Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DAVID LOPEZ-ROMERO,
Petitioner,
v.
2:25-cv-01113-MIS-JHR
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
MARY DE ANDA YBARRA, Director, El
Paso Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
and PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General
of the United States, in their official
capacities,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by
Petitioner David Lopez-Romero on November 7, 2025 (“Petition”). ECF No. 1. Respondents
filed a Response to the Petition on November 26, 2025 (“Response to the Petition”), ECF No. 7,
to which Petitioner filed a Reply on December 5, 2025 (“Reply in Support of the Petition”), ECF
No. 9. Also before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Grant the Petition Forthwith Under 28
U.S.C. § 2243, filed December 8, 2025 (“Motion”). ECF No. 10. Respondents filed a Response
on December 10, 2025 (“Response to the Motion”), ECF No. 11, to which Petitioner filed a Reply
on December 16, 2025 (“Reply in support of the Motion”), ECF No. 12. On November 13, 2025,
the Court issued an Order referring this matter to a United States Magistrate Judge “to conduct
hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal analysis required
to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case.” ECF No. 5 at 1 (“Order of
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Reference”). The Court hereby VACATES the Order of Reference and, upon review of the Parties’
submissions, the record, and the relevant law, the Court will GRANT the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
I. Background
The material facts of this case are undisputed. See Mot. at 1; Resp. to Mot. at 1. Petitioner
is a 42-year-old citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States without admittance or parole
at the age of 17 in May 2001. Pet. ¶ 20. He has not left the United States since his entry as a minor
in 2001. Id. He has three children who are United States citizens, ages 17, 14, and 6, who he lives
with and cares for. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15. He has filed with the Executive Office for Immigration Review
an Application for Cancellation of Removal as a non-lawful permanent resident. Id. ¶ 1.
On October 13, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) apprehended
Petitioner during a routine traffic stop while on his way to work in the State of Maryland. Id. ¶¶
2, 24. DHS issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in
the United States without admission or parole, and inadmissible under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)
of the INA, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an immigrant who, at the time of
application for admission, was not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry
permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the Act, and a valid
unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity, and nationality as
required under the regulation issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) of the Act. Id.
¶¶ 2, 25. Petitioner has not been convicted of any offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or
237(a)(3) of the INA. Id. ¶ 15. Indeed, he has no criminal record. Id. ¶ 87.
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Petitioner is in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, id. ¶ 65; Resp. to Pet. at 10,
and has been detained at the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico since
October 21, 2025, Pet. ¶ 27. On October 31, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s
request for a bond hearing, finding he lacked jurisdiction to consider the bond request based on
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec.
216 (BIA 2025). Id. ¶ 29; see also Order of the Immigration Judge at 1, ECF No. 1-3.
On November 7, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Count One of the Petition alleges that the BIA’s decision in Matter
of Yajure Hurtado violates the INA. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 48-79. Count Two alleges that Petitioner’s
prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Id. ¶¶ 80-93.
II. Legal Standard
“The habeas statute provides that a federal district court may entertain a habeas application
by a person held ‘in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States,’ or ‘in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 685 (2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1), (3)). “An individual is held ‘in custody’
by the United States when the United States official charged with his detention has ‘the power to
produce’ him.” Id. at 686 (quoting Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)).
“District courts are limited to granting habeas relief ‘within their respective jurisdictions.’”
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)). This language
requires “nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.”
Id. (quoting Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)).
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III. Discussion
As an initial matter, the Court’s jurisdiction over the Petition and Respondents is
uncontested, and the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this matter.
On the merits, Petitioner argues that because he has been continuously within the United
States for more than 20 years and was apprehended within the United States, he is not subject to
mandatory detention under the INA while in removal proceedings. Pet. ¶¶ 32-79. Specifically, he
argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See id. He further argues that his continued detention
violates the Fifth Amendment because he has no criminal record, poses no danger to the
community, and has substantial ties to the United States such that he is not a flight risk. Id. ¶¶ 80-
93.
Respondents argue that Petitioner is an “an alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted” and is therefore “an applicant for admission” who is subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. to Pet. at 2-21. They further argue that Petitioner’s
detention and removal proceedings do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id.
at 22-24.
In his Reply in support of the Petition, Petitioner argues that Respondents’ “unprecedented
expansion of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) to reclassify long-present noncitizens arrested in the
interior as ‘applicants for admission’ subject to mandatory, no-bond detention” has been rejected
by a final declaratory judgment in a nationwide class action before the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, Bautista v. Department of Homeland Security, et al., Case
No. 5:25-cv-07873-SSS-BFM, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025).
ECF No. 9 at 1-2. Petitioner maintains that because he was not apprehended on arrival to the
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United States, but rather was detained within the United States after being continuously present
within the country for more than twenty years, he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) and is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. at 5-6
(citations omitted).
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from depriving any
person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
[noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306, (1993); see also Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
What due process Petitioner is owed depends on his classification under the provisions of
the INA. The two statutes relevant to this determination in this case are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and
1226(a). In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court explained that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily
to aliens seeking entry into the United States (‘applicants for admission’ in the language of the
statute).” 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018). On the other hand, “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present
in the United States.” Id. at 303. United States District Judge Matthew Garcia summarized the
statutory scheme as follows:
1. Section 1225(b)
Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United
States,” i.e., “applicants for admission.”1 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. It requires,
inter alia, that all applicants for admission be inspected by an immigration officer.
§ 1225(a)(3). During that process, the immigration officer must determine whether
1 Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a noncitizen “present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” All applicants for admission must be inspected
by an immigration officer. § 1225(a)(3).
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an applicant is covered by either §§ 1225(b)(1) or 1225(b)(2). See Jennings, 583
U.S. at 287. Noncitizens who are arriving in the United States and initially deemed
inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7) due to fraud, misrepresentation, or
lack of valid documentation are treated in accordance with § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
Other noncitizens may also fall within the statute’s purview as designated by the
Attorney General if they have not been admitted or paroled and were not
continuously present in the United States for the two-year period prior to that
determination. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) also addresses
the situation where, during the inspection process, the noncitizen indicates either a
fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum. If the immigration officer
deems that claim credible, then the noncitizen must be “detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). The relevant
regulations regarding positive credible-fear determinations control the process
thereafter. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f).
Section 1225(b)(2) of Title 8 of the United States Code addresses those persons
who are seeking admission into the country but whom are not otherwise covered
by § 1225(b)(1). It requires that the noncitizen be detained provided “the examining
immigration officer determines that a [noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . .” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Noncitizens
covered by § 1225(b)(2) are not subject to the expedited removal process outlined
in § 1225(b)(1). They receive some process, including an evidentiary hearing before
an IJ, the right to counsel, and the right to seek review by the BIA and a federal
court of appeals. § 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1229a; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020).
2. Section 1226
Section 1226 is a separate statute addressing circumstances not covered by § 1225.
It sets “the default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the United
States.” Jennings, 538 U.S. at 303. Per § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from
the United States.” (emphasis added). Custody is not predetermined. Noncitizens
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are entitled to individualized bond hearings as
described by federal regulation. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§
236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). During those proceedings, an IJ is tasked with
determining whether the noncitizen is either a flight risk or a danger to the
community. Id. at 303. If either question is resolved in the affirmative, then the
noncitizen will be detained. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1262 (citing
Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) for the proposition
that “an IJ will order a detainee released on bond if the person is not ‘a threat to
national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise
a poor bail risk’”)). Otherwise, bond and conditions of release are appropriate. Id.
There are some instances in which custody is required—including those outlined in
Section 1226(c). But, generally speaking, those provisions apply to circumstances
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in which a noncitizen has “committed or been sentenced for certain criminal
offenses, or because they are affiliated with terrorist groups or activities.” Gomes
v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *3 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025)
(citing §§ 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D)).
Gonzalez Ramos v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00975-MLG-KRS, 2025 WL 3653928, at *2-3 (D.N.M.
Dec. 17, 2025).
Here, the Court finds that Section 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention because he is an
alien already present in the United States, not an “applicant for admission” or “alien seeking
admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See id. at *3. “Noncitizens, like [Petitioner], ‘who
reside in the country for decades are not ‘seeking admission.’ They are ‘no longer seeking to enter
the United States (lawfully or otherwise)’—they are already here.” Id. (quoting Cortez-Gonzalez
v. Noem, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 3485771, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025)); see also Pu Sacvin
v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025)
(“Noncitizens ‘seeking admission’ are those who have not ‘effected an entry’ into the United
States. Noncitizens who entered the country years earlier are not considered to be ‘seeking
admission,’ and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A).”) (citation omitted).
“Only a ‘[noncitizen] seeking admission’ falls within § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention
scheme. To conclude that all ‘applicants for admission’ are continuously ‘seeking admission’ for
as long as they live in the United States ‘goes against the plain, ordinary meaning of the words
‘seeking’ and ‘admission.’” Gonzalez Ramos, 2025 WL 3653928, at *3 (quoting Romero v. Hyde,
795 F. Supp. 3d 271. 284 (D. Mass. 2025)).
Additionally, Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) “would render the Laken
Riley Act (‘LRA’) as mere surplusage.” Id. The LRA “added additional criminal convictions
triggering § 1226’s custodial provisions.” Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3 (2025)
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(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E))). “So, ‘[i]f § 1225(b)(2) already mandated
detention of any [noncitizen] who has not been admitted, regardless of how long they have been
here, then adding § 1226(c)(1)(E) to the statutory scheme was pointless.’” Id. (quoting Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1152 (D. Minn. 2025)); see also Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, Case
No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (“[I]f, as the
Government argue[s] . . . , a non-citizen’s inadmissibility were alone already sufficient to mandate
detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A), then the 2025 amendment would have no effect.” (quoting
Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 221 (D. Mass. 2025)). “The Court doubts that Congress
intended such a result.” Gonzalez Ramos, 2025 WL 3653928, at *3 (citing Chevron Mining Inc.
v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1283 n.15 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The canon against surplusage
indicates that [courts] generally must give effect to all statutory provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous—each phrase must have distinct meaning.”)).
Finally, the Court’s interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.
There, the Supreme Court instructed that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the
Government to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country
under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain
[noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings
under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id. (emphases added). This interpretation of §§ 1225(b)
and 1226(a) is consistent with the due process afforded to noncitizens who have
entered the United States. “The distinction between a [noncitizen] who has effected
an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout
immigration law.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. Once a noncitizen effects entry into
the United States, the Due Process Clause applies “whether [the noncitizen’s]
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. Noncitizens who
have not yet effected entry are not afforded the same due process rights. See
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 103; see also Cortez-Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771, at
*4 n.10 (discussing distinction between merely “set[ting] foot on U.S. soil” and
when citizens have effected an entry (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40).
With this distinction in mind, it is unlikely that Congress intended the mandatory
detention of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to noncitizens already present in the United
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States. See Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 222; see also Cortez-Gonzalez[,] 2025 WL
3485771, at *5 (discussing DHS’ previous decades-long application of § 1226 to
noncitizens residing in the United States without admission).
Gonzalez Ramos, 2025 WL 3653928, at *4. Indeed, as previously noted, the Supreme Court in
Jennings explicitly stated that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United
States[,]” 583 U.S. at 297, while “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States[,]”
id. at 303.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). See id.; Cortez-Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771, at *6; Intriago-Sedgwick v. Noem, No.
1:25-cv-01065-MIS-LF, 2025 WL 3688155, at *7 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted No. 1:25-cv-01065-MIS-LF, ECF No. 27 (D.N.M. Jan. 6, 2026); see also
Melchor-Rios v. Ortiz, Case No. 2:25-cv-01055-WJ-GJF, 2025 WL 3764775, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec.
30, 2025) (“Whether the detention of individuals like Petitioner, who previously entered and
currently reside in the United States, is governed by the discretionary detention provisions of §
1226(a) or the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b), is a question that has been answered
in near-unison by district courts nationwide: § 1226(a) governs.”) (collecting cases).2
Because § 1226(a) is controlling, Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing as
a matter of right. Cortez-Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771, at *5. “Petitioner’s continued detention
without such review constitutes an ongoing violation of [his] right to due process.” Id.; see also
2 Although Respondents do not cite Matter of Yajure Hurtado in support of their position, see Resp.
to Pet., ECF No. 7; Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 11, the Court finds that the BIA’s decision in Hurtado is unpersuasive,
contrary to law, and entitled to no deference. See, e.g., Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025) (explaining that Hurtado is unpersuasive and entitled to “little deference” because it
contradicts prior BIA decisions and “conflicts with the implementing regulation for § 1225(b)” (quoting, Ortiz Donis
v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01228 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025))).
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Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2676729, at *5 (D.N.M. Sep. 17, 2025).
As such, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. See Velasquez Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9.
Petitioner requests “a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within 7 days, at which
hearing the Immigration Judge shall: (a) place the burden on the government to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the community; and
(b) set bond at an amount that Petitioner can reasonably afford if the government fails to meet its
burden[.]” Pet. at 22. To determine whether this is an appropriate remedy, the Court considers the
factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Upon consideration of these factors, the Court finds that the requested
relief is appropriate.
First, it is beyond dispute that Petitioner has a “strong private interest in being free from
civil detention.” Velasquez Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *6 (quoting L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp.
3d 1172, 1182 (D. Colo. 2024)). As previously mentioned, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. And Petitioner’s interest in
freedom is particularly weighty because he has no criminal record and has spent the last twenty-
four-and-a-half years out of custody. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 15, 87. During that time, he has maintained stable
employment, paid federal income taxes, and become a parent to three children—ages 17, 14, and
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6—all of whom are United States citizens and live with Petitioner. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 15, 28. This factor
weighs in favor of the requested relief.
Second, the Court finds that “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest is reduced
by shifting the burden of proof to the Government, given the difficulty of proving a negative (that
a noncitizen is not a flight risk or danger to the community) compared to the resources available
to the Government to gather information.” Velasquez Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *6 (citing
L.G., 744 F. Supp. 3d at 1183-84). The Court finds that shifting the burden in this case as an
additional procedural safeguard is especially appropriate because Respondents have offered no
evidence or argument that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community; given that the
Government has no reason to believe that Petitioner is either a flight risk or danger to the
community, it would be ridiculous to require Petitioner to prove that he is neither in order to regain
his freedom. This factor also weighs in favor of the requested remedy.
Finally, the Court finds that shifting the burden of proof to the Government is minimal
compared to the weighty liberty interests at stake for Petitioner, and is not fiscally or
administratively unreasonable. “Faced with a choice ‘between [minimally costly procedures] and
preventable human suffering,’ as discussed above, the Court concludes ‘that the balance of
hardships tips decidedly in [petitioner’s] favor.’” Singh v. Andrews, __ F. Supp. 3d. __, 2025 WL
1918679, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez v. Sessions,
872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017)).
Therefore, to protect Petitioner’s right to due process, the Court orders an individualized
bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge to determine Petitioner’s custody status pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of the date of this Order, at which the Government must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the
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community. If the Government fails to meet its burden, bond shall be set at an amount Petitioner
can reasonably afford. If no bond hearing is held within seven days, Petitioner must be
immediately released from custody unless and until it is determined that continued detention is
warranted pursuant to Section 1226(a). Melchor-Rios, 2025 WL 3764775, at *3; Velasquez
Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Order of Reference, ECF No. 5, is VACATED;
2. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED;
3. Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond
hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within
seven days of the date of this Order, at which the Government must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the
community. If the Government fails to meet its burden, bond shall be set at an
amount Petitioner can reasonably afford;
4. If Petitioner has not received a bond hearing by 3:00 pm on January 20, 2025, he
shall be immediately released and shall not be re-detained without a pre-deprivation
bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
at which the Government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Petitioner is a danger or flight risk;
5. The Government shall file a status report within ten days of the date of this Order
to certify compliance. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing
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occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the reasons for
the denial;
6. The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter; and
7. Petitioner’s Motion to Grant the Petition Forthwith Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, ECF
No. 10, is DENIED AS MOOT.
………………………………………….
MARGARET STRICKLAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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