Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
LILI XIMENA MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:25-cv-01294-KG-JFR
DORA CASTRO, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Lili Ximena Martinez Rodriguez’s 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 habeas petition, Doc. 1, Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”),
Doc. 2, and the Government’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 14. For the reasons below, the motion to
dismiss is denied, the habeas petition is granted, and the TRO motion is denied as moot.
I. Background
Petitioner, a 38-year-old Colombian citizen, entered the United States in 2022 with her
husband and daughter. Doc. 1 at 2. She arrived without inspection intending to apply for asylum
and was paroled discretionarily by the government in December 2022 with her family. Id. at 7.
She later filed an asylum claim contending that she needed to escape from an abusive and violent
relationship in Colombia. Id. Her asylum claim remains pending. Petitioner was apparently
charged with shoplifting in January 2023, but the charges were ultimately dismissed in
November 2023; the record does not indicate where the charges were filed. Doc. 14 at 3.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner without notice
or a hearing on November 18, 2025, while she was attending an asylum interview. Doc. 1 at 2.
She has been detained since that date, first in New Jersey, then in Texas, and now in New
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Mexico at the Otero County Processing Center. Id.
Petitioner filed a habeas petition and ex parte TRO motion with this Court on December
23, 2025, arguing that her redetention without a predeprivation hearing violates the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”) and due process principles. Docs. 1–2. She seeks a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 at which the Government bears the burden of proof. Id.
The Court held a TRO hearing on January 5, 2025. At the hearing, the Government
appeared and argued that the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because
Petitioner requested and received a bond hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) on
December 30, 2025. Doc. 14-2. The Court held the TRO motion in abeyance due to a lack of
sufficient information about the bond hearing and gave the Government 10 business days after
service to respond to the TRO motion. Doc. 7.
On January 20, 2026, the Government filed a motion to dismiss, arguing again that the
Court lacked jurisdiction because of the December 30 bond hearing. Doc. 14. The Government
attached to the motion the IJ’s ruling denying bond to Ms. Martinez Rodriguez. Doc. 14 -1.
That ruling stated the following: “Flight Risk: Arrested for shoplifting and used false name to
law enforcement; manner of entry, lack of ties to USA; form or relief.” Id. Petitioner opposed
the motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court still has jurisdiction and that the bond hearing was
deficient because she did not receive adequate notice of the hearing; the interpreter services
provided during the hearing were insufficient; and the IJ placed the burden of proof on her at the
hearing instead of the Government. Doc. 17. The Government filed a reply. Doc. 19.
The Court held a second hearing on the TRO motion and motion to dismiss on January
30, 2026, at which it was confirmed that Petitioner bore the burden of proof at the December 30
bond hearing. Doc. 18. The Court took the matter under advisement and stated that a written
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order would follow.
II. Standard of Review
A TRO “preserve[s] the status quo [ante]” before a final decision on the merits.
Resolution Trust v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 1992). The status quo is “the last
peaceable uncontested status…before the dispute developed.” Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v.
City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 798 n.3 (10th Cir. 2019). A petitioner seeking a TRO “must
establish that she is likely to succeed on the merits, that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief,” and that the balance of equities and public interest favor relief.
Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[A]ll four of the equitable factors [must] weigh in” the
petitioner’s favor, Sierra Club. v. Bostick, 539 Fed. Appx 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2013), but “[t]he
likelihood-of-success and irreparable-harm factors are the most critical.” People’s Trust Fed.
Credit Union v. Nat’l Credit Union, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1139 (D.N.M. 2018). “[R]egardless
of whether…notice is provided,” a TRO “should not exceed the maximum time allowed by”
Rule 65, which is 28 days, “absent consent of the opposing party.” Isler v. New Mexico
Activities, 2010 WL 11623621, at *3 (D.N.M.).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss may present either a facial or factual challenge to
subject-matter jurisdiction. A movant may “make a facial challenge to the plaintiff’s allegations
concerning subject matter jurisdiction, thereby questioning the sufficiency of the complaint,”
United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 2001), or
“present[] evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.”
Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003). Subject-matter jurisdiction requires an
actual, ongoing controversy “at all stages of review,” and a claim becomes moot when the Court
can no longer grant effectual relief. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67
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(1997). When assessing subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court has “wide discretion to” consider
“other documents” beyond the complaint. Shawnee Indians, 253 F.3d at 547.
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, (A) the Government’s motion to dismiss is denied, (B)
Petitioner’s habeas petition is granted, and (C) Petitioner’s TRO motion is denied as moot.
A. The motion to dismiss is denied.
The Court, first, rejects the Government’s jurisdictional arguments and denies the motion
to dismiss. At the threshold, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s
habeas petition, despite the December 30 bond hearing. The Government is correct that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(e) states that “discretionary judgment[s]” by immigration authorities “regarding the
application” of § 1226 “shall not be subject to judicial review” and that “[n]o court may set aside
any action or decision” by immigration authorities under § 1226 “regarding the detention of any
alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.” But 1226(e) “does not preclude…habeas
jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law,” such as those at issue here. Garcia v.
Hyde, 2025 WL 3466312, at *5 (D.R.I.) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., L.G. v. Choate, 744 F.
Supp. 3d 1172, 1178 n.12 (D. Colo. 2024) (concluding that district courts have “jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider any error of law in [petitioner’s] agency proceedings,
including any claimed due process violation”).
Here, Petitioner challenges the Government’s policy of detaining noncitizens (including
herself) already present in the U.S. without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225—she does not challenge
the IJ’s discretionary bond determinations at the December 30 hearing. See, e.g., Garcia, 2025
WL 3466312, at *5 n.7 (“For instance, this Court would not have jurisdiction to review a claim
that an IJ, exercising his statutorily-delegated discretion, set an excessively high bond amount.”
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(citation omitted)).
Likewise, the December 30 bond hearing does not render this case moot. In her habeas
petition, Petitioner seeks a “hearing before a neutral arbiter in which” the Government must
“prove[] by clear and convincing evidence that [she] is a danger or flight risk.” Doc. 1 at 32.
Petitioner has not yet received what she seeks, meaning that she still presents live claims. In
granting habeas relief in numerous similar cases across the county, courts (including this Court)
have placed the burden on the Government at § 1226 bond hearings—but “under normal
circumstances, the burden is on the noncitizen.” Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 2025 WL
2676729, at *6 (D.N.M.). Here, no court order was in place putting the burden on the
Government at the December 30 bond hearing, and the parties appeared to agree at the January
30 TRO hearing that Petitioner bore the burden of proof at the bond hearing. Additionally, the
record suggests procedural irregularities during the December 30 hearing, including issues with
proper notice and adequate interpreter services. Doc. 17. Her claims are therefore still live
under mootness doctrine, despite the December 30 hearing. See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 880 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[A]n action is not moot if a plaintiff has
a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome.”). Accordingly, the Court denies the
Government’s motion to dismiss.
B. The habeas petition is granted.
The Court, next, grants Petitioner’s habeas petition. The INA establishes distinct
detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is “seeking admission” to the United
States. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018). Title 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking admission” and “not clearly and beyond
a doubt entitled to be admitted.” This “provision mandates detention and affords no bond
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hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). By
contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and detention, “on a warrant issued by the
Attorney General,” of noncitizens “pending a decision on whether [they are] to be removed.”
Noncitizens “detained under this second detention regime are entitled to individualized bond
hearings at the outset of detention.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court finds that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v. Francis,
2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district court opinions nationwide and
noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across
50 courts); see also Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL
45288 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.); Patel v. Noem, 2026 WL 103163 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.).
Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a noncitizen “who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast, § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate
applies to noncitizens “seeking admission.” (Emphasis added.) Noncitizens “seeking
admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the United States. DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the country years earlier”
are not “seeking admission” and fall under § 1226. Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention. ICE arrested Petitioner
approximately three years after her initial entry into the United States. Doc. 1. ICE did not
apprehend her at the border, but within the U.S. while she was attending an asylum hearing. Id.
Section 1225’s mandatory detention provision therefore does not apply because Petitioner
effected entry by living in the United States for approximately three years. Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL
3187432, at *3. She is therefore not seeking admission and is entitled to a predeprivation bond
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hearing under § 1226. Because she did not receive that predeprivation hearing, and because of
the delay caused by the procedurally irregular December 30 bond hearing, the Court concludes
that the proper remedy in this case is immediate release from detention.
If the Government attempts to redetain Petitioner, it must provide her with a prompt bond
hearing under § 1226 at which the Government bears the burden to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community. “[U]nder normal
circumstances,” the burden at a § 1226 hearing “is on the noncitizen” to show that detention is
unwarranted—but Petitioner’s “unlawful detention...shifts that burden to the Government.” Pu
Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. A noncitizen’s “strong private interest in being free from civil
detention” outweighs the Government’s “comparatively minimal burden to justify custody.” Id.
C. The TRO motion is denied as moot.
Because the Court grants the habeas petition and orders immediate release from
detention, the TRO motion is denied as moot without prejudice, as preliminary injunctive relief
is no longer necessary.
IV. Conclusion
The Government’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) is denied, Petitioner’s § 2241 habeas
petition (Doc. 1) is granted, and Petitioner’s TRO motion (Doc. 2) is denied as moot.
The Government shall immediately release Petitioner from detention.
If the Government attempts to redetain Petitioner, it shall provide her with a prompt
predeprivation bond hearing under § 1226 at which the Government bears the burden to prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that her detention is justified. At any such hearing, the
Government shall provide Petitioner with sufficient notice of the hearing, including to her
counsel, and adequate access to an interpreter.
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Both parties shall file a status report with the Court within seven days of this Order
confirming that Petitioner has been released from detention.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the NEF
(Notice of Electronic Filing) accompanying this
document. Electronically filed documents can be
found on the court’s PACER public access
system.
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