3:25-cv-01042•SHRIQUI v. BTESH
Gesamter Gesetzestext
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SARA L. SHRIQUI,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-1042 (MAS) (TJB)
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BELINDA BTESH,
Defendant.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Sara L. Shriqui’s (‘Plaintiff’) civil
complaint (ECF No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 13). Having
reviewed the application, the Court finds that in forma pauperis status is warranted in this matter,
and Plaintiff’s application is therefore granted. Because the application shall be granted, the Court
is required to screen Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune
defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s first cause of action shall be dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s second
cause of action, however, shall proceed.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter involves a dispute regarding a Facebook post and Facebook Live video that
Defendant Belinda Btesh (“Defendant”) made about Plaintiff on January 14, 2025, and February
2, 2025, respectively. (Compl. J] 9, 17, ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Defendant posted that:
(1) Plaintiff brought “drug-addicted individuals [into]” Defendant’s home to steal her jewelry and
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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other valuables; (2) Plaintiff was a drug addict; (3) Plaintiff stole checks and cashed them; and
(4) Plaintiff was involved in a “fraudulent check-stealing scheme by assisting another woman in
gaining access to people’s homes in order to steal checks[.]” Ud. FJ 12-15.) In the Facebook Live
video, Defendant claimed that Plaintiff was a danger to her children and that her children should
be taken away from her. (Ud. f{[ 17-18.) Plaintiff alleges that because of the posts she has received
numerous unsolicited communications and had “various individuals from the Syrian Jewish
community” contact and harass her immediate family members. (/d. § 20.) Plaintiff has further
been subjected to ongoing harassment and other unwelcome communications. (/d. § 21.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, the Court is required to screen
her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, the Court must sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)', a
district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal
' All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must
contain “more than an unadormed, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
999
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’”” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it
provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bell Ail.
- Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A
complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd.
(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in
conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints
to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Il. DISCUSSION
In her Complaint, Plaintiff raises two causes of action against Defendant: (1) intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“ITED”) (“First Cause of Action’); and (2) defamation (“Second
Cause of Action”). (Compl. {J 19-30.) Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court finds no basis
to dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim and will therefore permit Plaintiff’s Second Cause of
Action to proceed. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action, however, is deficient.
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In order to make out an ITED claim pursuant to New Jersey law, a plaintiff must adequately
allege that: (1) the defendant acted intentionally; (2) the defendant’s conduct was “so outrageous
in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) the defendant’s actions
proximately caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) that distress was “so severe that no
reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.” Soliman v. Kushner Co., 77 A.3d 1214, 1229
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (quoting Segal v. Lynch, 933 A.2d 1229, 1241-42 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2010)).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a claim of ITED because she
has failed to allege that Defendant’s Facebook posts rose to the level that was “so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” L.C. v. Middlesex Cnty.
Prosecutor s Off., No. A-3654-18, 2021 WL 1327169, at *19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 9,
2021) (quoting Buckly v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)). “Courts have
refused to impose liability in cases involving more outrageous conduct than here.” Botts v. N.Y.
Times Co., No. 03-1582, 2003 WL 23162315, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2003), aff’d sub nom, Botts
v. N.Y. Times Co., 106 F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2004); see e.g., Ramirez v. United States, 998 F. Supp.
425, 434 (D.N.J. 1998) (dismissing IED claim where plaintiff was detained for over two and half
hours based on an unreasonable assumption that he was a person named in a warrant); Zamboni v.
Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 80 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding ITED claim insufficient where defendant
constantly harassed plaintiff in workplace causing physical and psychological problems). Being
falsely accused of a crime, moreover, is insufficient to establish that “a person acted in an extreme
or outrageous manner.” United States. ex rel. Magid v. Wilderman, No. 96-4346, 2005 WL 469590,
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at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2005) (explaining that “[f]alse accusations of crime[s] have been held
insufficient to meet” the extreme or outrageous “definition[,|” and that “being falsely accused of
acrime... does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct that has been found to
permit a recovery for [IIED]” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The Court, accordingly, dismisses Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action, however, shall proceed.
MICHAEL A. sate
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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