ELEIWA v. COMMISSIONER NJDOC et al

3:25-cv-14964Njd20.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TAHA Y. ELEIWA,

Petitioner, Civil Action No. 25-14964 (MAS)
V.

OPINION
COMMISSIONER NJDOC, et al.,

Respondents.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Taha Y. Eleiwa’s habeas petition (ECF
No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3). Petitioner’s application also
serves as his response to the Court’s Order directing him to show cause as to why his petition
should not be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. (See ECF No. 2.) Having reviewed the application,
the Court finds that Petitioner has shown his entitlement to proceed in forma pauperis, and the
application shall be granted. As Petitioner shall be granted in forma pauperis status, the Court is
required by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to screen the petition and determine
whether it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to [habeas] relief.” For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s habeas petition shall be
denied and Petitioner shall be denied a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

Following Petitioner’s guilty plea to second degree aggravated assault, third degree

burglary, and third degree credit card fraud, Petitioner was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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in January 2024 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County. (ECF
No. | at 2.) Petitioner filed an appeal, arguing that the sentencing judge had not properly weighed
the aggravating and mitigating factors and that his sentence was therefore unlawful. (/d. at 3.)
The Appellate Division remanded the case, and Petitioner was resentenced in November 2024.
(See ECF No. 3 at 1.) Petitioner appealed his receipt of the same sentence, and his case was
remanded again in June 2025. (/d.) Petitioner also filed a PCR petition during the pendency of
his appeal, which was dismissed without prejudice following the remand for a second resentencing.
(/d.) Petitioner was thereafter resentenced a third time, again to five years imprisonment, on July
30, 2025. (ECF No. | at 2.) Petitioner neither returned to the Appellate Division for a third round
of appeals, nor did he ever appeal his sentence to the New Jersey Supreme Court. (ECF No. 3 at
1; ECF No. 1 at 3.) Petitioner now raises a single claim in his habeas petition: that the sentencing
judge did not properly weigh mitigating and aggravating factors under state law in sentencing him,
and that he should therefore receive a new resentencing or a further reduced sentence. (ECF No.
1 at 6.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus [o|n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim
presented in his petition based upon the record that was before the state court. See Eley v. Erickson,
712 F.3d 837, 846-47 (3d Cir. 2013). Under the statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (“AEDPA”), district courts are required to give
great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 559

U.S. 766, 772-73 (2010).

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Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, the district court shall

not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Federal law is clearly established for these purposes where it is clearly
expressed in “only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta” of the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court. See Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015). “When reviewing state criminal
convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by
overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.”
Id. Where a petitioner challenges an allegedly erroneous factual determination of the state courts,
“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and the]
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court is required to
preliminarily review habeas petitions and motions to vacate sentence and determine whether it
“plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief.” Pursuant to this rule, a district court is “authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas
petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland y. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856
(1994).

Ill. DISCUSSION

In his habeas petition, Petitioner presents a single claim — that his sentencing judge did not

properly weigh mitigating and aggravating factors under state law and that he should therefore

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receive a sentencing reduction or new sentence. Petitioner, however, was required to raise that
claim in all three levels of the state court before pursuing that claim in a habeas proceeding. As
this Court previously explained,

A habeas petition “cannot proceed unless all meritorious claims
have been exhausted in state court.” Mallory v. Bickell, 563 F.
App’x 212, 215 (3d Cir. 2014). To satisfy the exhaustion
requirement, “state prisoners must give the state courts one full
opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one
complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). “The burden is
on the habeas petitioner to prove exhaustion.” DeFoy y.
McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005). The exhaustion
doctrine mandates that the claim “must have been ‘fairly presented’
to the state courts.” Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir.
2005) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). As
the exhaustion rule requires a habeas petitioner to afford the state
courts the opportunity to resolve the federal constitutional issues
before he goes to the federal court for habeas relief, a habeas
petition[er] challenging a New Jersey judgment of conviction must
fairly present each alleged federal ground for relief raised in his
habeas petition to all three levels of the New Jersey state courts —
the Law Division, Appellate Division, and New Jersey Supreme
Court. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); Rose
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Ragland v. Barnes, No. 14-7924,
2015 WL 1035428, at *1-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2015). As Petitioner
does not appear to have raised his claims to the state appellate courts
after his resentencing, his claim appears to be unexhausted.

Where a District Court is faced with a habeas petition that
contains unexhausted claims, the District Court has four options:
“(1) dismiss the petition without prejudice; (2) stay the proceedings
and hold them in abeyance until the claims are exhausted; (3) allow
[petitioner] to delete his unexhausted claims [and proceed on any
exhausted claims presented in the petition]; and (4) deny the petition
if [the District Court] found all of [petitioner’s] unexhausted claims
to be meritless under § 2254(b)(2).” Mallory v. Bickell, 563 F.
App’x 212, 215 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rhines vy. Weber, 544 U.S.
269, 274-78 (2005)). A stay can only be granted where the
petitioner’s claims are of at least arguable merit, there is no evidence
of dilatory tactics by the petitioner, and the [p]etitioner has shown
good cause for his failure to earlier exhaust his claims. Jd.

(ECF No. 2 at 2-3.)

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Although Petitioner twice appealed his sentence and twice received a remand for a
resentencing, he does not allege nor does it appear that he ever appealed his third sentence to the
Appellate Division, nor does he appear to have ever appealed his sentence to the state Supreme
Court. As Petitioner’s sole habeas claim therefore appears unexhausted, and as Petitioner has not
requested or sought a stay pending exhaustion, this Court is left with two options. The Court could
dismiss the petition as unexhausted as it appears that Petitioner has not fully exhausted his claims
on the merits following his most recent resentencing. Or the Court could dismiss Petitioner’s sole
habeas claim to the extent it is without merit. Given Petitioner’s assertion that he did fully exhaust
his claim and based upon the lack of a full record, the Court must take the second option,
notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner’s claim appears to have never been fully exhausted on the
record provided.

Here, Petitioner’s sole habeas claim is without merit and must be denied as such. Petitioner
asserts that the trial judge did not properly weigh the state law aggravating and mitigating factors
in determining his sentence, and that he should therefore receive a resentencing or a reduction of
his sentence. Petitioner does not allege that his sentence is beyond the range applicable to his
crimes of conviction, or that his sentence otherwise violated a Federal constitutional right.
Because federal courts do not have the authority during habeas review to re-examine issues of state
law, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-69 (1991), and “sentencing is a matter of state criminal
procedure and [generally] does not involve such a denial of fundamental fairness as to fall within
the purview of federal habeas corpus,” alleged sentencing errors by a state court will not warrant
habeas relief unless the sentence imposed was outside of the range authorized by the crime in
question or was otherwise beyond the sentencing judge’s authority. See, e.g., Sutton v. Blackwell,
327 F. Supp. 2d 477, 486 (D.N.J. 2004) (quoting Grecco v. O’Lone, 661 F. Supp. 408, 415 (D.N.J.

1987). Under New Jersey law, a crime of the second degree carries a standard sentencing range

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of “between 10 and 20 years’” imprisonment, and a third degree crime is punishable by a fixed
term sentence of “between five and 10 years[.]” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-7(a)(3)-(4). Petitioner
received a five-year sentence, which is well below the standard range for his second degree
conviction, and well within the range for his two third degree convictions. Petitioner’s sentence
was not beyond the term authorized by state law. Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged, let alone
shown, that his sentence was otherwise beyond the jurisdiction and authority of the sentencing
judge. Petitioner thus cannot show that his sentence amounts to a deprivation of his rights
warranting habeas relief. Petitioner’s state law error sentencing claim is thus meritless and must

be denied as such.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a habeas
proceeding where that petitioner’s detention arises out of his state court conviction unless he has
“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “[A petitioner] satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution
of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude [that] the issues presented here are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El] v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). Because Petitioner’s sole habeas claim is without merit for the reasons set forth above, he
has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, and his petition is not
adequate to receive encouragement to proceed further. This Court therefore denies Petitioner a

certificate of appealability.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED and
Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability. An order consistent with this Opinion will be
entered.

s/ Michael A. Shipp

MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: January 20, 2026

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