Blake v. New Mexico Corrections Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRIC COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
PRESTON J. BLAKE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 25-cv-113 JCH/JMR
NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Preston J. Blake’s Amended Prisoner’s Civil
Rights Complaint, (Doc. 5). 	Plaintiff is incarcerated, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
and he paid the required initial partial filing fee on December 3, 2025. (Doc. 25). Also before the
Court are thirteen motions filed by Plaintiff requesting, inter alia, relief relating to the filing fee,
discovery and depositions, appointment of counsel, injunctive relief, and to add claims and
Defendants. See (Docs. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33, 38, 39, and 41). Having reviewed
Plaintiff’s claims and the relevant law pursuant to the screening requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice and grant him leave to file a second
amended complaint, as set forth below.
I. 	Pending Motions
On August 12, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(Docs. 2 and 6), and assessed an initial partial filing fee of $13.95 based on his submitted financial
statement. (Doc. 15). The Court granted Plaintiff an extension to make the partial payment, and
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 1 of 12

2
on December 3, 2025, Plaintiff paid the initial filing fee. See (Docs. 17 and 25). 	Prior to paying
the initial filing fee, Plaintiff filed multiple motions asking the Court to reconsider the fee
assessment and further extend the payment deadline. See (Docs. 19, 20, 22, 38, and 41). Because
Plaintiff has paid the initial filing fee, the Court denies these motions are moot to the extent they
seek relief relating to payment of the initial fee.
Plaintiff also filed several motions seeking discovery and depositions, appointment of
counsel, injunctive relief, and to add claims and Defendants. See (Docs. 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33,
and 39). 	As to Plaintiff’s requests for appointment of counsel, “[c]ourts are not authorized to
appoint counsel in 1983 … cases; instead, courts can only ‘request’ an attorney to take the case”
on a pro bono basis. Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016). This decision is a matter
of discretion. 	Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 916 (10th Cir. 2012). 	Relevant factors include “the
merits of the claims, the nature of the claims, [the inmate’s] ability to present the claims, and the
complexity of the issues.” Rachel, 820 F.3d at 397. Considering these factors, the Court will not
ask a local attorney to handle this case on a pro bono basis. 	The claims pertain to Plaintiff’s
conditions of confinement and are not especially complex. Plaintiff’s filings also reflect he is able
to prosecute this action on a pro se basis. The requests to appoint counsel will therefore be denied
without prejudice.
As to Plaintiff’s requests for discovery and depositions, those requests are premature.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires
the Court to dismiss the claims sua sponte if Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune. 	Requests for discovery and depositions are
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 2 of 12

3
premature and unavailable prior to the Court’s completion of its screening obligation. See Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213-214 (2007).
The Court also denies Plaintiff’s requests for a preliminary injunction or protective order.
Plaintiff appears to seek a preliminary injunction or protective order relating to his placement in
the Mental Health Treatment Center, access to legal materials, retaliation, and confiscation of
property. 	See, e.g., (Docs. 24, 27, and 33). 	To obtain an injunction, a movant must clearly
establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to the movant
if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other
party; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to the public interest. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d
950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001). A federal court considering preliminary injunctive relief affecting the
conditions of a prisoner’s confinement must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on
public safety” and on prison operation. 	18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 	“[B]ecause the purpose of
preliminary injunctions is to preserve the relative positions of the parties until trial, they are
specifically disfavored if they alter the status quo, are mandatory (as opposed to prohibitory), or
afford the movant all the relief that could be recovered after a full trial.” Rudnick v. Raemisch, 731
F. App’x 753, 755 (10th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits such that his right to relief is clear and unequivocal, and he has not demonstrated a
likelihood of imminent irreparable harm. See Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189
(10th Cir. 2003) (“To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual and not
theoretical.”). Plaintiff has been able to make numerous filings and motions in this lawsuit, and
his claims have not yet survived screening. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s requests for a
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 3 of 12

4
preliminary injunction or protective order without prejudice. He may renew these requests if his
claims survive initial review.
Regarding Plaintiff’s motions to amend his claims and add parties, see, e.g., (Docs. 21, 27,
and 38), the Court grants these motions in part and will allow Plaintiff to file a single amended
complaint. He must include all claims and parties in that single amended complaint, as set forth
below.
II. 	Review of Plaintiff’s Claims
A. Intent to File Case in State Court
As an initial matter, it is not clear whether Plaintiff intended to file this action in this Court,
or if he intended to file in state court. In both the Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
marked out the name of this Court in the case caption and wrote: “In The Fifth Judicial District
Court, Lea County.” 	(Docs. 1 and 5). 	If Plaintiff intended to file in state court, he may file a
complaint in that court at the following address:
Fifth Judicial District Court
Lea County
100 N. Love St., Box 1A
Lovington, NM, 88260
B. Standards Governing Initial Review of Prisoner Complaints
To the extent Plaintiff intends to pursue federal claims, under the Prison Reform Litigation
Act (PLRA) federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners
seek redress from a government entity or officer. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	The Court must
identify any cognizable claim and dismiss any claim which is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 4 of 12

5
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court may also dismiss a complaint sua
sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) if “it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts
alleged, and allowing [plaintiff] an opportunity to amend [the] complaint would be futile.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotations omitted). To avoid dismissal for failure
to state a claim, a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right
to relief about the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
570. 	A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must
construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555. However, “when
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a [plausible] claim of entitlement to
relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558.
Because Plaintiff is pro se, his “pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. While pro
se pleadings are judged by the same legal standards that apply to represented litigants, the Court
can overlook the “failure to cite proper legal authority, … confusion of various legal theories, …
poor syntax and sentence construction, or … unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” 	Id.
Nevertheless, it is not the “proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for
the pro se litigant.” Id. Under these standards, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not survive
initial review for the reasons set forth below.
C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
The Amended Complaint consists of handwritten narratives discussing numerous claims
and defendants throughout, and generally appears to raise claims regarding retaliation, problems
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 5 of 12

6
with the prison grievance process, denial of medical care, and denial of access to the courts. See
(Doc. 5). Plaintiff has also filed multiple Letters, Notices, and Motions to Amend, amounting to
over 150 pages of additional allegations, defendants, and narratives. See (Docs. 18, 21, 23, 24, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, and 39). It appears Plaintiff seeks to add claims relating to his prison
placement and additional medical and retaliation claims. See, e.g., (Docs. 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, and
35).
Plaintiff’s pleadings do not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, which requires a short and plain
statement of the grounds for relief. “It is not the role of either the court or the defendant to sort
through a lengthy ... complaint and voluminous [supplemental pleadings] ... to construct plaintiff’s
causes of action.” McNamara v. Brauchler, 570 Fed. App’x 741, 743 (10th Cir. 2014) (citations
omitted). 	Moreover, plaintiffs are not permitted to file “kitchen-sink” or “shotgun” pleadings,
which “bring[] every conceivable claim against every conceivable defendant.” D.J. Young Pub.
Co., LLC ex rel. Young v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte, 2012 WL 4211669, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 18,
2012) (unpublished); see also Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th
Cir. 1989) (“The law recognizes a significant difference between notice pleading and ‘shotgun’
pleading.”). 	Shotgun pleadings are “pernicious” because they “unfairly burden defendants and
courts” by shifting onto them “the burden of identifying plaintiff’s genuine claims and determining
which of those claims might have legal support.” D.J. Young, 2012 WL 4211669, at *3; see also
Pola v. Utah, 458 Fed. App’x. 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that
was “incoherent, rambling, and include[d] everything but the kitchen sink”).
Here, Plaintiff’s filings present claims in a narrative form where Plaintiff discusses
numerous Defendants and constitutional and statutory violations throughout each claim. Plaintiff
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 6 of 12

7
does not clarify which cause of action is asserted against which Defendant, or what each Defendant
did that constitutes a violation of each asserted claim. Accepting Plaintiff’s piecemeal pleadings
would force the Court to “carefully comb through” the docket “to ascertain which [filings] contain
pertinent allegations to which a response is warranted.” McNamara, 570 Fed. App’x at 743. This
would be particularly difficult here, as Plaintiff’s legal theories and factual allegations are
intermingled with his arguments seeking relief. 	The piecemeal pleadings also impede the
screening function under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because the Court cannot discern which claims
Plaintiff seeks to pursue against which Defendants, or whether specific claims against specific
Defendants have merit.
D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To the extent some claims are discernable, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. “A cause of action under section 1983 requires the deprivation of a civil right by
a ‘person’ acting under color of state law.” 	McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trustees, 215 F.3d 1168, 1172
(10th Cir. 2000). 	The plaintiff must allege that each government official, through the official’s
own individual actions, has personally violated the Constitution. See Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d
1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 1998). There must also be a connection between the official conduct and
the constitutional violation. See Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008); Trask,
446 F.3d at 1046. 	In addition, “a successful § 1983 complaint must make clear exactly who is
alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of
the claim against him or her.” 	Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis in original).
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 7 of 12

8
Plaintiff does not specify how each Defendant was involved in the alleged wrongdoing,
which does not provide fair notice of the basis of the claims against each Defendant. See Baker v.
City of Loveland, 2017 WL 1485006, *1 (10th Cir. April 26, 2017) (A complaint is inadequate if
it “lacks clarity about what each defendant allegedly did to incur liability.”); see also Pahls v.
Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013) (“When various officials have taken different
actions with respect to a plaintiff, the plaintiff’s . . . passive-voice [allegations] showing that his
rights ‘were violated’ will not suffice. Likewise insufficient is a plaintiff’s more active voice yet
undifferentiated contention that ‘defendants’ infringed his rights.”). Plaintiff also appears to bring
claims against certain parties based solely on supervisory status. “[A] defendant’s role must be
more than one of abstract authority over individuals who actually committed a constitutional
violation.” 	Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1162. 	Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims against any Defendant
solely in their supervisory capacity, such as affirmance of prison grievances or classification
decisions, or bald assertions that a Defendant “allowed” or “approved” of an action by a
subordinate, are not sufficient to show the Defendant’s personal participation in the challenged
acts. 	See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (to plead supervisor’s
liability, plaintiff must show he or she personally directed alleged offensive conduct or knew
plaintiff’s rights were being violated but did not prevent it).
To the extent Plaintiff brings claims regarding the New Mexico Corrections Department
(NMCD) grievance procedures, alleged violations of prison regulations are not cognizable under
§ 1983. Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 482 (1995) (prison regulations and administrative policies are not intended “to confer rights
on inmates”); Anderson v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 185 F.3d 873, * 2 (10th Cir. 1999) (prisoner’s §
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 8 of 12

9
1983 “allegations relating to the requirements of the Department of Corrections grievance
procedure do not support a due process claim because those procedures do not create any liberty
interest in the incarcerated petitioner”); Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 n.4 (10th Cir.
1993) (“[A] failure to adhere to administrative regulations does not equate to a constitutional
violation.”). 	Plaintiff therefore cannot maintain a constitutional claim for NMCD mishandling
their grievance procedures.
III. 	Plaintiff May File an Amended Complaint
Consistent with these authorities, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint (Doc. 5)
without prejudice for failure to conform to Rule 8(a) and for failure to state a cognizable claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). The Tenth Circuit counsels that pro se plaintiffs should ordinarily be given
an opportunity to “remedy defects potentially attributable to their ignorance of federal law.”
Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff may file a single amended
complaint on the proper form § 1983 complaint within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order. The
amendment must contain all claims and list all Defendants that Plaintiff seeks to include in this
case, and it must not exceed 27 pages in length. It must also contain a short and plain statement
demonstrating the grounds for relief, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The amendment must
“make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with
fair notice as to the basis of the claim against him or her.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249-50 (emphasis
in original). 	Plaintiff must allege that each government official, through the official’s own
individual actions, has personally violated the Constitution. 	See Trask, 446 F.3d at 1046.
“Collective allegations” regarding the alleged wrongdoing will not meet this standard. Id. Plaintiff
is further reminded that if he wishes to name an entity or a prison supervisor, such defendants
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 9 of 12

10
cannot be liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Cannon v. City and County
of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 877 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 	The allegations must show the entity or prison supervisor is responsible
for a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation. See Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988,
993-94 (10th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff is also instructed that, to state a retaliation claim against a government official, he
must prove three elements: (1) the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2)
the defendant responded by causing an injury that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity;” and (3) the defendant’s adverse action was substantially
motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected activity. Shero v. City of Grove,
510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007); Rhodes v. Shannon, 2024 WL 79964, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan.
8, 2024). To show “substantial motivation,” Plaintiff must “allege specific facts that, if credited,
establish that ‘but for’ the defendant’s improper retaliatory motive ‘the incidents to which
[Plaintiff] refers ... would not have taken place.’” Allen v. Avance, 491 Fed. Appx. 1, 6 (10th Cir.
2012) (unpublished) (quoting Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d at 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998));
Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1069 (The “denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the
violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation
under § 1983.”); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999) (Plaintiff “must allege
more than his personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation.”).
To the extent Plaintiff intends to bring an Eighth Amendment claim, such claims require a
showing that each defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate … safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 10 of 12

11
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994). In the context of failure to protect cases, prison officials must be aware of specific
facts that the attacker could be dangerous. See, e.g., Miles v. Conrad, 805 Fed. App’x 607, 611
(10th Cir. 2020) (finding no constitutional violation where plaintiff “communicated several times
with prison staff that [his] cellmate was stealing from him and that they were not getting along,”
but “none of the … reports indicate[d] aggressive or threatening behavior by” the attacker); Gray
v. Sorrels, 744 Fed. App’x 563, 570 (10th Cir. 2018) (complaint failed to state a claim even though
prison doctors knew plaintiff’s attacker/cellmate stopped taking his psychotropic medication, as
there are were no specific warnings that the attacker could become violent).
Plaintiff is finally advised that any amendment will supersede the Amended Complaint and
must include all federal and state claims he wishes to pursue in this case. If Plaintiff fails to timely
amend his complaint as set forth above, the Court may dismiss all federal § 1983 claims with or
without prejudice; decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims; and
dismiss all state law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motions seeking relief relating to the initial partial filing fee, (Docs. 19, 20, 22,
38, and 41), are DENIED as moot;
2. 	Plaintiff’s Motions seeking discovery and depositions, appointment of counsel, injunctive
relief, and to add claims and Defendants, (Docs. 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 33, and 39), are
GRANTED in part and DENIED without prejudice in part, as set forth above;
3. 	Plaintiff’s Amended Prisoner’s Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 5) is DISMISSED without
prejudice; and
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 11 of 12

12
4. 	Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the
entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
_______________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-00113-JCH-JMR Document 42 Filed 06/01/26 Page 12 of 12