Askari v. Legarreta

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
SYED ASKARI,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Civ. No. 25‐220 GBW/KRS
MARIA G. LEGARRETA, in her
individual capacity, Gadsden
Independent School District,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Doc. 35. Having reviewed the briefing and all
relevant law, the Court will GRANT the motion to dismiss.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action in the Third Judicial District Court on January 17, 2025,
asserting various claims against Defendant relating to his alleged detention in
Defendant’s office and a negative performance review. Doc. 2. The case was removed
to federal court on March 3, 2025. Doc. 1. On October 20, 2025, the Court granted
Defendant’s motion to dismiss1 and gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint.
1 The Court did not dismiss Plaintiff’s libel claims based on the September 27, 2024, and October
28, 2024, publications, or Plaintiff’s false detention claim based on the events of October 28, 2024, because
Defendant specifically did not request their dismissal. See doc. 32 at 12. These remaining claims from the
First Amended Complaint were superseded by the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. See doc. 33.
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 1 of 14

2
Doc. 32. Plaintiff timely filed his Second Amended Complaint on November 18, 2025.
Doc. 33. Defendant again moves for dismissal. Doc. 35.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. At the time of
relevant events, Plaintiff was a mathematics teacher at Gadsden High School and had
been teaching for thirteen years. Doc. 33 at 3, 9, 10. Defendant was the school principal.
Id. at 3. On September 27, 2024, and October 28, 2024, Defendant issued publications
ordering Plaintiff to “collaborate with colleagues” and using the words “failure in
collaboration with colleagues.” Id. at 2. Defendant signed the statements. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff also signed the statements, but alleges he did so “under coercion” and without
his consent. Id. at 4.
On October 28, 2024, when Plaintiff signed a “fabricated performance plan” in
Defendant’s office, Defendant threatened discipline and/or termination if Plaintiff
refused to sign. Id. at 8. Plaintiff requested repeatedly to leave but Defendant kept the
door closed and would not let him leave the room until he signed the document. Id.
Plaintiff remained in Defendant’s office for 100 minutes. Id. at 7.
In January 2025, Plaintiff filed three grievances against Defendant, but the school
district did not take any action against Defendant. Id. at 6.
On January 30, 2025, at about 7:45 a.m., when Plaintiff arrived at his classroom,
Defendant was waiting in the empty room with the door closed, lights off, and a brown
envelope in her hands. Id. at 4. Her purpose was to secure Plaintiff’s signature on the
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 2 of 14

3
documents in the envelope. Id. Plaintiff became extremely frightened and suffered a
panic attack. Id. at 5. He could not speak due to sudden shock, and walked to the
library room to take refuge. Id. Defendant “chased” Plaintiff into the library room. Id.
Plaintiff cried, “[D]o not take me to the principal’s office; she keeps me for long hours.”
Id. Everything went black and Plaintiff could not remember anything until he heard a
nurse telling him he was in the hospital. Id. Plaintiff is now afraid of crowds, certain
places, and principals and vice principals, and has been living at home with post‐
traumatic stress disorder. Id. As a result of his injury on January 30, Plaintiff could not
teach during the 2025–2026 school year and stayed at home taking medication. Id. at 9.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Leverington v. City of Colorado Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). This standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” but it does require more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “assume the truth of all
well‐pleaded facts in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Leverington, 643 F.3d at 723 (quoting Dias v. City
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 3 of 14

4
& Cnty. Of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009)). The court need not accept the
truth of any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. 	A NALYSIS
The Second Amended Complaint alleges claims of: (1) defamation, (2) fraudulent
inducement, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) breach of duty/gross
negligence, (5) false imprisonment, (6) cruel and unusual punishment, and (7) quantum
meruit. See doc. 33.
A. 	NMTCA Notice Requirement
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) grants immunity from suit for torts
by “public employee[s] . . . acting within the scope of duty,” except as waived by §§ 41‐
4‐5 through 41‐4‐12. NMSA § 41‐4‐4(A). These exceptions to the “general rule of
immunity are strictly construed.” Sanders v. N.M. Corr. Dep’t, 562 P.3d 572, 578 (N.M.
2024) (quotation omitted). A public employee acts within the scope of duty when
“performing any duties that a public employee is requested, required or authorized to
perform by the governmental entity, regardless of the time and place of performance.”
NMSA § 41‐4‐3(G). “[A] public employee may be within the scope of authorized duty
even if the employee’s acts are fraudulent, intentionally malicious, or even criminal.”
Seeds v. Lucero, 113 P.3d 859, 862 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis in original). Public
school employees are “public employees” for purposes of the NMTCA. See, e.g.,
Henning v. Rounds, 171 P.3d 317, 322 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 4 of 14

5
The NMTCA requires claimants to provide written notice of “the time, place and
circumstances of the loss or injury” to the head of the public body being sued within
ninety days of the occurrence giving rise to the claims. NMSA § 41‐4‐16(A). The
NMTCA provides that “[n]o suit or action . . . shall be maintained and no court shall
have jurisdiction” unless the required notice was given, or unless the governmental
entity had “actual notice” of the occurrence. Id. § 41‐4‐16(B). The purpose of this
requirement is “(1) to enable the person or entity to whom notice must be given . . . to
investigate the matter while the facts are accessible; (2) to question witnesses; (3) to
protect against simulated or aggravated claims; and (4) to consider whether to pay the
claim or to refuse it.” Martens v. City of Albuquerque, 531 P.3d 607, 609 (N.M. Ct. App.
2023) (citation and quotation omitted). Therefore, the requisite notice “is not simply
actual notice of the occurrence of the accident or injury but rather, actual notice that
there exists a likelihood that litigation may ensue.” Herald v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
N.M., 357 P.3d 438, 449 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Dutton v. McKinley County Bd. of
Commʹrs, 822 P.2d 1134, 1136 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)). Under the NMTCA, “defendants
have the burden of proving that the notice requirement was not met.” Gallegos v.
Bernalillo Cnty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1269 (D.N.M. 2017) (quoting
Dutton v. McKinley Cnty. Bd. of Commʹrs, 822 P.2d 1134, 1135 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)).
Based on the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, it is clear that
Defendant was acting within the scope of duty as Gadsden High School’s principal
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 5 of 14

6
during relevant events. 2 Therefore, Plaintiff was required to provide written notice of
his claims within 90 days of September 27, 2024, October 28, 2024, and January 30, 2025,
respectively. The Second Amended Complaint is silent with respect to the required
notice. See generally doc. 33. However, as the Court noted in its previous order, Plaintiff
filed a “Tort Notice of Claims” on the docket on March 20, 2025, purporting to give the
Superintendent of the Gadsden Independent School District notice of claims based on
the events of January 30, 2025. Doc. 7. In addition, Plaintiff filed his first Amended
Civil Complaint on March 24, 2025, within 90 days of January 30, 2025. Doc. 8.
Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the notice provided for claims
arising on January 30, 2025. See doc. 35 at 4–5. However, Defendant argues that claims
arising on September 27, 2024, and October 28, 2024, should be dismissed for failure to
comply with the notice requirement. Id. Defendant attaches a summons showing that
the first complaint was not served until January 31, 2025, meaning that the complaint
itself could not serve as “actual notice” of the claims. Doc. 35‐1; c.f Griego v. N.M. State
Police, Civ. No. 9‐599 BB/ACT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154591, at *10 (D.N.M. Feb. 23,
2010) (“The purposes of the TCAʹs notice provision are satisfied where, as here, a
lawsuit is filed and the complaint is served within ninety days of the occurrence in
question.” (emphasis added)).
2 Plaintiff agrees with this characterization. His unauthorized sur‐reply asserts that Defendant
acted “within the scope of her official duties” and “within the course and scope of her employment.”
Doc. 42 at 3, 4.
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 6 of 14

7
In response, Plaintiff argues that the grievances he filed on January 8, 2025,
January 22, 2025, and January 29, 2025, were “akin to written notice” of the claims. Doc.
37 at 7. The grievances are attached to the response brief.3 Doc. 37 at 19–21. None
specifically mention the dates in question (September 27, 2024, and October 28, 2024),
nor do they relate to the events on which the instant claims are based. See id. The first
grievance relates to unannounced classroom observations by administrators, the second
expresses disagreement with a Human Resources response dated January 17, 2025, and
the third requests an “unbiased and bilateral FMCS Arbitrator/Mediator” as soon as
possible.4 Id. These grievances fail to satisfy the NMTCA’s notice requirement for
Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and fraudulent inducement which rest on the events in
2024. Thus, those claims must be dismissed on that basis.5
3 The Court considers the grievances without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment. The Tenth Circuit has held that “a document central to the plaintiffʹs claim and referred to in
the complaint may be considered in resolving a motion to dismiss, at least where the document’s
authenticity is not in dispute.” Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (10th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted). The grievances are referenced in the Second Amended Complaint and are
central to fourth cause of action, see doc. 33 at 6, and neither party disputes their authenticity.
4 The grievance dated January 8, 2025, also states that “[t]he Professional Performance Growth
Plan is completed on December 20, 2024, with exceeding the requirements of the Plan by the Teach of
Record Syed Askari in good faith for the School‐Year: 2024–2025.” Doc. 37 at 19. This bare mention of the
performance plan did not confer notice of likely tort claims against Defendant.
5 The Court finds in the alternative that the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for
either cause of action. First, Plaintiff has identified no waiver of immunity for claims of defamation or
fraudulent inducement under the NMTCA. Second, the operative complaint does not allege facts
showing publication by Defendant to a third party, see Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 773 P.2d 1231, 1236
(N.M. 1989), or Plaintiff’s reliance on a misrepresentation of material fact, see Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v.
Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 994 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lotspeich v. Golden Oil Co., 961 P.2d 790,
792 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998)). The Court finds these are all independently sufficient reasons to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims for defamation and fraudulent inducement.
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 7 of 14

8
B. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff alleges a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) based
on the events of January 30, 2025. Doc. 33 at 4. To establish a claim of IIED in New
Mexico, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the conduct in question was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct
of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(3) the plaintiffʹs mental distress was extreme and severe; and (4) there is a
causal connection between the defendantʹs conduct and the claimantʹs
mental distress.
Baldonado v. El Paso Nat. Gas. Co., 176 P.3d 286, 294 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 41 P.3d 333, 342 (N.M. 2001)). On the first
element, the plaintiff must demonstrate conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Trujillo, 41
P.3d at 342 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). Employment actions do
not generally satisfy this standard. See, e.g., id. at 343 (“Being fired is a common
occurrence that rarely rises to the level of being ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’
and ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”).
The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for IIED. Under the facts
alleged—that Defendant waited for Plaintiff in a classroom before work, held a brown
envelope, attempted to secure his signature on employment‐related documents, and
followed him to the library—the required element of “extreme and outrageous”
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 8 of 14

9
conduct simply cannot be satisfied. See Baldonado, 176 P.3d at 294. No fact alleged
demonstrates that Defendant’s conduct was “beyond all possible bounds of decency,”
see Trujillo, 41 P.3d at 343; on the contrary, it appears Defendant was fulfilling a fairly
ordinary employment‐related duty of securing Plaintiff’s signature on documents he
was required to sign. Therefore, regardless of Plaintiff’s level of subjective distress, no
relief can be granted.
C. Breach of Duty
Plaintiff asserts a claim of “Breach of Duty in a Grossly Negligent Manner.” Doc.
33 at 6–7. For this claim, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant [principal] had a legal duty to
protect the plaintiff … from harm [and that Defendant breached that duty by]
commit[ing] ‘ambush or simple assault’ with negligent or actual malice.” Id. at 6. The
“ambush or simple assault” identified is the same event which underpins the IIED
claim. The facts alleged do not establish any assault or ambush which breached a duty.
Thus, this claim is not cognizable and must be dismissed.
The Court also notes that, in this claim, Plaintiff references the school district’s
failure to investigate or act on the three grievances he filed in January 2025. Id. at 6–7.
He states the school district was “deliberately indifferent” to his grievances against
Defendant, thereby leaving him “more vulnerable” to Defendant’s subsequent conduct.
Id. at 7. However, as Defendant notes, see doc. 35 at 10, the school district is not a
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 9 of 14

10
defendant in this suit. 6 Defendant is sued in her individual capacity, and there is no
allegation that Defendant—as distinct from the school district—breached a duty with
respect to processing Plaintiff’s grievances. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim based
on inaction on the grievances.
D. False Imprisonment
Plaintiff alleges a claim of false imprisonment based on his presence in
Defendant’s office for 100 minutes on October 28, 2024. Doc. 33 at 7–8. To the extent
this is a state tort claim under the NMTCA, it fails for lack of notice as described above.
However, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s conduct “was constitutionally
impermissible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and violated his “Fifth 7 and Fourteenth
Amendment right . . . to be free from bodily confinement.” Id. at 8. Section 1983 claims
are not subject to the NMTCA’s notice requirement and the Court therefore considers
them separately.
6 On this point, the Court recognizes that “Gadsen Independent School District” is listed in the
caption of the operative complaint. Doc. 33 at 1. While this inclusion could support the argument that
the School District is a separate defendant, all other relevant indicators demonstrate conclusively, that it
is not. First, in the caption, the principal’s name is capitalized while the school district’s name is not. Id.
Second, in the caption, Plaintiff indicates that there is only one “DEFENDANT” rather than
“DEFENDANTS.” Id. Third, and relatedly, throughout the complaint, Plaintiff always uses the term
“Defendant” in the singular. See generally id. Lastly, and most importantly, throughout the complaint,
Plaintiff exclusively uses the term “Defendant” to refer to Principal Legarreta. Even when describing the
actions or inactions of the School District, it is never described as “Defendant.” Id.
7 Although Plaintiff cites the Fifth Amendment, claims of false imprisonment under § 1983 are
generally grounded in the Fourth Amendment, as explained below. See, e.g., Harvey v. Corneal, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 156997, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025) (“The constitutional analog to false arrest and false
imprisonment is the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 10 of 14

11
Under § 1983, a plaintiff may sue any person who, under color of state law,
subjects him to “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff who “has been imprisoned
without legal process . . . has a claim under the Fourth Amendment analogous to a tort
claim for false arrest or false imprisonment.” Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078,
1082 (10th Cir. 2008). “These torts are only analogies because § 1983 suits ultimately
rest on the Constitution, not on state (or federal) common law,” but they “guide us in
applying rules for the accrual of a cause of action.” Id. (citing Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d
1279, 1285–88 (10th Cir. 2004)); see also McGarry v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 294 F. Supp. 3d
1170, 1195 (D.N.M. 2018) (using New Mexico law as a “starting point” to determine the
contours of a § 1983 false imprisonment claim).
Under New Mexico law, false imprisonment “consists of intentionally confining
or restraining another person without his consent and with knowledge that he has no
lawful authority to do so.” Romero v. Sanchez, 895 P.2d 212, 215 (N.M. 1995) (quoting
NMSA § 30‐4‐3). Similarly, the general common law tort of false imprisonment
encompasses “[e]very confinement of the person,” including by “forcibly detaining”
them. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388–89 (2007). The Second Amended Complaint
does not allege that Defendant confined or restrained Plaintiff, only that the door was
closed. There is no allegation that Plaintiff was a minor during relevant events or that
he suffered from physical or mental disabilities rendering him unable to open a closed
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 11 of 14

12
door. The fact that Defendant informed Plaintiff there would be employment
consequences if he did not sign the documents, see doc. 33 at 8, does not elevate the
encounter to the level of false imprisonment. C.f. Diaz v. Lockheed Elecs., 618 P.2d 372,
373 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (denying summary judgment on false imprisonment claim
where plaintiffs were kept in a van for over two hours with an armed security guard
and the door handle was removed). The sixth cause of action is therefore dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
E. 	Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Plaintiff alleges a claim of cruel and unusual punishment based on the same facts
as the claim of false imprisonment. Doc. 33 at 9. Plaintiff does not specify whether his
claim arises under the Eight Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eight
Amendment guarantees the rights of convicted prisoners to “humane conditions of
confinement.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998). The Fourteenth
Amendment protects the same rights as applied to pretrial detainees. Hardy v. Rabie,
147 F.4th 1156, 1163 n.3 (10th Cir. 2025) (citing Garcia v. Salt Lake Cty., 768 F.2d 303, 307
(10th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff does not allege that he was convicted, arrested, or detained.
Indeed, as explained above, he does not allege that he was confined or restrained in any
meaningful sense. The claim must therefore be dismissed.
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 12 of 14

13
F. 	Quantum Meruit
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim of quantum meruit. He alleges that the school
board “had reasonable notice that the plaintiff expected salary compensation for [his]
teaching services,” but that “[d]ue to work related injury or illness on January 30, 2025,
the plaintiff could not teach for the school‐year 2025–2026 and as a result lost wages,
income or yearly‐salary [sic].” Doc. 33 at 10.
To prevail on a claim of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment under New
Mexico law, a party must show that “(1) another has been knowingly benefitted at one’s
expense (2) in a manner such that allowance of the other to retain the benefit would be
unjust.” Ontiveros Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695, 698 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
Recovery in quantum meruit is based not on the parties’ prior agreement, but on the
reasonable value of services actually rendered. Calderon v. Navarette, 800 P.2d 1058, 1059
(N.M. 1990). Under the facts alleged, no services were rendered during the 2025–2026
school year because Plaintiff was unable to teach. There is accordingly no plausible
claim for relief on a theory of quantum meruit.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (doc. 35) is GRANTED and all claims are hereby DISMISSED.
Because the Court finds that further amendment would be futile, the Second Amended
Complaint (doc. 33) and all claims alleged therein are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 13 of 14

14
See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted)
(“A dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.”).
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Sur‐Reply Filed Without Leave of Court (doc. 43)
and Defendant’s Motion to Strike Second Sur‐Reply Filed Without Leave of Court (doc.
46) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________________
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presiding by Consent
Case 2:25-cv-00220-GBW-KRS Document 47 Filed 02/06/26 Page 14 of 14