ARIAS et al v. FAMILY FIRST FUNDING, LLC et al

3:23-cv-01226Njd19.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FRANSISCA ARIAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FAMILY FIRST FUNDING, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Civ. No. 23-1226 (JBD)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Following a contentious dispute resulting in several competing motions to
enforce a settlement agreement, the Court issued an Opinion and Order enforcing
the terms of a settlement agreement reached during the December 2024 settlement
conference in this case. See [Dkts. 114, 115]. As part of that ruling, the Court
concluded that one of the parties’ agreed-upon terms provided that “[i]n the event of
any . . . breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or any
action to enforce them, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney[s’] fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with such
action to enforce.” [Dkt. 114] at 39 (quoting [Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21); see also
[Dkt. 115] at 2-4. Accordingly, the Court authorized the filing of appropriate
motions for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with the
motions to enforce. [Dkt. 114] at 39; [Dkt. 115] at 3-4.
Defendant American Neighborhood Mortgage Acceptance Company, LLC,
d/b/a AnnieMac Home Mortgage (“AnnieMac”) now seeks an award of $25,717.35 in
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Maddin Hauser Roth & Heller P.C. (“Maddin
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Hauser”) and Cole Schotz P.C. (“Cole Schotz”) in connection with its motion to
enforce. [Dkt. 118.] Defendant Scott Weikel, from whom AnnieMac seeks its fees,
opposes the motion. [Dkt. 119.]
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part AnnieMac’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court will provisionally
award AnnieMac $14,154.60, pending any supplemental submission to account for
time spent preparing AnnieMac’s reply brief on the instant motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court outlined the background to this case and the underlying
settlement dispute extensively in its July 1, 2025 Opinion and incorporates that
Opinion in full. The Court will limit its discussion here to the relevant background
necessary to resolve the present motion.
At the conclusion of a settlement conference held on December 17, 2025, the
parties agreed to a settlement resolving the federal and state wage claims asserted
by plaintiffs in this case. Id. at 4-9. A little over a month later, on
January 22, 2025, the parties informed the Court that a dispute had arisen
regarding the meaning and scope of the putative terms of the settlement agreement.
Id. at 12. Specifically, the parties disagreed whether the settlement agreement
required AnnieMac and defendants Gabriel and Neusa Gillen (collectively, the
“Gillens”) to waive or release certain defenses that they may have had to claims
that Weikel has asserted against them in a separate litigation filed in New Jersey
state court (the “State Court Action”). Id. at 10-11. Unable to resolve the dispute,
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each of the parties filed competing motions to enforce some version of the settlement
agreement. [Dkts. 96, 98, 102, 106, 107.]
Relevant here, AnnieMac’s respective motion argued that “the parties
negotiated, finalized, placed on the record, and confirmed via email the principal
terms of a valid and enforceable settlement,” and asked the Court to enforce the
version of the proposed written settlement agreement that was circulated amongst
counsel on January 15, 2025, but which had not been executed due to the parties’
dispute (the “January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement”). [Dkt. 96-2] at 7-8;
[Dkt. 113-3]. AnnieMac sought to enforce that version of the agreement because, in
AnnieMac’s view, it accurately reflected the release language the defendants had
agreed to during the settlement conference—namely, that defendants would release
each other only from claims seeking reimbursement for the settlement amounts
paid to plaintiffs, but not any other claims. Id.; [Dkt. 112] at 1. AnnieMac’s motion
also requested that the Court deem it a prevailing party for purposes of fee-shifting.
[Dkt. 96-2] at 8.
By contrast, Weikel’s motion to enforce argued that he agreed to settle this
matter on the condition that all claims that he “anticipated bringing against the
other [d]efendants were preserved and would not be adversely affected by having
participated in the [s]ettlement.” [Dkt. 106] at 13 (emphasis added); accord
[Dkt. 110] at 13. Weikel’s motion thus requested that the Court “enter an Order
enforcing the settlement agreement consistent with [his] understanding that an
entire controversy defense c[could] [not] be asserted against [him] in the pending
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State Court [Action],” or alternatively, “find that there [wa]s no meeting of minds
and declare the settlement agreement null and void.” [Dkt. 106] at 5; [Dkt. 110]
at 14.
In its resulting Opinion and Order, the Court enforced the settlement
agreement that the parties reached during the December 17, 2024 settlement
conference, consisting of the terms placed on the record, plus defendants’ agreement
to preserve non-reimbursement claims against each other. [Dkt. 114] at 35-38;
[Dkt. 115] at 2-3. In light of this ruling, the Court denied AnnieMac’s motion “to the
extent that it s[ought] to enforce the January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement,” but
otherwise granted the motion, “inasmuch as the Court agree[d] with AnnieMac that
defendants did not agree to waive any defenses to Weikel’s state law claims.”
[Dkt. 114] at 38 n.15. The Court denied Weikel’s motion in full. Id. at 41;
[Dkt. 115] at 2.
As to fee-shifting, the Court explicitly held that
[T]he parties agreed on the record at the settlement conference that “[i]n
the event of any . . . breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal
settlement agreement, or any action to enforce them, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney[s’] fees, costs,
and expenses incurred in connection with such action to enforce.” [A]nd
[b]ecause the Court conclude[d] that the settlement agreement reached
during the conference [wa]s enforceable, so too [wa]s th[e] provision
regarding attorneys’ fees.
[Dkt. 114] at 39 (citations omitted). The Court deferred decision “on who [wa]s a
prevailing party, and the amount of fees to be awarded,” and directed the parties to
submit any motions for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection
with their respective motions to enforce by August 8, 2025. Id.; [Dkt. 115] at 3-4.
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AnnieMac’s present fee motion followed on August 8, 2025, which Weikel opposes.
[Dkts. 118, 119.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the general “American Rule,” parties typically are responsible for
paying their own attorneys’ fees. John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Delaware Cty.
Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 555 (3d Cir. 2003). As such, courts generally do
not award fees to a prevailing party absent explicit authority “by statute, court
rule[,] or contract.” Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 480,
484 (D.N.J. 1998).
Here, the Court determined that the parties included as a term of their
enforceable settlement that “[i]n the event of any . . . breach of a settlement term
sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or any action to enforce them, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney[s’] fees, costs, and
expenses incurred in connection with such action to enforce.” [Dkt. 114] at 39
(quoting [Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21); see also [Dkt. 115] at 3 (“If a motion to enforce the
settlement is filed, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to an award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with the
motion.”). Accordingly, the parties’ settlement agreement provides a basis for an
award of counsel fees and costs here. 	Goethe v. Goethe, No. A-3043-11T4, 2013 WL
2173182, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2013) (upholding award of
attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing settlement as provided in the parties’
settlement agreement) (citing N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.,
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158 N.J. 561, 570 (1999) and Satellite Gateway Commc’ns, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car
Co., 110 N.J. 280, 285 (1988)); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Mar-Bridge Enters., Inc.,
Civ. No. 18-15205 (DEA), 2021 WL 7868721, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021)
(permitting award of attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing settlement pursuant to
the terms of the agreement).1
“A ‘prevailing’ plaintiff entitled to a fee award is one who has succeeded on
‘any significant issue in litigation [that] achieves some of the benefit the part[y]
sought in bringing the suit.’” Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598,
601-02 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
In the Third Circuit, “[t]he test for prevailing party status is essentially a twofold
inquiry.” Metro. Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244,
250 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 842 F.2d 1420, 1433 (3d Cir.
1988)). First, the Court must decide whether the moving party obtained relief on a
1 	The Court rejects Weikel’s argument that AnnieMac is not entitled to
attorneys’ fees and costs as a general matter because “there was no breach of a
settlement term or . . . any formal settlement agreement,” as “a formal settlement
agreement was never reached in [this] case,” and “the term sheet does not provide
that the failure of the [d]efendant parties to agree to specific language constitutes a
breach of any term sheet or agreement between the [d]efendants.” [Dkt. 119] at 10.
A “breach” of the settlement terms is not the only basis on which a party may
recover fees under the terms to which the parties agreed. [Dkt. 114] at 39 (quoting
[Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21) (a prevailing party is entitled to a fee award “[i]n the event
of any . . . breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or
any action to enforce them” (emphasis added)). Moreover, in its Opinion, the
Court concluded that the parties had reached the terms of a settlement agreement
during the settlement conference in December 2024; the parties’ prior motion
practice unquestionably concerned an “action to enforce” those terms; and,
therefore, the fee provision the parties agreed to is applicable here. Id.; see also
[Dkt. 115] at 2-3.
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significant claim in the litigation. Id. Then, the Court must evaluate whether there
is a causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained. Id.
Once a court determines that a party has prevailed for purposes of a fee
award, the court must then decide upon a reasonable award of fees and costs.
The Third Circuit uses the “lodestar” method as a starting point to assess whether
attorneys’ fees are reasonable, which courts determine by calculating the “‘number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.’” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The “party seeking attorney[s’] fees bears the ultimate
burden of showing that its requested hourly rates and the hours it claims are
reasonable.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’I, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5
(3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)).
To satisfy this burden, “the fee petitioner must ‘submit evidence supporting the
hours worked and [the] rates claimed.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
Specifically, Local Civil Rule 54.2 provides that the party seeking fees must
submit an affidavit setting forth the following:
(1) 	the nature of the services rendered, the amount of the
estate 	or 	fund 	in 	court, 	if 	any, 	the 	responsibility
assumed, the results obtained, any particular novelty
or 	difficulty 	about 	the 	matter, 	and 	other 	factors
pertinent to the evaluation of the services rendered;
(2) 	a record of the dates of services rendered;
(3) 	a description of the services rendered on each of such
dates by each person of that firm including the identity
of 	the 	person 	rendering 	the 	service 	and 	a 	brief
description of that person’s professional experience;
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(4) 	the time spent in the rendering of each of such services;
and
(5) 	the normal billing rate for each of said persons for the
type of work performed.
L. Civ. R. 54.2(a). The affidavit shall also set forth the “[total] time spent by each
individual performing services,” “describe[e] all fee agreements,” and detail “both
the amount billed to the client for fees and disbursements and the amount paid.”
L. Civ. R. 54.2(a), (b).
“[O]nce the fee petitioner ‘submit[s] evidence supporting the hour[s] worked
and rates claimed,’ the party opposing the fee application has the burden to
challenge the reasonableness of the requested fee.” Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford,
Inc., Civ. No. 13-7704 (RMB), 2017 WL 1502788, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2017), aff’d,
722 F. App’x 251 (3d Cir. 2018) (not precedential) (citing McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459
(citations omitted)). “The district court is afforded a ‘great deal of discretion’ to
adjust the awarded fee in light of the opponent’s objections.” Levy v. Glob. Credit &
Collection Corp., Civ. No. 10-4229 (RBK), 2011 WL 5117855, at *2 (D.N.J.
Oct. 27, 2011) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Indeed, “[i]f the party opposing
the fee petition meets its ‘burden of proving that an adjustment is necessary,’ the
Court has wide discretion to adjust the attorneys’ fee[s] for a variety of reasons such
as inadequate documentation of hours spent, reasonableness of hours expended or
duplication of efforts.” Apple Corps., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (first quoting Rode,
892 F.2d at 1183); and then citing Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677
(3d Cir. 1983)).
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“A court’s calculation of the lodestar, however, does not end its inquiry on a
fee application.” McKenna, 582 F.3d at 455. Once the lodestar is calculated, a court
may “adjust a fee award upward or downward.” Id. However, the Court’s discretion
to do so is not unlimited: “[a]fter calculating the lodestar, the court may deviate
from it, but only in the ‘rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not
adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee.’” Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 872 F.3d 122,
128 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 543-44
(2010)).2
III. 	DISCUSSION
Here, AnnieMac seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and costs totaling at least
$25,717.35.3 [Dkt. 118-1] at 6. Specifically, AnnieMac seeks an award of fees for
2 	Those factors are (1) the “time and labor required,” (2) the “novelty and
difficulty” of the issues presented, (3) the requisite skill needed “to perform the legal
service properly,” (4) the “preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case,” (5) the “customary fee,” (6) “[w]hether the fee is fixed or
contingent,” (7) the “[t]ime limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,”
(8) the “amount involved and the results obtained,” (9) the “experience, reputation,
and ability of the attorneys,” (10) the “‘undesirability’ of the case,” (11) the “nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client,” and (12) “[a]wards in
similar cases.” Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19
(5th Cir. 1974); see also id. (noting that “consideration of Johnson ‘factors’ is
permissible on the back end of a lodestar’s calculation, as long as they are not
already ‘subsumed in the lodestar calculation.’”).
3 	AnnieMac “reserve[d] its rights to submit further fee petitions” for “any
additional fees and costs incurred in connection with its [m]otion to [e]nforce
[s]ettlement – including, but not limited to, the preparation of [its fee petition], the
review of any response to the same, and preparing any reply brief in support of the
[fee petition].” [Dkt. 118-1] at 16.
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Robert M. Horwitz, a partner at Michigan-based law firm Maddin Hauser, for
52.6 hours at a rate of $435.00 per hour—totaling $22,881.004 with the following
breakdown:
1. 	2.5 hours spent preparing a letter submitted to the Court on
January 22, 2025, first notifying the Court of the parties’ settlement
dispute, see [Dkt. 113] (the “January 22 Letter”).
2. 	11.3 hours spent attempting to resolve the parties’ settlement dispute
without motion practice.
3. 	20.5 hours spent working on AnnieMac’s motion to enforce the settlement
agreement and analyzing/responding to the competing motions to enforce.
4. 	3.3 hours spent reviewing the Court’s Opinion and Order resolving the
parties’ competing motions to enforce and facilitating redactions to the
same.
5. 	5.7 hours spent facilitating and implementing the settlement pursuant to
the Court’s Order enforcing the settlement terms agreed to at the
December 2024 settlement conference.
6. 	9.3 hours spent on the present motion for recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs.
[Dkt. 118-2] ¶¶ 6, 9, 13, Ex. A.
AnnieMac also seeks $2,801.25 in attorneys’ fees incurred by New
Jersey-based law firm Cole Schotz for 6.85 hours billed for its participation in
drafting the January 22 Letter and in connection with AnnieMac’s motion to enforce
settlement and resulting fee request. Cole Schotz’s billed hours are broken down as
4 	On the Court’s review, Maddin Hauser’s unredacted invoices reflect 53.3
hours of work billed by Horwitz, totaling $23,185.50 in fees. [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. A.
However, the time discrepancies appear to fall within categories two and five of the
billing record, id., and the Court will exclude all of the time billed in category two
and reduce the time billed in category five, see infra at 22-23, 27-28. These small
discrepancies are accordingly irrelevant for purposes of the lodestar analysis.
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follows: 3.9 hours billed at a rate of $490 per hour by litigation associate Connor M.
Mannion for a total of $1,911.00 in fees; 1.35 hours billed at a rate of $415 per hour
by litigation associate Catherine J. Costagliola for a total of $560.25 in fees;
0.4 hours billed at a rate of $400 per hour by paralegal Frances Pisano for a total of
$160.00 in fees; and 0.5 hours billed at a rate of $400 per hour by paralegal Amy N.
Figiel for a total of $200.00 in fees. [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 5, 7-11, 14, Ex. A.5
Finally, AnnieMac seeks to recover $35.10 in litigation costs. [Dkt. 118-2]
¶ 12, Ex. A at 17.
Weikel opposes AnnieMac’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs on several
grounds. [Dkt. 119.] First, he argues that AnnieMac is not entitled to any
attorneys’ fees or costs because it did not prevail on its motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. Id. at 9-10. Weikel also argues that an award of attorneys’
fees under the circumstances presented here would be fundamentally unfair. Id. at
10-11. Finally, Weikel alternatively argues that if the Court does permit the
recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, AnnieMac’s “request for attorneys’ fees should
be reduced” because the time it spent “on the narrow issue presented” and the
hourly rates for the Cole Schotz associates and paralegals staffed on this matter
were not reasonable. Id. at 11-18. The Court addresses each of Weikel’s arguments
in turn.
5 	On the Court’s review of the billing records submitted, the total number of
relevant hours that Cole Schotz billed is 6.15, not the 6.85 hours that AnnieMac’s
motion papers reflect. Compare [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 10-11 with [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A.
The Court will only credit Cole Schotz for the hours reflected in its billing records in
conducting the lodestar analysis below.
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A. 	AnnieMac is a Prevailing Party Entitled to Attorneys’
Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement
The Supreme Court has given a “generous formulation” to the term
“prevailing party,” explaining that “plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’
for attorney[s’] fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433 (quotation omitted). Under this standard, a party may be deemed
prevailing “even though the relief they obtained is not identical to the relief they
specifically demanded, as long as the relief obtained is of the same general type.”
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 912 (3d Cir. 1985);
see also K.A.L. v. Salem Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 94-661 (JEI), 1994 WL 327160, at *3
(D.N.J. June 21, 1994) (“A [party] need not achieve the relief he originally sought
exactly or completely in order to be deemed a prevailing party.” (citations omitted)).
Weikel argues that AnnieMac is not a prevailing party because the Court
rejected AnnieMac’s request to enforce the January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement,
and it therefore did not obtain the relief it sought. [Dkt. 119] at 10. Although the
Court did not enforce the specific version of the settlement agreement set forth in
AnnieMac’s motion to enforce, the Opinion specifically noted that “the Court
denie[d] AnnieMac’s motion only to the extent that it s[ought] to enforce the
January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement.” [Dkt. 114] at 38 n.15. The Court
otherwise granted AnnieMac’s motion, “inasmuch as [it] agree[d] with AnnieMac
that defendants did not agree to waive any defenses to Weikel’s state law claims.”
Id. The central thrust of AnnieMac’s motion was to enforce a version of the
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settlement agreement that accurately reflected the release language it believed
defendants had agreed to during the settlement conference—specifically, that
defendants would release each other only from claims seeking reimbursement for
the settlement amounts paid to plaintiffs, but not for any other claims. [Dkt. 96-2]
at 7-8; [Dkt. 112] at 1. Because the Court agreed with that proposition and
ultimately enforced a version of the settlement agreement containing that release
language, the Court readily concludes that that AnnieMac “succeed[ed] on [a]
significant issue in [this] litigation” because the relief it obtained was generally
similar to the relief it sought. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (quotation omitted).
AnnieMac is thus a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the
settlement agreement.
B. 	Principles of Fundamental Fairness Do Not Preclude an
Award of Fees and Costs
Weikel contends that “it would not be fair or equitable to award attorney[s’]
fees to AnnieMac in light of [its] pre-motion procedural posture,” as “Weikel and
AnnieMac had agreed to terms,” and AnnieMac never indicated “that it would be
changing its position in connection with its motion to enforce the settlement
agreement if Weikel did not cave to the demands of the Gillen[s].” [Dkt. 119] at 11.
Weikel additionally argues that because he “sought [his] requested language based
upon his good faith understanding of what had been agreed to at the [s]ettlement
[c]onference,” fees are not warranted. Id.
As an initial matter, the Court need not (and does not) find that Weikel acted
in bad faith in pursuing his respective motion to enforce. Acting in “bad faith” is
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not a contractual prerequisite for the recovery of fees under the terms of the
settlement agreement. That agreement provided that “[i]n the event of any . . .
breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or any action to
enforce them, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney[s’] fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with such action to
enforce” regardless whether any such breach or action to enforce was in good or bad
faith. [Dkt. 114] at 39 (quoting [Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21). Indeed, that fee provision
was an undisputed term of the settlement that the parties unequivocally agreed to
be bound by on the record at the settlement conference—neither Weikel nor any
other party challenged that term in their motions to enforce. Cf. [Dkts. 96, 98, 102,
106, 107].
To be sure, courts have an inherent discretionary power to award attorneys’
fees as a sanction for a party’s bad faith litigation conduct, see Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (quotation omitted), but that is not at issue here.
There is a significant distinction between fees recovered pursuant to a contract and
a discretionary award of fees conferred “when a party has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id.; see also United States Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Marago, Civ. No. 22-1913 (RLS), 2024 WL 6078930, at *2 (D.N.J. May 13,
2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3173858 (D.N.J. Nov. 13,
2025) (“Courts do not ordinarily grant attorneys’ fees and costs unless specifically
authorized by statute or party agreement or where there is bad faith.”
(citing Hobbs v. Am. Invs. Mgt., Inc., 576 F.2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1978)) (emphasis
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added)); Fortune Title Agency, Inc. v. Fortune Abstract Co. LLC, Civ. No. 23-1914
(JBC), 2025 WL 1627122, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 1627207 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2025) (granting party’s request for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with a motion to enforce pursuant to a
provision of the settlement agreement being enforced, but denying request for fee
award as a result of defendants’ “bad faith conduct.”). Because AnnieMac seeks to
recover fees based on an agreed-upon settlement term that did not contemplate a
bad faith component as opposed to the Court’s inherent discretionary authority,
Weikel’s good faith or bad faith is not relevant to the analysis.
The Court also rejects Weikel’s argument that “an award of attorney[s’] fees
would be contrary to notions of fundamental fairness,” because Weikel and
AnnieMac had essentially resolved their dispute before “the Gillens’ refusal to agree
to the compromised language that was accepted by all other parties.” [Dkt. 119]
at 10. Although AnnieMac, Family First, and Weikel agreed to revised release
language after the settlement dispute arose, that agreement was made in an effort
to obviate the need for Court intervention in the parties’ settlement dispute.
[Dkts. 87, 89.] AnnieMac only agreed to a compromise to avoid motion practice, as
it made clear that it never agreed to waive any defenses at the settlement
conference throughout the dispute proceedings and in their resulting motion to
enforce. 	Id.; [Dkt. 96-2] at 2-8; [Dkt. 96-3] ¶¶ 5, 8, 17-19; [Dkt. 112] at 1-3;
[Dkt. 113] at 1-3. All parties could not agree; motions to enforce became necessary;
and Weikel took a position that, the Court later found, materially deviated from the
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agreed-upon settlement. In that context, AnnieMac was well within its right to
take a position consistent with the agreement—i.e., that defendants did not agree to
any waiver of defenses in the State Court Action. And Weikel was well aware that
this was a possibility. There is no unfairness, fundamental or otherwise, in holding
Weikel to the terms of the settlement agreement.6
C. 	The Court Will Provisionally Award AnnieMac Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs in the Amount of $14,154.60
Weikel argues that any fees awarded to AnnieMac should be reduced because
the hourly rates for the Cole Schotz attorneys and legal professionals who worked
on this case were not reasonable, and because the time AnnieMac spent on issues
related to its motion to enforce was not reasonable. [Dkt. 119] at 11-18.
Specifically, Weikel contends that AnnieMac has not met its burden of
demonstrating that Cole Schotz’s billing rates are reasonable because they are not
consistent with AnnieMac’s proffered community-standard billing guidelines. Id. at
17-18. Moreover, regarding the number of hours billed, Weikel takes issue with (1)
the time AnnieMac billed “facilitating the terms of the settlement,” which Weikel
argues would have been necessary regardless of any dispute or motion practice, id.
at 14-15; (2) the time AnnieMac billed for its pre-motion dispute resolution efforts,
which Weikel argues does not fall within the purview of the fee provision of the
settlement agreement, id. at 15; (3) the 20+ hours AnnieMac spent preparing its
6 	In any event, and as discussed in more detail below, see infra at 22-23, the
Court will exclude the time AnnieMac spent on pre-enforcement activities, so
Weikel need not bear AnnieMac’s fees and costs for the period during which he and
AnnieMac reached their tentative agreement.
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motion to enforce, which Weikel argues was “exorbitant and duplicative,”
id. at 15-16; and (4) the time Cole Schotz spent on this matter, which Weikel
contends was entirely duplicative of Maddin Hauser’s work and should be
discounted entirely, id. at 15-17.7
1. 	The Lodestar
As noted, the “lodestar” method is the starting point to assess whether
attorneys’ fees are reasonable. McKenna, 582 F.3d at 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Courts calculate the lodestar by multiplying the
“‘number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly
rate.’” Id. “Reasonable hourly rates are typically determined based on the market
rate in the attorney’s community for lawyers of similar expertise and experience.”
Machado v. Law Offs. of Jeffrey H. Ward, Civ. No. 14-7401 (MAS),
2017 WL 2838458, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (citing Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 712).
“The starting point in determining a reasonable hourly rate is the attorney’s usual
7 	Weikel also complains that, due to redactions in its billing records, AnnieMac
“cannot demonstrate at certain points throughout its billing process that its billing
practices are either reasonable or non-duplicative, or that some of the time entries
are even related to the . . . settlement dispute.” [Dkt. 119] at 16. However,
AnnieMac does not seek fees stemming from the completely redacted billing entries,
and of the fees it does claim, only three entries contain partial redactions.
See [Dkt. 118-2] at 26, 28, 33 (Horwitz’s April 1, 2025 billing entry for 0.2 hours,
Horwitz’s April 28, 2025 billing entry for 0.7 hours, and Horwitz’s May 6, 2025
billing entry for 2.6 hours). Out of an abundance of caution, the Court reviewed the
unredacted versions of those partially redacted billing records in camera and is
satisfied that AnnieMac seeks to recover only those fees that correspond with its
unredacted and partially redacted time entries, all of which fall into the six
categories of work detailed above.
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billing rate, but this is not dispositive.’” Id. (quoting Pub. Int. Research Grp. of N.J.,
Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995)).
“After a court ascertains a reasonable hourly rate, it must then determine
whether the hours that the attorney expended are reasonable.” Id. (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433-34). In making that determination, the Court must exclude any
hours that were “not reasonably expended” from the fee calculation. Rode, 892 F.2d
at 1183 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). “Hours are not reasonably expended if
they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. The Court also
“should reduce the hours claimed by the number of hours spent litigating claims on
which the party did not succeed.” Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173,
178 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing id.). Accordingly, “[t]o determine whether the hours
expended in [a] matter are reasonable,” the Court must “‘go line, by line, by line’
through the billing records supporting the fee request.’” Rhodes v. Marix Servicing,
LLC, Civ. No. 12-1636 (MAS), 2020 WL 5760455, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2020)
(quoting Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001)).
a. 	Reasonableness of Proposed Hourly Rates8
First, the Court notes that Weikel does not dispute the reasonableness of
Horwitz’s rate of $435.00 per hour. [Dkt. 119] at 14. Upon review, AnnieMac has
provided appropriate documentation reflecting Horwitz’s billing rate,
see [Dkt. 118-2] ¶¶ 9-11, Ex. A, and the Court is satisfied that Horwitz’s hourly
rates are reasonable based on prevailing market rates. See U.S. Sewer & Drain,
8 	Because the Court will exclude all of the time billed by Costagliola, see infra
at 23, the Court need not address the reasonableness of her hourly rate.
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Inc. v. Earle Asphalt Co., Civ. No. 15-1461 (TJB), 2016 WL 11663197, *9 (D.N.J.
June 22, 2016) (concluding that hourly rates were reasonable where non-moving
party did not object to attorney’s rates and it appeared that the rates listed were
reasonable in light of prior case precedent finding that hourly rates ranging from up
to $540.00 to $750.00 per hour for partners were reasonable (collecting cases));
[Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B. The Court accordingly accepts Horwitz’s $435.00 per hour
rate as reasonable for purposes of the lodestar calculation below.
As to Mannion, the Court concludes that his billing rate should be adjusted.
AnnieMac seeks to impose a billing rate of $490.00 per hour for Mannion, which it
states “is commensurate with the prevailing market rates in New Jersey and with
[his] background and experience.” [Dkt. 118-3] ¶ 5. In support of its position,
AnnieMac cites the reasonable hourly rates established by Community Legal
Services (“CLS”), which publishes a fee schedule based on “Philadelphia law firm
market survey data and increases in the Consumer Price Index,” and provides that
Mannion has nearly five years of post-law school experience. [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B;
[Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 4-5; see also [Dkt. 118-1] at 13-15.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that courts in this District (including
the undersigned) routinely use the CLS guidelines to determine reasonable hourly
rates for attorneys and legal professionals for purposes of fee petitions. See, e.g.,
Asdal Holdings, LLC v. IdeaSoil, LLC, Civ. No. 22-04158 (AME), 2025 WL 1453134,
at *4 n.5 (D.N.J. May 21, 2025) (citing the CLS attorney fees schedule in assessing
reasonableness of hourly rates in breach of contract dispute); Depth Charge Marine,
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LTD. v. F/V C. ANN, Civ. No. 24-6336 (RK), 2025 WL 1088236, at *9 (D.N.J.
Apr. 11, 2025) (noting that the CLS table of reasonable hourly rates “ha[s] been
applied in the District of New Jersey” and finding that “counsel’s hourly rate [wa]s
well below the CLS rate for his experience and [ ] thus, reasonable.”); Lin v. Hudson
City Sav. Bank, Civ. No. 18-15387 (JBD), 2024 WL 1704730, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 19,
2024) (accepting and applying hourly rates consistent with the CLS guidelines and
noting that “multiple courts in this district have adopted the CLS rates as a
reasonable benchmark for the prevailing market rates in Trenton and the
surrounding southern New Jersey legal market” (collecting cases)). The Court
accordingly finds that the CLS guidelines are an appropriate benchmark for
determining reasonable hourly rates here.
However, for an attorney with Mannion’s level of experience (two to five
years), the CLS guidelines provide a range of $265.00-$315.00 per hour—
significantly lower than the $490.00 hourly rate that AnnieMac seeks to apply here.
Contrast [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B with [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 4-5. While AnnieMac cites some
cases in which courts in this District upheld associate billing rates higher than the
CLS guidelines, see, e.g., [Dkt. 120] at 9-10, the Court sees no reason for such a
departure here, especially considering that AnnieMac’s requested rate for Mannion
(an associate) is higher than the requested rate for Horwitz, who is a partner (albeit
at a different firm) with several decades more legal experience than Mannion.
[Dkt. 118-2] ¶¶ 9-10; [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 4-5. Consistent with the CLS guidelines, the
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Court finds that an hourly rate of $300.00 is reasonable within the prevailing legal
market for an attorney of Mannion’s experience.9
For the same reasons, the Court also will adjust Pisano’s and Fiegel’s billing
rates. AnnieMac states that Pisano and Fiegel each have over twenty years of
experience as paralegals and seeks to impose an hourly rate of $400.00 for both,
which AnnieMac asserts is “commensurate with the prevailing market rates in New
Jersey and with [their] background and experience.” [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 8-9. As with
Mannion, AnnieMac relies on the CLS guidelines to demonstrate that Pisano’s and
Fiegel’s proffered billing rates are reasonable. See [Dkt. 118-1] at 13-15;
[Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B. However, for “Senior and Supervisory Paralegal[s],” the CLS
guidelines recommend an hourly rate range of $245-$285. [Dkt. 112-3] at Ex. B.
Once again, the Court sees no reason to depart from the CLS guidelines and finds
that a rate of $285.00 per hour is reasonable within the prevailing legal market for
paralegals of Pisano’s and Fiegel’s experience.
9 	To the extent AnnieMac argues that the Court should not reduce any hourly
rates because Weikel did not provide “affirmative evidence of the unreasonableness
of the rates,” [Dkt. 120] at 9, that argument is rejected. It is AnnieMac’s burden to
show that its requested hourly rates are reasonable in the first instance,
see Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 703 n.5 (citations omitted), and AnnieMac’s own proffered
community-standard billing guidelines fail to support its reasonableness argument
on this point. Accordingly, a downward departure is warranted. Allegro Freight,
Inc. v. World Trucking Exp., Inc., Civ. No. 07-4294 (RBK), 2008 WL 4601926, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2008) (parties “are not entitled to their requested fees and costs
until they . . . satisfy their burden of establishing the reasonableness of the amount
claimed”).
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b. 	Reasonableness of Hours Billed
AnnieMac’s billing records can be broken down to six categories of work:
(1) time spent preparing the January 22, 2025 Letter; (2) time spent attempting to
resolve the parties’ settlement dispute without motion practice; (3) time spent on
preparing materials in support of its motion to enforce; (4) time spent reviewing the
Court’s Opinion and Order ruling on the parties’ motions to enforce and facilitating
redactions to the same; (5) time spent facilitating and implementing the settlement
pursuant to the Court’s Opinion and Order; and (6) time spent on this fee petition.
[Dkt. 118-2] ¶ 6, Ex. A; [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A. To account for these six categories,
AnnieMac seeks fees and costs dating back to January 19, 2025 and continuing
through at least July 2025. [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. A; [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A. Under the
circumstances, the Court finds this to be an unreasonable time frame.
Although the parties first raised their settlement dispute with the Court via
the January 22 Letter, see [Dkt. 113], their actual enforcement efforts did not begin
until March 31, 2025, when it became clear that the parties reached an impasse on
the dispute and the Court granted leave to file motions to enforce the settlement
agreement. See [Dkt. 95]. While it is true that “the parties did not initially see eye
to eye on the [a]greement” before March 31, that “is not in and of itself particularly
troubling,” as “[s]uch disputes are not uncommon” while formally memorializing an
oral agreement, and “parties [ ] are often able to resolve their issues on their own
with little, or even sometimes no, nudging by the Court.” U.S. Sewer & Drain,
2016 WL 11663197, *10 (permitting attorneys’ fees for settlement enforcement
tasks from date on which the Court directed motion practice). Because it did not
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become necessary for counsel to engage in compensable enforcement efforts until
March 31, 2025, the Court will exclude Maddin Hauser and Cole Schotz’s billed
time in categories one and two, all of which occurred before March 31. [Dkt. 118-2]
¶ 6, at 9-10, 12-13, 19-10; [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 10, 12, at 7, 9, 12. The Court will
accordingly subtract the 13.8 hours that Horwitz billed between January 19, 2025
and March 27, 2025; the 0.9 hours that Mannion billed on January 22, 2025 and
February 19, 2025; and the 1.35 hours that Costagliola billed on March 24, 2025
from its lodestar calculation below. Id.
Regarding category three—time spent preparing AnnieMac’s motion to
enforce briefing (and related tasks)—Weikel argues that the “time spent on th[e]
narrow issue presented to the Court in this matter is [ ] exorbitant and duplicative,”
as “[t]his is not a complex case, and the issue presented, whether or not a
settlement agreement should be enforced, did not require expertise or outside
consultation, and certainly did not require spending over 20 hours of motion
preparation, especially where oral argument was never held.” [Dkt. 119] at 15-16.
As to Horwitz specifically, Weikel also points out that he “never bill[ed] in less than
[0.2] increments,” and takes issue with the fact that he billed for time spent
“providing edits/comments to co-defendants’ briefs.” Id. First, the Court finds the
time Horwitz spent on AnnieMac’s motion to enforce and related tasks generally to
be reasonable. Although the Court did not hear oral argument on the motions to
enforce, the briefing involved a contentious settlement agreement, and how it
impacted certain claims and defenses in a separate state-court matter. Moreover,
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there were several competing motions at issue, see [Dkts. 96, 98, 102, 106, 107], and
AnnieMac’s motion specifically contributed to the Court’s ultimate resolution of the
dispute.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Weikel that the hours Horwitz billed for
some tasks were excessive, and minor reductions to Horwitz’s fees in this category
are therefore appropriate. In particular, the Court concludes that the time Horwitz
spent on the following tasks was overkill: (1) analyzing the Court’s two-sentence
Text Order granting the parties leave to file motions to enforce filed at [Dkt. 95]
(0.2 hours), (2) analyzing the parties’ two-page Consent Order entered at [Dkt. 105]
(0.2 hours), and (3) analyzing and communicating about the Court’s decision to file
the January 22 Letter at [Dkt. 113] (0.5 hours). See [Dkt. 118-2] at 20, 33-34.
Additionally, although some amount of coordination between AnnieMac and the
other parties was required for purposes of motion preparation and strategy, the
Court finds the total amount of time Horwitz spent on such communication was
excessive. To account for the foregoing, the Court will reduce the time Horwitz
billed in this category from 20.5 hours to 18 hours. See Evans, 273 F.3d at 362
(“in determining whether the fee request is excessive the [C]ourt will inevitably
engage in a fair amount of ‘judgment calling’ based upon its experience with the
case and the general experience as to how much a case requires.” (quotation
omitted) (cleaned up)).
Regarding Cole Schotz’s hours, Weikel argues that none of the time Cole
Schotz billed in connection with the motion to enforce was necessary or reasonable
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because it was “needlessly duplicative” of Maddin Hauser’s legal work, but he does
not identify any specific billing entries indicative of duplication. [Dkt. 119]
at 15-17.10 To the contrary, Weikel generally contends that there was no need for
local counsel in this matter, and broadly states that “it is apparent and obvious
from the invoices submitted to the Court that [Maddin Hauser] essentially claim[s]
to have performed the exact same work as Cole Schotz” because both Maddin
Hauser and Cole Schotz billed time for work on AnnieMac’s motion to enforce and
supporting materials. Id. at 17.
The Court rejects Weikel’s argument that the hours billed by Cole Schotz are
categorically unreasonable. Courts in this District routinely award fees to local
counsel when the time expended on their representation is well founded, and here,
“[a] certain amount of communication between [Maddin Hauser] and local counsel,
and work on the part of local counsel, was necessary during the course of the
litigation.” Port Drivers Fed’n 18, Inc. v. All Saints, Civ. No. 09-868 (WHW), 2011
WL 3610100, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2011); see also Sabinsa Corp. v. Herbakraft,
Inc., Civ. No. 14-04738 (RBK), 2021 WL 5449087, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2021)
(“engagement of both local, i.e., forum, and non-forum counsel does NOT mean
[absent an exception not applicable here] that the time entries of the non-forum
10 	The Court notes that the party opposing a fee award may not rely on
generalized objections; rather, the opposing party must support its opposition with
specific facts. Cintron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 13-7125 (KM), 2015 WL
3938998, at *2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2015) (“The party opposing a fee request has the
burden to submit objections that are specific and well-supported.”). Nevertheless,
the Court has conducted its own independent review of AnnieMac’s billing records
and analyzes them for overlap based upon Weikel’s general arguments.
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counsel and the forum counsel are automatically duplicative.”); Transamerica Life
Ins. Co. v. Daibes Gas Holdings Atlanta, L.L.C., Civ. No. 18-10869 (CLW), 2022 WL
773261, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
769904 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2022) (awarding fees to local counsel after finding that the
hours billed “were reasonable and not duplicative.”).
On the Court’s line-by-line review of AnnieMac’s billing records, Cole Schotz’s
billed time appears neither duplicative nor excessive. Cole Schotz billed a total of
only 3.55 hours on the motion to enforce, and based on its billing descriptions, there
does not appear to be significant overlap between Maddin Hauser and Cole Schotz’s
work. Compare [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. A with [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A. Indeed, Cole
Schotz appears to have billed only for tasks that could not be accomplished without
the assistance of local counsel. See [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A; Ingemi v. Pelino & Lentz,
866 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.N.J. 1994) (“District court local rules [ ] require local
counsel to take more than a de minimis role in the representation” and help “ensure
that attorneys representing New Jersey clients in New Jersey courts are sufficiently
familiar with state law and practice to represent their clients knowledgeably and
effectively.” (emphasis added)); L. Civ. R. 101.1(c)(4) (“Only an attorney at law of
this Court may file papers, enter appearances for parties, sign stipulations, or sign
and receive payments on judgments, decrees or orders.”). The Court thus finds it
reasonable and appropriate to award AnnieMac with the full amount of time that
Cole Schotz billed on the motion to enforce, consisting of 2.65 hours billed by
Mannion, 0.4 hours billed by Figiel, and 0.5 hours billed by Pisano.
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Regarding category four, Weikel does not specifically challenge the 3.3 hours
Horwitz spent reviewing and facilitating redactions to the Court’s Opinion and
Order resolving the parties’ motions to enforce.11 Instead, Weikel states generally
that the hours are “not reasonable and [are] excessive.” [Dkt. 119] at 14. On the
Court’s review, the hours Horwitz spent on the various tasks in this category are
well documented and appear reasonable. In light of this and the absence of a
specific objection from Weikel, the Court “will not . . . arbitrarily exclude [these]
hours from the lodestar calculation.” Castro v. McCarthy & Jennerich, Civ. No.
11-01832 (JAD), 2013 WL 335973, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2013), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 324300 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2013) (citations
omitted).
As to category five, the Court will reduce the 5.7 hours that Horwitz spent
“complying with the Order in terms of facilitating and implementing the settlement,
including preparing the release of claims ordered by the Court and communications
with counsel re[garding the] same.” [Dkt. 118-2] ¶ 6, Ex. A at 41-44.12 The Court
does not agree with Weikel’s assertion that hours spent on “facilitating the terms of
the settlement” are categorically un-recoverable. [Dkt. 119] at 14-15. But the Court
does believe that a partial reduction is warranted because there is not a sufficient
causal connection between some of the time that Horwitz billed in this category—
like time spent gathering closing documents and coordinating wire payments,
11 	Cole Schotz did not bill any time in this category.
12 	Cole Schotz did not bill any time in this category.
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see [Dkt. 118-2] at 42-44—and AnnieMac’s motion to enforce and the Court’s
resulting Opinion and Order. Accordingly, the Court concludes that some of the
time Horwitz spent facilitating the terms of the agreement following the Court’s
ruling was unwarranted, and a modest downward adjustment is necessary. The
Court will reduce the time Horwitz billed in this category to 3.5 hours.
Finally, as to category six, the Court concludes that AnnieMac is entitled to
recover fees for the time counsel spent working on the present motion to recover
attorneys’ fees. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 297 F.3d
253, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A party entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees is also
entitled to reimbursement for the time spent litigating its fee application.” (citation
omitted)). However, on review, the Court agrees with Weikel that the combined
9.65 hours Maddin Hauser and Cole Schotz spent drafting this motion was
excessive. [Dkt. 119] at 14.
First, AnnieMac spent almost half as much time preparing its fee motion as it
did preparing its substantive motion to enforce. Pretlow v. Cumberland Cnty. Bd. of
Soc. Servs., Civ. No. 04-2885 (FLW), 2005 WL 3500028, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2005)
(finding attorney’s request for time spent on fee request “to be unreasonable and
excessive” where, inter alia, the attorney “spent almost half the amount of time
drafting a fee petition as he did preparing a moving and reply brief on the
substantive issues in the case”). Moreover, there was no oral argument for this
motion, and the fee motion itself is not particularly comprehensive. See, e.g., Norton
v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that time
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departing from the lodestar is appropriate. Souryavong, 872 F.3d at 128 (citing
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 543 (2010)).
These calculations do not include the time that AnnieMac spent in reviewing
Weikel’s opposition brief to the instant motion or preparing its reply. AnnieMac
will therefore be given seven days from the date of this Order to supplement its
request for fees. Weikel will have seven days from the date AnnieMac submits its
supplemental request to file any objections.
2. 	Costs
In addition to attorneys’ fees, AnnieMac seeks to recover the $35.10 in costs it
incurred in connection with its motion to enforce. [Dkt. 118-1] at 16. AnnieMac
states that the $35.10 “represents the cost of ordering the transcript of the
Settlement Conference on December 17, 2024,” and provides an invoice regarding
the same. [Dkt. 118-2] ¶ 12, Ex. A at 17. Weikel does not challenge AnnieMac’s
request to recover these costs, and the Court finds them reasonable and necessary.
Thus, the Court will permit AnnieMac to recoup the $35.10 in full. Apple Corps.,
25 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS on this 19th day of February, 2026,
ORDERED that AnnieMac’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs, [Dkt. 118], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court provisionally awards attorneys’ fees and costs to
AnnieMac in the amount of $14,154.60, subject to supplementation authorized
below; and it is further
ORDERED that, on or before February 26, 2026, AnnieMac may
supplement its fee application to include the time it spent reviewing Weikel’s
opposition brief to the instant motion and/or preparing its reply. If AnnieMac files a
supplemental fee application, Weikel may file any objections thereto no later than
March 5, 2026. If AnnieMac does not file a supplemental fee application, Weikel
shall pay AnnieMac attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $14,154.60 no later
than April 5, 2026.
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:23-cv-01226-JBD Document121 Filed 02/19/26 Page 1 of 31 PagelD:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 23-1226 (JBD)
FRANSISCA ARIAS, et al.,
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiffs,

Vv.
FAMILY FIRST FUNDING, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Following a contentious dispute resulting in several competing motions to
enforce a settlement agreement, the Court issued an Opinion and Order enforcing
the terms of a settlement agreement reached during the December 2024 settlement
conference in this case. See [Dkts. 114, 115]. As part of that ruling, the Court
concluded that one of the parties’ agreed-upon terms provided that “[i]n the event of
any... breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or any
action to enforce them, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney[s’] fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with such
action to enforce.” [Dkt. 114] at 39 (quoting [Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21); see also
[Dkt. 115] at 2-4. Accordingly, the Court authorized the filing of appropriate
motions for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with the
motions to enforce. [Dkt. 114] at 39; [Dkt. 115] at 3-4.

Defendant American Neighborhood Mortgage Acceptance Company, LLC,
d/b/a AnnieMac Home Mortgage (“AnnieMac’) now seeks an award of $25,717.35 in

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Maddin Hauser Roth & Heller P.C. (“Maddin

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
Hauser”) and Cole Schotz P.C. (“Cole Schotz”) in connection with its motion to
enforce. [Dkt. 118.] Defendant Scott Weikel, from whom AnnieMac seeks its fees,
opposes the motion. [Dkt. 119.]
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part AnnieMac’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court will provisionally
award AnnieMac $14,154.60, pending any supplemental submission to account for
time spent preparing AnnieMac’s reply brief on the instant motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court outlined the background to this case and the underlying
settlement dispute extensively in its July 1, 2025 Opinion and incorporates that
Opinion in full. The Court will limit its discussion here to the relevant background
necessary to resolve the present motion.
At the conclusion of a settlement conference held on December 17, 2025, the
parties agreed to a settlement resolving the federal and state wage claims asserted
by plaintiffs in this case. Id. at 4-9. A little over a month later, on
January 22, 2025, the parties informed the Court that a dispute had arisen
regarding the meaning and scope of the putative terms of the settlement agreement.
Id. at 12. Specifically, the parties disagreed whether the settlement agreement
required AnnieMac and defendants Gabriel and Neusa Gillen (collectively, the
“Gillens”) to waive or release certain defenses that they may have had to claims
that Weikel has asserted against them in a separate litigation filed in New Jersey
state court (the “State Court Action”). Id. at 10-11. Unable to resolve the dispute,
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each of the parties filed competing motions to enforce some version of the settlement
agreement. [Dkts. 96, 98, 102, 106, 107.]
Relevant here, AnnieMac’s respective motion argued that “the parties
negotiated, finalized, placed on the record, and confirmed via email the principal
terms of a valid and enforceable settlement,” and asked the Court to enforce the
version of the proposed written settlement agreement that was circulated amongst
counsel on January 15, 2025, but which had not been executed due to the parties’
dispute (the “January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement”). [Dkt. 96-2] at 7-8;
[Dkt. 113-3]. AnnieMac sought to enforce that version of the agreement because, in
AnnieMac’s view, it accurately reflected the release language the defendants had
agreed to during the settlement conference—namely, that defendants would release
each other only from claims seeking reimbursement for the settlement amounts
paid to plaintiffs, but not any other claims. Id.; [Dkt. 112] at 1. AnnieMac’s motion
also requested that the Court deem it a prevailing party for purposes of fee-shifting.
[Dkt. 96-2] at 8.
By contrast, Weikel’s motion to enforce argued that he agreed to settle this
matter on the condition that all claims that he “anticipated bringing against the
other [d]efendants were preserved and would not be adversely affected by having
participated in the [s]ettlement.” [Dkt. 106] at 13 (emphasis added); accord
[Dkt. 110] at 13. Weikel’s motion thus requested that the Court “enter an Order
enforcing the settlement agreement consistent with [his] understanding that an
entire controversy defense c[could] [not] be asserted against [him] in the pending
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State Court [Action],” or alternatively, “find that there [wa]s no meeting of minds
and declare the settlement agreement null and void.” [Dkt. 106] at 5; [Dkt. 110]
at 14.
In its resulting Opinion and Order, the Court enforced the settlement
agreement that the parties reached during the December 17, 2024 settlement
conference, consisting of the terms placed on the record, plus defendants’ agreement
to preserve non-reimbursement claims against each other. [Dkt. 114] at 35-38;
[Dkt. 115] at 2-3. In light of this ruling, the Court denied AnnieMac’s motion “to the
extent that it s[ought] to enforce the January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement,” but
otherwise granted the motion, “inasmuch as the Court agree[d] with AnnieMac that
defendants did not agree to waive any defenses to Weikel’s state law claims.”
[Dkt. 114] at 38 n.15. The Court denied Weikel’s motion in full. Id. at 41;
[Dkt. 115] at 2.
As to fee-shifting, the Court explicitly held that
[T]he parties agreed on the record at the settlement conference that “[i]n
the event of any . . . breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal
settlement agreement, or any action to enforce them, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney[s’] fees, costs,
and expenses incurred in connection with such action to enforce.” [A]nd
[b]ecause the Court conclude[d] that the settlement agreement reached
during the conference [wa]s enforceable, so too [wa]s th[e] provision
regarding attorneys’ fees.
[Dkt. 114] at 39 (citations omitted). The Court deferred decision “on who [wa]s a
prevailing party, and the amount of fees to be awarded,” and directed the parties to
submit any motions for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection
with their respective motions to enforce by August 8, 2025. Id.; [Dkt. 115] at 3-4.
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AnnieMac’s present fee motion followed on August 8, 2025, which Weikel opposes.
[Dkts. 118, 119.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the general “American Rule,” parties typically are responsible for
paying their own attorneys’ fees. John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Delaware Cty.
Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 555 (3d Cir. 2003). As such, courts generally do
not award fees to a prevailing party absent explicit authority “by statute, court
rule[,] or contract.” Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 480,
484 (D.N.J. 1998).
Here, the Court determined that the parties included as a term of their
enforceable settlement that “[i]n the event of any . . . breach of a settlement term
sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or any action to enforce them, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney[s’] fees, costs, and
expenses incurred in connection with such action to enforce.” [Dkt. 114] at 39
(quoting [Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21); see also [Dkt. 115] at 3 (“If a motion to enforce the
settlement is filed, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to an award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with the
motion.”). Accordingly, the parties’ settlement agreement provides a basis for an
award of counsel fees and costs here. 	Goethe v. Goethe, No. A-3043-11T4, 2013 WL
2173182, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2013) (upholding award of
attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing settlement as provided in the parties’
settlement agreement) (citing N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co.,
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158 N.J. 561, 570 (1999) and Satellite Gateway Commc’ns, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car
Co., 110 N.J. 280, 285 (1988)); Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Mar-Bridge Enters., Inc.,
Civ. No. 18-15205 (DEA), 2021 WL 7868721, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2021)
(permitting award of attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing settlement pursuant to
the terms of the agreement).1
“A ‘prevailing’ plaintiff entitled to a fee award is one who has succeeded on
‘any significant issue in litigation [that] achieves some of the benefit the part[y]
sought in bringing the suit.’” Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 598,
601-02 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
In the Third Circuit, “[t]he test for prevailing party status is essentially a twofold
inquiry.” Metro. Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244,
250 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 842 F.2d 1420, 1433 (3d Cir.
1988)). First, the Court must decide whether the moving party obtained relief on a
1 	The Court rejects Weikel’s argument that AnnieMac is not entitled to
attorneys’ fees and costs as a general matter because “there was no breach of a
settlement term or . . . any formal settlement agreement,” as “a formal settlement
agreement was never reached in [this] case,” and “the term sheet does not provide
that the failure of the [d]efendant parties to agree to specific language constitutes a
breach of any term sheet or agreement between the [d]efendants.” [Dkt. 119] at 10.
A “breach” of the settlement terms is not the only basis on which a party may
recover fees under the terms to which the parties agreed. [Dkt. 114] at 39 (quoting
[Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21) (a prevailing party is entitled to a fee award “[i]n the event
of any . . . breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or
any action to enforce them” (emphasis added)). Moreover, in its Opinion, the
Court concluded that the parties had reached the terms of a settlement agreement
during the settlement conference in December 2024; the parties’ prior motion
practice unquestionably concerned an “action to enforce” those terms; and,
therefore, the fee provision the parties agreed to is applicable here. Id.; see also
[Dkt. 115] at 2-3.
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significant claim in the litigation. Id. Then, the Court must evaluate whether there
is a causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained. Id.
Once a court determines that a party has prevailed for purposes of a fee
award, the court must then decide upon a reasonable award of fees and costs.
The Third Circuit uses the “lodestar” method as a starting point to assess whether
attorneys’ fees are reasonable, which courts determine by calculating the “‘number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate.’” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The “party seeking attorney[s’] fees bears the ultimate
burden of showing that its requested hourly rates and the hours it claims are
reasonable.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’I, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5
(3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)).
To satisfy this burden, “the fee petitioner must ‘submit evidence supporting the
hours worked and [the] rates claimed.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
Specifically, Local Civil Rule 54.2 provides that the party seeking fees must
submit an affidavit setting forth the following:
(1) 	the nature of the services rendered, the amount of the
estate 	or 	fund 	in 	court, 	if 	any, 	the 	responsibility
assumed, the results obtained, any particular novelty
or 	difficulty 	about 	the 	matter, 	and 	other 	factors
pertinent to the evaluation of the services rendered;
(2) 	a record of the dates of services rendered;
(3) 	a description of the services rendered on each of such
dates by each person of that firm including the identity
of 	the 	person 	rendering 	the 	service 	and 	a 	brief
description of that person’s professional experience;
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(4) 	the time spent in the rendering of each of such services;
and
(5) 	the normal billing rate for each of said persons for the
type of work performed.
L. Civ. R. 54.2(a). The affidavit shall also set forth the “[total] time spent by each
individual performing services,” “describe[e] all fee agreements,” and detail “both
the amount billed to the client for fees and disbursements and the amount paid.”
L. Civ. R. 54.2(a), (b).
“[O]nce the fee petitioner ‘submit[s] evidence supporting the hour[s] worked
and rates claimed,’ the party opposing the fee application has the burden to
challenge the reasonableness of the requested fee.” Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford,
Inc., Civ. No. 13-7704 (RMB), 2017 WL 1502788, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2017), aff’d,
722 F. App’x 251 (3d Cir. 2018) (not precedential) (citing McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459
(citations omitted)). “The district court is afforded a ‘great deal of discretion’ to
adjust the awarded fee in light of the opponent’s objections.” Levy v. Glob. Credit &
Collection Corp., Civ. No. 10-4229 (RBK), 2011 WL 5117855, at *2 (D.N.J.
Oct. 27, 2011) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Indeed, “[i]f the party opposing
the fee petition meets its ‘burden of proving that an adjustment is necessary,’ the
Court has wide discretion to adjust the attorneys’ fee[s] for a variety of reasons such
as inadequate documentation of hours spent, reasonableness of hours expended or
duplication of efforts.” Apple Corps., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (first quoting Rode,
892 F.2d at 1183); and then citing Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677
(3d Cir. 1983)).
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“A court’s calculation of the lodestar, however, does not end its inquiry on a
fee application.” McKenna, 582 F.3d at 455. Once the lodestar is calculated, a court
may “adjust a fee award upward or downward.” Id. However, the Court’s discretion
to do so is not unlimited: “[a]fter calculating the lodestar, the court may deviate
from it, but only in the ‘rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not
adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee.’” Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 872 F.3d 122,
128 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 543-44
(2010)).2
III. 	DISCUSSION
Here, AnnieMac seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and costs totaling at least
$25,717.35.3 [Dkt. 118-1] at 6. Specifically, AnnieMac seeks an award of fees for
2 	Those factors are (1) the “time and labor required,” (2) the “novelty and
difficulty” of the issues presented, (3) the requisite skill needed “to perform the legal
service properly,” (4) the “preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case,” (5) the “customary fee,” (6) “[w]hether the fee is fixed or
contingent,” (7) the “[t]ime limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,”
(8) the “amount involved and the results obtained,” (9) the “experience, reputation,
and ability of the attorneys,” (10) the “‘undesirability’ of the case,” (11) the “nature
and length of the professional relationship with the client,” and (12) “[a]wards in
similar cases.” Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19
(5th Cir. 1974); see also id. (noting that “consideration of Johnson ‘factors’ is
permissible on the back end of a lodestar’s calculation, as long as they are not
already ‘subsumed in the lodestar calculation.’”).
3 	AnnieMac “reserve[d] its rights to submit further fee petitions” for “any
additional fees and costs incurred in connection with its [m]otion to [e]nforce
[s]ettlement – including, but not limited to, the preparation of [its fee petition], the
review of any response to the same, and preparing any reply brief in support of the
[fee petition].” [Dkt. 118-1] at 16.
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Robert M. Horwitz, a partner at Michigan-based law firm Maddin Hauser, for
52.6 hours at a rate of $435.00 per hour—totaling $22,881.004 with the following
breakdown:
1. 	2.5 hours spent preparing a letter submitted to the Court on
January 22, 2025, first notifying the Court of the parties’ settlement
dispute, see [Dkt. 113] (the “January 22 Letter”).
2. 	11.3 hours spent attempting to resolve the parties’ settlement dispute
without motion practice.
3. 	20.5 hours spent working on AnnieMac’s motion to enforce the settlement
agreement and analyzing/responding to the competing motions to enforce.
4. 	3.3 hours spent reviewing the Court’s Opinion and Order resolving the
parties’ competing motions to enforce and facilitating redactions to the
same.
5. 	5.7 hours spent facilitating and implementing the settlement pursuant to
the Court’s Order enforcing the settlement terms agreed to at the
December 2024 settlement conference.
6. 	9.3 hours spent on the present motion for recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs.
[Dkt. 118-2] ¶¶ 6, 9, 13, Ex. A.
AnnieMac also seeks $2,801.25 in attorneys’ fees incurred by New
Jersey-based law firm Cole Schotz for 6.85 hours billed for its participation in
drafting the January 22 Letter and in connection with AnnieMac’s motion to enforce
settlement and resulting fee request. Cole Schotz’s billed hours are broken down as
4 	On the Court’s review, Maddin Hauser’s unredacted invoices reflect 53.3
hours of work billed by Horwitz, totaling $23,185.50 in fees. [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. A.
However, the time discrepancies appear to fall within categories two and five of the
billing record, id., and the Court will exclude all of the time billed in category two
and reduce the time billed in category five, see infra at 22-23, 27-28. These small
discrepancies are accordingly irrelevant for purposes of the lodestar analysis.
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follows: 3.9 hours billed at a rate of $490 per hour by litigation associate Connor M.
Mannion for a total of $1,911.00 in fees; 1.35 hours billed at a rate of $415 per hour
by litigation associate Catherine J. Costagliola for a total of $560.25 in fees;
0.4 hours billed at a rate of $400 per hour by paralegal Frances Pisano for a total of
$160.00 in fees; and 0.5 hours billed at a rate of $400 per hour by paralegal Amy N.
Figiel for a total of $200.00 in fees. [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 5, 7-11, 14, Ex. A.5
Finally, AnnieMac seeks to recover $35.10 in litigation costs. [Dkt. 118-2]
¶ 12, Ex. A at 17.
Weikel opposes AnnieMac’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs on several
grounds. [Dkt. 119.] First, he argues that AnnieMac is not entitled to any
attorneys’ fees or costs because it did not prevail on its motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. Id. at 9-10. Weikel also argues that an award of attorneys’
fees under the circumstances presented here would be fundamentally unfair. Id. at
10-11. Finally, Weikel alternatively argues that if the Court does permit the
recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, AnnieMac’s “request for attorneys’ fees should
be reduced” because the time it spent “on the narrow issue presented” and the
hourly rates for the Cole Schotz associates and paralegals staffed on this matter
were not reasonable. Id. at 11-18. The Court addresses each of Weikel’s arguments
in turn.
5 	On the Court’s review of the billing records submitted, the total number of
relevant hours that Cole Schotz billed is 6.15, not the 6.85 hours that AnnieMac’s
motion papers reflect. Compare [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 10-11 with [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A.
The Court will only credit Cole Schotz for the hours reflected in its billing records in
conducting the lodestar analysis below.
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A. 	AnnieMac is a Prevailing Party Entitled to Attorneys’
Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement
The Supreme Court has given a “generous formulation” to the term
“prevailing party,” explaining that “plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’
for attorney[s’] fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433 (quotation omitted). Under this standard, a party may be deemed
prevailing “even though the relief they obtained is not identical to the relief they
specifically demanded, as long as the relief obtained is of the same general type.”
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 912 (3d Cir. 1985);
see also K.A.L. v. Salem Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 94-661 (JEI), 1994 WL 327160, at *3
(D.N.J. June 21, 1994) (“A [party] need not achieve the relief he originally sought
exactly or completely in order to be deemed a prevailing party.” (citations omitted)).
Weikel argues that AnnieMac is not a prevailing party because the Court
rejected AnnieMac’s request to enforce the January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement,
and it therefore did not obtain the relief it sought. [Dkt. 119] at 10. Although the
Court did not enforce the specific version of the settlement agreement set forth in
AnnieMac’s motion to enforce, the Opinion specifically noted that “the Court
denie[d] AnnieMac’s motion only to the extent that it s[ought] to enforce the
January 15 Draft Settlement Agreement.” [Dkt. 114] at 38 n.15. The Court
otherwise granted AnnieMac’s motion, “inasmuch as [it] agree[d] with AnnieMac
that defendants did not agree to waive any defenses to Weikel’s state law claims.”
Id. The central thrust of AnnieMac’s motion was to enforce a version of the
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settlement agreement that accurately reflected the release language it believed
defendants had agreed to during the settlement conference—specifically, that
defendants would release each other only from claims seeking reimbursement for
the settlement amounts paid to plaintiffs, but not for any other claims. [Dkt. 96-2]
at 7-8; [Dkt. 112] at 1. Because the Court agreed with that proposition and
ultimately enforced a version of the settlement agreement containing that release
language, the Court readily concludes that that AnnieMac “succeed[ed] on [a]
significant issue in [this] litigation” because the relief it obtained was generally
similar to the relief it sought. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (quotation omitted).
AnnieMac is thus a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the
settlement agreement.
B. 	Principles of Fundamental Fairness Do Not Preclude an
Award of Fees and Costs
Weikel contends that “it would not be fair or equitable to award attorney[s’]
fees to AnnieMac in light of [its] pre-motion procedural posture,” as “Weikel and
AnnieMac had agreed to terms,” and AnnieMac never indicated “that it would be
changing its position in connection with its motion to enforce the settlement
agreement if Weikel did not cave to the demands of the Gillen[s].” [Dkt. 119] at 11.
Weikel additionally argues that because he “sought [his] requested language based
upon his good faith understanding of what had been agreed to at the [s]ettlement
[c]onference,” fees are not warranted. Id.
As an initial matter, the Court need not (and does not) find that Weikel acted
in bad faith in pursuing his respective motion to enforce. Acting in “bad faith” is
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not a contractual prerequisite for the recovery of fees under the terms of the
settlement agreement. That agreement provided that “[i]n the event of any . . .
breach of a settlement term sheet, or formal settlement agreement, or any action to
enforce them, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney[s’] fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with such action to
enforce” regardless whether any such breach or action to enforce was in good or bad
faith. [Dkt. 114] at 39 (quoting [Dkt. 82] at Tr. 16:4-21). Indeed, that fee provision
was an undisputed term of the settlement that the parties unequivocally agreed to
be bound by on the record at the settlement conference—neither Weikel nor any
other party challenged that term in their motions to enforce. Cf. [Dkts. 96, 98, 102,
106, 107].
To be sure, courts have an inherent discretionary power to award attorneys’
fees as a sanction for a party’s bad faith litigation conduct, see Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (quotation omitted), but that is not at issue here.
There is a significant distinction between fees recovered pursuant to a contract and
a discretionary award of fees conferred “when a party has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id.; see also United States Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Marago, Civ. No. 22-1913 (RLS), 2024 WL 6078930, at *2 (D.N.J. May 13,
2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3173858 (D.N.J. Nov. 13,
2025) (“Courts do not ordinarily grant attorneys’ fees and costs unless specifically
authorized by statute or party agreement or where there is bad faith.”
(citing Hobbs v. Am. Invs. Mgt., Inc., 576 F.2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1978)) (emphasis
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added)); Fortune Title Agency, Inc. v. Fortune Abstract Co. LLC, Civ. No. 23-1914
(JBC), 2025 WL 1627122, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 1627207 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2025) (granting party’s request for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs associated with a motion to enforce pursuant to a
provision of the settlement agreement being enforced, but denying request for fee
award as a result of defendants’ “bad faith conduct.”). Because AnnieMac seeks to
recover fees based on an agreed-upon settlement term that did not contemplate a
bad faith component as opposed to the Court’s inherent discretionary authority,
Weikel’s good faith or bad faith is not relevant to the analysis.
The Court also rejects Weikel’s argument that “an award of attorney[s’] fees
would be contrary to notions of fundamental fairness,” because Weikel and
AnnieMac had essentially resolved their dispute before “the Gillens’ refusal to agree
to the compromised language that was accepted by all other parties.” [Dkt. 119]
at 10. Although AnnieMac, Family First, and Weikel agreed to revised release
language after the settlement dispute arose, that agreement was made in an effort
to obviate the need for Court intervention in the parties’ settlement dispute.
[Dkts. 87, 89.] AnnieMac only agreed to a compromise to avoid motion practice, as
it made clear that it never agreed to waive any defenses at the settlement
conference throughout the dispute proceedings and in their resulting motion to
enforce. 	Id.; [Dkt. 96-2] at 2-8; [Dkt. 96-3] ¶¶ 5, 8, 17-19; [Dkt. 112] at 1-3;
[Dkt. 113] at 1-3. All parties could not agree; motions to enforce became necessary;
and Weikel took a position that, the Court later found, materially deviated from the
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agreed-upon settlement. In that context, AnnieMac was well within its right to
take a position consistent with the agreement—i.e., that defendants did not agree to
any waiver of defenses in the State Court Action. And Weikel was well aware that
this was a possibility. There is no unfairness, fundamental or otherwise, in holding
Weikel to the terms of the settlement agreement.6
C. 	The Court Will Provisionally Award AnnieMac Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs in the Amount of $14,154.60
Weikel argues that any fees awarded to AnnieMac should be reduced because
the hourly rates for the Cole Schotz attorneys and legal professionals who worked
on this case were not reasonable, and because the time AnnieMac spent on issues
related to its motion to enforce was not reasonable. [Dkt. 119] at 11-18.
Specifically, Weikel contends that AnnieMac has not met its burden of
demonstrating that Cole Schotz’s billing rates are reasonable because they are not
consistent with AnnieMac’s proffered community-standard billing guidelines. Id. at
17-18. Moreover, regarding the number of hours billed, Weikel takes issue with (1)
the time AnnieMac billed “facilitating the terms of the settlement,” which Weikel
argues would have been necessary regardless of any dispute or motion practice, id.
at 14-15; (2) the time AnnieMac billed for its pre-motion dispute resolution efforts,
which Weikel argues does not fall within the purview of the fee provision of the
settlement agreement, id. at 15; (3) the 20+ hours AnnieMac spent preparing its
6 	In any event, and as discussed in more detail below, see infra at 22-23, the
Court will exclude the time AnnieMac spent on pre-enforcement activities, so
Weikel need not bear AnnieMac’s fees and costs for the period during which he and
AnnieMac reached their tentative agreement.
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motion to enforce, which Weikel argues was “exorbitant and duplicative,”
id. at 15-16; and (4) the time Cole Schotz spent on this matter, which Weikel
contends was entirely duplicative of Maddin Hauser’s work and should be
discounted entirely, id. at 15-17.7
1. 	The Lodestar
As noted, the “lodestar” method is the starting point to assess whether
attorneys’ fees are reasonable. McKenna, 582 F.3d at 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Courts calculate the lodestar by multiplying the
“‘number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly
rate.’” Id. “Reasonable hourly rates are typically determined based on the market
rate in the attorney’s community for lawyers of similar expertise and experience.”
Machado v. Law Offs. of Jeffrey H. Ward, Civ. No. 14-7401 (MAS),
2017 WL 2838458, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017) (citing Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 712).
“The starting point in determining a reasonable hourly rate is the attorney’s usual
7 	Weikel also complains that, due to redactions in its billing records, AnnieMac
“cannot demonstrate at certain points throughout its billing process that its billing
practices are either reasonable or non-duplicative, or that some of the time entries
are even related to the . . . settlement dispute.” [Dkt. 119] at 16. However,
AnnieMac does not seek fees stemming from the completely redacted billing entries,
and of the fees it does claim, only three entries contain partial redactions.
See [Dkt. 118-2] at 26, 28, 33 (Horwitz’s April 1, 2025 billing entry for 0.2 hours,
Horwitz’s April 28, 2025 billing entry for 0.7 hours, and Horwitz’s May 6, 2025
billing entry for 2.6 hours). Out of an abundance of caution, the Court reviewed the
unredacted versions of those partially redacted billing records in camera and is
satisfied that AnnieMac seeks to recover only those fees that correspond with its
unredacted and partially redacted time entries, all of which fall into the six
categories of work detailed above.
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billing rate, but this is not dispositive.’” Id. (quoting Pub. Int. Research Grp. of N.J.,
Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995)).
“After a court ascertains a reasonable hourly rate, it must then determine
whether the hours that the attorney expended are reasonable.” Id. (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433-34). In making that determination, the Court must exclude any
hours that were “not reasonably expended” from the fee calculation. Rode, 892 F.2d
at 1183 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). “Hours are not reasonably expended if
they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. The Court also
“should reduce the hours claimed by the number of hours spent litigating claims on
which the party did not succeed.” Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173,
178 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing id.). Accordingly, “[t]o determine whether the hours
expended in [a] matter are reasonable,” the Court must “‘go line, by line, by line’
through the billing records supporting the fee request.’” Rhodes v. Marix Servicing,
LLC, Civ. No. 12-1636 (MAS), 2020 WL 5760455, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2020)
(quoting Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001)).
a. 	Reasonableness of Proposed Hourly Rates8
First, the Court notes that Weikel does not dispute the reasonableness of
Horwitz’s rate of $435.00 per hour. [Dkt. 119] at 14. Upon review, AnnieMac has
provided appropriate documentation reflecting Horwitz’s billing rate,
see [Dkt. 118-2] ¶¶ 9-11, Ex. A, and the Court is satisfied that Horwitz’s hourly
rates are reasonable based on prevailing market rates. See U.S. Sewer & Drain,
8 	Because the Court will exclude all of the time billed by Costagliola, see infra
at 23, the Court need not address the reasonableness of her hourly rate.
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Inc. v. Earle Asphalt Co., Civ. No. 15-1461 (TJB), 2016 WL 11663197, *9 (D.N.J.
June 22, 2016) (concluding that hourly rates were reasonable where non-moving
party did not object to attorney’s rates and it appeared that the rates listed were
reasonable in light of prior case precedent finding that hourly rates ranging from up
to $540.00 to $750.00 per hour for partners were reasonable (collecting cases));
[Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B. The Court accordingly accepts Horwitz’s $435.00 per hour
rate as reasonable for purposes of the lodestar calculation below.
As to Mannion, the Court concludes that his billing rate should be adjusted.
AnnieMac seeks to impose a billing rate of $490.00 per hour for Mannion, which it
states “is commensurate with the prevailing market rates in New Jersey and with
[his] background and experience.” [Dkt. 118-3] ¶ 5. In support of its position,
AnnieMac cites the reasonable hourly rates established by Community Legal
Services (“CLS”), which publishes a fee schedule based on “Philadelphia law firm
market survey data and increases in the Consumer Price Index,” and provides that
Mannion has nearly five years of post-law school experience. [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B;
[Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 4-5; see also [Dkt. 118-1] at 13-15.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that courts in this District (including
the undersigned) routinely use the CLS guidelines to determine reasonable hourly
rates for attorneys and legal professionals for purposes of fee petitions. See, e.g.,
Asdal Holdings, LLC v. IdeaSoil, LLC, Civ. No. 22-04158 (AME), 2025 WL 1453134,
at *4 n.5 (D.N.J. May 21, 2025) (citing the CLS attorney fees schedule in assessing
reasonableness of hourly rates in breach of contract dispute); Depth Charge Marine,
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LTD. v. F/V C. ANN, Civ. No. 24-6336 (RK), 2025 WL 1088236, at *9 (D.N.J.
Apr. 11, 2025) (noting that the CLS table of reasonable hourly rates “ha[s] been
applied in the District of New Jersey” and finding that “counsel’s hourly rate [wa]s
well below the CLS rate for his experience and [ ] thus, reasonable.”); Lin v. Hudson
City Sav. Bank, Civ. No. 18-15387 (JBD), 2024 WL 1704730, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 19,
2024) (accepting and applying hourly rates consistent with the CLS guidelines and
noting that “multiple courts in this district have adopted the CLS rates as a
reasonable benchmark for the prevailing market rates in Trenton and the
surrounding southern New Jersey legal market” (collecting cases)). The Court
accordingly finds that the CLS guidelines are an appropriate benchmark for
determining reasonable hourly rates here.
However, for an attorney with Mannion’s level of experience (two to five
years), the CLS guidelines provide a range of $265.00-$315.00 per hour—
significantly lower than the $490.00 hourly rate that AnnieMac seeks to apply here.
Contrast [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B with [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 4-5. While AnnieMac cites some
cases in which courts in this District upheld associate billing rates higher than the
CLS guidelines, see, e.g., [Dkt. 120] at 9-10, the Court sees no reason for such a
departure here, especially considering that AnnieMac’s requested rate for Mannion
(an associate) is higher than the requested rate for Horwitz, who is a partner (albeit
at a different firm) with several decades more legal experience than Mannion.
[Dkt. 118-2] ¶¶ 9-10; [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 4-5. Consistent with the CLS guidelines, the
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Court finds that an hourly rate of $300.00 is reasonable within the prevailing legal
market for an attorney of Mannion’s experience.9
For the same reasons, the Court also will adjust Pisano’s and Fiegel’s billing
rates. AnnieMac states that Pisano and Fiegel each have over twenty years of
experience as paralegals and seeks to impose an hourly rate of $400.00 for both,
which AnnieMac asserts is “commensurate with the prevailing market rates in New
Jersey and with [their] background and experience.” [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 8-9. As with
Mannion, AnnieMac relies on the CLS guidelines to demonstrate that Pisano’s and
Fiegel’s proffered billing rates are reasonable. See [Dkt. 118-1] at 13-15;
[Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. B. However, for “Senior and Supervisory Paralegal[s],” the CLS
guidelines recommend an hourly rate range of $245-$285. [Dkt. 112-3] at Ex. B.
Once again, the Court sees no reason to depart from the CLS guidelines and finds
that a rate of $285.00 per hour is reasonable within the prevailing legal market for
paralegals of Pisano’s and Fiegel’s experience.
9 	To the extent AnnieMac argues that the Court should not reduce any hourly
rates because Weikel did not provide “affirmative evidence of the unreasonableness
of the rates,” [Dkt. 120] at 9, that argument is rejected. It is AnnieMac’s burden to
show that its requested hourly rates are reasonable in the first instance,
see Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 703 n.5 (citations omitted), and AnnieMac’s own proffered
community-standard billing guidelines fail to support its reasonableness argument
on this point. Accordingly, a downward departure is warranted. Allegro Freight,
Inc. v. World Trucking Exp., Inc., Civ. No. 07-4294 (RBK), 2008 WL 4601926, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2008) (parties “are not entitled to their requested fees and costs
until they . . . satisfy their burden of establishing the reasonableness of the amount
claimed”).
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b. 	Reasonableness of Hours Billed
AnnieMac’s billing records can be broken down to six categories of work:
(1) time spent preparing the January 22, 2025 Letter; (2) time spent attempting to
resolve the parties’ settlement dispute without motion practice; (3) time spent on
preparing materials in support of its motion to enforce; (4) time spent reviewing the
Court’s Opinion and Order ruling on the parties’ motions to enforce and facilitating
redactions to the same; (5) time spent facilitating and implementing the settlement
pursuant to the Court’s Opinion and Order; and (6) time spent on this fee petition.
[Dkt. 118-2] ¶ 6, Ex. A; [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A. To account for these six categories,
AnnieMac seeks fees and costs dating back to January 19, 2025 and continuing
through at least July 2025. [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. A; [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A. Under the
circumstances, the Court finds this to be an unreasonable time frame.
Although the parties first raised their settlement dispute with the Court via
the January 22 Letter, see [Dkt. 113], their actual enforcement efforts did not begin
until March 31, 2025, when it became clear that the parties reached an impasse on
the dispute and the Court granted leave to file motions to enforce the settlement
agreement. See [Dkt. 95]. While it is true that “the parties did not initially see eye
to eye on the [a]greement” before March 31, that “is not in and of itself particularly
troubling,” as “[s]uch disputes are not uncommon” while formally memorializing an
oral agreement, and “parties [ ] are often able to resolve their issues on their own
with little, or even sometimes no, nudging by the Court.” U.S. Sewer & Drain,
2016 WL 11663197, *10 (permitting attorneys’ fees for settlement enforcement
tasks from date on which the Court directed motion practice). Because it did not
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become necessary for counsel to engage in compensable enforcement efforts until
March 31, 2025, the Court will exclude Maddin Hauser and Cole Schotz’s billed
time in categories one and two, all of which occurred before March 31. [Dkt. 118-2]
¶ 6, at 9-10, 12-13, 19-10; [Dkt. 118-3] ¶¶ 10, 12, at 7, 9, 12. The Court will
accordingly subtract the 13.8 hours that Horwitz billed between January 19, 2025
and March 27, 2025; the 0.9 hours that Mannion billed on January 22, 2025 and
February 19, 2025; and the 1.35 hours that Costagliola billed on March 24, 2025
from its lodestar calculation below. Id.
Regarding category three—time spent preparing AnnieMac’s motion to
enforce briefing (and related tasks)—Weikel argues that the “time spent on th[e]
narrow issue presented to the Court in this matter is [ ] exorbitant and duplicative,”
as “[t]his is not a complex case, and the issue presented, whether or not a
settlement agreement should be enforced, did not require expertise or outside
consultation, and certainly did not require spending over 20 hours of motion
preparation, especially where oral argument was never held.” [Dkt. 119] at 15-16.
As to Horwitz specifically, Weikel also points out that he “never bill[ed] in less than
[0.2] increments,” and takes issue with the fact that he billed for time spent
“providing edits/comments to co-defendants’ briefs.” Id. First, the Court finds the
time Horwitz spent on AnnieMac’s motion to enforce and related tasks generally to
be reasonable. Although the Court did not hear oral argument on the motions to
enforce, the briefing involved a contentious settlement agreement, and how it
impacted certain claims and defenses in a separate state-court matter. Moreover,
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there were several competing motions at issue, see [Dkts. 96, 98, 102, 106, 107], and
AnnieMac’s motion specifically contributed to the Court’s ultimate resolution of the
dispute.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Weikel that the hours Horwitz billed for
some tasks were excessive, and minor reductions to Horwitz’s fees in this category
are therefore appropriate. In particular, the Court concludes that the time Horwitz
spent on the following tasks was overkill: (1) analyzing the Court’s two-sentence
Text Order granting the parties leave to file motions to enforce filed at [Dkt. 95]
(0.2 hours), (2) analyzing the parties’ two-page Consent Order entered at [Dkt. 105]
(0.2 hours), and (3) analyzing and communicating about the Court’s decision to file
the January 22 Letter at [Dkt. 113] (0.5 hours). See [Dkt. 118-2] at 20, 33-34.
Additionally, although some amount of coordination between AnnieMac and the
other parties was required for purposes of motion preparation and strategy, the
Court finds the total amount of time Horwitz spent on such communication was
excessive. To account for the foregoing, the Court will reduce the time Horwitz
billed in this category from 20.5 hours to 18 hours. See Evans, 273 F.3d at 362
(“in determining whether the fee request is excessive the [C]ourt will inevitably
engage in a fair amount of ‘judgment calling’ based upon its experience with the
case and the general experience as to how much a case requires.” (quotation
omitted) (cleaned up)).
Regarding Cole Schotz’s hours, Weikel argues that none of the time Cole
Schotz billed in connection with the motion to enforce was necessary or reasonable
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because it was “needlessly duplicative” of Maddin Hauser’s legal work, but he does
not identify any specific billing entries indicative of duplication. [Dkt. 119]
at 15-17.10 To the contrary, Weikel generally contends that there was no need for
local counsel in this matter, and broadly states that “it is apparent and obvious
from the invoices submitted to the Court that [Maddin Hauser] essentially claim[s]
to have performed the exact same work as Cole Schotz” because both Maddin
Hauser and Cole Schotz billed time for work on AnnieMac’s motion to enforce and
supporting materials. Id. at 17.
The Court rejects Weikel’s argument that the hours billed by Cole Schotz are
categorically unreasonable. Courts in this District routinely award fees to local
counsel when the time expended on their representation is well founded, and here,
“[a] certain amount of communication between [Maddin Hauser] and local counsel,
and work on the part of local counsel, was necessary during the course of the
litigation.” Port Drivers Fed’n 18, Inc. v. All Saints, Civ. No. 09-868 (WHW), 2011
WL 3610100, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2011); see also Sabinsa Corp. v. Herbakraft,
Inc., Civ. No. 14-04738 (RBK), 2021 WL 5449087, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2021)
(“engagement of both local, i.e., forum, and non-forum counsel does NOT mean
[absent an exception not applicable here] that the time entries of the non-forum
10 	The Court notes that the party opposing a fee award may not rely on
generalized objections; rather, the opposing party must support its opposition with
specific facts. Cintron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. No. 13-7125 (KM), 2015 WL
3938998, at *2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2015) (“The party opposing a fee request has the
burden to submit objections that are specific and well-supported.”). Nevertheless,
the Court has conducted its own independent review of AnnieMac’s billing records
and analyzes them for overlap based upon Weikel’s general arguments.
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counsel and the forum counsel are automatically duplicative.”); Transamerica Life
Ins. Co. v. Daibes Gas Holdings Atlanta, L.L.C., Civ. No. 18-10869 (CLW), 2022 WL
773261, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
769904 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2022) (awarding fees to local counsel after finding that the
hours billed “were reasonable and not duplicative.”).
On the Court’s line-by-line review of AnnieMac’s billing records, Cole Schotz’s
billed time appears neither duplicative nor excessive. Cole Schotz billed a total of
only 3.55 hours on the motion to enforce, and based on its billing descriptions, there
does not appear to be significant overlap between Maddin Hauser and Cole Schotz’s
work. Compare [Dkt. 118-2] at Ex. A with [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A. Indeed, Cole
Schotz appears to have billed only for tasks that could not be accomplished without
the assistance of local counsel. See [Dkt. 118-3] at Ex. A; Ingemi v. Pelino & Lentz,
866 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D.N.J. 1994) (“District court local rules [ ] require local
counsel to take more than a de minimis role in the representation” and help “ensure
that attorneys representing New Jersey clients in New Jersey courts are sufficiently
familiar with state law and practice to represent their clients knowledgeably and
effectively.” (emphasis added)); L. Civ. R. 101.1(c)(4) (“Only an attorney at law of
this Court may file papers, enter appearances for parties, sign stipulations, or sign
and receive payments on judgments, decrees or orders.”). The Court thus finds it
reasonable and appropriate to award AnnieMac with the full amount of time that
Cole Schotz billed on the motion to enforce, consisting of 2.65 hours billed by
Mannion, 0.4 hours billed by Figiel, and 0.5 hours billed by Pisano.
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Regarding category four, Weikel does not specifically challenge the 3.3 hours
Horwitz spent reviewing and facilitating redactions to the Court’s Opinion and
Order resolving the parties’ motions to enforce.11 Instead, Weikel states generally
that the hours are “not reasonable and [are] excessive.” [Dkt. 119] at 14. On the
Court’s review, the hours Horwitz spent on the various tasks in this category are
well documented and appear reasonable. In light of this and the absence of a
specific objection from Weikel, the Court “will not . . . arbitrarily exclude [these]
hours from the lodestar calculation.” Castro v. McCarthy & Jennerich, Civ. No.
11-01832 (JAD), 2013 WL 335973, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2013), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 324300 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2013) (citations
omitted).
As to category five, the Court will reduce the 5.7 hours that Horwitz spent
“complying with the Order in terms of facilitating and implementing the settlement,
including preparing the release of claims ordered by the Court and communications
with counsel re[garding the] same.” [Dkt. 118-2] ¶ 6, Ex. A at 41-44.12 The Court
does not agree with Weikel’s assertion that hours spent on “facilitating the terms of
the settlement” are categorically un-recoverable. [Dkt. 119] at 14-15. But the Court
does believe that a partial reduction is warranted because there is not a sufficient
causal connection between some of the time that Horwitz billed in this category—
like time spent gathering closing documents and coordinating wire payments,
11 	Cole Schotz did not bill any time in this category.
12 	Cole Schotz did not bill any time in this category.
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see [Dkt. 118-2] at 42-44—and AnnieMac’s motion to enforce and the Court’s
resulting Opinion and Order. Accordingly, the Court concludes that some of the
time Horwitz spent facilitating the terms of the agreement following the Court’s
ruling was unwarranted, and a modest downward adjustment is necessary. The
Court will reduce the time Horwitz billed in this category to 3.5 hours.
Finally, as to category six, the Court concludes that AnnieMac is entitled to
recover fees for the time counsel spent working on the present motion to recover
attorneys’ fees. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 297 F.3d
253, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A party entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees is also
entitled to reimbursement for the time spent litigating its fee application.” (citation
omitted)). However, on review, the Court agrees with Weikel that the combined
9.65 hours Maddin Hauser and Cole Schotz spent drafting this motion was
excessive. [Dkt. 119] at 14.
First, AnnieMac spent almost half as much time preparing its fee motion as it
did preparing its substantive motion to enforce. Pretlow v. Cumberland Cnty. Bd. of
Soc. Servs., Civ. No. 04-2885 (FLW), 2005 WL 3500028, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2005)
(finding attorney’s request for time spent on fee request “to be unreasonable and
excessive” where, inter alia, the attorney “spent almost half the amount of time
drafting a fee petition as he did preparing a moving and reply brief on the
substantive issues in the case”). Moreover, there was no oral argument for this
motion, and the fee motion itself is not particularly comprehensive. See, e.g., Norton
v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 216, 219 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that time
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spent preparing the fee petition “should be considered separately by the court, and
may [ ] be reduced to reflect the partial success of the petition.” (citation omitted));
Freid v. Nat'l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 10-2870 (ES), 2011 WL 6934845, at
*8 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2011) (reducing fee award where “the fee petition [wa]s not
particularly comprehensive and there was no oral argument,” among other things).
The Court, in its discretion, will therefore reduce Horwitz’s preparation of the fee
motion to five hours, but permit Mannion to recover the 0.35 hours he billed on the
motion in full because the time appears reasonable and not duplicative.
*
Factoring in the foregoing adjustments, the Court calculates the lodestar in

this case as follows:

Legal Professional Hours Hourly Rate Total
Robert M. Horwitz 29.8 $435.00 $12,963.00
Connor M. Mannion 3 $300.00 $900.00
Catherine J. Costagliola | 0 N/A $0
Frances Pisano 0.4 $285.00 $114
Amy N. Figiel 0.5 $285.00 $142.50

$14,119.50

Because Weikel does not argue for a downward adjustment of the lodestar, the
Court will not make such an adjustment sua sponte. Clyburn v. Gem Recovery Sys.,
Civ. No. 17-562 (SCM), 2017 WL 4570288, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2017) (citation

omitted). Regardless, this case is not one of the “rare circumstances” where

29

30
departing from the lodestar is appropriate. Souryavong, 872 F.3d at 128 (citing
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 543 (2010)).
These calculations do not include the time that AnnieMac spent in reviewing
Weikel’s opposition brief to the instant motion or preparing its reply. AnnieMac
will therefore be given seven days from the date of this Order to supplement its
request for fees. Weikel will have seven days from the date AnnieMac submits its
supplemental request to file any objections.
2. 	Costs
In addition to attorneys’ fees, AnnieMac seeks to recover the $35.10 in costs it
incurred in connection with its motion to enforce. [Dkt. 118-1] at 16. AnnieMac
states that the $35.10 “represents the cost of ordering the transcript of the
Settlement Conference on December 17, 2024,” and provides an invoice regarding
the same. [Dkt. 118-2] ¶ 12, Ex. A at 17. Weikel does not challenge AnnieMac’s
request to recover these costs, and the Court finds them reasonable and necessary.
Thus, the Court will permit AnnieMac to recoup the $35.10 in full. Apple Corps.,
25 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS on this 19th day of February, 2026,
ORDERED that AnnieMac’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs, [Dkt. 118], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court provisionally awards attorneys’ fees and costs to
AnnieMac in the amount of $14,154.60, subject to supplementation authorized
below; and it is further
ORDERED that, on or before February 26, 2026, AnnieMac may
supplement its fee application to include the time it spent reviewing Weikel’s
opposition brief to the instant motion and/or preparing its reply. If AnnieMac files a
supplemental fee application, Weikel may file any objections thereto no later than
March 5, 2026. If AnnieMac does not file a supplemental fee application, Weikel
shall pay AnnieMac attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $14,154.60 no later
than April 5, 2026.
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