Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DJURABEK JURAEV,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00720-SMD-SCY
GEORGE DEDOS, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record,
and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Djurabek Juraev, a citizen of Uzbekistan, entered the United States without
inspection on August 10, 2016. Doc. 1 ¶ 1. Immigration authorities apprehended him shortly upon
entry and initially placed him in expedited removal proceedings pursuant to Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 235(b)(1). Id. Petitioner’s Notice to Appear dated September 8, 2016
did not classify him as an “arriving alien.” See Doc. 1-2 at 1. After a positive credible fear
determination, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) elected to initiate full removal
proceedings under INA § 240. Doc. 1 ¶ 2. An immigration judge subsequently released Petitioner
on a $10,000 bond pursuant to INA § 236(a). Id. Petitioner argues that his release on bond
confirms that § 236(a), rather than § 235(b), governs his detention. Id. Since his release, Petitioner
has married Manzura Rustamova and established a stable residence in Florida. Id. ¶ 3.
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On June 21, 2017, Petitioner filed Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for
Withholding of Removal. Id. ¶ 5. DHS issued Petitioner a valid Employment Authorization
Document, effective from May 26, 2025 to May 25, 2030. Id. Petitioner maintained a commercial
driver’s license, worked as a commercial truck driver, and allegedly paid taxes. Id. Furthermore,
Petitioner asserts that he has no criminal record, has complied with all terms of his release, and
has appeared at every scheduled immigration court hearing for nearly ten years. Id. ¶ 6.
On June 19, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner while he was working as a truck driver and
transferred him to New Mexico. Id. ¶ 7. On July 16, 2025, an immigration judge denied bond for
lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 8. The immigration judge alternatively denied bond on the merits,
finding that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving he was not a flight risk and
characterizing his claims for relief as “speculative.” Id. Petitioner has appealed this decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), where the matter remains pending. Id. ¶ 10.
On January 26, 2026, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and
ordered Petitioner removed to Uzbekistan. Id. ¶ 11. Petitioner’s appeal of this decision is also
currently pending before the BIA. Id.
Petitioner challenges his ongoing detention and seeks immediate release, asserting that the
denial of a bond hearing violates the INA, the Suspension Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Id.
¶ 36–55. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a constitutionally adequate bond
hearing.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
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a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
Mass. 2025); see also, Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
Petitioner has resided in the United States for approximately ten years since his entry in 2016 and
was recently detained in the U.S. interior. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 7. He is therefore not subject to the
mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, which apply to those seeking admission, specifically
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noncitizens who present at a port of entry or are apprehended immediately after entering.
Petitioner is instead entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). See Aragon v. Noem, No. 2:26-
CV-00065, 2026 WL 458449, at *2 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, ___ F.
Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 3485771, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025); Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No.
1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Pu Sacvin v. De
Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025); see
also Figuera v. Ripa, No. 26-CV-20307-JB, 2026 WL 467569, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2026);
Wuilmer v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3236 (NEB/JFD), 2026 WL 458457, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026);
Villatoro v. Ripa, No. 2:26-CV-00213-SPC-DNF, 2026 WL 452432, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18,
2026).
II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
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stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018).
The Government has offered neither a justification nor a formal process for the deprivation
of Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. The combination of release on bond and the issuance of
a valid Employment Authorization Document by DHS creates a constitutionally protected interest
that cannot be revoked without providing due process of law. While the Court recognizes that
neither bond nor an Employment Authorization Document constitutes formal legal status to remain
in the country, any revocation of these interests must still comport with constitutional procedural
safeguards.
The United State’s power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and was deprived
of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
The Government concedes that the material facts of this case are similar from those in
Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063-SMD-GJF, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb.
11, 2026). See Doc. 7 at 3. Furthermore, the Government acknowledges that Martin Ramirez
controls the outcome here should the Court adhere to that precedent. See id. Because Respondents
have offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief
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pursuant to § 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869; Cortez-Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771,
at *3.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 24 hours of this Order being entered;
3) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by notifying Petitioner’s counsel when and where he can be collected, and by
providing all necessary identity and travel documents to board a domestic flight to
return to Florida;
4) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
5) Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
6) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
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7) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order and to entertain
any motions for attorneys’ fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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