KORENFELD v. CAMP MACHANE, L.L.C. et al

3:25-cv-02329Njd25.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 10 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ELTYAHU KORENFELD,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-2329 (MAS) (TJB)

Vv.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CAMP MACHANE, LLC, et ail.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Gross & Co., LLC’s (“Gross”) Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) Plaintiff Eliyahu Korenfeld’s (“Plaintiff or “Korenfeld”) Complaint
(ECF No. 1) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure! 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposed (ECF
No. 16), and Gross replied (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff subsequently filed correspondence (ECF
No. 20) providing supplemental authority for the Court’s consideration, and Gross filed a response

(ECF No. 21). For the reasons below, Gross’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

' All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background?

Plaintiff, a citizen of New York, brought this Complaint against four defendants:
(1) Alexander Guttman (“A. Guttman’); (2) Sara Guttman (“S. Guttman’); (3) Camp Machane,
LLC (“Camp Machane”); and (4) Gross (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Compl. ff 1-4, ECF
No. 1.) Camp Machane is a limited liability company whose members are A. Guttman and
S. Guttman, two New Jersey residents. (id. J] 2-3.) Gross is a New Jersey limited liability
company whose members, “upon information and belief, [are] all citizens of New Jersey and none
of whom are citizens of New York State.” Ud. ¥ 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that prior to August 15, 2019, A. Guttman retained Gross, an insurance
broker, for the purposes of obtaining liability insurance for Camp Machane and its employees. (Id.
4 8.) Prior to August 15, 2019, Gross procured a one-million-dollar insurance policy from U.S.
Fire Insurance Co. (“U.S. Fire”) to insure “[Camp Machane’s] non-owned motor vehicles.” (/d.
4 9.) On August 15, 2019, at around 6:51 p.m., a counselor of Camp Machane, Yaakov Schwartz
(“Schwartz”), was driving a motor vehicle with the license plate “HZM2106 NY” (the “Vehicle’’)
that was leased by Camp Machane from Hertz. Ud. J 10-11.) Schwartz was driving the Vehicle
“with multiple camper-passengers on behalf of and with the permission of his employer, [Camp

Machane].” (/d. J 11.) Schwartz lost control of the Vehicle, causing it to turn over, on State Route

? For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and considers the public documents in the underlying state court action
discussed in the Complaint. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008);
Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resol., L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that the
court can “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon [those]
documents” on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (citation omitted)).

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

1214 near Gaston, North Carolina. Ud. J 12.) Plaintiff was one of the passengers in the Vehicle
during the accident and suffered “serious and permanent personal injuries, including fractures to
his pelvis, sacrum[,] and clavicle, pulmonary contusions, kidney hematomas, liver contusions,
pneumonia, loss of teeth, blood loss, loss of consciousness[,] and the removal of his spleen... .”
(Id. { 13.) Plaintiff alleges that Camp Machane “became liable” to him as a result of the accident,
entitling Plaintiff to monetary damages from Schwartz and Camp Machane. (/d. J 13-14.)
Plaintiff further claims that: (1) A. Guttman and S. Guttman “were the sole owners, officials,
principals, and directors of [Camp Machane] and in exclusive control of the camp” at the time the
accident with the Vehicle occurred (id. § 15); (2) Schwartz and Camp Machane became “debtors”
under the New Jersey Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (the “NJUVTA”) (id. 416); and
(3) Plaintiff became a “creditor” under the NJUVTA (id. ¥ 17).

In June 2020, U.S. Fire brought a declaratory judgment action in the New Jersey Superior
Court, Ocean County (the “DJ Action”), against Camp Machane for recission of the
one-million-dollar insurance policy “for making a material misrepresentation in its insurance
application.” (Ud. J 18.) In February 2021, Korenfeld was permitted to intervene in the DJ Action.
Ud. § 19.) In June 2021, Camp Machane filed a third-party complaint in the DJ Action against
Gross alleging professional negligence for failing to procure auto insurance. (/d. F¥ 18, 20.) In
October 2022, the Court in the DJ Action determined that the insurance policy was rescinded due
to Camp Machane’s material misrepresentation on the application, which was filled out and signed
by A. Guttman. (Ud. § 21.) Following the recission, Camp Machane became insolvent. (/d. 23.)
In December 2022, Camp Machane settled the claim it had against Gross for an amount that
Korenfeld claims “was not a reasonably equivalent value for its claims against Gross.” (/d.

qq 24-25.) Plaintiff now brings this action and alleges in part that “Gross, as the transferee of the

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

[Camp Machane release,] and transferor of the insufficient consideration for said release[,] is
subject to all of the remedies under the [NJUVTA] ....” Ud. 4 37.)

B. Procedural Background

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendants alleging two causes of
action related to Defendants’ purported violation of the NJUVTA. (See generally Compl., ECF
No. 1.) Gross subsequently moved to dismiss the single claim asserted against it with prejudice.
(See generally Gross’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff opposed Gross’s motion (see
generally P\.’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 16), and Gross replied (see generally Gross’s Reply Br., ECF
No. 19). Plaintiff subsequently filed correspondence asking the Court to consider supplemental
authority in evaluating Gross’s Motion. (See generally P|.’s Correspondence, ECF No. 20.) Gross
replied, arguing that Plaintiff's correspondence was an impermissible sur-reply. (See generally
Gross’s Correspondence, ECF No. 21.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the .. . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations, accept
them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff’ Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully
harmed the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court
must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Igbal, 556
U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). On a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.
v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Il. DISCUSSION

Gross raises three arguments in favor of dismissal of the claim against it: (1) Plaintiff's
claim is barred by the entire controversy doctrine; (2) Plaintiffs claim is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata; and (3) Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See generally
Gross’s Moving Br., ECF No. 13-1.) Because the Court agrees that Plaintiffs claim against Gross
is barred by the entire controversy doctrine, the Court need only address Gross’s first argument.

The entire controversy doctrine is essentially “New Jersey’s specific, and idiosyncratic,
application of traditional res judicata principles.” Ricketti v. Barry, 775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir.
2015) (quoting Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997)).
“Because New Jersey law determines the preclusive effect of a prior New Jersey state court
judgment on the merits, the entire controversy doctrine is applicable here.” Bank Leumi USA v.
Kloss, 331 F. Supp. 3d 404, 409 (D.N.J. 2018) (first citing Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta,
178 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 1999); and then citing Rycoline, 109 F.3d at 887). As codified in New

Jersey Court Rule 4:30A, the doctrine provides, in relevant part that: “[nJon-joinder of claims

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted
claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine. ...” N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A.

“Under the entire controversy doctrine, a party cannot withhold part of a controversy for
later litigation even when the withheld component is a separate and independently cognizable
cause of action.” Jn re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Paramount, 178 F.3d
at 137). In determining whether a claim should be barred under the doctrine, “the central
consideration is whether the claims against the different parties arise from related facts or the same
transaction or series of transactions.” Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 110 A.3d 19, 27 (N.J. 2015)
(quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995)). “The entire controversy doctrine is
‘constrained by principles of equity’ and does not bar claims ‘where to do so would be unfair in
the totality of the circumstances and would not promote any of its objectives, namely, the
promotion of conclusive determinations, party fairness, and judicial economy and efficiency.’”
Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of Ocean City, N.J., No. 19-21405, 2022 WL 951287, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar.
30, 2022) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Charte v. Am. Tutor, Inc., 934 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2019)). As a
result, the doctrine’s “application is flexible, with a case-by-case appreciation for fairness to the
parties.” In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 229.

Plaintiff argues that the entire controversy doctrine does not bar his claim against Gross
here because: (1) he “had no claim against Gross in the underlying recission action[ as i]t is well
established that no duty runs from an insurance broker to an injured third party”; (2) “the crux of
the two lawsuits [the DJ Action and the present action] are based on separate facts”; and (3) “it
would be fundamentally unfair to Plaintiff’ if his claim was barred by the entire controversy

doctrine. (PI.’s Opp’n Br. 3-7.) The Court disagrees.

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

First, Plaintiff is incorrect that he could not have brought a claim in the underlying DJ
Action. Plaintiff contends that “[i]t was not until Gross took part in a voidable transaction that a
claim arose” and that he “‘was not even aware of the amount of the settlement until recently.” (PI.’s
Opp’n Br. 3-4.) Even if a claim did not arise until the settlement was entered into,’ as Gross points
out, Korenfeld was aware of the settlement between Camp Machane and Gross because he filed
correspondence in the DJ Action objecting to the voluntary dismissal that the two entities filed
after reaching their agreement. (See Ex. I to Gross’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Ex. I”), ECF No. 13-13.)
This objection came after: (1) Korenfeld filed a motion to intervene in the DJ Action; (2) Camp
Machane obtained leave of court to sue Gross in the DJ Action—an action Korenfeld was certainly
aware of after intervening; and (3) Camp Machane and Gross entered into the settlement agreement
over a year after Camp Machane first brought its third-party complaint against Gross. (Gross’s
Moving Br. 11-14; Compl. §f 19-20, 24.) Korenfeld had an opportunity to file a formal motion
objecting to the settlement in the underlying DJ Action and seek relief at that time.* Korenfeld,
however, chose not to do so beyond filing short correspondence to the Court, instead focusing on
his appeal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Fire. (See Compl. § 22; Ex. I); Jn re
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 229; see also Wadeer, 110 A.3d at 606 (noting that entire controversy
doctrine “does not apply to unknown or unaccrued claims” but that the inquiry “focuses on the

litigation posture of the respective parties and whether all of their claims and defenses could be

3 For the purpose of its analysis, the Court assumes that Korenfeld had no cause of action against
Gross prior to Gross’s settlement with Camp Machane. The Court notes, however, that the New
Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n certain settings, insurance brokers have been held
to have a limited duty to a third party who is not the insured, but who has nonetheless suffered
harm by virtue of the broker’s act or omission.” Holm v. Purdy, 285 A.3d 857, 869 (N.J. 2022).

* In fact, as Gross points out (see Gross’s Moving Br. 11), Korenfeld could have sought leave to
sue Gross in state court, which is exactly what Camp Machane elected to do in bringing suit against
Gross in the DJ Action.

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

most soundly and appropriately litigated and disposed of in a single comprehensive adjudication”
(citation omitted)). The Court, therefore, rejects Plaintiffs first argument and finds that Plaintiff
had an opportunity to raise its claim against Gross in the DJ Action.

Second, although the facts of the present action and the DJ Action are not identical, the
claims relate to the same series of transactions and underlying facts. The test for determining
whether claims are “related” such that they should be brought in a single action pursuant to the
entire controversy doctrine is:

if parties or persons will, after final judgment is entered, be likely to
have to engage in additional litigation to conclusively dispose of
their respective bundles of rights and liabilities that derive from a
single transaction or related series of transactions, the omitted

components of the dispute or controversy must be regarded as
constituting an element of one mandatory unit of litigation.

DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 502 (citing O’Shea v. Amoco Oil Co., 886 F.2d 584, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Korenfeld’s claim in this action rests on the theory that “Gross, as the transferee of the
Camp Machane release[,] and transferor of the insufficient consideration for said release[,] is
subject to all of the remedies under the [NJUVTA]....” (Compl. § 37.) This claim directly relates
to facts at issue in the underlying DJ Action, namely, the third-party complaint that Camp Machane
filed against Gross. (See Gross’s Reply Br. 9.) As Gross points out, Gross’s defense to Plaintiff's
NJUVTA claim would center on the argument that “Gross did not commit malpractice and/or that
the $200,000.00 settlement was reasonable based on strength of the evidence against Gross relating
to the malpractice claim.” (/d.) This would necessitate a reproduction of the documents that were
produced in connection with the third-party complaint in the DJ Action. (See id.)

Gross also likely would not have settled the claim Camp Machane brought if it had known
Korenfeld would subsequently bring suit regarding his purported rights related to the accident and

the settlement agreement that Gross reached with Camp Machane. The Court, therefore, finds that

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

any claim Korenfeld had against Gross related to the settlement between Gross and Camp Machane
was necessarily “related” to, at a minimum, the third-party complaint and settlement thereof at
issue in the DJ Action. See DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 502. The Court therefore rejects Plaintiffs second
argument.

Third, it would not be “fundamentally unfair” to find that Plaintiff’s claim against Gross is
barred by the entire controversy doctrine. Plaintiff argues that because the state court decided not
to act on Korenfeld’s correspondence objecting to the dismissal of Camp Machane’s third-party
complaint in the DJ Action, that this Court should now hear Plaintiff's claim. (See PI.’s Opp’n Br.
7.) Plaintiff, however, has not provided any argument as to why the state court was not ina position
to evaluate Korenfeld’s objection in the DJ Action. (See generally id.) Further, as Gross also notes,
from the time Gross filed an answer to the third-party complaint to the stipulation of dismissal was
514 days, which was plenty of time for Korenfeld to raise any potential claims against Gross. (See
Gross’s Reply Br. 10.)

The Court here sees no reason to give Korenfeld a second bite at the apple. In fact, it would
be unfair to Gross to make it revisit a claim it thought had already been addressed by its settlement
in the DJ Action years ago. See DiTrolio, 662 A.2d at 505 (“Fairness is thus a protective concept
that focuses primarily on whether defendants would be in a better position to defend themselves if
the claims against them had been raised and asserted in the first litigation.”). The Court, therefore,
rejects Plaintiffs fairness argument and finds that Plaintiffs claim against Gross is barred by the

entire controversy doctrine.

Case 3:25-cv-02329-MAS-TJB Document 22 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 10 PagelD:
<pagelD>

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Gross’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's claim

against Gross is dismissed with prejudice. The Court will issue an Order consistent with this

Memorandum Opinion. / | J

MICHAEL A. SHIPP /
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 25, 2026

10

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.