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1298 (D.N.M. 2025). Where detention proceeds without
constitutionally adequate safeguards, the Court determines what additional procedures are due
under the balancing framework set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See
Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001). That framework
considers (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under the
procedures used and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest,
including the burdens of additional procedures. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5 (5th Cir.). The Tenth Circuit has not yet
addressed this question.
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The Mathews factors weigh in favor of shifting the burden. To start, Petitioner’s private
interest in remaining free from detention is substantial. “Freedom from imprisonment...lies at
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
Second, the procedures in place create a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation.
Petitioner has submitted evidence demonstrating that he is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, but that evidence has not been meaningfully considered. And this failure is not
isolated. Courts have observed similar cases arising across the country, raising “serious concerns
about Petitioner’s access to a meaningful bond hearing.” Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F.
Supp. 3d 1231, 1243 (D.N.M. 2025) (collecting cases). Requiring the Government “to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk and/or a danger to the community
ameliorates those concerns.” Id.
Third, the Government’s interest does not outweigh these concerns. Although the
Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring appearance and protecting the community,
shifting the burden of proof imposes minimal additional burden. The Government has “vast
resources at its disposal to gather information about Petitioner’s eligibility for bond.” Id.
Moreover, detention has not been necessary to ensure Petitioner’s presence at immigration
proceedings—he had complied with all conditions of release to date.
IV. Conclusion
The Court therefore grants Petitioner’s habeas petition, Doc. 1. The Court directs the
Government to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before an immigration
judge within seven (7) days of this Order. At that hearing, the Government has the burden of
justifying Petitioner’s detention by clear and convincing evidence. If the Government fails to do
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so, it must release him. The Court further orders the Government to file a status report within ten
(10) business days of this Order confirming that it has complied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access
system.
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