Enriquez v. Mesilla Valley Manufactured Housing Community, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ESTHER ENRIQUEZ, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case 2:26-cv-109-GBW-KRS
)
MESILLA VALLEY MANUFACTURED 	)
HOUSING COMMUNITY, LLC; and 	)
ROSEHILL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER TO AMEND NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE FEDERAL
COURT JURISDICTION
THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte upon its review of the Notice of Removal.
On December 3, 2025, Plaintiff Esther Enriquez filed a Complaint for Damages And Declaratory
Judgment (“Complaint”) in the Third Judicial District, Doña Ana County, New Mexico (Doc. 1-
1). On January 20, 2026, Defendants Mesilla Valley Manufactured Housing Community, LLC
(“Mesilla Valley”) and Rosehill Property Management, Inc. (“Rosehill”) removed the Complaint
to this Court, asserting federal court subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Doc. 1 at 1).
“Federal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party,’ and thus a court may sua
sponte raise the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction ‘at any stage in the
litigation.’” Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir.
2006) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). As the parties asserting federal
jurisdiction, Defendants bear the burden of adequately pleading, and ultimately proving, subject
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 1 of 12

2
matter jurisdiction. Anderson v. XTO Energy, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1275 (D.N.M. 2018).
Having considered Defendants’ jurisdictional allegations in the Notice of Removal (Doc. 1), the
applicable law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that the
Notice of Removal fails to include the necessary facts to plausibly allege diversity jurisdiction.
A. 	Citizenship of Mesilla Valley
Defendant Mesilla Valley is a limited liability company (“LLC”). See (Doc. 1 ¶ 15). A
limited liability company is a citizen of each and every state in which any member is a citizen.
Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C. v. Century Surety Co., 781 F.3d 1233, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2015). In
addition, “if any member of an unincorporated entity is itself an unincorporated entity, then the
[party asserting diversity jurisdiction] must identify that unincorporated entity’s members and
those members’ citizenship, tracing through however many layers necessary to reach either a
corporation or a natural person.” ADA Carbon Sols. (Red River), LLC v. Atlas Carbon, LLC, 146
F.4th 1296, 1304 (10th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Notice of Removal alleges that Mesilla Valley is comprised of three members: Great
Space, LLC, Oikos Investments Ltd, and Century Boulevard Corporation. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15). The
Notice of Removal adequately alleges that Century Boulevard Corporation is a citizen of Texas
because it is incorporated and has its principal place of business in that State. (Id. ¶15(c)). See 28
U.S.C.§ 1332(c)(1) (“a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by which it
has been incorporated and . . . where it has its principal place of business”).1 Great Space, LLC
and Oikos Investments Ltd, on the other hand, are business entities that each have their own
1 The Notice of Removal alleges that “the sole member of Century Boulevard Corporation” is Jarkesy Family
Partnership Ltd. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15(c)). However, a corporation does not have “members”; it has stockholders. And for
purposes of the diversity statute, the citizenship of each of a corporation’s stockholders is irrelevant. See 28
U.S.C.§ 1332(c)(1).
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 2 of 12

3
constituent members. The Notice of Removal alleges that Great Space is a limited liability
company whose membership is comprised of Jarkesy Family Partnership Ltd., the Miranda Pena
2022 Trust, the Netza Ivette Pena Jarkesy 2022 Trust, the Olivia Marie Jarkesy2022 Trust, and the
Maximus Aaron Jarkesy 2022 Trust. It alleges that the Jarkesy Family Partnership Ltd. is a limited
partnership the “membership” of which is comprised of George R. Jarkesy Jr., Oikos Investments
Ltd. and Jarkesy Venture, LLC. Jarkesy Venture, LLC’s sole member is George R. Jarkesy Jr.,
while Oikos Investment Ltd is a limited partnership whose “membership is comprised of George
R. Jarkesy Jr., the George Jarkesy III 2019 Trust, the Maximus Aaron Jarkesy 2019 Trust, and
Olivia Marie Jarkesy 2019 Trust.” (Doc. 1 at 5).
1. 	Citizenship of a Limited Partnership
The Notice of Removal refers to Oikos Investment Ltd and the Jarkesy Family Partnership
Ltd. as being comprised of “members.” The constituent entities of a limited partnership includes
general and limited partners, and its citizenship is determined by reference to both of those groups.
See Ross Dress For Less, Inc. v. Magness, Civ. No. 25-814 JHR/SCY, 2025 WL 2430422, at *2
(N.M.D. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Carden v. Arkoma Assocs.,494 U.S. 185, 185 (1990)). Because
the Court cannot tell from the reference to “members” whether the Notice of Removal has
identified all general and all limited partners of 	Oikos Investment Ltd and the Jarkesy Family
Partnership Ltd., Defendants will be required to file an amended Notice of Removal clarifying
those allegations.
2. 	Citizenship of a Trust
Most of the constituent members of Great Space, LLC and Oikos Investments Ltd. are
trusts, whose citizenship is alleged in the Notice of Removal based on the citizenship of the
trustees. “The citizenship of a traditional trust … depends only on the citizenship of its trustees.”
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 3 of 12

4
ADA Carbon Sols. (Red River), LLC, 146 F.4th at 1304. But an “entity’s membership is not
limit[ed] to its trustees just because the entity happens to call itself a trust.” Id. at 1305 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Unlike a traditional trust, a “non-traditional trust,” also
called a “business trust,” “takes the citizenship of all its members.” Id. “[T]o determine whether a
trust is traditional, courts must look to the laws of the state where the trust is formed, with the
primary consideration being whether the trust exists as a fiduciary relationship or as a separate
legal entity. … [T]o determine a non-traditional trust’s members, courts must again look to state
law to ascertain who is in the same position as those who have been designated members of other
unincorporated entities, such as partners, shareholders, or others with ownership interests.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Notice of Removal does not allege any information from which the Court can
determine if the trusts in question are traditional or business trusts.2 As the Tenth Circuit explained:
Neither 	party 	… 	provided 	any 	information 	about 	the 	proper
classification of the four trusts under state law. Without information
about the trusts’ designations or their beneficiaries, it is impossible
to 	determine 	their 	respective 	citizenships. 	If 	these 	trusts 	are
traditional trusts, they take the citizenship of only their trustees. But
if these trusts are non-traditional trusts, then they take the citizenship
of all of their members—like any unincorporated entity would—
which may or may not include the trusts’ beneficiaries, depending
on the particularities of the trusts under applicable state law.
Consequently, we have no way of knowing the trusts’ citizenships.
Id. at 1306.3
2 “The rules for determining citizenship do not change depending on whether a trust is embedded within another
business entity.” ADA Carbon Sols. (Red River), LLC, 146 F.4th at 1306 (quoting GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt.
Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 41 (3d Cir. 2018)). Thus, “a trust takes the citizenship of all its members regardless of the
trust’s position within an unincorporated entity’s ownership structure.” Id. at 1307.
3 The Tenth Circuit took “no position on how to determine the membership of non-traditional trusts” because it
“lack[ed] briefing as well as a lower court decision on the issue.” ADA Carbon Sols. (Red River), LLC, 146 F.4th at
1306 n.5. Instead, the court left the issue “to the district court to consider in the first instance, if necessary,” while also
“not[ing] that the Supreme Court in Americold looked to state law to determine who the business trust’s members are
and determined that the trust’s members included its beneficiaries.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded, “at the very
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 4 of 12

5
Defendants must amend the Notice of Removal to allege sufficient information from which
the Court can determine whether the trusts named in the Notice of Removal are traditional trusts
or business trusts. If the trusts are business trusts, then the amended Notice of Removal must
additionally allege the facts necessary under state law for identifying the “members” of those
trusts, which likely would include at least identifying the beneficiaries of each of the trusts. The
amended Notice of Removal would then have to provide the necessary information for determining
the citizenship of each of the trust members, including the beneficiaries.
3. 	Citizenship of Individuals
To the extent that any LLC members, LP partners, or Trustees named in the Notice of
Removal are individuals, the Notice of Removal improperly alleges their citizenship by
referencing where each individual resides. See (Doc. 1 ¶ 15). For diversity-jurisdiction purposes,
citizenship is determined by a person’s domicile, and a person’s domicile is defined as the place in
which the party has a residence in fact and an intent to remain indefinitely, as of the time of the
filing of the lawsuit. See Crawley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 776, 678 (10th Cir. 1983). “[A]n allegation
that a party ... is a resident of a state is not equivalent to an allegation of citizenship and is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the District Court.” Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C., 781 F.3d
at 1238.4 As the Tenth Circuit recently explained:
While “[r]esidence alone is not the equivalent of citizenship,” the
“place of residence is prima facie [evidence of] domicile.” However,
as we have explained, “the prima facie case flowing from an
least, beneficiaries of non-traditional trusts are relevant to the jurisdictional analysis in some circumstances.” Id.
(discussing Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378 (2016)).
4 See also Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The allegations in Travaglio’s complaint
about her citizenship are fatally defective. Residence alone is not enough.”); Simon v. Taylor, 455 F. App’x 444, 446
(5th Cir. 2011) (“an allegation that the parties are ‘residents’ of particular states is insufficient to provide the court
with diversity jurisdiction”); Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[A]llegations of mere
‘residence’ may not be equated with ‘citizenship’ for the purposes of establishing diversity.”); Kantrow v. Celebrity
Cruises Inc., 533 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1215 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (citing additional cases).
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 5 of 12

6
allegation of residence must be backed up by a district court finding,
at some later point in the proceeding, as to the existence of diversity
at the time of the filing of the complaint.”
ADA Carbon Sols. (Red River), LLC, 146 F.4th at 1303 n.3 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994), and Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C., 781 F.3d at 1235)).
To avoid any jurisdictional doubts down the road, the Court will require Defendants, when they
file an amended Notice of Removal, to properly allege citizenship of individuals by reference to
their domicile rather than residence.5
B. 	Amount in Controversy
“[A] defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount
in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,
574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). Plausibility may turn on allegations in the complaint and/or information
provided in the notice of removal. See Buscema v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, 485 F. Supp. 3d 1319,
1328 (D.N.M. 2020) (“When a complaint does not state a specific amount in controversy, a
defendant’s notice of removal may do so.” (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 84 (citing
§ 1446(c)(2)(A))). In the absence of an explicit demand in the complaint for more than $75,000.00,
or specific factual allegations from which an actual calculation can be performed, the removing
defendant must show how much is in controversy through other means, such as “interrogatories or
admissions in state court; … informal estimates or settlement demands[;] or …. evidence, in the
form of affidavits from the defendant’s employees or experts, about how much it would cost to
satisfy the plaintiff’s demands.” McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 955 (10th Cir. 2008)
5 See, e.g., Sample v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., No. 25CV984 JFR/SCY, 2025 WL 2926893, at *2 (D.N.M. Oct.
15, 2025) (“There being no other proof in the record indicating citizenship, an allegation of ‘residency’ and not
‘citizenship’ is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court.” (citing Vincent v. Nelson, 51 F.4th 1200, 1211-12 (10th
Cir. 2022) (complaint alleging residency was insufficient to confer jurisdiction); and McEntire v. Kmart Corp., No.
09cv567 JB/LAM, 2010 WL 553443, at *8 (D.N.M. Feb. 9, 2010) (collecting cases discussing requirement to amend
notice of removal))).
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 6 of 12

7
(quoting Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Roe v. Michelin
N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that in some cases, the removing
defendant may need “to provide additional evidence demonstrating that removal is proper”)). Once
the removing defendant has plausibly alleged the amount in controversy, evidence “establishing
jurisdiction [is not] required,” unless “the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s
[plausible] allegation[s].” Brown v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 21-4122, 2023 WL 4174064, at *4
(10th Cir. June 26, 2023) (unpublished) (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89, and McPhail, 529
F.3d at 955). If a challenge is made, “the ‘party invoking diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of
proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Middleton v. Stephenson,
749 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2014)).
The state court complaint alleges that Plaintiff was told that she could purchase a mobile
home for $10,800, with a $2,500 down payment, and monthly payments thereafter towards the
purchase price of $385 plus an additional $465 per month to lease the mobile home space. (Doc.
1-1 at 2 (Complt, ¶10)). Plaintiff allegedly paid the $2,500 in cash, and moved into the home, after
which she made payments for repairs, including trying to fix an air conditioner and having the
house leveled. (Id. at 3 (Complt. ¶¶ 11, 21)). Plaintiff alleges she tried on several occasions to make
her monthly payments, but she was rejected each time. (Id. (Complt. ¶ 22)). She alleges that she
was then informed that she did not have a contract, and that she needed to submit an application
and pay a $45 application fee. (Id. at 4 (Complt. ¶ 23)). The complaint alleges claims and
unspecified damages for breach of contract; breach of implied warranty; violations of the
Manufactured Housing Act and the Unfair Practices Act (UPA); and fraud.
From these allegations, it appears that Plaintiff is out-of-pocket $2,500 plus the costs of the
repairs. Notwithstanding these relatively minimal out-of-pocket losses, the Notice of Removal
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 7 of 12

8
asserts that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied because the complaint seeks attorneys’ fees,
punitive damages, and/or treble damages. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 20-22). “In determining whether the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, a court may aggregate actual damages, punitive damages,
attorney’s fees, and statutorily imposed penalties.” Wiatt v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 560 F. Supp. 2d
1068, 1075 (D.N.M. 2007) (internal citations omitted). For the court to consider punitive damages
and/or or statutorily imposed penalties such as treble damages, they must be “recoverable as a
matter of governing substantive law” and the plaintiff’s allegations must include some facts from
which entitlement to punitive damages or statutory penalties can be plausibly inferred. See id.
“Attorney’s fees may be considered if a contract provides for them or if a statute mandates or
allows their payment.” Id.
Although the Notice of Removal does not provide any explanation, or point to the
necessary supporting factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court will assume that
Plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleges entitlement to punitive damages, treble damages, and
attorney’s fees under state law and/or any applicable contract. Nevertheless, it is “well settled that
vaguely listing categories of damage does not satisfy a removing defendant’s burden of
establishing the amount in controversy.” Warren v. Wild 1, Inc., No. CV 24-00471-KD-B, 2025
WL 980081, at *11 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2025) (citing cases), report and recommendation adopted,
No. CV 24-00471-KD-B, 2025 WL 978398 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2025); see also Gamboa v.
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., No. CV 23-5843, 2024 WL 147852, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 12,
2024) (“pleading general categories of damages, ... without any indication of the amount of the
damages sought, does not provide sufficient information for the removing defendant to meet his
burden of proving that the amount in controversy is satisfied under the facially apparent test”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Further, “[w]hen the amount in controversy
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 8 of 12

9
depends largely on alleged punitive damages, the court ‘will scrutinize a claim ... more closely
than a claim for actual damages to ensure Congress’s limits on diversity jurisdiction are properly
observed.’” Lange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. SACV08-1466DOC(RZX), 2009 WL
322835, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) (quoting McCorkindale v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 909
F. Supp. 646, 655 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).
Defendants have asserted that punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees
plausibly exceed $75,000.00 without any reference to the amount of compensatory damages at
stake in the case. With Plaintiff alleging facts showing that her out-of-pocket damages are only
$2,500 plus repairs—“well shy of the minimum jurisdictional amount”—it is far from apparent
that even if the Court considers the cited categories of damages, the amount in controversy would
exceed $75,000.00. Wiatt, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. Treble damages would add an additional $7,500
plus the trebled cost of repairs to Plaintiff’s potential compensatory recovery of $2,500 plus the
cost of repairs. And it seems highly unlikely that if punitive damages are recoverable in addition
to treble damages,6 those damages could exceed more than at most ten times the compensatory
damages,7 which would be an additional $25,000 for Plaintiff’s down-payment loss. Even if
6 “In Hale v. Basin Motor Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that section 57–12–10(D) [of the UPA]
allowed a prevailing claimant to be awarded treble damages under the UPA, as well as punitive damages if a separate
common law theory of liability is proved. 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006, 1012 (N.M.1990). To prevent double recovery,
the party must then elect to accept either the award of treble damages or the compensatory plus punitive damages
award. Id. If the party’s combined award of compensatory and punitive damages is greater than the trebled damages
under the UPA, the party has the option of taking the greater punitive damages award.” Woodmen of World Life Ins.
Soc’y v. Manganaro, 342 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003).
7 Although “[t]here is no statutory limit to the amount of punitive damages a plaintiff may request,” nor are there any
“specific guidelines this court can cite,” the Court of Appeals of New Mexico … cited the analysis set forth in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), which requires a court ‘to look at 1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the conduct; 2) the ratio of the punitive award to the actual harm inflicted on plaintiff; and 3) a comparison between
the punitive award and other sanctions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.’ The New Mexico court
further stated that ‘[i]n economic injury cases, if the damages are significant and the injury not hard to detect, the ratio
of punitive damages to the harm generally should not exceed ten to one.’” Burrell v. Burrell, 229 F.3d 1162, 2000 WL
1113702, at *2 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (quoting Weidler v. Big J Enterprises, Inc., 124 N.M.
591, 603, 953 P.2d 1089, 1101, 1102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 9 of 12

10
Plaintiff spent an equal amount on repairs—not very likely—multiplying that amount by ten would
result in a total punitive damages award of only $50,000, an insufficient amount when added to
the alleged out-of-pocket losses to put the total amount in controversy over the jurisdictional limit.
Even though the Court could add to that total an amount for attorney’s fees, “Defendant[s]
provide[ ] the Court with no evidence to suggest that attorney’s fees … would bring the amount in
controversy above the jurisdictional threshold.” Scheidt v. MHM Health Pros., LLC, No. 1:23-CV-
00346-DHU-KK, 2024 WL 1256979, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar. 25, 2024). In short, “to arrive at a figure
that satisfies the jurisdictional threshold, the Court would be required to speculate. It is the
Defendant[s’] burden to provide the Court with sufficient information, and in regard to [treble
and/or punitive damages, and] reasonable attorney’s fees to be added to Plaintiff’s damages,
Defendant[s] ha[ve] not provided a reasonable estimate.” Id.8
The Court is permitted “to make ‘reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other
reasonable extrapolations’ from the pleadings” and “may use [its] judicial experience and common
sense in determining whether the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional
requirements.” Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061-62. But “that is not an invitation to speculate as to whether
the requisite amount in controversy is facially apparent.” Vail v. Smarterfuel S., LLC, Civil Action
8 See also Medina on behalf of Medina v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., No. CV 24-767 GBW/KRS, 2024 WL 5087557, at
*3 (D.N.M. Dec. 12, 2024) (“Defendant offers no other evidence to support removal outside of the Complaint's
allegations and prayers for relief.”); Sanchez v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. CV 14-222 MCA/KBM, 2014 WL
12791244, at *4 (D.N.M. May 15, 2014) (where the defendant’s Notice of Removal did not refer to the criteria for
awarding punitive damages, or allege underlying facts that would allow the court to estimate a range of punitive
damages that would be recoverable and sustainable under New Mexico law under the facts of the case); Hoffman v.
McCarthy, No. 12-CV-01609-PAB, 2012 WL 2501098, at *1 (D. Colo. June 27, 2012) (where defendant did not
suggest what monetary value the Court should attach to plaintiff’s requested categories of damages, and also noting
that the plaintiff sought attorney’s fees but did not provide any estimate of what those fees might be, citing Nagim v.
Abraham, No. 11-CV-00729-CMA-MEH, 2011 WL 1211394, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (where the plaintiff
sought $25,000 in damages plus punitive damages, and the defendants “merely allude[d] to the unspecified amount of
punitive damage” without pointing to any underlying facts, objective evidence, or factual or economic analysis, from
which the court could determine in a non-speculative manner that the amount of punitive damages could potentially
be enough to reach the jurisdictional minimum) (internal citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No.
11-CV-00731-REB-MEH, 2011 WL 1899781 (D. Colo. May 19, 2011))).
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 10 of 12

11
No. 13–00277–KD–N, 2013 WL 5373525, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2013); see also Medina, 2024
WL 5087557, at 2 (“While a defendant may refer to the substance and nature of the injuries and
damages described in the pleadings to meet their burden, vague and general allegations may be
insufficient grounds for the court to find, without resorting to speculation, that the amount in
controversy has been satisfied.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “Nothing in [the
complaint’s] sparse allegations and generic list of unspecified damages makes it clear that the
amount in controversy reaches the jurisdictional amount.” Warren, 2025 WL 980081, at *11.
Without any “specific factual support for [Defendants’] assertion,” Wiatt, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1079,
that the aggregate amount of treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees would exceed
$75,000.00, the Court is unable to determine that Defendants have plausibly alleged the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied such that removal was proper.
When faced with insufficient allegations in a notice of removal, courts generally will grant
the removing defendants leave to amend their notice of removal to cure “the errors in some of the
formalistic technical requirements.” Quintana v. Yost, No. Civ 17-0701 JB/JHR, 2018 WL
3849881, at *4 (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 2018). ACCORDINGLY, Defendants are ordered to file, on or
before February 13, 2026, an amended notice of removal correcting the deficient jurisdictional
allegations identified above. If Defendants are unable to allege federal court jurisdiction as set
forth herein, the Court may recommend that the case be remanded. See Brown, 2023 WL 4174064,
at *3 (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 11 of 12

12
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of January, 2026.
________________________________
KEVIN R. SWEAZEA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 2:26-cv-00109-KG-KRS Document 4 Filed 01/27/26 Page 12 of 12