Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
____________________
ERNESTO GONZALEZ RAMOS,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 1:25-cv-00975-MLG-KRS
GEORGE DEDOS, in his official capacity
as Warden of Cibola County Correctional Center;
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, in her official capacity
as Field Office Director of the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal
Operations; KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
and PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as
Attorney General,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Ernesto Gonzalez Ramos was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
agents while at his workplace in Downey, California. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶¶ 21, 23 (English Translation of
Petitioner’s Declaration). He is presently confined at the Cibola County Correctional Center in
Milan, New Mexico; he has been held there since June 25, 2025. Id. at 2-3 ¶¶ 10-11, 14. The
question presented in this matter is whether his continued detention, without a bond hearing,
comports with relevant statutory law and decisional authority. The Court holds that it does not.1
Gonzalez Ramos is entitled to a bond hearing.
1 Nearly every other court to address the matter has reached a similar result (including this one).
See Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835-DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17,
2025); Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432 (D.N.M.
Nov. 14, 2025); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-00985-MLG-KK, 2025 WL 3485771, at
*4 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025); see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1257-61 (W.D.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Gonzalez Ramos is a noncitizen present in the United States without admission or parole.
Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 1; Doc. 12 at 1 ¶ 2. For that reason, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
initiated removal proceedings against him. Doc. 12 at 2 ¶ 5. Gonzalez Ramos remains in custody.
Id. ¶ 10. Seeking release, he filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 on October 7, 2025. Doc. 1. Gonzalez Ramos asserts that his continued detention at in the
Cibola County Processing Center violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(A)(6), the Fourth Amendment, and the
Fifth Amendment. Doc. 1 at 8-13 ¶¶ 35-53. After receiving Gonzalez Ramos’s filing, the Court
required him to effectuate service on the Respondents. Doc. 3. Once served, Director De Anda-
Ybarra, Secretary Noem, and Attorney General Bondi (“Federal Respondents”) filed a Response
to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 27, 2025. Docs. 6, 7. They argue Gonzalez
Ramos’s detention is lawful and comports with § 1225. Doc. 12 at 4-6.
The Court held a hearing on the Petition thereafter. Doc. 20. After some discussion on the
matter, Gonzalez Ramos requested that he be afforded leave to withdraw his original Petition and
file a new pleading that includes a request for a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See id.
The Court ultimately allowed Gonzalez Ramos to file an amended Petition (rather than begin his
writ anew). Id.
On November 12, 2025, Gonzalez Ramos filed his Amendment to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Amendment”) asserting that his prolonged detention without an individualized
Wash. 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 483-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Jimenez v.
FCI Berlin, No. 25-cv-326-LM-AJ, 2025 WL 2639390 (D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); Cerritos
Echevarria v. Bondi, No. CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *4-5 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 3, 2025) (collecting cases); Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25-cv-10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at
*5 n.8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025) (collecting cases).
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bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and is also inconsistent with §
1226. Doc. 21 at 2:1-2:7.2 Federal Respondents filed a Response to the Amendment, asserting
Gonzalez Ramos’s detention is mandatory as required by § 1225(b). Doc. 23 at 4-13.3
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Standard for Writ of Habeas Corpus
This Court is authorized to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody
. . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought
directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
B. 	The Relevant Statutes
The primary question presented in Gonzalez Ramos’s Amendment is whether 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b) or § 1226 governs. See Doc. 21. Although both statutory provisions address the detention
2 The parties do not address whether Gonzalez Ramos requested an individualized bond hearing
prior to filing his Petition or Amendment. See Docs. 1, 12, 21, 23, 25. Regardless, on September
5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec.
216 (BIA 2025). In its decision, the BIA “categorically considers anyone arrested within the United
States and charged with being inadmissible to be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A).” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS, 2025 WL 2591530, at *1, *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
2025)). Additionally, the decision purports to preclude immigration judges (“IJ”) from providing
§ 1226(a) bond hearings to people present in the United States unlawfully due to lack of
jurisdiction, “rendering any attempt to seek relief directly from the agency futile.” Pu Sacvin, 2025
WL 3187432, at *2.
3 Respondent George Dedos, Warden of Cibola County Correction Center, joined in the Federal
Respondents Responses to the Petition and Amendment. Docs. 17, 24.
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of noncitizens4 prior to a final order of removal, they have distinct applications. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).
1. 	Section 1225(b)
Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States,”
i.e., “applicants for admission.”5 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. It requires, inter alia, that all applicants
for admission be inspected by an immigration officer. § 1225(a)(3). During that process, the
immigration officer must determine whether an applicant is covered by either §§ 1225(b)(1) or
1225(b)(2). See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Noncitizens who are arriving in the United States and
initially deemed inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C) or (a)(7) due to fraud, misrepresentation, or
lack of valid documentation are treated in accordance with § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Other noncitizens
may also fall within the statute’s purview as designated by the Attorney General if they have not
been admitted or paroled and were not continuously present in the United States for the two-year
period prior to that determination. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) also
addresses the situation where, during the inspection process, the noncitizen indicates either a fear
of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum. If the immigration officer deems that claim
credible, then the noncitizen must be “detained for further consideration of the application for
asylum.” 	§ 	1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). 	The 	relevant 	regulations 	regarding 	positive 	credible-fear
determinations control the process thereafter. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f).
Section 1225(b)(2) of Title 8 of the United States Code addresses those persons who are
seeking admission into the country but whom are not otherwise covered by § 1225(b)(1). It requires
4 The Court uses the term aliens and noncitizens interchangeably.
5 Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a noncitizen “present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” All applicants for
admission must be inspected by an immigration officer. § 1225(a)(3).
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that the noncitizen be detained provided “the examining immigration officer determines that a
[noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . .” §
1225(b)(2)(A). Noncitizens covered by § 1225(b)(2) are not subject to the expedited removal
process outlined in § 1225(b)(1). They receive some process, including an evidentiary hearing
before an IJ, the right to counsel, and the right to seek review by the BIA and a federal court of
appeals. § 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1229a; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108
(2020).
2. 	Section 1226
Section 1226 is a separate statute addressing circumstances not covered by § 1225. It sets
“the default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the United States.” Jennings, 538
U.S. at 303. Per § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” (emphasis added). Custody is
not predetermined. Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are entitled to individualized bond
hearings as described by federal regulation. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§
236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). During those proceedings, an IJ is tasked with determining whether the
noncitizen is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. Id. at 303. If either question is
resolved in the affirmative, then the noncitizen will be detained. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at
1262 (citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) for the proposition
that “an IJ will order a detainee released on bond if the person is not ‘a threat to national security,
a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk’”)). Otherwise,
bond and conditions of release are appropriate. Id. There are some instances in which custody is
required—including those outlined in Section 1226(c). But, generally speaking, those provisions
apply to circumstances in which a noncitizen has “committed or been sentenced for certain
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criminal offenses, or because they are affiliated with terrorist groups or activities.” Gomes v. Hyde,
No. 	1:25-cv-11571-JEK, 	2025 WL 1869299, 	at 	*3 	(D. 	Mass. 	July 	7, 	2025) 	(citing 	§§
1226(c)(1)(A)-(D)).
C. 	Section 1226 governs Gonzalez Ramos’s detention.
1. 	Section 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable.
Federal Respondents take the position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates Gonzalez Ramos
remain detained because he is an “applicant for admission” after unlawfully entering the United
States without admission and choosing to remain in the country without inspection “for years.”
Doc. 23 at 13-14. This argument is inconsistent with the text of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Section
1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention provision comes into effect only after all of the following conditions are
satisfied: (1) an “examining immigration officer” (2) must conclude during an “inspection” (3) of
an “applicant for admission” (4) who is “seeking admission” (5) that the individual “is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” See also Jimenez, 2025 WL 2639390, at *4. The
active construction of “the phrase ‘seeking admission’ . . . necessarily implies some sort of present-
tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. 2025). Noncitizens, like
Gonzalez Ramos, “who reside in the country for decades are not ‘seeking admission.’ They are ‘no
longer seeking to enter the United States (lawfully or otherwise)’—they are already here.” Cortez-
Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771, at *4 (quoting Jimenez, 2025 WL 2639390, at *8); see also Pu
Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (“Noncitizens ‘seeking admission’ are those who have not
‘effected an entry’ into the United States.” (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140)). Only a
“[noncitizen] seeking admission” falls within § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme. To
conclude that all “applicants for admission” are continuously “seeking admission” for as long as
they live in the United States “goes against the plain, ordinary meaning of the words ‘seeking’ and
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‘admission.’” Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 284 (D. Mass. 2025) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 489); see also TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S.
19, 31 (2001) (“[N]o clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).
Other reasons exist to question Respondents’ take on the law. To begin with, their
interpretation would render the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) as mere surplusage. Earlier this year,
Congress passed the LRA, which added additional criminal convictions triggering § 1226’s
custodial provisions. See Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3 (2025) (codified as amended at §
1226(c)(1)(E)).6 So, “[i]f § 1225(b)(2) already mandated detention of any [noncitizen] who has
not been admitted, regardless of how long they have been here, then adding § 1226(c)(1)(E) to the
statutory scheme was pointless.” Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d. 1134, 1152 (D. Minn.
2025). The Court doubts that Congress intended such a result. See Chevron Mining Inc. v. United
States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1283 n.15 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The canon against surplusage indicates that
[courts] generally must give effect to all statutory provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous—each phrase must have distinct meaning.”).
Finally, the Court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes accords with the Supreme Court’s
holding in Jennings. 583 U.S. at 289. There, the Supreme Court instructed that “U.S. immigration
law authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country
under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens]
6 The LRA amendments mandate detention for noncitizens charged as inadmissible “under
Sections 1182(a)(6)(A) (the inadmissibility ground for a noncitizen ‘present in the United States
without 	being 	admitted 	or 	paroled’), 	1182(a)(6)(C) 	(the 	inadmissibility 	ground 	for
misrepresentation), or 1182(a)(7) (the inadmissibility ground for lacking valid documentation) and
if the noncitizen has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes.” Rodriguez,
779 F. Supp. 3d at 1246.
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already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id.
(emphases added). This interpretation of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a) is consistent with the due process
afforded to noncitizens who have entered the United States. “The distinction between a
[noncitizen] who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs
throughout immigration law.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. Once a noncitizen effects entry into the
United States, the Due Process Clause applies “whether [the noncitizen’s] presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. Noncitizens who have not yet effected entry are not
afforded the same due process rights. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 103; see also Cortez-
Gonzalez, 2025 WL 3485771, at *4 n.10 (discussing distinction between merely “set[ting] foot on
U.S. soil” and when citizens have effected an entry (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40).
With this distinction in mind, it is unlikely that Congress intended the mandatory detention of §
1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to noncitizens already present in the United States. See Martinez, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 222; see also Cortez-Gonzalez 2025 WL 3485771, at *5 (discussing DHS’ previous
decades-long application of § 1226 to noncitizens residing in the United States without admission).
For these reasons, the Court concludes Gonzalez Ramos’s detention is governed by §
1226(a). Gonzalez Ramos entered the United States in 1998 and has lived here since. Doc. 1 at 4
¶ 19. He therefore cannot be considered an applicant “seeking admission” pursuant to §
1225(b)(2)(A), as he has lived here for decades.
2. 	Section 1225(b)(1)’s credible-fear detention mandate is irrelevant.
On September 24, 2025, Gonzalez Ramos filed an application for asylum with the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) due to his fear of future persecution and
torture if he is deported to Mexico. Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 2, 5 ¶ 25, 33. He alleges that his family has
experienced violence at the hands of cartel members, which raises the specter of similar harm
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falling upon Gonzalez Ramos were he to be forced to return to his home country. Id. at 2 ¶ 3. His
asylum application remains pending. Id. at 9 ¶ 36; Doc. 12 at 2 ¶ 9.
Federal Respondents argue that Gonzalez Ramos must be detained while his asylum
application is pending. See Doc. 23 at 15-17. The Court disagrees. As Respondents admit,
Gonzalez Ramos is not subject to the expedited removal process of § 1225(b)(1). Doc. 12 at 6;
Doc. 23 at 17. He is not an “arriving alien,” nor does he fall under the conditions of “certain other
aliens” subject to § 1225(b)(1)—he has lived in the United States for almost three decades. Doc.
1 at 4 ¶19; §§ 1225 (b)(1)(A)(i), (iii). Accordingly, his asylum application does not fall under the
credible-fear inspection process nor the mandatory detention provisions under §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)
and (iii)(IV).7
D. 	Respondents are violating Gonzalez Ramos’ Fifth Amendment rights.
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from depriving any
person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
7 Respondents fail to consider that there are additional ways for a noncitizen to apply for asylum.
Generally, a noncitizen may apply for asylum in one of three ways:
(1) if [he] is not in any kind of removal proceeding, [he] may file an affirmative
application for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a)(1); (2) if [he]
is subject to regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, [he] may file a
defensive application for asylum as a defense to removal, see 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b); or (3) if [he] is subject to expedited removal
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, [he] may also file a defensive application for
asylum as a defense to expedited removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.30(f).
O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2019). Here, Gonzalez Ramos applied for asylum
pursuant to the second option. See Doc. 25 at 4-5.
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While Respondents argue that Gonzalez Ramos “‘has only those rights regarding admission that
Congress has provided by statute[,]’” precedent clearly demonstrates noncitizens who have
effected an entry to this country are entitled to due process. See Doc. 23 at 4 (quoting
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693; supra Section II.C.1. Gonzalez
Ramos’s detention and removal proceedings are therefore subject to the Fifth Amendment.
Because § 1226 governs Gonzalez Ramos’s detention, he is entitled to an individualized
bond hearing before an IJ. See § 1226(a)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); Salazar, 2025
WL 2676729, at *6; Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. At that hearing, Respondents must prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that Gonzalez Ramos is not a flight risk nor a danger to the
community.8
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court grants Petitioner Ernesto Gonzalez Ramos’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus and subsequent Amendment, Docs. 1, 21. The Court concludes that 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Gonzalez Ramos’s detention. Respondents are hereby ordered to provide
Gonzalez Ramos with an individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226 within seven days of the
date of this Order. Respondents shall bear the burden of justifying Gonzalez Ramos’s continued
detention by clear and convincing evidence. Respondents are further ordered to file a status report
within ten days of this Order to certify compliance. The status report shall include when the bond
8 Normally, the burden at the bond hearing is on the noncitizen to demonstrate detention is
unwarranted. Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *6 (first citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8); then citing In
Re Adeniji, 22 I.&N. Dec. 1102, 1116 (BIA 1999)). Given the ongoing violation of Gonzalez
Ramos’s due process rights, this Court agrees with the other courts who have addressed similar
cases and found that the burden at the individualized bond hearing has shifted to Respondents. Pu
Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (joining “most other district courts in concluding that a
noncitizen’s ‘strong private interest in being free from civil detention’ outweighs the Government’s
comparatively minimal burden to justify custody”); Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *6-9.
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hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
If Gonzalez Ramos has not received a lawful bond hearing within seven days, this Court orders
that he be immediately released.
It is so ordered.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MATTHEW L. GARCIA
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