USA v. Jensen-Tanner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Case No. 2:22-cr-00368-MIS
CHRISTOPHER JENSEN-TANNER,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELEASE
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Christopher Jensen-Tanner’s Motion
for Extraordinary Release (“Motion”), ECF No. 71, filed March 18, 2026. Because Defendant
provided no evidence in support of his Motion, and because, even if he had, compassionate release
is not merited, the Court will DENY the Motion.
I. Background
On March 8, 2022, a Grand Jury sitting in the District of New Mexico returned a thirty-
eight count Indictment charging Defendant with thirty-four counts of wire fraud (Counts 1-34), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and four counts of engaging in monetary transactions in property
derived from specified unlawful activity (Counts 35-38), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
Indictment, ECF No. 2. On April 26, 2023, Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a written Plea
Agreement to Counts 5 and 37 of the Indictment. Plea Agreement at 5-6, ECF No. 35; Plea Min.
Sheet at 1, ECF No. 37.
Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) outlining the offense conduct. ECF No. 41. Briefly, Defendant
owned and operated Roswell Escrow Services, Inc. (“RES”), which (1) served as a Qualified
Intermediary for 1031 exchanges, and (2) serviced real estate contracts. Id. ¶ 13. Both functions
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entail holding money for clients that either should be left untouched and unspent (1031 exchanges)
or may only be spent for limited purposes (real estate contracts). Id. Around 2017, Defendant
began living beyond his means and began using clients’ funds to pay for his personal lifestyle
which included frequent travel, luxury goods, and personal real estate purchases. Id. Eventually,
Defendant’s scheme was discovered and an investigation revealed that RES had a shortfall of funds
owed to customers nearing $3,000,000. Id. ¶ 19. Ultimately, the total loss amounted to
$1,219,928.92. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
The PSR assigned Defendant a Total Offense Level of 23 which included a two-level
increase under United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) for using
sophisticated means, id. ¶ 36, a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 for abusing a position
of public or private trust, id. ¶ 38, and a three-level decrease under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) & (b) for
acceptance of responsibility, id. ¶¶ 42-43. Because Defendant had no prior criminal history, his
criminal history score was zero, which established a Criminal History Category of I. Id. ¶ 48.
With a Total Offense Level of 23 and a Criminal History Category of I, Defendant’s advisory
guideline imprisonment range was 46 to 57 months. Id. ¶ 82.
On July 25, 2024, the Court held a sentencing hearing during which it adopted the PSR’s
factual findings, accepted the Plea Agreement, and sentenced Defendant on Counts 5 and 37 to
concurrent terms of 46 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release.1
Sentencing Min. Sheet, ECF No. 56; see also Judgment, ECF No. 57. On September 25, 2024, the
Court entered an Unopposed Order of Restitution. ECF No. 65.
1 On July 30, 2024, the Court granted the Government’s Motion to Dismiss the remaining counts.
ECF No. 59.
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On March 18, 2026, Defendant, though counsel, filed the instant Motion for Extraordinary
Release, invoking 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. 71.
According to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)’s website, Defendant is currently being
detained at FCI Atlanta, and is scheduled for release on May 31, 2027.
II. Legal Standard
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of
2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, contains the so-called “compassionate release”
provision. That statute provides, in relevant part:
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment.—The court may not
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
(1) in any case—
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier,
may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation
or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the
unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the
factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it
finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction;
. . .
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The court may grant compassionate release (or otherwise reduce a sentence) pursuant to
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) only if the movant establishes all three of the following elements: (1) that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[;]” (2) the “reduction is consistent
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with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[;]” and (3) the applicable
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support a sentence reduction. United States v. Maumau,
993 F.3d 821, 831 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (10th
Cir. 2021). A district court may deny compassionate release if any of these elements is lacking.
Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 n.4; McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043. “The moving defendant bears the burden
of establishing that such a ‘compassionate release’ is warranted under the statute.” United States
v. Moreno, 519 F. Supp. 3d 937, 941 (D. Kan. 2021).
Effective November 1, 2023, the United States Sentencing Commission revised U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 “rendering the policy statement applicable and controlling the definition of
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ when a prisoner initiates a § 3582(c)(1)(A) proceeding.”
United States v. Mulder, Case No. 19-CR-0157-001-JFH, 2024 WL 382048, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Jan.
31, 2024). Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the Court may reduce a term of imprisonment if:
(1)(A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or
(B) The defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 30 years in
prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) for the offense or
offenses for which the defendant is imprisoned;
(2) The defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the
community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); and
(3) The reduction is consistent with this policy statement.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). As relevant here, extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence
reduction include certain medical circumstances of the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1).
Specifically, the Policy Statement’s “Medical Circumstances of the Defendant” provision states
that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist if:
(A) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced
illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e.,
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a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples
include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-
stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(B) The defendant is--
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging
process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-
care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she
is not expected to recover.
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or
specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant
is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.
(D) The defendant presents the following circumstances--
(i) the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at imminent risk
of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or (II) an
ongoing public health emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or
local authority;
(ii) due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the defendant is at
increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death as a result of
exposure to the ongoing outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public
health emergency described in clause (i); and
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1).
III. Discussion
a. Exhaustion
As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that he exhausted his administrative remedies with
BOP by submitting a request for compassionate release to the Warden of FCI Atlanta in October
2025, which was subsequently denied on December 30, 2025. Mot. at 2. However, he failed to
provide any proof of exhaustion. This failure is grounds enough for denying the Motion. See
United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1029-31 (10th Cir. 2021) (observing that because the
defendant had “failed to provide proof that he exhausted his administrative rights as is required
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)” it typically “would be the end of the line for” the defendant, but ultimately
holding that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional but instead is a
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mandatory claim-processing rule, and finding that the Government waived the exhaustion issue by
failing to argue it on appeal); United States v. Fillman, Case No. 06-10218-JWB, 2025 WL
1918570, at *3 (D. Kan. July 11, 2025) (denying a motion for compassionate release because the
defendant “failed to establish proof that he exhausted his administrative remedies under §
3582(c)(1)(A)” and the Government did not waive the issue).
b. Extraordinary and compelling reasons
Even assuming arguendo that Defendant did, in fact, exhaust his administrative remedies
as required by § 3582(c)(1)(A), or that the Government would waive the issue, Defendant failed
to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.
Defendant argues that extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant his release
under the “Medical Circumstances of the Defendant” provision of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)
because he “is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that substantially diminishes
his ability to provide self-care within the BOP[.]” See Mot. at 2. In this regard, Defendant argues
that on August 19, 2025, while incarcerated at FCI Atlanta, he “suffered cardiac arrest, he was
pulseless, technically dead, and had to be resuscitated.” Id. He states that the “likely trigger” for
this event was “severe single-vessel coronary artery disease, specifically a 90–99% calcified
blockage (stenosis) in the ostial portion of his Left Anterior Descending (LAD) artery[.]” Id. at 3.
He states that the “single-vessel coronary artery disease is extremely severe, characterized as life-
threatening and requiring urgent surgical intervention.” Id. He has subsequently undergone a
coronary artery bypass graft, which restored blood flow to his heart “but did not remove the
underlying atherosclerotic disease from his native arteries.” Id. at 4. He was discharged with
“Coronary Artery Disease” and an ongoing “discharge problem” and prescribed “a daily lifelong
regimen of medications, including aspirin, Plavix (clopidogrel), statins (atorvastatin), and beta-
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blockers (metoprolol).” Id. Defendant has experienced what he describes as “ongoing
complications” since his release from the hospital and return to FCI Atlanta. Id. at 5.
However, once again, Defendant provides no proof of any of these statements—he has
provided no medical records, prison records, or evidence of any kind supporting his assertions.
Therefore, he has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting
compassionate release. See United States v. Yong, 95-CR-0825(JS), 2024 WL 3648259, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2024) (“[I]n considering Defendant’s health condition, i.e., hypertension, and
its management, the Court notes Defendant has not provided any medical records substantiating
the condition he asserts he suffers; yet, it is his burden to prove compassionate release is
warranted.”); United States v. Wagner, No. 17-CR-0106, 2024 WL 2801981, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May
31, 2024) (finding, where the defendant did not provide any medical records substantiating the
conditions from which he asserted he suffered, the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing
entitlement to compassionate release based upon those purported medical conditions); United
States v. Caitano, CR. NO. 18-00167 HG-02, 2022 WL 16553362, at *3 (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 2022)
(denying motion for compassionate release where the defendant alleged “a number of new medical
conditions without providing supporting evidence”).
Defendant has further failed to prove that his alleged conditions substantially diminish his
ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility. Consequently, he has
failed to establish that release would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s Policy Statement. See
United States v. Farmer, 04-CR-0209(JS), 2025 WL 3033762, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2025)
(“[U]pon the record presented, which does not include any of Defendant’s medical records,
Defendant has failed to show his medical condition so incapacitate[d] him as to warrant a reduction
of his sentence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Yong, 2024 WL 3648259, at *6
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(finding that “in the absence of records demonstrating his suffering from hypertension to such a
degree that he is unable to self-care, Defendant cannot sustain his burden warranting
compassionate release”).
c. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
Even assuming arguendo that Defendant has established (1) he exhausted his
administrative remedies, (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, and
(3) that a sentence reduction would be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission, the Court finds that the 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence
reduction.
First, the nature and circumstances of Defendant’s offense are serious. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1). Defendant was convicted of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and engaging
in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1957. See Judgment, ECF No. 57. There are at least ten identifiable victims of
Defendant’s crimes whose accumulated loss total $786,659.59. PSR ¶ 24. Defendant used money
the victims entrusted to him to fund his personal lifestyle which included frequent travel, luxury
goods, and personal real estate purchases. Id. ¶¶ 13, 20. When including unpaid taxes, the total
loss amounted to $1,219,928.92. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. The nature and circumstances of Defendant’s
crimes do not support compassionate release. See United States v. Shepherd, Case No. 4:19-cr-
00128-DN-PK-3, 2020 WL 7771029, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 30, 2020) (finding that the nature and
circumstances of the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud did not support
compassionate release where the defendant conspired “with his family members to defraud an
elderly woman (1) by soliciting payments of cash and assets in exchange for false promises to
perform work for [the victim] and (2) by helping and encouraging Frank Powell to engage in a
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romance fraud in which he enticed [the victim] into a fake romantic relationship”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Court acknowledges that Defendant has no prior criminal history. However, the Court
finds that under the circumstances of this case, a reduction of Defendant’s 46-month sentence is
not warranted when considering the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the offense, and to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) – (C). To begin with,
Defendant’s 46-month sentence is at the bottom of the guideline imprisonment range. See PSR ¶
82. He was sentenced on July 25, 2024, ECF Nos. 56, 57, and has therefore served approximately
20 months of his sentence. The Court finds that granting Defendant’s Motion after serving less
than half of his sentence “would do little to ‘promote respect for the law’ or ‘provide just
punishment for the offense.’” United States v. Daugerdas, 613 F. Supp. 3d 807, 812 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)); see also United States v. Goldberg, 13-CR-120 (JMA),
2020 WL 6273947, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2020) (finding that granting compassionate release to
defendant convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud after serving less
than 30% of his sentence “would create an unwarranted sentence disparity among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[,]” “fail to reflect the seriousness
of the offense Defendant committed and would not provide a just punishment for his conduct[,]”
and “would also undermine the Court’s attempt to use the sentence to promote respect for the law
and serve as a deterrent for criminal conduct”).
When considering all of the applicable 3553(a) factors, the Court finds that a sentence
reduction is not merited. See Goldberg, 2020 WL 6273947, at *3; see also United States v. Weir,
22cr695-001 (DLC), 2024 WL 3429480, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2024) (finding that the 3553(a)
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factors did not support compassionate release for defendant who was convicted of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud where “[h]e engaged for many months in a massive fraud, a fraud from which
he personally profited handsomely”); United States v. McDonald, Case No. 4:20-cr-00029-DN,
2022 WL 604860, at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 1, 2022) (finding that the 3553(a) factors did not support
compassionate release for defendant who was convicted of wire fraud where the defendant
embezzled over $400,000 from the company he worked for, “violating his fiduciary duties and
trust”).
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Christopher Jensen-Tanner’s
Motion for Extraordinary Release, ECF No. 71, is DENIED.
………………………………………….
MARGARET STRICKLAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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