Jones et al v. Bank et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MICHAEL J. JONES and
TAMERA A. JONES,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civ. No. 2:25-472 MLG/GJF
PIONEER BANK, ADRIANN RAGSDALE,
DEE ANN NUNEZ, and
DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION IN LIMINE AND REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude
Defendants’ Defenses and Exhibits Due to Insufficient Evidence (“Motion in Limine”) (Dkt. No.
28); Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice of Unrebutted Affidavits, Rescission, and Fraudulent
Conduct (“First Motion for Judicial Notice”) (Dkt. No. 29); and Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial
Notice (“Second Motion for Judicial Notice”) (Dkt. No. 55). Defendants responded in opposition
to the first two Motions. See Dkt. Nos. 32, 33. Plaintiffs failed to file a reply as to any of the
Motions within the time prescribed for doing so, which constitutes consent that the briefing on
them is compete. See D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES
each of these Motions.
I. MOTION IN LIMINE
In their Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs seek three forms of relief: (1) to “[e]xclude from
evidence all defenses, rebuttals, and exhibits by Defendants that lack proper foundation under
[Federal Rules of Evidence] 104 and 602”; (2) to “[b]ar Defendants from presenting any
documentation not authenticated or submitted under sworn affidavit or declaration”; and (3) to
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“[p]revent reference to any claim of note ownership or authority to enforce without admissible
documentation.” Dkt. No. 28 at 3. In other words, Plaintiffs ask the Court to make evidentiary
rulings as to evidence for which Defendants may potentially seek admission but which may not
conform to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Notably, Plaintiffs do not identify any particular evidence or documents that they seek to
exclude. See id. at 2. Instead, they vaguely suggest that Defendants’ “unsupported defenses and
exhibits” will “unfairly prejudice Plaintiffs; [m]islead the jury as to legal ownership and authority;
[and v]iolate FRE 403 by introducing irrelevant and confusing material.” Id. According to
Plaintiffs, exclusion of these unidentified exhibits “is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
proceedings, protect against prejudicial misrepresentations, and uphold the evidentiary standard of
‘personal knowledge’ and ‘authentication’ required by federal law.”1 Id. at 1.
As Defendants point out in response, discovery has not yet commenced in this case, and
no trial date has been set. Dkt. No. 32. Indeed, the Court has determined that good cause exists to
delay issuance of a scheduling order pending resolution of Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 80.
Because the case is in its initial stages, with discovery not yet underway, Plaintiffs’ request
for rulings on the admissibility of not-yet-identified evidence is premature and lacks sufficient
particularity. See Pedroza v. Lomas Auto Mall, Inc., No. CIV 07-0591 JB/RHS, 2009 WL 1300944
(D.N.M. Apr. 2, 2009) (denying motion in limine as premature due to ongoing discovery and
observing that the movant could re-raise the issue at a later date with a more particularized
showing); Shaw v. T-Mobile, No. 1802513-DDC-GEB, 2020 WL 4334993, at *3 (D. Kan. July 28,
1 The Court notes that Plaintiffs have attached to their Motion in Limine, perhaps through inadvertence, documents
that appear to relate to their now-withdrawn Motion to Disqualify Attorney Luke Ragsdale for Conflict of Interest
(Dkt. No. 17). Because these documents do not have any apparent relevance to Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine, the Court
disregards them for purposes of its resolution of that Motion.
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2020) (denying motion in limine filed before the completing of discovery, where the movant had
not tied her motion to “arguments on summary judgment or ones expected to arise at an imminent
trial,” and explaining that a “court is well within its discretion to deny a motion in limine that fails
to identify the evidence with particularity or to present arguments with specificity”) (citation
omitted). For these reasons, the Court will therefore DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine.
II. MOTIONS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiffs have filed two separate motions asking the Court to take judicial notice pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. In their first motion, they request judicial notice of “undisputed”
documents that they identify by title or description: an “Unrebutted TILA Rescission” dated
November 19, 2024, a Notice of Adverse Claim, a Notice of Breach of Fiduciary Duty, a Notice
of Dishonor under UCC § 3-504, a UCC-1 Financing Statement, a UCC-3 Termination Statement,
and documents showing “the unauthorized transfer and securitization of the promissory note.” Dkt.
No. 29 at 2. Plaintiffs do not attach to their Motion the documents they ask the Court to judicially
notice, nor do they provide any information as to their source or where they can be accessed.
In their Second Motion for Judicial Notice, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice
of “official statutes, judicial opinions, and federal agency publications directly bearing on the
issues in Plaintiffs’ pending Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Statement in
Support.” Dkt. No. 55 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs identify three types of authority for which they
seek judicial notice: (1) NMSA § 47-1-7 (1978); (2) Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. O’Malley, 414
P.3d 334 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018); and (3) “Fannie Mae Document Custodial Requirements,” which
are available on Fannie Mae’s website. Id. at 2–3.
Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact “that is not subject
to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 201(a)–(b). The facts of which a court may take judicial
notice, however, are limited to those that are (1) “generally known within the trial court’s territorial
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jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Pursuant to Rule 201(c), judicial notice is
required “if the court is supplied with the necessary information.”
For their part, Defendants respond only to Plaintiffs’ First Motion for Judicial Notice. They
contend that “each of Plaintiffs’ proffers [in that Motion] include[] stringently disputed facts and
impermissible legal conclusions.” Dkt. 33 at 2. As to Plaintiffs’ 2024 TILA rescission notice,
Defendants explain that they have disputed the validity of that attempted rescission in their
response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment briefing. See id. (citing Dkt. Nos. 18, 26). With respect
to the various “notices” to which Plaintiffs refer, Defendants insist that Plaintiffs have failed to
establish their “applicability and effect,” and they insist that all of them are disputed. Id. Finally,
Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs seek legal conclusions as to the referenced UCC filings and as
to documents allegedly showing “fraudulent concealment and securitization,” and they emphasize
that Rule 201 does not authorize a court to make legal conclusions. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to judicial notice with respect to any of the documents or
authorities for which they seek it. First, they have not supplied the Court with the information
necessary to establish that any adjudicative facts are “generally known” or could “be accurately
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b). Instead, Plaintiffs simply reference documents and advance arguments that would
be better suited to a motion for summary judgment or to the presentation of evidence at trial. In
their First Motion for Judicial Notice, for instance, Plaintiffs’ ask the Court to “[a]cknowledge the
legal effect of the unrebutted rescission, notices, and UCC filings” and “[b]ar any contradictory
claims by Defendants.” See Dkt. No. 29 at 3. From this, the Court surmises that Plaintiffs seeks
what amounts to findings of fact and conclusions of law on their claims against Defendants. The
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Court understands Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to reference supplemental authority in support of
their summary judgment motion. See Dkt. No. 55. But neither Motion constitutes a proper request
for judicial notice.
Judicial notice is not the proper vehicle for resolution of a document’s legal effect on a
party’s claims (particularly where the opposing parties dispute the import of that document), nor
is it the proper manner for seeking consideration of supplemental legal authority in support of a
motion for summary judgment. See Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir.
1998) (“Rule 201 authorizes the court to take notice only of ‘adjudicative facts,’ not legal
determinations.”); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (observing that the
effect of judicially noticing a fact under Rule 201 is to preclude the opposing party from having
that fact determined, after the presentation of contrary evidence, by a factfinder at trial). Because
Plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirements or the purposes of Rule 201, the Court DENIES both
Motions for Judicial Notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine to Exclude
Defendants’ Defenses and Exhibits Due to Insufficient Evidence (Dkt. No. 28); Request for
Judicial Notice of Unrebutted Affidavits, Rescission, and Fraudulent Conduct (Dkt. No. 29); and
Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 55) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
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THE HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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