Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
FARIZ NAGHIYEV,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 2:25-cv-1313 MIS/DLM
PAM BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Fariz Naghiyev’s Amended Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 5.) Petitioner challenges his
continued detention following a final order of removal, asserting that his confinement under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a) has become unlawful because removal is not reasonably foreseeable. He also
requests additional relief, including issuance of a Social Security number and work authorization.
Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the
Amended Petition be GRANTED IN PART to the extent Petitioner seeks release under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a) and DENIED IN PART to the extent he seeks relief outside the scope of habeas review.1
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is a 32‑year‑old native and citizen of Azerbaijan. (See Docs. 5 at 9–14; 8 at 2; 8-
1 at 1; 8-2 at 1–2.) On February 15, 2025, he attempted to enter the United States at the Hidalgo
Port of Entry in Hidalgo, Texas. (See Doc. 8‑1 at 1; Doc. 8‑2 at 1–2.) Upon arrival at the border,
Petitioner presented himself to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers and requested
1 On January 6, 2026, United States District Judge Margaret I. Strickland entered an Order of Reference referring this
case to the undersigned “to conduct hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal
analysis required to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case.” (Doc. 3.)
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asylum. (See Doc. 8‑2 at 2–3.) CBP determined that Petitioner was inadmissible under Section
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and processed him for expedited
removal with a credible‑fear referral.2 (See id.) Petitioner was then turned over to custody of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for detention. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner has no criminal
history. (Id. at 1.)
Petitioner is currently detained at the Otero County Processing Center (OCPC) in
Chaparral, New Mexico. (Docs. 5 at 1; 8-1 at 1.) On July 10, 2025, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled. (See Doc. 8‑1 at 1.)
On August 19, 2025, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found Petitioner removable as charged
under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, denied asylum and statutory withholding, and granted
withholding of removal to Azerbaijan under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). (See Docs. 8
at 2; 8‑3 at 1.) The IJ’s written order reflects that Petitioner waived appeal on the record that same
day. (See Doc. 8-3 at 4.) DHS reserved appeal but did not file one. (Id.; see also Doc. 8 at 2.)
Petitioner has remained continuously detained since February 15, 2025. (See Docs. 5 at 1;
8 at 2.) He asserts that despite the IJ’s grant of CAT withholding, DHS has not identified any third
country willing to accept him, has not provided a timeline for removal, and has not obtained travel
documents. (See Docs. 5 at 6; 9 at 1–2.) Respondents state that “DHS is pursuing removal to a
third country.” (Doc. 8 at 2.)
2 DHS’s Form I‑831 reflects that CBP found Petitioner inadmissible under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA and
processed him for expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (See Doc. 8‑2 at 2.) Petitioner was later charged
under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA. (See Docs. 8‑1 at 1; 8-3 at 1.) The undersigned cites each statutory provision
in the context in which it was applied.
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On January 7, 2026, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (See Doc. 5 at
6.) He seeks immediate release from ICE custody with rights to legally work in the United States,
including a Social Security Number and a work permit. (Id. at 7.) Respondents filed their response
in opposition on January 27, 2026. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner filed his Reply on February 10, 2026. (Doc.
9.) The matter is now fully briefed and ready for disposition.
II. 	Legal Standard
Federal courts possess longstanding authority to review the legality of executive detention
through the writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 expressly authorizes courts to issue a writ of
habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Tenth Circuit has recognized that “[c]hallenges
to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort,
388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
The fundamental purpose of a § 2241 habeas corpus proceeding is to allow a detainee to
challenge the legality of his custody and to secure release from unlawful detention. See
Palma‑Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012). Because Petitioner challenges the
legality of his continued detention, his claim falls squarely within the scope of § 2241.
No party has identified any factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing, and the issues
presented are purely legal and fully briefed. As such, the existing record is sufficient to resolve the
habeas petition.
III. 	Discussion
Petitioner challenges the legality of his continued post‑order detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a), asserting that DHS has detained him for nearly a year without demonstrating any
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significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. (See Docs. 5 at 1, 6; 9 at 1–
2.) Petitioner also notes that DHS has not identified any country willing to accept him, has not
obtained travel documents, and has not provided any concrete timeline for effectuating removal.
(See Docs. 5 at 6; 9 at 1–2.)
Respondents counter that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2)
because his removal order became final on September 19, 2025, and that his Zadvydas claim is
premature because the six‑month presumptively reasonable period has not yet elapsed. (See Doc.
8 at 1–2, 5–6.) Respondents also assert, without evidentiary support, that DHS is “pursuing
removal to a third country” and that removal is “imminent.” (Id. at 2, 6.)
For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s removal order
became administratively final on August 19, 2025, when he waived appeal, and his prolonged
detention raises a genuine claim under Zadvydas. The record also demonstrates good reason to
believe removal is not reasonably foreseeable. The undersigned therefore addresses (1) the date on
which Petitioner’s removal order became final, and (2) whether Petitioner has met his burden under
Zadvydas to show that continued detention is no longer reasonably related to its immigration
purpose.
A. 	Petitioner’s removal order became final on August 19, 2025, when he waived
appeal.
The undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final
on August 19, 2025, the date on which he expressly waived appeal, and the government’s reliance
on later dates is inconsistent with the governing regulation and the record. Under the INA’s
regulation, an IJ’s removal order becomes final when any of the following events occur:
(a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals;
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(b) Upon waiver of appeal by the respondent;
(c) Upon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file
an appeal within that time;
(d) If certified to the Board or Attorney General, upon the date of the subsequent
decision ordering removal;
(e) If an immigration judge orders an alien removed in the alien's absence,
immediately upon entry of such order; or
(f) If an immigration judge issues an alternate order of removal in connection with
a grant of voluntary departure, upon overstay of the voluntary departure period, or
upon the failure to post a required voluntary departure bond within 5 business days.
If the respondent has filed a timely appeal with the Board, the order shall become
final upon an order of removal by the Board or the Attorney General, or upon
overstay of the voluntary departure period granted or reinstated by the Board or the
Attorney General.
8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (emphasis added).3
The record reflects that Petitioner affirmatively waived appeal on August 19, 2025, the
same day the IJ issued the decision in the removal proceedings. (See Doc. 8‑3 at 4.) Under
§ 1241.1(b), that waiver made the removal order administratively final as of that date, without the
need to wait for the 30‑day appeal period to run. Courts routinely recognize that waiver of appeal
renders an IJ’s removal order administratively final on the date of the waiver. See, e.g., Jumadar
v. Castro, No. 2:26-cv-0159 KG/JMR, 2026 WL 392424, at *1 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026) (removal
order “administratively final” where petitioner “waived his right to appeal”); Hmung v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-1303-J, 2025 WL 3657221, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 9, 2025) (waiver “made the decision
administratively final”); Safari v. Warden, No. 3:26-cv-41 CCB/SJF, 2026 WL 507367, at *2
3 In § 1241.1, the term “respondent” refers to the noncitizen who was the respondent in the immigration‑court
proceedings. This usage is distinct from the “Respondents” named in the caption of this federal habeas action, who
are the government officials responsible for Petitioner’s detention. (See Doc. 8‑3 at 1 (identifying Petitioner as the
“Respondent” in the removal proceedings).)
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(N.D. Ind. Feb. 23, 2026) (order “became final . . . when he waived his right to an appeal”); Zhe
v. Green, No. 17-cv-7182 KM, 2017 WL 4407934, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2017) (same).
The government nonetheless asserts that the order did not become final until September
19, 2025, the date listed as the appeal deadline. (See Doc. 8 at 2 (citing Doc. 8‑3 at 4).) But
subsection (c) governs only when none of the other bases for finality apply, including waiver of
appeal by the noncitizen. Notably, Respondents themselves acknowledge elsewhere in their brief
that a removal order “may also become final when an alien waives appeal[,]” citing the same
regulation. (Doc. 8 at 3 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1).) Here, Petitioner, the “respondent” in the
removal proceedings, expressly waived appeal on the record. (See Doc. 8-3 at 1, 4.) The regulation
is clear: finality attaches upon waiver by the noncitizen, not upon the expiration of the appeal
period. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(b).
Nor does anything in the record support the government’s assertion that the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) January 8, 2026 “return without action” somehow confirmed or
triggered finality. (See Doc. 8 at 5–6.) Respondents cite no exhibit reflecting such an order, and
the record contains no BIA filing dated January 8, 2026—or any BIA filing at all. The only
document addressing appeal rights is the IJ’s August 19, 2025 order, which expressly states that
Petitioner, in this case, waived appeal. (See Doc. 8‑3 at 4.) Respondents’ brief also suggests that
Petitioner “withdrew his appeal,” but that characterization is inconsistent with the IJ’s order and
unsupported by any citation to the record. (Doc. 8 at 6.) Because the record reflects a waiver—not
a withdrawal—and because Respondents identify no BIA action affecting when the order became
final, the undersigned finds no basis to depart from § 1241.1(b)’s rule that the order became final
on August 19, 2025. Once Petitioner waived appeal on August 19, 2025, the order was final for
purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
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Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s removal order became final on August
19, 2025, and the removal period—and any analysis under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001)—must be calculated from that date.
B. 	Petitioner’s continued detention is unlawful under Zadvydas.
Petitioner’s continued detention is unlawful because he has been held beyond the
six‑month presumptively reasonable period and the record establishes that his removal is not
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents have not carried their burden
to show otherwise.
Post-removal detention is generally governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), which mandates
detention “[a]fter entry of a final removal order.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(2)). Pursuant to the INA, the Government must remove a noncitizen from the United
States within a 90-day removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During the 90-day removal
period, the noncitizen must be detained. Id. § 1231(a)(2). The removal period begins when the
removal order “becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). If ICE does not remove
the noncitizen within the 90-day removal period, the noncitizen “shall be subject to supervision
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3).
The Government may detain a noncitizen beyond the initial 90‑day removal period only
for the time “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699; see also
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Detention for six months is “presumptively reasonable.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 701. Once that period passes, a detainee need only “provide[] good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” at which point
the burden shifts to the Government to rebut that showing with evidence. Id. This framework
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applies equally to inadmissible and arriving noncitizens. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386
(2005).
As explained above, Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on August
19, 2025, when he waived appeal. His detention is therefore governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). The
six‑month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas therefore expired on February 19,
2026. Petitioner has now been detained beyond the six‑month presumptively reasonable period
since his removal order became final—and for more than one year in total. Respondents do not
dispute the length of detention. The question, then, is whether Petitioner has shown good reason
to believe that his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and
whether Respondents have rebutted that showing.
1. 	Petitioner has shown good reason to believe removal is not reasonably
foreseeable.
Petitioner asserts that DHS has not identified any country willing to accept him, has not
obtained travel documents, and has not provided any timeline for effectuating removal. (See Docs.
5 at 6; 9 at 1–2.) Respondents do not dispute these assertions. They identify no accepting country,
no pending travel‑document request, and no communication with any foreign government. They
provide no declaration from an ICE officer, no evidence of outreach to any consulate, and no
documentation of repatriation efforts.
This absence of evidence constitutes “good reason to believe” that removal is not
reasonably foreseeable. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Courts in this district have repeatedly held
that prolonged detention, combined with failed or nonexistent removal efforts, satisfies the
petitioner’s initial burden. See Lorenzo v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-0923 KWR/GJF, 2026 WL 84521,
at *5–6 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2026) (no reasonably foreseeable removal where DHS had contacted
only one country and received no response); Jimenez Chacon v. Lyons, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No.
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2:25-cv-0977 DHU/KBM, 2025 WL 3496702, at *7 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025) (no reasonably
foreseeable removal where DHS had contacted multiple countries without success and could not
identify any accepting country); Salazar‑Martinez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-0961 KG/KBM, 2025
WL 3204807, at *2 (D.N.M. Nov. 17, 2025) (pending third‑country requests without concrete
progress insufficient).
Here, the record is even thinner: Respondents have not shown that they contacted any
country.
2. 	Respondents have not rebutted Petitioner’s showing.
Once Petitioner made his initial showing, the burden shifts to Respondents to produce
evidence demonstrating a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Respondents have not done so.
Their only assertion is that removal is “imminent.” (Doc. 8 at 6.) They cite no exhibit,
provide no declaration, and identify no factual basis for this claim. Courts in this district have
emphasized that speculative assertions or minimal removal efforts do not establish a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Izbitski v. Carnes, No. 1:25-cv-
0778 JB/JMR, 2026 WL 102974, at *7–8 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2026) (government’s single request for
travel documents and vague references to continued efforts insufficient where “nothing in the
record suggests that removal is imminent” and no accepting country identified); Lorenzo, 2026
WL 84521, at *5 (government’s claim that petitioner was “on the cusp” of removal unsupported
where no accepting country identified and no evidence of progress).
Respondents also suggest that Petitioner “withdrew his appeal,” but once again, that
assertion is contradicted by the IJ’s order and unsupported by any citation to the record. (See Docs.
8 at 6; 8‑3 at 4.) Respondents appear to invoke this mischaracterization to imply that an appeal
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existed and delayed the finality of the removal order, and that DHS could not pursue removal
efforts until the appeal was supposedly withdrawn. But the record contains no evidence of any
such appeal or any resulting impediment to removal efforts.
Because 	Respondents 	have 	not 	identified 	any 	accepting 	country, 	any 	pending
travel‑document request, or any concrete progress toward removal, they have not rebutted
Petitioner’s showing.
Under Zadvydas, detention is permissible only so long as it remains reasonably related to
its immigration purpose—i.e., effectuating removal. See 533 U.S. at 699–701. After the six‑month
presumptively reasonable period, detention is lawful only if the Government can show that
removal remains significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 701. And where,
as here, the Government cannot identify any viable removal route, continued detention is no longer
authorized. See, e.g., Jimenez Chacon, 2025 WL 3496702, at *7 (“the remote prospect of removal[
]to 	a hypothetical 	third 	country 	. 	. 	. 	does 	not 	make removal 	reasonably 	foreseeable”);
Salazar‑Martinez, 2025 WL 3204807, at *2 (“mere possibility of repatriation . . . without concrete
progress, is insufficient to justify continued detention”).
Because Petitioner has shown good reason to believe that his removal is not significantly
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, and because Respondents have not rebutted that
showing, his continued detention violates § 1231(a). The undersigned therefore recommends that
Petitioner 	be released 	under 	appropriate conditions 	of 	supervision 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(3).
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C. 	Petitioner’s requests for a Social Security number and work authorization are
outside the scope of habeas review.
Petitioner also seeks an order directing the issuance of a Social Security number, work
authorization, and related benefits. (See Doc. 5 at 7.) These requests fall outside the scope of relief
available in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The purpose of habeas corpus is
to challenge the legality of custody and to secure release from unlawful detention; it does not
provide a vehicle to obtain collateral immigration benefits or authorization to work in the United
States. See Palma‑Salazar, 677 F.3d at 1035 (“the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody”) (quoting McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th
Cir. 1997)). The Supreme Court has likewise emphasized that habeas corpus cannot be used “to
claim the right to . . . remain in a country or to obtain administrative review potentially leading to
that result[,]” because “[t]he writ simply provide[s] a means of contesting the lawfulness of
restraint and securing release.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 117
(2020).
Because Petitioner’s requests for a Social Security number, work authorization, and other
benefits do not relate to the legality of his custody, they fall outside the scope of habeas relief. The
undersigned therefore recommends that this portion of the Amended Petition be denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the following:
1. 	Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED
IN PART to the extent he seeks release from immigration custody. Petitioner
should be released immediately under appropriate conditions of supervision
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), subject to any additional terms and conditions
the Court may deem appropriate.
2. 	Petitioner’s request for additional relief—namely, an order directing the issuance
of a Social Security number, work authorization, or any other benefits—is outside
the scope of habeas review and should be DENIED.
3. 	The Court should ORDER Respondents to file a status report within seven days of
the Court’s order confirming Petitioner’s release and compliance with the Court’s
directives.
THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE of a
copy of these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may file written objections
with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party must file any
objections with the Clerk of the District Court within the 14-day period if that party wants
to have appellate review of the proposed findings and recommended disposition. If no
objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
_______________________________________
DAMIAN L. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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