Rieck v. Sanchez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DEAN M. RIECK,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 2:25-cv-0066-JB-JHR
ALFRED SANCHEZ, and
KIM STEWART,
Defendants.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION TO GRANT [8]
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT AND DENY [12]
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SURREPLY
THIS MATTER comes before me on Defendant Alfred Sanchez’s and Kim Stewart’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 8]. Pro se plaintiff Dean M. Rieck filed a response
in opposition [Doc. 9], and Defendants replied [Doc. 10]. Presiding District Judge James Browning
referred this case to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3) to submit proposed findings
and a recommended disposition. [Doc. 20]. After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the record, and
the applicable law, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 8]
and DENY Rieck’s motion for leave to file a surreply [Doc. 12].
I. 	BACKGROUND
Rieck’s complaint seeks the return of certain property confiscated during and after his arrest
for various crimes in 2014. [Doc. 1]. Rieck was released from prison and discharged from
probation in 2024. Id. at 8. He then contacted the Dona Ana Sherriff’s Office to request an
“evidence review” of all his property confiscated during his 2014 arrest. Id. “After many phone
calls and e-mails,” Rieck says he “was finally allowed to conduct an evidence review on 6-13-
2024.” Id. His efforts yielded “most (75%)” of his property released on August 27, 2024. Id. at 9.
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However, he complains that his emails requesting the rest of his property—including laptops,
tablets, hard drives and other electronics—were ignored. Id. 	at 10. Rieck seeks a declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, and money damages for this alleged unconstitutional deprivation of
property. Id. at 12, 13.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint arguing that Rieck fails to state a claim because
he did not exhaust the remedies available to him at the state court level. [Doc. 8]. Defendants
explain that procedural due process requires a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, typically in
the form of a hearing. Id. at 8 (collecting cases). They contend that Rieck’s informal emails fail to
meet this standard and note that he has not filed any sort of state court lawsuit to recover his
property. Id. Rieck responds by critiquing Defendant’s citation to Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984) as inapplicable because he was out of custody when his property was confiscated. Id. at 2–
3. Defendants reply that the general principle of Hudson advancing a meaningful remedy to cure
property deprivation by the state still stands, and regardless, Rieck did not use any state remedy
before filing this lawsuit. [Doc. 10]. Rieck also requests leave to file a surreply to further scrutinize
non-dispositive aspects of Defendants’ case law. [Doc. 12].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendants may move for dismissal for part or all of a complaint for failure to state a
plausible claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is “plausible” when the court can
reasonably infer from the complaint that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must put forth facts
stating a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Id. Only factual allegations matter to this
determination and the court must disregard assumptions, speculation, or legal conclusions within
the complaint. Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 606–07 (10th Cir. 2022).
In addition, while not needing lengthy or detailed facts the plaintiff must elaborate beyond “an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However,
the court must construe the complaint and make all reasonable inferences from it in favor of the
plaintiff. Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Law Regarding Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process.
The Constitution prohibits the government from taking a citizen's life, liberty, or property
“without due process of law.’” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. When a plaintiff alleges that a state
seized his property in violation of his procedural due process rights, he must first exhaust state-
level process before seeking federal relief. Pinder v. Mitchell, 658 F. App'x 451, 453 (10th Cir.
2016). To determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, “it is necessary to ask what
process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 126 (1990). A plaintiff can only claim a taking of property occurred without due process
of law if the state provided no remedies or inadequate remedies. Pinder, 658 F. App'x at 453-454
(collecting cases).
The Tenth Circuit prescribes a two-step inquiry in determining whether an individual's
procedural due process rights were violated: (i) “Did the individual possess a protected property
interest to which due process protection was applicable?”; and (ii) “Was the individual afforded
an appropriate level of process?” Camuglia v. The City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th
Cir.2006) (quoting Clark v. City of Draper, 168 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir.1999)). 	As for the
second step, ordinarily one who has a protected property interest is entitled to a hearing before the
government acts to impair that interest, although the hearing need not necessarily provide all, or
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even most, of the protections a trial affords. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
The hearing required depends on: (i) the nature of the private interest at stake; (ii) the risk of
erroneous deprivation given the procedures already guaranteed, and whether additional procedural
safeguards would prove valuable; and (iii) the government's interest and the burdens that additional
procedures might impose. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
“Due process is flexible and calls [only] for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.” Id. at 334 (internal quotation and brackets omitted). For example, “[w]here .
. . the state must act quickly [to seize property], a meaningful post-deprivation hearing is
adequate.” Clark, 168 F.3d at 1189. In that regard, the court must determine “whether the
deprivation was ‘random,’ whether pre-deprivation due process was impracticable, and whether
the state actor was not authorized to take the action that deprived the plaintiff of his liberty.”
Gonzales v. Trujillo, CIV 00-0615, 2001 WL 37125352, at *5 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2001) (finding
officer excessive force in effecting arrest to be a random incident thus precluding pre-deprivation
process) (internal citation omitted). To state a claim for denial of procedural due process, “the
plaintiff must plead and prove that a post-deprivation remedy is not available.” Id.
B. I Propose Finding that Rieck Has Not Exhausted His State Level Remedies and
Therefore Cannot Seek Federal Relief.
I recommend the Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss because Rieck failed to
employ any post-deprivation remedy in state court before filing in federal court. There appears to
be no dispute that Rieck has a protected property interest in his electronic devices. Law
enforcement confiscated Rieck’s electronics pursuant to a pre-arrest search warrant, which made
pre-deprivation process impracticable. See Gonzales, 2001 WL 37125352, at *5. 	Nonetheless,
post-deprivation remedies in state court are still available to Rieck which remain unused and
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“preclude a claim for a denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
(citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-536 (1984)).
As Defendants note, Rieck can pursue post-deprivation remedies under several theories.
[Doc. 8, at 3]; See, e.g., Nosker v. Trinity Land Co., 1988-NMCA-035, ¶ 20 (conversion); United
States v. Copeman, 458 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2006) (state judicial-forfeiture); Rule 5-212(A)
NMRA (motion to return property); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-12 (violation of property right or
property damage via New Mexico Tort Claims Act). What is clear is that Rieck’s informal emails
to the Dona Ana Sherriff’s Office asking for his electronics do not constitute meaningful process.
Rieck’s response and motion for surreply focusing on irrelevant points fail to persuade otherwise.
See [Docs. 9, 12]. In sum, Rieck has adequate state remedies at his disposal, “even if imperfect,”
which he has not pled nor proven unavailable. See Copeman, 458 F.3d at 1073. Thus, Rieck fails
to state a claim for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. See Pinder, 658 F.
App'x at 453.
IV. 	CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the above reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court GRANT Defendants Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 8] and DENY Rieck’s Motion for Leave to File a Surreply
[Doc. 12].
I further recommend the Court allow Rieck the opportunity to file an amended complaint
in order to plead exhaustion of state-level remedies within 30 days of entry of this Order. Should
Rieck fail to comply either with the state remedy requirement or the time to file, I recommend
the Court dismiss the matter without prejudice.
_________________________
HON. JERRY H. RITTER
United States Magistrate Judge
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THE PARTIES ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE
of a copy of these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, they may file written
objections with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party
must file any objections with the Clerk of the District Court within the 14-day period if
that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings and recommended
disposition. If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed.
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