Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
CARIDAD ALEMAN GONZALES,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 2:26-cv-00695-SMD-KK
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the
record, and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Caridad Aleman Gonzales, a citizen of Cuba, is currently in the custody of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otero County Processing Center in
Chapparal, New Mexico. Doc. 1 ¶ 4. Petitioner first entered the United States at a port of entry
in December of 2024. Doc. 7 at 2. Petitioner applied for admission and paroled pending review
of her application. Id. Petitioner continued to live in the United States without incident and in full
compliance with the terms of her release. Id. Petitioner appeared an immigration court hearing
on September 15, 2025. 	Id. 	The immigration judge dismissed Petitioner’s case and permitted
DHS to pursue expedited removal. Id. ICE arrested Petitioner that day and placed her in custody.
Id. 	Petitioner appealed that ruling and his appeal is pending before the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Id. Petitioner has now been in custody for over seven months. Id.
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the case caption shall be updated to reflect that Markwayne Mullin
is the Secretary of Homeland Security. All future filings should be in the name of the substituted party.
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DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
I. 	Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). 	Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
Mass. 2025); see also, Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
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Petitioner has resided in the United States since December of 2024 and was detained in the U.S.
interior. 	Doc. 7 at 2–3. 	She is therefore not subject to the mandatory detention provisions of
§ 1225, which apply to those seeking admission, specifically noncitizens who present at a port of
entry or are apprehended immediately after entering. Petitioner is instead entitled to a bond hearing
under § 1226(a). 	See Requejo Roman v. Castro, __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 125681, at *8
(D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1296 (D.N.M. 2025);
Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17,
2025); Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov.
14, 2025); Ayala v. Moniz, et al, __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 1031167, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 16,
2026); Wuilmer v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3236, 2026 WL 458457, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026);
Villatoro v. Ripa, No. 2:26-CV-00213, 2026 WL 452432, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2026).
II. 	The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates Her Fifth Amendment Rights.
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates her Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). 	“Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 	Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
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period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018).
The United States’ power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” 	See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and was deprived
of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
The Government has offered neither a justification nor a formal process for the deprivation
of Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. 	ICE detained Petitioner during a routine check-in
appointment, effectively penalizing the very compliance the agency required. 	While the Court
recognizes that the length of residency does not constitute legal authorization to remain in the
country, the prevailing interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226, both by this Court and a majority
of courts nationwide, indicates that noncitizens apprehended within the U.S. interior are entitled
to certain constitutional procedural safeguards. Petitioner has dutifully complied with immigration
court orders and there is no evidence that she is a flight risk nor a threat to the community. She
has now been in custody for over seven months without any prospect of removal. The likelihood
of removal is particularly low given that Petitioner is a citizen of Cuba. 	Morales-Fernandez v.
I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (“There is no contention that conditions in Cuba have
changed so that [petitioner]’s removal to Cuba is reasonably foreseeable.”).
The Government concedes that the material facts of this case are similar from those in
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Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026).
See Doc. 7 at 3. 	Furthermore, the Government acknowledges that Martin Ramirez controls the
outcome here should the Court adhere to that precedent. 	See id. 	Because Respondents have
offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to
§ 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869; Cortez-Gonzalez, 811 F. Supp. 3d at 1296.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) 	Respondents shall release Petitioner within 72 hours of this Order being entered;
3) 	Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by providing all necessary identity and travel documents to return to her primary
address;
4) 	Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
5) 	Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
6) 	Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which she
does not have a removal order without first providing her with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
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7) 	The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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