Owen v. Audubon Field Solutions, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DAVID OWEN,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 2:24-cv-0215 MLG/DLM
AUDUBON FIELD SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Audubon Field Solutions, LLC’s Corrected
Motion for Reconsideration and for Protection. (Doc. 106.) Owen timely responded (Doc. 112),
and Audubon did not file a reply brief. As explained below, the Court will DENY the motion.
I. 	Legal Standards
A. 	Motions to Reconsider
Audubon asks the Court to reconsider the rulings it made on certain documents central to
Owen’s Motion to Compel. (See Docs. 78; 103.) Audubon’s motion “is considered ‘an
interlocutory motion invoking the [Court’s] general discretionary authority to review and revise
interlocutory rulings prior to entry of final judgment.’” See Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d
1217, 1223 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Rule 54(b) provides that a district court can
freely reconsider its prior rulings.” Med Flight Air Ambulance, Inc. v. MGM Resorts Int’l, No. 17-
CV-0246 WJ/KRS, 2018 WL 1997292, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 27, 2018) (citing Lujan v. City of Santa
Fe, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1238 (D.N.M. 2015)). “In addition, the rule ‘puts no limit or governing
standard [on] the district court’s ability to do so, other than that it must do so before the entry of
judgment.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 122 F. Supp. at 1238 (quotation marks omitted)). The Court “may
look to the standard used to review a motion made pursuant to . . . Rule 59(e)[,]” Ankeney v.
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Zavaras, 524 F. App’x 454, 458 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added), but it “has not cabined district
courts’ discretion beyond what [R]ule 54(b) provides[,]” Lujan, 122 F. Supp. at 1238 (citing Been
v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007)). In Med Flight Air Ambulance, for
example, the court was “guided by concerns of judicial economy, avoiding piecemeal litigation,
and the posture of all the parties involved.” See 2018 WL 1997292, at *6. And in Lujan, the court
considered (1) “how thoroughly the earlier ruling addressed the specific findings or conclusions
that the motion to reconsider challenge[d]”; (2) “the case’s overall progress and posture, the motion
for reconsideration’s timeliness relative to the ruling it challenges, and any direct evidence the
parties . . . produce[d]”; and (3) the grounds courts use to consider a motion to reconsider brought
under Rule 59(e). 122 F. Supp. 3d at 1238–39; see also Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d
1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000)). “Grounds for granting a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e)
include: ‘(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously
unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Ankeney, 524
F. App’x at 458 (quoting Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012).
B. 	Motions for Protective Order
“The trial court has discretion to grant a protective order pursuant to rule 26(c).” Bhasker
v. Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 361 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1119 (D.N.M. 2019) (citation omitted). The party
seeking the protective order has the burden to show good cause for the order. See id. (citations
omitted). The movant “must submit ‘a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as
distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’” Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,
452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981)).
II. 	Analysis
Audubon argues that certain documents are “privileged attorney-client and attorney work
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product for the reasons discussed in Audubon’s response to Owen’s motion and supporting
declarations from Dan Wellons . . . .” (See Doc. 106 at 2 (citing Docs. 79 at 12–16; 79-14 at 1–13;
36-6, Ex. 14).) It argues that other documents should not be disclosed on the basis that “they reflect
privileged discussions regarding matters that are not relevant to Owen’s claims or Audubon’s
defenses.” (Id. at 3.)
Beyond these general assertions, Audubon offers no new argument or authority in support
of its motion to reconsider. This failure is detrimental to its motion. Much of the requested
discovery has been at issue since June 24, 2024. (See Doc. 78 at 1 & n.1.) As the Court noted at
the discovery hearing, “Audubon never provided a privilege log as required by Rule 26(b)(5)(A)
and as directed by the undersigned at the December 1, 2025 informal discovery conference.” (Doc.
103 at 7 (citing Doc. 74 at 3).) Because Audubon fails to develop a well-reasoned argument to
establish that the documents should not be produced, the Court will deny the motion to reconsider.
Moreover, Audubon fails to develop any argument to show good cause for a protective
order. Owen asks the Court to order Audubon to “simply produce all the documents for an
attorneys’ eyes-only review.” (See Doc. 112 at 2.) The Court finds Owen’s proposed solution may
be adequate. The Court will order the parties to confer and submit a proposed stipulated protective
order for the Court’s consideration.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Audubon’s Corrected Motion for Reconsideration
and for Protection (Doc. 106) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 105) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than April 13, 2026, Audubon shall produce
all documents that are not at issue in the motion to reconsider. Audubon must contemporaneously
file a notice with the Court confirming the production.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall, no later than April 18, 2026, submit
a proposed stipulated protective order regarding the documents at issue in the motion to reconsider
(Bates-stamped 00001–2, 000013, 000023–27, 000038–39, 0000550–551, 555–560, 574–575,
576–588, 614–615, 631–632, 635).
_______________________________________
DAMIAN L. MARTINEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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