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3:24-cv-05045Njd12.01.2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN H.,1
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:24-cv-5045
v. 	Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King
FRANK BISIGNANO,2
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding the application of Plaintiff John H. for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Plaintiff
appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying that application.
After careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire administrative record, the
Court decides this matter pursuant to Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the
reasons that follow, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed his application for benefits, alleging that he has been
disabled since April 26, 2019.3 R. 93, 110, 212–18. The application was denied initially and
1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of
the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, federal courts should refer to plaintiffs in such cases by only their first names and last
initials. See also D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.
2 Frank Bisignano, the current Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted as Defendant in
his official capacity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
3 Plaintiff later amended his disability onset date to August 31, 2018. R. 24, 48.
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upon reconsideration. R. 111–15, 123–27. Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). R. 130–32. ALJ Tonya Green held a hearing on November 14,
2023, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. R.
39–92. In a decision dated December 8, 2023, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from August 31, 2018, Plaintiff’s
amended alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2020, the date on which Plaintiff
was last insured. R. 24–33. That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security when the Appeals Council declined review on February 22, 2024. R. 8–13.
Plaintiff timely filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 1. On April 16, 2024,
Plaintiff consented to disposition of the matter by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 4.4 On June
13, 2024, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. ECF No. 7. The matter is ripe for
disposition.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Standard of Review
In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the
authority to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204
F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to
determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d
Cir. 2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The United States Supreme Court has explained this
standard as follows:
4 The Commissioner has provided general consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in cases
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. See Standing Order In re: Social Security Pilot
Project (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018).
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Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative
record and asks whether it contains sufficien[t] evidence to support the agency’s
factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of substantial in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this
Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means – and means only – such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (citation and internal quotations
omitted); Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and
quotations omitted); K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309, 2018 WL 1509091,
at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018).
The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and the ALJ’s decision cannot
be set aside merely because the Court “acting de novo might have reached a different
conclusion.” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Fargnoli
v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.”) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)); K.K.,
2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (“‘[T]he district court ... is [not] empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’”) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic
or self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)
(“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of
social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.”);
see Coleman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-6484, 2016 WL 4212102, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9,
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2016). The Court has a duty to “review the evidence in its totality” and “take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (quoting
Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted));
see Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that substantial evidence exists
only “in relationship to all the other evidence in the record”). Evidence is not substantial if “it is
overwhelmed by other evidence,” “really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or
“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114); see
K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The ALJ’s decision thus must be set aside if it “did not take into
account the entire record or failed to resolve an evidentiary conflict.” Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp.
at 284-85 (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular
format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient development of the
record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000)); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The Court “need[s] from the ALJ not only an
expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of
the evidence which was rejected.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705-06; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121
(“Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, [s/]he must give some indication
of the evidence which [s/]he rejects and [the] reason(s) for discounting such evidence.”) (citing
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he ALJ is not required to supply a
comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short
paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). Absent
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such articulation, the Court “cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or
simply ignored.” Id. at 705. As the Third Circuit explains:
Unless the [ALJ] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the
weight [s/]he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that [the] decision is
supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational.
Gober, 574 F.2d at 776; see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 284-85.
Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, the Court can
enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is appropriate if the
record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or contains illogical or
contradictory findings. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20; Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221-22 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is also appropriate if the ALJ’s findings are not the product of a
complete review which “explicitly weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the
record. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
A.B. on Behalf of Y.F. v. Colvin, 166 F. Supp.3d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2016).
B. 	Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the
Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d
632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled.
At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or
combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the plaintiff does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of
impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of
Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d). If so, then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or combination
of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.
at § 404.1509. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
and determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (f).
If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the ALJ determines that the plaintiff can do
so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the
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impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous
period of at least twelve months.
III. 	ALJ DECISION AND APPELLATE ISSUES
Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December
31, 2020. R. 26. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity between August 31, 2018, his amended alleged disability onset date, through December
31, 2020, the date on which Plaintiff was last insured for benefits. R. 27.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff ‘s chronic lung disease, history of recurrent
gout, and obesity were severe impairments. Id. The ALJ also found that the following
impairments were not severe: hypertension, hyperlipidemia, recurrent rash, obstructive sleep
apnea, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and adjustment disorder with anxiety. R. 27–28.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. R. 28.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work subject to
various additional limitations. R. 28–33. The ALJ also found that this RFC permitted the
performance of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a sales representative, sales and auto; and
manager, retail. R. 32–33. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act from August 31, 2018, his amended alleged disability onset
date, and December 31, 2020, the date on which he was last insured for benefits. R. 33.
Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at step four and asks that the decision of the
Commissioner be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10;
Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13. The Commissioner takes the position that his decision
should be affirmed in its entirety because the ALJ’s decision correctly applied the governing
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legal standards, reflected consideration of the entire record, and was supported by sufficient
explanation and substantial evidence. Defendant’s Brief Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 9.1, ECF
No. 12.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ concluded, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s
PTSD and adjustment disorder with anxiety were not severe impairments and resulted in no more
than mild limitations in two functional areas:
I note that claimant was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and
adjustment disorder with anxiety. The record substantiates that claimant has the
following degree of limitation in the four broad areas of mental functioning set out
in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders and in the mental
disorders listings in 20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1: no limitation in
understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying 	information, 	a 	mild 	limitation 	in
interacting with others, no limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining
pace, and a mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. The evidence also
failed to establish the presence of the “paragraph C” criteria.
The record showed a history of approximately bi-weekly therapy for PTSD
beginning around April 2020. I note an April 30, 2019 treatment record indicating
claimant was not receiving any mental health treatment. His depression screening
was essentially negative on that date. Claimant initially presented reporting
symptoms including hypervigilance, fear in regard to someone following him and
may break into his home, intrusive memories of past deployment, avoidance of
situations, and isolation from others. Treatment records centered around claimant
using CBT modules and practicing PFT to decrease reactive anxiety elevations. An
August 19, 2020 report noted that in spite of recent food poisoning, and other
medical complaints, claimant’s mood and affect were moderately well managed
along with his stress levels. He had no emergent mental health issues present. I note
an October 16, 2020 report indicating claimant was alert and followed commands.
Subsequent mental health treatment records into February 2022 continued to note
no presence of emergent mental status factors. Exhibit 7F.
Because claimant’s medically determinable mental impairment causes no more
than mild limitation in any of the functional areas, it is nonsevere (20 CFR
404.1520a(d)(1).
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R. 27–28. After finding at step three of the sequential evaluation that none of Plaintiff’s
impairments met or medically equaled a listed impairment, R, 28, the ALJ found at step four of
the process that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date last
insured, claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except with breaks accommodated by normal work
breaks. He could not climb ladders ropes or scaffolds. He could occasionally climb
ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. He should avoid all exposure to
high exposed places and moving mechanical parts. He should avoid even moderate
exposure to atmospheric conditions as defined in the SCO.
R. 28. The ALJ specifically explained, inter alia, that “[i]n making this finding, I have
considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of
20 CFR 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p.” R. 28. Other than noting that Plaintiff alleged disability due
to, among other impairments, PTSD, anxiety, and depression, R. 29, the ALJ did not discuss
Plaintiff’s mental impairments—or any limitations flowing from those impairments—at step
four. R. 28–33. At step five, and relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ went
on to find that Plaintiff was able to perform his past semi-skilled and skilled work as that work
was generally performed: “sales representative (DOT 259.357-022, SVP 3, light): sales, auto
(DOT 273.353.010, SVP 6, generally performed at light, actually performed at heavy), and
manager, retail (DOT 185.167-046, SVP 7, generally performed at light, actually performed at
heavy).” R. 32–33; see also Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d Cir. 2014) (“SVP levels . . .
measure the skill level necessary to perform a particular job.”) (citing SSR 00–4p, 2000 WL
1898704, at *3 (Dec. 4, 2000)); SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *3 (“[U]nskilled work
corresponds to an SVP of 1-2; semi-skilled work corresponds to an SVP of 3-4; and skilled work
corresponds to an SVP of 5-9 in the DOT [Dictionary of Occupational Titles].”).
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ, having found at step two that Plaintiff’s mental impairments
resulted in mild limitations in his ability to interact with others and to adapt or manage himself,
erred by failing both to translate these findings into functional restrictions and to explain in the
RFC assessment why no related mental limitations had been included. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No.
10, pp. 7–14 (collecting cases, including, inter alia, Maria A. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV 23-
2484, 2024 WL 943466 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2024); Perez-Vega v. Kijakazi, No. CV 22-3994, 2023
WL 3620747 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2023)); Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 1–5 (same).
Plaintiff insists that this error was not harmless because these mental impairments, even though
mild, precluded his ability to perform his past relevant semi-skilled work as a sales
representative and his skilled work as auto sales and retail manager. Id. In support, Plaintiff
points to the testimony of the vocational expert that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his past
relevant work if he were limited to only occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and
the general public. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, p. 13 (citing R. 77); Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF
No. 13, p. 4–5 (same).
The Commissioner counters that “‘[m]any courts in this District, however, have
concluded that ALJs do not err when giving short shrift to non-severe mental impairments in
RFC determinations’ and that ‘the trend from these cases is clear: [the ALJ] did not reversibly err
by relying on his thorough step-two findings in crafting [the claimant’s] RFC.’” Defendant’s
Brief Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 9.1, ECF No. 12, p. 11 (quoting Gita P. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. CV 21-6087, 2022 WL 1683834, at *6 (D.N.J. May 26, 2022); citing Grice v.
Saul, No. CV 20-02804, 2021 WL 4551357, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2021)). The Commissioner
argues further that, even assuming that the ALJ should have further discussed at step four
Plaintiff’s mild mental impairments, any such error was harmless. Id. at 12–13 (collecting cases).
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District court cases on this issue—i.e., whether an ALJ errs by relying on step-two
findings with little or no discussion at step four of mild limitations flowing from mental
impairments when excluding such findings from the RFC—“are inconsistent[,]” Perez-Vega,
2023 WL 3620747, at *4 (collecting cases) (citations omitted); see also Angros v. Bisignano, No.
C-24-1058, 2025 WL 2711148, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025) (same) (citations omitted), and
“[t]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not addressed this question head-on.” Gita
P., 2022 WL 1683834, at *6. “Given the variety of decisions on this subject, and the lack of
Third Circuit guidance, it is not clear whether this error can be described as a failure to follow an
established rule.” Perez-Vega, 2023 WL 3620747, at *6. “However, in order to decide whether
to grant relief in this case, it is not crucial to decide this. If the ALJ erred in failing to follow a
rule, it must still be determined whether or not the error warrants remand. Remand is not
necessary where it would not affect the outcome of a case.” Id. (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 546, (3d Cir. 2005)); see also id. at *3, 6–7 (concluding that such error was harmful
because the ALJ failed to explain why the conflicting report of a consulting medical examiner
had not been considered and where the plaintiff had pointed out how her limitations affected her
ability to perform past relevant skilled work); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009)
(“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the
agency’s determination. . . . [T]he party seeking reversal normally must explain why the
erroneous ruling caused harm.”); Holloman v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir.
2016) (stating that a harmless error review requires that the claimant explain how the error to
which he points could have made any difference); Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553 (finding that “a
remand is not required here because it would not affect the outcome of the case”).
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In the present case, even assuming without definitively deciding that the ALJ erred by
failing to expressly discuss Plaintiff’s mild mental limitations at step two, the Court is not
persuaded that any such failure amounts to more than harmless error.
Plaintiff argues that the medical records “support the need for mental health restrictions
in the RFC[,]” pointing to four particular records. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, pp. 11–12. This
Court disagrees. Plaintiff first points to a record dated April 14, 2020, which “showed that the
Plaintiff was instructed to ‘start new journal that will delineate pattern of thinking and triggering
situations that is eliciting his anxiety and irritability that also leads to avoidant behaviors’” and
that “Plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD and Chronic to Mild to Moderate Depression.” Id.
(quoting R. 1787). Plaintiff, however, does not explain how this evidence establishes that the
information contained in this record would require a different RFC or would otherwise establish
that Plaintiff is disabled. See id.; see also Padgett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 16-9441, 2018
WL 1399307, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2018) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff has articulated no analysis of
the evidence, the Court does not understand what argument Plaintiff has made here. Plaintiff has
done no more than throw down a few pieces of an unknown jigsaw puzzle and left it to the Court
to put them together. The Court does not assemble arguments for a party from fragments.”).
Notably, “[a] diagnosis alone, however, does not demonstrate disability.” Foley v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 349 F. App’x 805, 808 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Petition of Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 845
(3d Cir. 1990)); cf. Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[The claimant’s]
argument incorrectly focuses on the diagnosis of an impairment rather than the functional
limitations that result from that impairment. A diagnosis of impairment, by itself, does not
establish entitlement to benefits under the Act”).
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Plaintiff next points to a record dated May 14, 2020, which “indicated that his therapist
‘focused [him] on managing heightened sadness, frustration and anger of Lung and other
treatment’s stalling or happening later due to corona virus restrictions. Also, focused [him] on
any virtual connections he can make with others to decrease loneliness. His dog does give him
support.’” Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, p. 12 (quoting R. 1782). Again, Plaintiff does not
explain the significance of this evidence or how it could change the RFC determination. See id.
Plaintiff further refers to evidence dated June 10, 2020 (during the Covid pandemic), that
“showed that the Plaintiff reported that he is ‘laying low primarily at home and limiting contact
with others or going out. He reports he is doing this also for stress/anxiety management as he is
having continued difficulties tolerating too much time with others particularly if he considers
there are too many people around him. We focused on paying attention to how he is breathing
early on in having any stressbased changes. This will objectively help him to catch the stress
response earlier and not having very poor breathing episodes due to stress.’” Id. (quoting R.
1780). As with the other cited records, Plaintiff simply points to this evidence without any
analysis or suggestion of harm flowing from the ALJ’s analysis of the record. See id.
Plaintiff also cites to a record dated March 25, 2021, generated after the lapse of his
insured status on December 31, 2020, and indicating that Plaintiff “has been inpatient for a while
at UPenn due to lung issues. Since hospitalization, return to home and the Boulder, CO mass
shooting - he has had increased PTSD symptoms, eg, hypervigilance, feeling fear in regard to
someone following him or may break into his home - breach his property, intrusive memories
from past deployments, avoidance from situations and isolation from others. Past deployments
source of PTSD - 1. Combat Vet Gulf War and 2. Rescue missions in Japan- i.e. MOS- Air
Special Operations and Air Lift Rescue Control Elements Team. We re-established TX plan to
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focus on PTSD with CPT and PST therapies every other week. Pending reductions in anxiety
levels, may refer Vet to psychiatry.’” Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, pp. 12–13 (quoting R. 744).
While Plaintiff generally asserts that “[t]hese medical records show the presence of mental health
symptoms which affect Plaintiffs [sic] ability to work[,]” id. at 13, he fails to explain how these
PTSD symptoms—which were documented after the lapse of his insured status—would change
the RFC limitations during the relevant time period as found by the ALJ. See id. In short,
Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that this evidence establishes that the ALJ reversibly erred
at step four when crafting the RFC. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553; Phillips, 91 F. App’x at
780; Padgett, 2018 WL 1399307, at *2.
Finally, in challenging the ALJ’s finding of only a mild limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to
interact with others, Plaintiff emphasizes the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff would
be unable to perform his past relevant work if, in addition to the other limitations included in the
RFC, Plaintiff could have only occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the
general public. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, p. 13 (citing R. 77); Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF
No. 13, p. 4 (same). Further, and considering that the vocational expert also testified that
Plaintiff’s past relevant work provided no transferrable skills, Plaintiff argues that the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines would direct a finding of disability. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 10, pp. 13
(citing R. 28, 32, 50, 89, 94; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2 §
202.06) (directing a finding of disability for a claimant of advanced age with at least a high
school education, who is unable to perform past relevant work and has no transferrable skills,
and who has an RFC for light exertion); Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 4–5 (same).
Again, this argument is not well taken. As previously discussed, Plaintiff has not met his burden
of showing that the record would support any mental limitation in the RFC. Plaintiff simply
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asserts—without explanation or supporting evidence—that his mild limitation in interaction with
others warrants an RFC limitation of only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
and the general public. Id. Moreover, because the RFC found by the ALJ enjoys substantial
support, it is irrelevant that the ALJ also posed to the vocational expert an alternative
hypothetical that contained more limitations than did the RFC actually found by the ALJ. Cf.
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554; Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 218; Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d
1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987) (“A hypothetical question must reflect all of a claimant’s impairments
that are supported by the record; otherwise the question is deficient and the expert’s answer to it
cannot be considered substantial evidence.”).
Under all these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ reversibly erred in
failing to include or to discuss at step four any limitations flowing from Plaintiff’s mild mental
impairments.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
The Court will issue a separate Order issuing final judgment pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 12, 2025 	s/Norah McCann King
NORAH McCANN KING
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:24-cv-05045-NMK Document 14 Filed 01/12/26 Page 15 of 15 PageID:
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