Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MARTIN GARCIA-LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
v. 	Civ. No. 25-1144 JB/SCY
DORA CASTRO, Warden, Otero
County Processing Center; MARY
DE ANDA-YBARRA, Director, El
Paso Field Office, Enforcement and
Removal Operations- U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI
NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; and PAMELA
BONDI, Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice,
Respondents.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
This matter comes before me on Petitioner Martin Garcia-Lopez’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. United States District Judge James Browning
referred this case to me under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3), and Va. Beach Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Wood, 901 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1990) “to conduct hearings, if warranted, including
evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an
ultimate disposition of the case.” Doc. 3. Having reviewed the briefs and the law, I recommend
that the Court grant in part the petition and order an immediate bond hearing.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Garcia-Lopez is a 51-year-old citizen and national of Guatemala, without lawful
status in the United States. Doc. 1 ¶ 15; Doc. 11 at 2. He arrived in the United States more than
23 years ago. Doc. 1 ¶ 15. On October 6, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
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encountered Mr. Garcia-Lopez at a traffic stop in Washington DC and detained him. Doc. 1 ¶ 16;
Doc. 11 at 2. After being taken into ICE custody, Mr. Garcia-Lopez was transported to the Otero
County Processing Center, Doc. 1 ¶ 16, and was charged with removability, Doc. 11 at 2. On
November 10, 2025, while Mr. Garcia-Lopez remained in detention, an Immigration Judge
denied his request for custody redetermination because “[t]he Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a
bond.” Doc. 1 ¶ 17; Doc. 1-2.
On November 17, 2025, Mr. Garcia-Lopez filed the present petition for writ of habeas
corpus, challenging his detention. Doc. 1. The court entered an order directing Petitioner to effect
service of the petition and, thereafter, for Respondents to show cause why the petition should not
be granted. Docs. 4, 8. On December 3, 2025, Respondent Dora Castro appeared and notified the
Court that she “joins in the position(s) that the USA Respondents may take related to the Petition
and/or other pleadings filed in this matter.” Doc. 6. On December 22, 2025, the remaining
Respondents filed a response in opposition to the petition, Doc. 11, and Petitioner filed a reply
on December 28, 2025, Doc. 12. Because the petition presents a purely legal question, I did not
hold a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“Unless the application for the writ and the return present
only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the
hearing the body of the person detained.”).
ANALYSIS
Mr. Garcia-Lopez filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging he “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). Specifically, he argues that he is being improperly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) in violation of his due process rights, and that he is instead entitled to release or an
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immediate bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. He also requests an award of reasonable costs
and attorney’s fees. Doc. 1 at 10.
1. 	Detention and Bond Hearing
This petition presents an issue that has become common in the District Courts. As Chief
Judge Gonzales explained,
The Immigration Nationality Act (“INA”) “contemplates two detention regimes
for noncitizens pending removal proceedings.” Salazar v. Dedos, [No. 25-835-
DHU-JMR,] 2025 WL 2676729, at *3 (D.N.M. [Sept. 17, 2025]); see Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). The first detention regime provides that
when “an applicant for admission” is “seeking admission” and “not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the noncitizen “shall be detained” for
removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This provision “mandates
detention” and affords no bond hearing. Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *3. The
second detention regime authorizes the arrest and detention “on a warrant issued
by the Attorney General” of noncitizens “pending a decision on whether [they
are] to be removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “Under federal regulations, noncitizens
detained under” this second detention regime “are entitled to individualized bond
hearings at the outset of detention.” Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *3 (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). At the bond hearing, “the burden is on the
noncitizen to demonstrate that their ‘release would not pose a danger to property
or persons, and that [they are] likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” Id. at
*6 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)).
. . .
This case is among a growing number of challenges to the Government’s policy
of reclassifying long-term noncitizen residents in the United States as individuals
“seeking admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Historically, “[t]he line drawn . . . is
that [§] 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas [§] 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the
country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass.) (citing
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89). Recently, however, ICE has detained long-term
residents under § 1225(b)(2)(A), thereby subjecting them to mandatory detention.
See Romero, 2025 WL 2403827, at *1 (collecting cases).
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Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-CV-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1, *2
(D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025).
I recommend that, in line with the majority of courts in this District, this Court find that
§ 1226 governs Mr. Garcia-Lopez’s detention.1 See, e.g., Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-
CV-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025) (as to a petitioner that
has been in the United States since the late 1980s, “[i]t is clear that § 1226, not § 1225, should
have governed Petitioner’s detention from the outset”); Diaz-Cruz v. Dedos, No. 1:25-CV-
01117-MLG-JMR, 2025 WL 3628517, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 12, 2025) (collecting cases and
holding that “[l]ike the overwhelming majority of courts who have considered the matter, this
Court agrees that § 1226(a) governs [petitioner’s] detention and, therefore, Diaz-Cruz is entitled
to an individualized bond hearing”); Gonzalez Ramos v. Dedos, No. 1:25-CV-00975-MLG-KRS,
2025 WL 3653928, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 2025) (“The Court concludes Gonzalez Ramos’s
detention is governed by § 1226(a). Gonzalez Ramos entered the United States in 1998 and has
lived here since. He therefore cannot be considered an applicant ‘seeking admission’ pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), as he has lived here for decades.”); Molina Ochoa v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-
00881-JB-LF, 2025 WL 3125846, at *7 (D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2025) (collecting cases). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that once a noncitizen is within the United States, “Section 1226
generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of aliens pending their
removal.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018).
As explained by Chief Judge Gonzales,
Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a noncitizen “who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” (emphasis added). In
contrast, § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate applies only to noncitizens
1 Respondents do not cite, and I am unaware of any Tenth Circuit cases addressing this issue.
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“seeking admission” (emphasis added). The statute consistently differentiates
between the broader category of “applicants for admission” and the narrower
subset “seeking admission.” Noncitizens “seeking admission” are those who have
not “effected an entry” into the United States. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens who entered the country years earlier are not
considered to be “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *5 (“For a
noncitizen to be deemed ‘seeking admission,’ they must be currently taking active
steps . . . to seek lawful entry into the U.S.”); Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, 2025
WL 2977650, at *6 (D. Colo.) (same); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL
2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.) (same).
Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (footnote omitted). Here, Mr. Garcia-Lopez has been
present and living in the United States for more than 23 years and ICE did not apprehend him at
or near the border. “Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply
because Mr. [Garcia-Lopez] already effected an entry into the United States by living here for
decades.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
As in many other cases, Respondents here rely on “the recent precedential decision by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,” when arguing that Section
1225(b)(2)(A) is applicable. Doc. 11 at 2 (citing 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), Interim
Decision 4125, 2025 WL 2674169). However, “[t]he agency’s interpretation carries only the
‘power to persuade,’ and most district courts have rejected Hurtado as inconsistent with the
INA’s text.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024)); see also Molina Ochoa, 2025 WL 3125846, at *8 (“The Supreme
Court recently directed district courts that they ‘must exercise independent judgment in
determining the meaning of statutory provisions’ and ‘may not defer to an agency interpretation
of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.’” (quoting Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at
394)).
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For these reasons, I recommend finding that § 1226 governs Mr. Garcia-Lopez’s
detention. In his petition, Mr. Garcia-Lopez argues that he is entitled to “immediate release or at
the very least, a custody redetermination decided on its merits.” Doc. 1 ¶ 24. “In similar cases in
this district, courts have ordered a prompt bond hearing but not the petitioner’s immediate
release.” Molina Ochoa, 2025 WL 3125846, at *13 (collecting cases). In line with those cases, I
recommend that the Court order Respondents to provide Mr. Garcia-Lopez a bond hearing under
Section 1226(a) within seven days of the Court’s order. If Mr. Garcia-Lopez is not afforded a
bond hearing within that time, I recommend that the Court order his immediate release.
2. 	Attorney’s Fees
Mr. Garcia-Lopez also requests that he be awarded reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.
Doc. 1 at 10. The Tenth Circuit has recently made clear that the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”) “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging immigration
detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152 (10th Cir. 2025). EAJA provides that
a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a),
incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),
including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against
the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Consistent with this provision, I recommend that Mr. Garcia-Lopez may file a motion for
EAJA fees, and that briefing on that motion shall proceed according to the deadlines in Local
Rule 7.4.
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RECOMMENDATION
For these reasons, I recommend that the Court GRANT IN PART the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) as follows:
 	Respondents shall provide Mr. Garcia-Lopez a bond hearing under Section 1226(a)
within seven days of the Court’s order;
 	If Mr. Garcia-Lopez is not afforded the bond hearing within that time, he shall be
immediately released;
 	Respondents shall file a status report within eight days of the Court’s order as to the
status of the bond hearing or release; and
 	Mr. Garcia-Lopez may file a motion for EAJA fees and briefing on that motion shall
proceed according to the deadlines in Local Rule 7.4.
____________________________________
Steven C. Yarbrough
United States Magistrate Judge
THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE of a
copy of these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may file written
objections with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party
must file any objections with the Clerk of the District Court within the fourteen-day period
if that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings and recommended
disposition. If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
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