Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JAVIER SERRANO-MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
vs. 	Civ. No. 26-529 JB/JFR
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Field Office
Director the El Paso Field Office of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Enforcement and Removal Operations;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI,
U.S. Attorney General; Executive Office for
Immigration Review; DORA CASTRO, in her
Official Capacity as Warden of Otero County
Processing Center,
Respondents.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S PROPOSED FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 1
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Habeas Corpus,
filed February 24, 2026. Doc. 2. On February 25, 2026, Petitioner also filed a First Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order. Doc. 4. On March 9, 2026, the Federal Respondents filed a
Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.2 Doc. 8. On March 16, 2026, Petitioner
filed a Reply. Doc. 9. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the
Petition (Doc. 2) be GRANTED IN PART.
1 By an Order of Reference Relating to Immigration Habeas Corpus Proceedings filed March 16, 2026, the presiding
judge, United States District Judge James O. Browning, referred this matter to the undersigned to conduct hearings as
warranted and to perform any legal analysis required to recommend an ultimate disposition of the case. Doc. 10;
accord 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3); Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wood, 901 F.2d 849 (10 th Cir. 1990).
2 Counsel for the Federal Respondents do not represent the warden of the detention facility, as it is a private facility,
and the warden is not a federal employee. Doc. 8 at 1 n.1. However, all arguments made on behalf of the remaining
respondents would apply equally to the warden. Id.
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I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a 36 year old native and citizen of Honduras. Doc. 4 at 3, ¶ 5. He entered
the United States without inspection in or about 2006 and has continuously resided in the United
States for approximately 20 years. Id. Petitioner has no history of or encounters with
immigration. Doc. 2 at 6, ¶ 20. Petitioner was arrested in the interior of the United States on
January 11, 2026, and placed in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Doc. 2 at
2, ¶ 8. The Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear charging him as
removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). Doc. 4 at 3, ¶ 7. Respondents classified Petitioner as
an “applicant for admission” and detained and continue to detain him pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
¶ 1225(b). Id. After his arrest, Petitioner requested review of his custody by an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”). Doc. 2 at 6, ¶ 20. On February 11, 2026, Petitioner was denied bond by an IJ at the
El Paso Immigration Court because he was found subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) and the IJ therefore had no jurisdiction.
Id. In the alternative, the IJ found that “if jurisdiction were found to be proper, the court would
issue a bond in the amount of $5,000 with ATD. [Petitioner] does not present a danger to the
community nor a flight risk.” Id. (citing Exhibit 2). Petitioner is currently detained at the Otero
Processing Center under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Doc. 4 at 3, ¶ 8.
Petitioner argues that having resided in the United States since 2006 he is incorrectly
classified as an “applicant for admission” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and is being
unlawfully subjected to mandatory detention. Doc. 2 at 2, ¶ 1. Petitioner argues the Supreme
Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018), plainly states that 8 U.S.C. § 1226
applies to aliens like himself already in the United States. Id. at ¶ 2. Petitioner also seeks
enforcement of his rights as a member of the Bond Denial Class pursuant to Maldonado Bautista
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v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (order granting partial summary judgment to named Plaintiffs-
Petitioners), and Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (order certifying Plaintiffs-
Petitioners’ proposed nationwide Bond Eligible Class, incorporating and extending declaratory
judgment from Order Granting Petitioner’s’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). Doc. 2 at
2-3, at ¶ 4. In sum, Petitioner argues that Respondents are denying him his statutory rights under
the INA and rulings pursuant to Jennings and Maldonado Bautista by denying him a bond
hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1226(b)(2). Id. at 7, ¶ 6.
Petitioner seeks, inter alia, release within one day or, in the alternative, that Respondents
release Petitioner unless they allow Petitioner to post bond immediately under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within seven days. Doc. 2 at 8.
On March 6, 2026, the Court issued an Order to Answer.3 Doc. 6.
On March 9, 2026, Respondents filed their Answer. Doc. 8. Respondents begin by
stating that:
Petitioner is in a somewhat unusual position in that an Immigration Judge has
explicitly stated that, if it were not for his (the Immigration Judge’s) lack of
jurisdiction, he would grant Petitioner release on bond. Doc. 2-2. The Immigration
Judge was bound, at that time, by a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision
declaring that judges such as he lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief. That BIA
opinion has since been vacated.
3 In the Order to Answer, the Court ordered that Respondents are enjoined pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a), from transferring Petitioner outside the District of New Mexico while this proceeding is pending in order
to ensure the Court retains jurisdiction in this matter. Doc. 6 at 2.
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Doc. 8 at 1-2. Respondents nonetheless request this Court deny the Petition arguing that
Petitioner is correctly classified as an “applicant for admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
based on the plain language of that statute. Id. at 2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
Respondents argue that because Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States without
inspection and is currently without lawful status, he is subject to mandatory detention under
Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. at 6-10. Respondents argue that should the Court find that Section
1226, rather than Section 1225, applies to Petitioner, the subsequent relief, if any, would be to
return Petitioner to that status: classification under Section 1226 with eligibility for a bond
review in the normal course. Id. at 12. Respondents argue that the Court should not award
attorney fees pursuant to EAJA as their position is substantially justified. Id. at 13. Finally,
Respondents argue that Petitioner is not a member of the California Class because the
“December 18, 2025, partial final judgment in Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-1873 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 18, 2025), ECF No. 92, is neither binding nor applicable here and presents no independent
basis for granting the petition.” Id. at 14.
In his Reply, Petitioner contends that Respondents have failed to show that Petitioner is
legally detained, and this Court should grant the writ or order immediate release. Doc. 9 at 1.
Petitioner contends that “[b]y their own admission, Respondents agree that the authority used by
the Immigration Judge to deny Petitioner’s release has been vacated and the order of the
immigration judge granting Petitioner bond should be immediately reinstated.” Id. at 2.
Petitioner contends that:
[d]espite the vacatur, Respondents continue to detain Petitioner based solely on a
disputed statutory interpretation that would classify a noncitizen who has lived in
the United States for more than twenty years as an “applicant for admission” subject
to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). That interpretation is
inconsistent with the structure of the immigration detention statutes and the
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longstanding distinction between individuals seeking admission at the border and
those arrested in the interior of the United States.
Id.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The All Writs Act, as the name implies, provides federal courts with general authority to
“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (emphasis added). Available writs include, inter alia, mandamus, habeas corpus,
certiorari, quo warranto, and prohibition—antiquatedly termed “prerogative writs.” See
generally Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 716 (1993) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in
part) (“In English law, habeas corpus was one of the so-called ‘prerogative’ writs, which
included the writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.” (citations omitted)).
Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides federal courts the jurisdiction to grant a writ
of habeas corpus to “release from unlawful physical confinement,” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 485 (1973), a petitioner demonstrating “by a preponderance of the evidence,” Beeler v.
Crouse, 332 F.2d 783, 783 (10 th Cir. 1964) (per curiam), the existence of one of the five
circumstances enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Relevant here, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus raised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) seeks release from federal custody that is “in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .”
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(citing U.S. CONST . art. I, § 9, cl. 2). This includes immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004) (“[Noncitizen]
Petitioners contend that they are being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the
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United States. . . . Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more.”), judgment entered, No.
04A41, 2004 WL 7372970 (U.S. July 16, 2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
Broadly speaking, federal immigration law vests the Attorney General with two primary
sources of authority to detain noncitizens pending a decision on removability: 8 U.S.C. § 1225
and § 1226. The distinction between these provisions matters here because each establishes
materially different detention regimes and affords materially different procedural protections.
Section 1226 governs the detention of noncitizens who are already present in the United
States and are placed in removal proceedings. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303
(2018) (“[Section] 1226 applies to [noncitizens] already present in the United States” and
“creates a default rule for those aliens.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). With the exception of certain
narrowly defined provisions requiring detention of individuals with specified criminal history,
§ 1226 permits the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending a decision on removability or
to release them on bond or conditional parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B); § 1226(c)(1)–
(4); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (“1226(a) ... permit[s] ... but [does] not requir[e] ... the Attorney
General to issue warrants for [the] arrest and detention [of]” noncitizens already present in the
United States; “Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those [noncitizens]
on bond[.]”).
Section 1225, by contrast, governs the inspection and detention of certain “arriving
aliens” and other noncitizens seeking admission to the United States. See, e.g., §§ 1225(b)(1),
(b)(2)(A). Under § 1225(b), detention is generally mandatory and does not permit release on
bond or parole, subject to limited statutory exceptions. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV),
(b)(2)(A).
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Because the availability of release on bond turns entirely on which statutory provision
governs detention, the threshold question in this case is whether Petitioner is detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b) or § 1226(a). In line with other courts in this District and the overwhelming majority
of courts across jurisdictions, the Court agrees with Petitioner that § 1226(a) governs his
detention.4
When read within the context of the statutory and regulatory scheme governing
immigration detention, it is clear that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in circumstances not present here
— namely, to the inspection and detention of individuals seeking admission at or near the border.
See Gutierrez v. Garcia, Civ. No. 25-1145 WJ/KRS, 2026 WL 310064, at *3 (Feb. 5, 2026)
(examining and discussing relevant statutory text) (citing Tanchez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-1150,
2026 WL 125184, at *7 (D. Utah Jan. 16, 2026) (Ҥ 1225 applies to noncitizens at or near the
border who are entering or who have recently entered[.]”)). Within that context, properly
understood, Petitioner — who has lived in the United States for 20 years — and was
apprehended in the interior of the United States, is not subject to detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A).
By contrast, § 1226 governs detention once a noncitizen has been placed in removal
proceedings. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Petitioner has resided in the United States
for a substantial period of time prior to his apprehension and placement in removal proceedings.
He is not an individual apprehended at or near the border, nor is he properly characterized as an
4 See Gutierrez v. Garcia, Civ. No. 25-1145 WJ/KRS, 2026 WL 310064, at *5 (Feb. 5, 2026) (explaining that “[c]ourts
across jurisdictions have consistently rejected the proposition that current residents of the United States may be
retroactively reclassified as arriving aliens for purposes of mandatory detention under § 1225(b).”) (citing cases); see
also Ortiz v. Bondi, et al., Civ. No. 26-287 KG/JFR, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 7 at 2-3) (Feb. 20, 2026)
(citing Barco Mercado v. Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions
nationwide and noting that challengers opposing the government’s policy of mandatory detention of noncitizens
already present in the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) have prevailed in at least 350 of them in decisions
by over 160 judges across fifty courts)).
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arriving alien within the meaning of § 1225(b). Thus, Petitioner cannot be said to be “seeking
admission” to the United States so as to justify his detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Having established that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(a), the question
becomes what process is due. Here, Petitioner has presented a February 11, 2026, Order of the
Immigration Judge in which the IJ determined that Petitioner does not present a danger to the
community, is not a flight risk, and that but for the jurisdictional constraints imposed by the BIA
decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, a decision that has been vacated, he would order
Petitioner’s release with a “bond in the amount of 5,000 with ATD.” Notably, Respondents
concede that this BIA decision that purported to constrain the IJ’s jurisdiction has been vacated.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends as follows:
1. 	That Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2) be
GRANTED IN PART; 5
2. 	That Petitioner be immediately released pursuant to the alternative findings and
terms in the Order of the Immigration Judge (Exhibit 2);
3. 	That the parties submit a joint status report to the Court confirming Petitioner’s
release;
4. 	That the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 4) be DENIED AS
MOOT; and
5 Having found the Petitioner’s detention is governed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that he should be released
on bond pursuant to the February 11, 2026, Order of the Immigration Judge, the Court does not address Petitioner’s
class member argument.
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5. 	That Petitioner submit an application for costs and fees within 30 days of a final
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412, to which Respondents may reply within fourteen (14) days.
_____________________________________
JOHN F. ROBBENHAAR
United States Magistrate Judge
THE PARTIES ARE NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE of a copy of
these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may file written objections with
the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	A party must file any
objections with the Clerk of the District Court within the fourteen-day period if that party
wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings and recommended disposition. If
no objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
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