GARAJAU v. STERN

3:22-cv-05213Njd24.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RAQUEL GARAJAU,
Petitioner,
v.
ERICA STERN, et al
in her official capacity as Administrator of
Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women
Respondents.
Civil Action No. 22-5213 (GC)
OPINION
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Petition)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (§ 2254) filed by Petitioner Raquel Garajau through counsel. (ECF
No. 1.) Petitioner filed a brief in support of the Petition (ECF No. 1-1), and Respondents answered
the Petition (ECF No. 6). Petitioner seeks relief from the New Jersey state courts’ denial of her
claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her weapon-related convictions, including a
conviction for felony murder. (See ECF No. 1-1.) Petitioner initially failed to present that claim
to the New Jersey Supreme Court. (See ECF No. 6.) In their response (id.), Respondents raised
exhaustion as a defense to Petitioner’s insufficiency challenge (see id.), and the Court granted
Petitioner’s unopposed motion to stay the case to permit exhaustion (see ECF No. 8). 	After
Petitioner exhausted her opportunities for state relief, the Court granted Petitioner’s unopposed
motion to reopen. (See ECF No. 15.) Respondents filed a supplemental response to the Petition
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(ECF No. 16), and Petitioner submitted a reply to their supplemental response (ECF No. 17). The
Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions. For the reasons set forth below, and other
good cause shown, the Petition is DENIED, and a certificate of appealability shall issue.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner’s state court criminal convictions derive from her role in the death of Trupal
Patel, who was shot during an armed robbery committed by Petitioner’s co-defendant boyfriend,
Joseph Villani. 	See State v. Garajau, No. A-2807-18, 2021 WL 1750140, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. May 4, 2021) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted) (citing State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967)).
“The State had alleged that defendant and her boyfriend conspired to rob and murder the victim,
someone they had known, then dispose of the body.” Id. A jury found Petitioner guilty of second-
degree conspiracy to commit robbery (Count Three), first-degree robbery (Count Four), first-
degree felony murder (Count Five), third-degree conspiracy to commit theft of marijuana (Count
Six), third-degree theft of marijuana (Count Seven), third-degree conspiracy to commit theft of
cash and/or a Movado watch (Count Eight as to theft and theft of cash), third-degree theft of cash
and/or a Movado watch (Cout Nine as to theft and theft of cash), second-degree conspiracy to
possess a weapon for an unlawful purpose (Count Ten), second-degree possession of a weapon for
an unlawful purpose (Count Eleven), third-degree conspiracy to distribute marijuana (Count
Fourteen), fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence (Counts Sixteen, Seventeen, and
Eighteen), third-degree hindering the apprehension of oneself (Count Nineteen), third-degree
hindering the apprehension of another (Count Twenty-One), and third-degree tampering with a
witness or informant (Count Twenty-Two). Id. at *1 n.1.
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The following summary recounts the trial evidence concerning Petitioner’s role in the
events leading to the robbery and Patel’s fatal shooting and in the subsequent efforts to cover up
the crimes.
Petitioner and Villani started dating around the summer of 2016. (ECF 1-2, Aug. 8, 2018
Tr. Vol. I (“Aug. 8. 2018 Tr. Vol. I”) at T84:8-18 (A_1556).) Patel was a marijuana dealer, who
was known to carry cash. 	(ECF No. 1-2, Jul. 24, 2018 Tr. (“Jul. 24, 2018 Tr.”) at T94:8-20
(A_0200).) Petitioner and Villani also both sold marijuana, and the couple often sold marijuana
together. 	(ECF No. 1-2, Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. (“Jul. 25, 2018 Tr.”) at T13:19-14:11, T:16:12-25
(A_0228-29, A_0231); Jul. 26, 2018 Tr. (“Jul. 26, 2018 Tr.”) at T10:13-12:3 (A_0359-61).)
Petitioner’s best friend (Niko Kacandes) described Petitioner’s relationship with Villani as “toxic”
because Petitioner was “very controlling,” and, in early 2017, the couple communicated with each
other between thirty to two hundred times a day. 	(Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T10:25-11:11, T12:2-16
(A_0226-27); ECF No. 1-2, Aug. 9, 2017 Tr. (“Aug. 9, 2017 Tr.”) at 185:20-187:23 (A_1892-
94).)
On January 12, 2017, Villani and his friend Eric Geller met up with Patel at a tavern. (Aug.
8, 2018 Tr. Vol. I at T96:21-97:8 (A_1568-69).) Petitioner also went to the tavern separately with
her friend Thaisa Borges, and Petitioner and Borges discussed Petitioner following Patel after Patel
left the tavern. (Id. at T113:2-13 (A_1585).) During the meeting, Petitioner and her friend sat
nearby but did not approach or interact with Villani and Patel. 	(Id. at T98:1-24, T107:1–24
(A_1570, A_1579).) After dinner, Petitioner and her friend sat in her car for forty minutes, and
Petitioner texted Villani, “[W]hat is the next step[?] Should we follow[?]” (Aug. 16, 2018 Tr. at
T85:24–86:15 (A_2340–41).) Villani responded, “I’m getting a QP” (quarter pound of marijuana)
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and “I made the connection.” (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T13:22-14:5 (A_2093-94).) Petitioner did not
follow Patel after he left the tavern. (Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. Vol. I at T113:9-10 (A_1585).)
On 	January 	19, 	2017, 	Villani 	texted 	Petitioner, 	“Rifle 	works” 	and
“Got the bullets too.” (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T43:17-19 (A_2123).) Petitioner responded, “What?”
“Why are you fucking with it?” “Where did you shoot it?” (Id. at T43:20-22 (A_2123).) Villani
replied, “Just to understand it.” “Didn’t shoot it.” “I cleaned it.” “Watched YouTube.” 	(Id. at
T43:22-25 (A_2123).) Petitioner then texted: “Baby please don’t.” “What made you get up and
clean a gun?” (Id. at T43:25-44:3 (A_2123-24).) The next day (January 20, 2017) Villani texted
Petitioner about purchasing more marijuana from Patel, which he did that afternoon. 	(Aug. 15,
2018 Tr. at T45:1-47:25 (A_2125-27).
On February 2, 2017, Petitioner texted Villani, “You need to clean the bullets,” and Villani
responded, “No shit.” (Id. at T52:8-53:12 (A_2132-33).)
On February 3, 2017, Petitioner texted Villani, “I didn’t get paid for a full week and have
no gas” and “I’m just stressed – the hell out RN about money.” (Id. at T56:22-57:1 (A_2135-36).)
On February 5, 2017, Petitioner and Villani had a conversation with Kacandes, who wanted
to buy marijuana. 	(Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T18:3-19 (A_0233).) 	Petitioner told Kacandes that he
should refrain from buying any marijuana that night because Villani was planning on robbing
someone the next day. 	(Id.) 	Villani joined the conversation and said he had bought from this
“plug” (Patel) before, planned to bring Patel into the garage, and then shut the door so Patel could
not leave. (Id. at T23:8-18 (A_0238).) On cross-examination, Kacandes testified that Villani said
that “he [Villani] was going to beat him [Patel] up and hit [Patel] so hard that [Villani] wouldn’t
have to worry about the man retaliating.” (Id. at T73:21-74:10 (A_0288-89).)
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On February 6, 2017, at 12:31 p.m. Petitioner texted Villani: “What’s Troop saying?”
(Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T62:3-19 (A_2142).) Petitioner and Villani were in contact throughout the
day, and, at approximately 2:00 p.m., their phones were both in the cell coverage area that included
Villani’s house. 	(ECF 1-2, Aug. 14, 2018 Tr. (“Aug. 14, 2018 Tr.”) at T80:4-25, T86:16-87:16
(A_1983, A_1989-90).) Petitioner texted Villani that she wanted to break up, and he responded
by telling her to leave. 	(Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T66:17-23 (A_2146).) 	The couple’s “break-ups”
typically lasted about an hour. 	(Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at 44:8-45:8 (A_0259-60).) 	In this instance,
fifteen minutes later, Petitioner texted that she would come back after class. (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at
T66:17-23 (A_2146).) 	Petitioner missed her 2:00 p.m. class at Brookdale Community College
and was back in Villani’s cell coverage area by 2:23 p.m. (Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. Vol. I at T155:2-12
(A_ 1627); Aug. 14, 2018 Tr. at T88:1-20 (A_1991).) At 2:29 p.m., Petitioner texted her sister and
lied by telling the sister she was in class. (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at 67:22-69:2 (A_2147-49).)
At 3:33 p.m., Patel’s phone was within Villani’s cell coverage area. (ECF 1-2, Aug. 9, 2018
Tr. (“Aug. 9, 2018 Tr.”) at T158:10-63:2 (A_1865-70).) Around the same time, a neighbor heard
three gunshots. (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T120:18-122:4 (A_0335-37).) Patel did not return home that
day. (Jul. 24, 2018 Tr. at T75:13-23 (A_0181).)
In the evening, Villani told Kacandes that he had robbed Patel and hit the victim so hard
“he [Patel] would not retaliate.” (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T30:13-23 (A_0245).) Petitioner, who was
present during their conversation, added, “You should have heard how hard [Patel] hit the ground.”
(Id. at T30:8-24 (A_0245); see also id. at T93:19-94:1 (A_0308-09).) 	Petitioner and Villani
described taking a pound of marijuana and $2,000 from Patel’s car. (Id. at T30:18-31:3, T32:3-11
(A_0245-46, A_0247A).)
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Throughout the evening, Petitioner texted Villani, including texting him at 5:02 p.m. the
word “Bleach.” 	(Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T104:8-20 (A_2184).) Petitioner also instructed Villani,
“Take your time bleaching everything,” and “Take that bag of stuff out ’cause I touched his phone.
We will throw that stuff in the Ocean.” (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T104:14-05:6 (A_2184-85).) Villani
later showed Brandon Wobser Patel’s body in his garage, wrapped in a blue blanket. (ECF No. 1-
2, Aug. 1, 2018 Tr. (“Aug. 1, 2018 Tr.”) at T106:1-09:15 (A_0899-0902).) Before disposing of the
body, Wobser poured bleach while Villani cleaned blood from the garage floor. (Id. at T117:23-
18:7 (A_0910-11).) Villani and Wobser eventually disposed of Patel’s body in Shark River Park.
(Aug. 1, 2018 Tr. at 128:15-130:6, 149:2-12 (A_0921-23, A_0942).)
In the early morning of February 7, 2017, Petitioner told Villani to “wipe down the car”
and asked him to call her when he was done, which he did. 	(Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T89:14-18.
T106:11-21 (A_2186, A_2169).) Petitioner and Villani exchanged additional texts, including one
where Petitioner warned Villani about increased police presence near his home, texting, “They're
gonna be around your neighborhood a lot.” 	(Id. at T110:22-111:11, T137:5-25 (A_2190-2191,
A_2217).) At 3:31 p.m., Petitioner urged him to move Patel’s Jaguar: “Babe you need to move
that car. It's too important.” “Like ASAP.” “People will start noticing he's not answering.” (Id. at
T112:12-21 (A_2192).) Petitioner continued texting Villani in the afternoon, demanding he leave
work to deal with the car. (Id. at T112:23-15:10 (A_2192-95).)
At 12:00 a.m. on February 8, 2017, a YouTube search for “[h]ow to drive a stick shift” was
made on Petitioner’s phone and later deleted. (Id. at T117:6-22 (A_2197).) Petitioner then texted
Villani, “Take everything you touch out,” and later warned, “If that car isn’t moved by 11:30 we’re
done.” (Id. at T117:1-5, T121:2-3 (A_2197, A_2201).) On that same day, Petitioner and Villani
coordinated with Tyler Yuhas to move Patel’s Jaguar. 	(Id. at T126:1-28:5 (A_2206-08).) 	Later
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that afternoon, Villani texted Petitioner, “Dad needs the bleach,” and she replied, “Just buy a new
one.” (Id. at T127:22-28:1 (A_2207-08).)
After the robbery, Petitioner had in her possession a new pair of Louboutin shoes and a
gold Pandora ring Villani had purchased for her. (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T41:1-19 (A_0256).) On
February 21, 2017, Petitioner’s employer received an anonymous email stating, “To get away with
murder the best cause is with a smile.” (Sept. 4, 2018 Tr. at T61:3-62:3, T64:19-69:25 (A_2497-
98, A_2500-05).) Thirteen minutes later, Petitioner texted Villani, “The best way to get away with
murder is with a smile.” 	(Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T151:10-24 (A_2231).) 	On February 22, 2017,
after news reports confirmed that Patel’s body had been found in Shark River Park, Petitioner took
a screenshot of a newspaper article and sent it to Villani, telling him to clean his car and saying
she was going to faint. (Id. at T155:7-58:21 (A_2235-38).)
Following a twenty-four-day trial, the state trial court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate
term of thirty-three years imprisonment, including thirty years of parole ineligibility for felony
murder, and a consecutive three-year sentence for witness tampering, with concurrent terms of
either eighteen months or three years on the remaining convictions. 	See Garajau, 2021 WL
1750140, at *1 n.4. Petitioner appealed on several grounds, including the claim that the trial court
erred in denying her motions for judgment of acquittal and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. 	See id. 	The
Appellate Division rejected that argument on the merits and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
See id. at *2-24.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court, but she
did not include the sufficiency of the evidence argument among the issues presented. (See ECF
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No. 	6-6 	at 	1-26.) 	On 	November 	1, 	2021, 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	denied
certification. See State v. Garajau, 248 N.J. 591 (2021).
Petitioner filed her timely Petition and a supporting brief on August 24, 2022, raising one
claim of relief: “The New Jersey state courts’ rejection of [Petitioner’s] insufficient evidence
challenges to the Weapon Convictions is objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal
law.” (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1.) In their response to the Petition, Respondents argued that
Petitioner failed to exhaust this claim because she did not raise it before the New Jersey Supreme
Court. (See ECF No. 6 at 4.) Petitioner sought a stay, which the Court denied without prejudice.
(See ECF Nos. 7, 9.) After renewing her stay request, which Respondents did not oppose, the
Court granted it and ordered Petitioner to seek exhaustion before the New Jersey Supreme Court.
(See ECF Nos. 10–12.) On March 24, 2023, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted her motions
for leave to file a motion for reconsideration as within time and for leave to file a supplemental
petition for certification, but denied reconsideration and certification. See State v. Garajau, 263
N.J. 397 (2023). Petitioner then filed a motion to reopen this case, which the Court granted. (See
ECF Nos. 14-15.)
Respondents contend that the Court should reject Petitioner’s (now exhausted) evidentiary
insufficiency claim because it was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal
law for the Appellate Division to decide that a rational jury could have found Petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery, felony murder,
conspiracy to possess a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose. (See ECF Nos. 6, 16.) Petitioner filed a reply in further support of her claim.
(See ECF No. 17.)
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only for violations of the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982); see also Mason
v. Myers, 208 F.3d 414, 415 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). 	Petitioner filed the
Petition after April 24, 1996, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997).
Under AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas relief on claims that a state court has
adjudicated on the merits unless the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States
Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “highly deferential” and “difficult to meet,”
requiring federal courts to give state-court decisions the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington v., Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011); Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that § 2254(d)
bars relief so long as “‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)). Under this statutory provision, habeas relief is precluded unless the state court’s decision
was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
Clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) refers to the governing legal principle
set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court rendered its decision. See Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 	A federal court reviewing for unreasonable application must
ask 	whether 	the 	state 	court’s 	application 	of 	federal 	law 	was 	objectively
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unreasonable. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). It may not grant relief merely
because it believes the state court applied federal law incorrectly; the application must also be
unreasonable. See Id. at 411.
The law presumes the state court’s factual findings are correct, and a Petitioner may rebut
them only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Rice v. Collins,
546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001). Review under
§ 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181.
When reviewing a habeas petition under AEDPA, the relevant decision for the federal court
is the last reasoned opinion issued by the state courts. See Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289–90
(3d Cir. 2008). 	When a state court issues a reasoned decision rejecting a federal claim, courts
presume that any subsequent unexplained affirmances rest on the same grounds. 	See Ylst v.
Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This presumption remains valid under AEDPA and has
been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). The Third
Circuit has likewise recognized its continued applicability. See Rambo v. Adm’r East Jersey State
Prison, 762 F. App’x 105, 107 (3d Cir. 2019).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Petitioner’s Sole Claim for Habeas Relief
1. 	The Jackson Standard and the Appellate Division’s Opinion
In her only claim for habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he New Jersey state courts’
rejection of [her] insufficient evidence challenges to the Weapon Convictions is objectively
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unreasonable under clearly established federal law.”1 	(ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1.) 	The
challenged 	“Weapon 	Convictions” 	consist 	of 	the 	following 	five 	charges: 	(second-degree
conspiracy to commit robbery (Count Three) first-degree robbery (Count Four), first-degree felony
murder (Count Five), second-degree conspiracy to possess a weapon for an unlawful purpose
(Count Ten), and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (Count Eleven).
(See ECF No. 1 at 5.))
The parties agree that “[t]he clearly established federal law” was established in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 207 (1979). Under Jackson, a conviction comports with due process if, "after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 	443 U.S. at 319
(citation omitted); see also Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 847 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The clearly
established federal law governing Eley’s [insufficient evidence] claim was determined in
Jackson.”). The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt “impress[es] upon the factfinder
the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused.” Jackson, 443
U.S. at 315 (citation omitted); see also id. at 320 (indicating that a “mere modicum of evidence”
is insufficient to support a conviction).
It also undisputed that AEDPA imposes a second layer of deference on claims of
insufficient evidence under Jackson because the Appellate Division considered and rejected
Petitioner’s Jackson claim on the merits. “[O]n habeas review, ‘a federal court may not overturn
a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal
court disagrees with the state court. 	The federal court instead may do so only if the state court
1 	Petitioner does not claim that the Appellate Division’s decision was contrary to clearly
established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
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decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” 	Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per
curiam) (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (per curiam)).
The Appellate Division decided that there was sufficient evidence to support the
convictions for “conspiracy to commit armed robbery and robbery” and “felony murder”:
As to the robbery counts, the State provided proofs which
included: (1) testimony from Kacandes about conversations that
occurred on February 5, 2017 with defendant and Villani about a
plan to rob an individual; (2) multiple text messages that were sent
between defendant and Villani regarding a rifle, and specifically, a
text sent by defendant to Villani, which said “[y]ou need to clean the
bullets;” (3) attendance records, which showed that defendant did
not attend class on February 6, 2017; (4) cell phone records, which
showed that defendant was in the area of Villani's home around the
time of the robbery and murder; (5) testimony from multiple
witnesses regarding the amount of marijuana Villani had in his
possession after February 6, 2017, and the amount of cash he had
available after that date; and (6) testimony from the medical
examiner and Brandon Wobser that the victim was shot three
times—once in the chest and twice in the head. Based on this
evidence, 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	find 	defendant 	guilty 	of
conspiracy to commit armed robbery and robbery. These same
proofs also supported the felony murder count.
Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *6.
The Appellate Division also addressed the weapon possession charges:
As to the weapon possession counts, once again, the State's
proofs included text messages between defendant and Villani
regarding a rifle. Of significance was a text sent by defendant to
Villani that said, “[y]ou need to clean the bullets.” Additionally, the
State's proofs included: (1) the murder weapon, a .22 Long Rifle
Caliber Marlin Semi-Automatic Rifle, which was found in Villani's
home; (2) bullet casings, which were found in Villani's garage and
bedroom; and (3) YouTube videos found on Villani's computer that
were accessed two weeks prior to the victim's murder regarding
loading, cleaning, and shooting the rifle. A reasonable jury could
find defendant guilty of possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose.
Id.
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The Appellate Division further rejected Petitioner’s contention that, “as for the conspiracy
counts . . . 	[t]here is no direct evidence of defendant’s participation in a conspiracy to commit
armed robbery or acting as an accomplice to felony murder or the weapons charges”:
As for the conspiracy counts, defendant contends that
“[t]here is no direct evidence of defendant's participation in a
conspiracy to commit armed robbery or acting as an accomplice to
felony murder or the weapons charges.” Defendant maintains that
“[t]he entirety of the State's case rests on the inferences to be drawn
from the facts presented.” As explained above, however, the State
need not present only direct evidence. [State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454,
459, 236 A.2d 385 (1967)]. The evidence may be circumstantial, and
the jury is permitted to draw inferences from that evidence. [State v.
Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 594, 95 A.3d 721 (2014)]. As discussed
above, the State presented multiple pieces of evidence suggesting
that defendant and Villani had entered a conspiracy to rob the victim
of marijuana and cash, and thus, the judge correctly denied
defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on those counts.
Defendant further argues that there was no direct evidence
that she acted as Villani's accomplice. However, once again, direct
evidence is not required. Reyes, 50 N.J. at 459, 236 A.2d 385. The
State 	presented 	multiple 	pieces 	of 	evidence 	suggesting 	that
defendant did act as Villani's accomplice, and therefore, the judge
correctly denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on
those counts as well.
Id. at *7.
2. 	The Substantive Elements of Petitioner’s “Weapon Convictions”
“Under Jackson, federal courts must look to state law for ‘the substantive elements of the
criminal offense, but the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to
prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.’” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655 (quoting Jackson,
433 U.S. at 324 n.16)); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980) (indicating
that a conviction violates due process if it rests on a legal or factual theory that was never presented
to the jury).
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In its jury instructions, the state trial court explained that, in Count Three, the prosecution
charged Petitioner with the crime of conspiracy with Villani to commit the armed robbery of Patel.
(ECF No. 1-2, Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. (“Sept. 6, 2018 Tr.”) at T31:14-18, 32:2-10 (A_2715-16).) 	To
convict Petitioner of conspiracy, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Petitioner, “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating” the commission of a crime either “(1)
[a]grees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct
which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime” or “(2) [a]grees
to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt
or solicitation to commit such crime.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-2(a). “A person acts purposely with
respect to the nature of her conduct or a result thereof, if it is her conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or cause such a result,” and she acts purposely with respect to attendant
circumstances “if she is aware of the existence of such circumstances or she believes or hopes that
they exist.” (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T32:20:-33:1 (A_2716-17).) 	According to the trial court: “In
order to find a defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the state does not have to prove that
she actually committed armed robbery. However, to decide whether the state has proven the crime
of conspiracy you must understand what constitutes the crime of armed robbery” (Id. at T:33:2-7
(A_2717).)
A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he or she inflicts bodily
injury or uses force upon another. 	N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:15-1(a)(1). 	“Robbery is a crime of the
second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft
the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury,
or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.” Id. § 2C:15-1(b).
The trial court explained to the jury that, “[i]n this case, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable
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doubt, that a person was armed with, used or threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon
[i.e., a firearm] while in the course of committing the robbery,” and, to be “armed with a firearm
the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they were in possession of it.” (Sept. 6, 2018
Tr. at T37:12-14, T38:4-6 (A_2718-19).)
To prove possession:
[T]the State must show “intentional control and dominion, the
ability to affect physically and care for the item during a span of
time, accompanied by knowledge of its character.” “Possession does
not necessarily mean actual physical possession; it is enough that
defendant have ‘intentional control and dominion’ over the object.”
Thus the law recognizes that possession may be constructive as well
as actual. If two or more persons share actual or constructive
possession of a thing, possession is joint, that is, if they knowingly
share control over the article. Thus possession need not be exclusive
but may be jointly exercised by two or more persons. Proof of
possession may be by circumstantial evidence as well as direct
evidence.
State v. Latimore, 197 N.J. Super. 197, 210 (App. Div. 1984) (citations omitted), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Camacho, 153 N.J. 54 (1998).2
2 	According to the trial court:
In order for a person to be armed with a firearm the state
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they were in possession
of it. The word “possess” means a knowing, intentional control of a
designated thing, accompanied by a knowledge of its character. I’ve
already defined the term knowingly for you. Thus the person must
know or be aware that they possess the item and must know that
what it is that they possess or control.
This possession cannot nearly be a passing control that is
fleeting or uncertain in nature. In other words, “to possess” within
the meaning of the law a person must knowingly procure or receive
the item possessed, or be aware of their control thereof for a
sufficient period of time to have been able to relinquish control if
they choose to do so.
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Furthermore, “the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt not only possession, but
also immediate access to that deadly weapon,” i.e., that “the firearm was easily accessible and
readily available for use during the robbery.” (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T39:16-22 (A_2720).) “Finally,
in order for you [the jury] to find that a person was armed with a deadly weapon, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that they possessed and had immediate access to the
potential weapon, but also had the purpose to use it in a way that is capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury.” (Id. at T39:23-40:4 (A_2720).)
Conspiracy may be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence, but mere association
or acquittance, a family relationship, or meetings or discussions of “names and interests in
common” with an alleged co-conspirator, or an awareness of the conspiracy, is not sufficient
(however, such circumstances, may be taken into consideration with other relevant evidence in the
When 	we 	speak 	of 	“possession,” 	we 	mean 	conscious
knowing possession. The law recognizes two kinds of possession.
They are actual possession and constructive possession. A person is
in actual possession of a particular article or thing when they have
knowledge of its character, and knowingly have it on their person at
a given time. A person who had knowledge of its character
knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is
in actual possession of it.
“Constructive possession” means a possession in which the
person does not physically have the property but though not
physically on one’s person they are aware of the presence of the
property and are able to and has the intention to exercise control over
it.
A person 	who 	although 	not 	in 	actual 	possession 	has
knowledge of its character knowingly both has the power and
intention at a given time to exercise control over a thing, either
directly or through another person or person is then in constructive
possession of it.
(Sept. 6. 2018 Tr. at T38:4-39:15 (A_2719-20).)
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jury’s deliberations). 	(Id. at T40:7-23 (A_2720).) 	The jury had to decide whether Petitioner’s
“purpose” was that either “she or a person with whom she was conspiring would commit the crime
of armed robbery.” (Id. at T40:24-41:1 (A_2720-21).) “For her [Petitioner] to be found guilty of
conspiracy, the state has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that when she agreed it was her
conscious object or purpose to promote or make it easier to commit the crime of armed robbery.”
(Id. at T41:1-5 (A_2721).) The nature of the purpose was a question of fact for the jury to decide
by inference from conduct, words, or acts, and it was not necessary for the prosecution to produce
a witness or witnesses who could testify that the defendant stated, for example, that she acted with
a specific purpose. (Id. at T41:6-17 (A_2721).)
“As to count four [first-degree robbery], the judge correctly charged the jury with the model
jury charge on accomplice liability as well as co-conspirator liability.” 	Garajau, 2021 WL
1750140, at *8.
Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-6(c)(1)(b), the jury could convict Petitioner on Count Four
as an accomplice if it was proven that Petitioner, “[w]ith the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense,” “[a]ids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning
or committing it.” The trial court instructed the jury that, to find Petitioner guilty on Count Four
under an accomplice theory of liability, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Villani
committed the crime of robbery,3 she did aid or agree or attempt to aid him in planning or
committing the robbery, her purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense of
robbery, and she possessed the criminal state of mind required to be proved against the person who
actually committed the criminal act of robbery. (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T51:12-23 (A_2726).) “Aid”
3 	The trial court again instructed the jury on the elements of robbery and armed robbery.
(Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T43:14-50:1 (A_2722-25).)
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means to assist, support, or supplement the efforts of another, “agreed to aid” means to encourage
by a promise or assistance or support, and “attempt to aid” means that a person takes a substantial
step in the course of conduct designed to or planned to lend support or assistance in the efforts of
another to cause the commission of another substantive offense. (Id. at T52:3-11 (A_2726).) To
prove that Petitioner was an accomplice, the prosecution did not have to prove “a verbal
agreement” or provide direct evidence of a “formal plan” to commit a crime; instead “proof may
be circumstantial,” and participation in an agreement may be shown with conduct or spoken words.
(Id. at T52:20-53:1 (A_2726-27).) While mere presence at the scene was not conclusive evidence
of participation; the jury could infer from presence at the scene in connection with other evidence
that the defendant assented to, and aided, in the commission of the crime. 	(Id. at T53:1-22
(A_2727).) 	“To constitute guilt there must be existence of a community of purpose, an actual
participation in the crime committed.” (Id. at T53:10-12 (A_2727).)
According to the trial court:
Remember 	that 	this 	defendant 	can 	be 	held 	to 	be 	an
accomplice with equal responsibility only if you find, as a fact that
she possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved
against the person as she committed the criminal act.
In order to convict the defendant as an accomplice to the
specific crime charged, you must find the defendant had the purpose
to participate in that particular crime. She must act with the purpose
of promoting or facilitating the commission of the substantive crime
with which she is charged.
A defendant cannot be convicted as an accomplice to
robbery based solely on conduct occurring after the principal’s
commission of the theft. Specifically, defendant must have the
purpose that in the course of committing a theft, bodily injury or
force be inflicted upon Trupal Patel and Joseph Villani be armed
with use or threaten the immediate use of a deadly weapon. It is not
sufficient to prove only that the defendant had knowledge that
Joseph Villani was going to commit robbery. The state must prove
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that it was the defendant’s conscious object that robbery be
committed.
(Id. at T54:5-55:2 (A_2727-28).) “An accomplice is only guilty of the same crime committed by
the principal if he shares the same criminal state of mind as the principal.” State v. Ramirez, 246
N.J. 61, 67 (2021) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Whittaker, 200 N.J. 444, 458 (2009)).
“[A]n accomplice who does not have a shared purpose ‘to a commit a robbery with a weapon is
guilty of robbery – not armed robbery.’” Id. at 67-68 (emphasis in original) (quoting Whittaker,
200 N.J. at 459). 	In other words, for Petitioner to be found guilty of armed robbery under an
accomplice theory of criminal liability, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that she shared the purpose of committing a robbery with a weapon.
Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that “if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . that Joseph Villani committed the crime of robbery, then you must go on to determine
the guilt or innocence of Defendant as a co-conspirator for that same crime.” (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at
T56:22-57:2 (A_2728-29).) To find that Petitioner engaged in a conspiracy with Villani, the jury
had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. 	The defendant agreed with Joseph Villani that they
or one or more of them will engage in conduct, which constitutes
armed robbery or an attempt to solicitation to commit armed
robbery.
2. 	That when the defendant so agreed with Joseph
Villani the defendant’s purpose, i.e., her conscious object was to
promote or make it easier for Joseph Villani to commit the crime of
armed robbery.
(Id. at T57:23-58:5 (A_2729).)
Felony murder (Count Five) “is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one
or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery” and, “in the course of such crime or of immediate
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flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants.” N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(a)(3). According to the jury charge, the jury could not find Petitioner guilty
of felony murder unless it found her guilty of committing the crime of robbery charged in Count
Four. (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T62:4-7 (A_2731).)
In Counts Ten and Eleven, Petitioner was charged with second-degree conspiracy to
possess a weapon for an unlawful purpose and second-degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose, respectively. See Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *1 n.1. A person is guilty of
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose if he “has in his possession any firearm with a
purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-
4(a)(1).
The trial court instructed the jury that, in order to find Petitioner guilty of the crime of
conspiracy, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner agreed with
Villani that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes the crime of
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, or an attempt or solicitation to commit possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose; and that the defendant’s purpose was to promote or facilitate
the commission of the crime of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. (Sept. 6, 2018
Tr. at T107:10-20 (A_2754).) The trial court reiterated its explanation from Count Four of such
terms as “purposely” and the fact that a conspiracy may be proven by either direct or circumstantial
evidence. (Id. at T1107:21-10:7 (A_2754-55).)
Like the robbery charge in Count Four, the prosecution alleged under Count Eleven
(second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose) that Petitioner was legally
responsible for the criminal conduct of Villani as an accomplice and/or a co-conspirator, and
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accordingly, the trial judge instructed the jury on the theories of accomplice and co-conspirator
liability. (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T110:24-28:14 (A_2755-64).)
Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that, in order to find Petitioner guilty on
Count Eleven as an accomplice, the jury must find:
1. 	That 	Joseph 	Villani 	committed 	the 	crime 	of
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. I’ve already
explained the elements of this offense for you.
2. 	That this defen[dant] did aid or agree, or attempt to
aid him in the planning or committing it.
3. 	That this defendant’s purpose was to promote or
facilitate the commission of the offense of possession of a weapon
for an unlawful purpose. And –
4. 	That this defendant possessed the criminal state of
mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually
committed the act of possession of the weapon for the unlawful
purpose.
(Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at T119:19-20:6 (A_2760); see also id. at T120:7-22:22 (explaining principles
of accomplice liability such as potential significance of “presence”).) In order for the jury to find
Villani committed the offense of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, the prosecution
had to show that the rifle is a firearm, he possessed the firearm, he possessed the firearm with the
purpose to use it against the person or property of another, and his purpose was to use the firearm
unlawfully. (Id. at T112:4-16 (A_2756); see also id. at T113:12-17:3 (A_2757-59) (charging the
jury that the prosecution must prove that Villani knowingly (constructively or actually) possessed
the weapon with a purpose to use it against the person or property of another).) The trial court
explained that: “It is not sufficient to prove only that the defendant had knowledge that Joseph
Villani was going to use a firearm unlawfully against a person or property of Trupal Patel. The
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state must prove that it was the defendant’s conscious object that a firearm be used unlawfully
against a person or property of Trupal Patel. (Id. at T122:16-22 (A_2761).)
The prosecution also alleged that Petitioner was legally responsible for the conduct of
Villani as a co-conspirator. 	(Id. at T123:14-21 (A_2762).) 	“If you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the state has proven all of these essential elements that Joseph Villani
committed the crime of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose then you must go on to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant as a co-conspirator for that same offense.” (Id.
at T124:15-20 (A_2762).) According to the trial court:
Our law provides that a person is guilty of an offense if it is
committed by her own conduct or by the conduct of another person
for which she is legally accountable or both. A person is legally
accountable for the conduct of another person when she is engaged
in a conspiracy with such other person and the conduct is within the
scope of the conspiracy. Thus, she [sic] must decide whether the
defendant engaged in the conspiracy with Joseph Villani to commit
the crime of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose
A person is guilty of a conspiracy with another [person] if
with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of a
crime she agrees with such other person or persons that they or one
or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes such
crime or attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. Thus, for the
purposes of this case to find the defendant engaged in the conspiracy
with Joseph Villani you must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of the following elements:
1. That they or one or more of them would engage in conduct
which constitutes possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose
or an attempt or solicitation to commit possession of a weapon for
an unlawful purpose.
2. When the defendant so agreed with Joseph Villani, the
defendant’s purpose, i.e. her conscious object was to promote or to
make easier for Joseph Villani to commit the crime of possession of
a weapon for an unlawful purpose.
(Id. at T125:6-26:10 (A-2763).)
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3. 	The Sufficiency of the Evidence under Jackson and the Objective
Reasonableness of the Appellate Division’s Decision
It is undisputed that, for purposes of Petitioner’s claim for relief, Villani committed armed
robbery and felony murder and possessed a weapon for an unlawful purpose. 	According to
Petitioner, “[e]ach of the Weapon Convictions required the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Petitioner] knew – before Villani robbed and killed Patel -- that he intended to use his
father’s rifle during the robbery and that she conspired with him to commit or purposely aided him
in committing, that armed robbery.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 31.) However, the Court initially concludes
that Petitioner’s detailed parsing of the evidence is inconsistent with the deference this Court owes
to the jury’s fact-finding under the Jackson standard and the state court’s ruling under AEDPA.
Petitioner argues at some length that the New Jersey courts unreasonably rejected her
sufficiency challenge to the Weapon Convictions because the evidence suggested, at most, that she
knew that her then-boyfriend, Villani, planned to rob Patel and beat him up but that “[n]o evidence
suggested that she knew [Villani] intended to use a weapon during that robbery, much less that she
conspired with him to do so or purposely aided his doing so.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.)
Petitioner notes that the Appellate Division relied on the two pre-robbery text exchanges
regarding the rifle and “bullets” between Petitioner and Villani. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Petitioner
contends that nether text exchange suggested that she had any idea that Villani would arm himself
with the rifle during his solo robbery of Patel; the text messages did not mention or have anything
to do with the future robbery, much less that Petitioner shared Villani’s later-formed decision to
use the weapon, and at most showed that she knew Villani had access to an operable rifle and
bullets, and not that he would use the rifle during the robbery; the exchanges occurred over two
weeks apart and the first exchange took place three weeks before the robbery; no evidence
suggested that Villani contemplated robbing Patel at the time of either text exchange, or that
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Petitioner was aware that Villani planned an unarmed robbery at that time; in the first exchange,
instead of approving of any future use of the rifle, Petitioner begged her boyfriend not to clean the
rifle again; Villani purchased marijuana from Patel after the first exchange (thereby confirming
that no such robbery was then contemplated), and, in the second exchange, her reference to
cleaning the bullets merely referred to casings in Villani’s house (and not any future use of the
firearm). (ECF No. 1-1 at 4; ECF No. 17 at 1-2, 10-14,)
According to Petitioner, Respondents argue that the Weapon Convictions can be sustained
even if the evidence merely showed that she knew that Villani had “access” to the rifle, which is
inconsistent with controlling state court precedent dictating that, to be convicted of armed robbery
and the other weapons-based offenses, an accomplice must share the perpetrator’s purpose of
committing the robbery with a weapon (and accordingly knowledge that Villani had mere “access”
to a weapon was legally insufficient). (ECF No. 17 at 3.) In addition, the trial court instructed the
jury that, to find Petitioner guilty on the armed robbery charges, it had to find that Villani had
“immediate access” to the rifle, i.e., that it was easily accessible and readily available for use during
the robbery. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) However, Petitioner contends that no evidence suggested that
she knew Villani would have immediate access to the rifle during the robbery; on the contrary, she
understood that the weapon was stored in his father’s bedroom closet, and there was purportedly
no indication that she was aware Villani would remove the weapon to use it to rob the victim (in
the garage). (ECF No. 17 at 13-15.)
Noting that the Appellate Division cited Kacandes’s testimony about his conversations with
Villani and Petitioner, Petitioner further contends this testimony actually undermined any
suggestion that she knew that Villani intended to commit armed robbery because, prior to the
robbery, Villani and Petitioner indicated to Kacandes that Villani planned to beat up Patel and trap
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the victim in the garage (and not to arm himself with the rifle kept in Villani’s father’s bedroom
closet) and, after the crime was committed, Petitioner told Kacandes that her boyfriend had told
her that he punched Patel so hard that Patel dropped to the floor. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4-5; ECF No.
17 at 2.) According to Petitioner, Kacandes’s testimony that, after Villani was charged with armed
robbery and murder, “[Petitioner] ‘was frantic, very, very upset,’ and told Kacandes ‘I can’t believe
I was dating a murderer,’” which allegedly confirmed that she had no prior knowledge that Villani
intended to use the rifle during the robbery and that she was shocked to learn afterwards that he
had done so. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.)
According to Petitioner, the Appellate Division made no attempt to cite any evidence that
Petitioner conspired with Villani to commit armed robbery and that, “[i]ndeed, the court ignored
undisputed evidence establishing the opposite, such as a text message by which [Petitioner] broke
up with Villani approximately 90 minutes before the robbery.” (Id.) Petitioner indicates that “the
mere fact that she did so suggests that she objected to some aspect of the crime he was about to
commit, not that she was conspiring with him to commit it or purposely aiding his commission of
it.” (Id. at 5-6.)
Petitioner also claims that any post-robbery evidence of her limited assistance to conceal
her boyfriend’s crimes did not suggest that Petitioner knew beforehand that Villani would arm
himself during the robbery. (ECF No. 17 at 16-17.) On the contrary, the evidence of Petitioner’s
conduct after the robbery purportedly confirmed that she did not learn Villani would arm himself
until after the shooting. (Id.)
However, while Petitioner’s arguments could have potentially persuaded a reasonable jury
to acquit Petitioner, “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw
from the evidence at trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
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to ultimate facts.’” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Under Jackson,
a conviction violates due process only if—considering the totality of both the direct and
circumstantial evidence and giving the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that
can be drawn from the evidence—no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 	See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 324-26. 	“[A] federal
habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must
presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326 (explaining
that the Supreme Court had rejected the theory that the prosecution must affirmatively rule out
every hypothesis except guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
Accordingly, in Jackson, the United States Supreme Cout concluded that, “[f]rom the
circumstantial evidence in the record, it is clear that the trial judge could reasonably have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner did possess the necessary intent [to kill] at or before
the time of killing” because the uncontradicted evidence established that he shot the victim twice,
the fatal shooting occurred after the petitioner had fired several shots into the ground and reloaded,
the two shots were fired at close and predictably fatal range by a person with experience in the use
of the firearm, after the shooting, the petitioner drove without mishap from Virginia to North
Carolina (despite his claim of extreme intoxication), and shortly before the shooting, he expressed
an intention to have sexual relations with the victim (and her body was found partially unclothed).
Id. at 325. 	The Jackson Court concluded that the petitioner’s claim of self-defense would have
required the fact-finder to draw a series of implausible inferences from the basic facts, specifically
that he was wholly uninterested in sexual activity but that the decedent was so interested as to have
willingly removed a piece of her clothing and then attacked him with a knife when he resisted her
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advances despite the fact he was armed with a loaded revolver he had just demonstrated he knew
how to use. Id. It was evident that the trial judge found this story (and the claim that he was so
intoxicated he was incapable of premeditation) incredible. 	Id. 	Deferring to the trier of fact’s
resolution of the factual conflicts, the Court held that “a trier of fact could reasonably have found
that the petitioner committed murder in the first degree under Virginia law.” Id. at 326.
“This deferential [Jackson] standard does not permit the type of fine-grained factual
parsing” that Petitioner suggests. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655. In sum, “[t]he opinion of the Court
in [Jackson] makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what
conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the
jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have
agreed with the jury.” Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2.
In addition, Petitioner’s Jackson claim is subject to another layer of deference under
AEDPA. 	It is well established that § 2254(d) is “highly deferential” and “difficult to meet,”
Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 (citations omitted), and the statutory provision bars relief so long as
“‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” Harrington,
562 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted). Habeas relief is precluded unless the state court’s decision was
“so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.
“[O]n habeas review, ‘a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state
court. 	The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was “objectively
unreasonable.”’” Coleman, 566 U.S. at 651 (quoting Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2). “Because rational
people can sometimes disagree,” Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2, an “‘inevitable consequence’ of this
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double deference ‘is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be
mistaken, but that they must nonetheless uphold,’” Eley, 712 F.3d at 853 (quoting Cavazos, 565
U.S. at 2).
As the Third Circuit explained in Eley, “[h]ad we been the jury, we might have acquitted
Eley; had we been the [Pennsylvania] Superior Court, we might even have reversed his conviction.
But applying our doubly deferential standard of review, we simply cannot conclude that it was
objectively unreasonable for the Superior Court to decide that a rational jury could have found
Eley guilty of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 853 (citation omitted).
Applying the doubly deferential standards mandated by Jackson and AEDPA, the Court
concludes that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, giving the
prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence, and resolving
every factual dispute in the prosecution’s favor, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Petitioner “knew – before Villani robbed and killed Patel – that he intended to use his
father’s rifle during the robbery and that she conspired with him to commit, or purposely aided
him in committing, that armed robbery” (ECF No. 1-1 at 3). In any event, it was not objectively
unreasonable for the Appellate Division to decide that a rational jury could have found Petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the weapons-related charges.4
4 	Petitioner acknowledges that the state felony murder statute “proscribes one who causes
another death while committing the crime of 2nd-degree [unarmed] robbery in addition to the
crime of 1st-degree armed robbery.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 32 n.4.) According to Petitioner, because
the jury was not instructed that it could convict Petitioner of felony murder if it found her guilty
of having committed the crime of second-degree robbery, the New Jersey state courts could not
(and did not) sustain her felony murder conviction on the grounds that there was sufficient
evidence establishing that she committed the crime of second-degree (unarmed) robbery. 	(See
ECF No. 17 at 5-6); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236-37 (indicating that a conviction violates
due process if it rests on a legal or factual theory that was never presented to the jury). Respondents
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a. 	Count Three
The Court begins its analysis with Count Three. As Petitioner acknowledges, this second-
degree conspiracy charge “required the State to prove that [she] agreed with Villani to commit the
armed robbery charge. . . and purposely promoted or facilitated those charges.” (ECF No. 1-1 at
32 (citations omitted).) Under Jackson, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Petitioner, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime of armed
robbery, either agreed with Villani that either he, she, or they would engage in conduct constituting
armed robbery, or agreed to aid Villani in the planning or commission of the armed robbery.
As the Appellate Division observed, “the State provided proofs which included” “multiple
text messages that were sent between [Petitioner] and Villani regarding a rifle, and specifically a
text sent by [Petitioner] to Villani, which said ‘[y]ou need to clean the bullets.’” Garajau, 2021
WL 1750140, at *6. The prosecution presented text messages exchanged between Petitioner and
Villani 	discussing 	Villani 	checking 	on 	and 	cleaning 	the firearm 	and 	“bullets” that 	was
subsequently used to shoot and kill Patel. On January 19, 2017, Villani texted Petitioner: “Rifle
works” and “Got the bullets too.” (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T43:17-19 (A_2123).) Petitioner asked
why Patel was cleaning a gun. 	(Id. at T43:17-44:3 (A_2123).) 	Villani responded: “Just to
contend that, because a defendant need not have contemplated or intended the victim’s death to be
guilty of felony murder, and “robbery” is one of the underlying felonies specified in the felony
murder provision, “petitioner did not have to know prior to the commission of the robbery that
Villani intended to use the loaded rifle in the course of the robbery.” (ECF No. 16 at 42.) Because
the Appellate Division reasonably determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the first-
degree (armed) robbery conviction, the Court need not (and does not) rule on whether the felony
murder conviction could be sustained if Petitioner knew only that Villani would commit an
unarmed robbery.
Furthermore, “[Petitioner] readily concedes that the State did not have to prove that she
knew Villani intended to fire the rifle or to shoot Patel during the robbery.” (ECF No. 17 at 5 n.2.)
Instead, Petitioner contends that the prosecution had to prove that she knew Villani would “use”
the rifle by arming himself with it during the robbery. (Id.)
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understand it.” “Didn’t shoot it.” “I cleaned it.” “Watched YouTube.” 	(Id. at T43:22-25
(A_2123).) 	On February 2, 2017, four days before the fatal robbery, Petitioner texted Villani:
“You need to clean the bullets” and Villani answered, “No shit.” (Id. at T52:8-53:12 (A_2132-33)
[add his response).)
Considering all of the evidence presented against Petitioner (viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution), the texts gave rise to a reasonable inference that Petitioner knew
Villani possessed a functional firearm and ammunition and that she anticipated, approved of, and
agreed to the firearm’s use in their planned robbery of Patel.
In fact, as Petitioner acknowledges (ECF No. 1-1 at 7), Petitioner and Villani were in a
romantic relationship, having started dating around the summer of 2016, and they often sold
marijuana together. (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T13:19-14:11, T:16:12-25 (A_0228-29, A_0231); Jul. 26,
2018 Tr. at T10:13-12:3 (A_0359-61); Aug. 8. 2018 Tr. Vol. I at T84:8-18 (A_1556)); Garajau,
2021 WL 1750140, at *1 (stating that Petitioner appeals from her convictions stemming from her
role in the death of the victim, “who was shot during a robbery committed by her codefendant
boyfriend”). Petitioner and Villani had a close, but troubled relationship (because Petitioner was
“very controlling”), and the couple communicated with each other between thirty to two hundred
times a day. (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T10:25-11:11, T12:2-16 (A_226-27); Aug. 9, 2017 Tr. at 185:20-
187:23 (A_1892-94).)
Furthermore, approximately one week before the first text exchange regarding the rifle,
Petitioner was present at the tavern with Villani and Patel and texted Villani, “What is the next
step. Should we follow?” (Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. Vol. I at T96:21-97:8, T98:1-24, T107:1-24, T113:2-
13 (A_1568-70, A_1579, A_1585); Aug. 16, 2018 Tr. at T85:24-86:15 (A_2340-41)). 	A jury
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could reasonably construe this message as Petitioner signaling her participation in surveilling or
following the intended victim.
Subsequently, one day after the text exchange regarding the bullets, on February 3, 2017,
Petitioner texted Villani, “I didn’t get paid for a full week and have no gas” and “I’m just stressed
– the hell out RN [right now] about money.” (Id. at 56:22-57:1 (A_2135-36).) On the following
day (the day before the robbery), Petitioner and Villani spoke with Kacandes about the couple’s
plan to commit a robbery. See Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *6. Petitioner warned Kacandes
not to buy marijuana that night because Villani would be “robbing someone tomorrow.” (Jul. 25,
2018 Tr. at T18:3-19 (A_0233).) Villani then described to their friend the plan to trap the victim
in a garage. 	(Id. at T23:8-18 (A_0238).) 	In addition, it is undisputed that the rifle, which was
tested and was found to be functional, was kept at the same house. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 8.)
On the date of the armed robbery, Petitioner and Villani remained in almost constant
contact, and Petitioner was, at the very least, in close proximity to the crime scene. Shortly before
the robbery occurred, Petitioner texted Villani that she wanted to break up, and he responded by
telling her to leave. (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T66:17-23 (A_2146).) However, fifteen minutes later,
Petitioner texted Villani that she would come back after class; she missed her 2:00 p.m. class, lied
to her sister about her whereabouts, and was back in her boyfriend’s cell coverage encompassing
Villani’s house by 2:23 p.m.; and, at 3:33 p.m., Patel’s phone was within Villani’s (and Petitioner’s)
cell coverage area, a neighbor heard three gunshots, and testimony from the medical examiner and
Wobser established that Patel was shot three times. (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T120:18-122:4 (A_0335-
37); Aug. 8, 2018 Tr. Vol. I at T155:2-12 (A_1627); Aug. 14, 2018 Tr. at T88:1-20 (A_1991); Aug.
15, 2018 Tr. at T66:17-23, 67:22-69:2 (A_2146, A_2147-49)); Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *6.
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Petitioner attempts to minimize the extent of her involvement in the efforts to dispose of
evidence of the fatal robbery, asserting, among other things, that she only took “limited” steps to
help to conceal the crime.5 (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) However, Petitioner demanded that Villani take
actions to conceal, and personally benefited from, the fatal armed robbery and even joked about
“getting away with murder.” “It is universally conceded today that the fact of an accused's flight,
escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related
conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” 	State v.
Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 125 (2007) (quoting 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 276 (Chadbourn rev.
1979))). The New Jersey Supreme Court has “recognized the relevance of post-crime conduct to
a defendant’s mental state when the conduct demonstrates a consciousness of guilt.” Id. In fact,
in Jackson, the United States Supreme Court relied on post-crime conduct to conclude that there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the petitioner had a specific
intent to kill the victim. 	See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 325 (“Immediately after the shooting, the
petitioner drove without mishap from Virginia to North Carolina, a fact quite at odds with his story
of extreme intoxication.”). According to Jackson, “the petitioner’s calculated behavior both before
and after the killing demonstrated that he was fully capable of committing premediated murder.”
Id.
In the present matter, Petitioner, among other steps taken to conceal the fatal shooting of
Patel, texted Villani: “Bleach.” “Take your time bleaching everything.” “Take that bag of stuff out
5 	Petitioner also suggests that Villani threatened to kill her and her family unless she helped
him attempt to conceal his crime (ECF No. 1-1 at 13; ECF No. 17 at 17 n.4); however, Petitioner
acknowledges that “no evidence of such threats were presented at trial” (ECF No. 1-1 at 13), and
it is well established that this Court’s review of the objective reasonableness of the Appellate
Division’s ruling is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits, see Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181.
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’cause I touched his phone. We will throw that stuff in the Ocean.” “[W]ipe down the car.” “Babe
you need to move the car. Its too important.” “Like ASAP.” and “People will start noticing he’s
not answering.” 	(Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T112:12-21 (A_2192); Aug. 15 2018 Tr. at T89:140-18
T104:8-05:6, 	T106:11-12, 	T110:22-111:11, 	T112:12-21; 	T137:5-25 	(A_2169, 	A_2184-86,
A_2190-92).) Petitioner threatened to break up with Villani if he did not move Patel’s car. ((Id.
at T121:2-3 (A_2201).). After the robbery, Petitioner and Villani told Kacandes that they took a
pound of marijuana and $2,000 in cash from Patel’s vehicle. (Jul. 25, 2018 Tr. at T30:18-31:13,
T32:3-11 (A_0245-46, A_0247A).) Petitioner also had in her possession a new pair of Louboutin
shoes and a gold Pandora ring. (Id. at T41:1-19 (A_0256).)
Finally, after Villani cleaned the crime scene and disposed of Patel’s body and car (and
before the body and vehicle were discovered by law enforcement), Petitioner’s employer received
an anonymous email stating that “[t]o get away with murder the best cause is with a smile” and,
less than fifteen minutes later, Petitioner similarly texted Villani that “[t]he best way to get away
with murder is with a smile.” (Aug. 15, 2018 Tr. at T151:10-24 (A_2231); Sept. 4, 2018 Tr. at
T61:3-62:3, T64:19-69:25 (A_2231, A_2500-05).) As the Appellate Division noted in its rejection
of Petitioner’s challenge to the prosecution’s opening statement addressing the text message, given
its timing, “reasonable minds could view the text message as inculpatory evidence even if there
was other evidence presented that the text message was about something that had happened at
defendant’s workplace.” Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *22. Similarly, the Appellate Division
determined that the prosecutor properly referred to this message in the closing statement on the
grounds that:
As previously discussed, however, the text message was sent the day
before the body was discovered and two weeks after the murder.
Given the timing of the message, reasonable minds could view the
text message as inculpatory evidence. Defense counsel was free to
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argue alternatively, and he did. Thus, there was nothing improper
about the prosecutor arguing that this text was made in reference to
the victim's death.
Id. at *23. 	Under the circumstances, a reasonable juror could infer these statements were
inculpatory in nature.
Based on the evidence summarized above, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, giving the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn
from this evidence, and resolving every factual dispute in the prosecution’s favor, the Court cannot
conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner,
with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime of armed robbery, either
agreed with Villani that either he, she, or they would engage in conduct constituting armed robbery,
or agreed to aid Villani in the planning or commission of the armed robbery, In any event, even if
the Court might have acquitted Petitioner or vacated her conviction if it had been the jury or the
Appellate Division, “applying our doubly deferential standard of review, we simply cannot
conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the [Appellate Division] to decide that a rational
jury could have found [Petitioner] guilty of [conspiracy to commit armed robbery] beyond a
reasonable doubt,” Eley, 712 F.3d at 853 (citation omitted).
Petitioner analogizes this case to Travillion v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 982 F.3d 896
(3d Cir. 2020), arguing that the absence of any evidence she knew and shared Villani’s intent to
commit armed robbery renders the Appellate Division’s sufficiency of the evidence determination
objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal law. 	(See ECF 17 at 17-18.) 	In
Travillion, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief and concluded that
“[i]t was objectively unreasonable [for the Pennsylvania Superior Court] to apply the Jackson
standard and deny relief on Travillion's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a
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conclusion that Travillion was the robber that carried the folder and paper during the commission
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 982 F.3d at 906. “Any determination that Travillion's
fingerprints were left on the folder and paper during the commission of the offense is unreasonably
speculative.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Unlike Travillion, the case against Petitioner did not depend on unreasonable speculation.
As explained above, in this case, the prosecution presented text messages, particularly messages
exchanged by Petitioner and her boyfriend Villani regarding the rifle he used in the fatal robbery,
cell site evidence, eyewitness accounts, and evidence of Petitioner’s own inculpatory actions and
statements following the robbery, all of which, under Jackson and AEDPA, could result in “a fair-
minded jurist” agreeing with the Appellate Division’s determination that a jury could reasonably
find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101
(quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664).
Accordingly, the Court rejects Petitioner’s challenge to the state court’s disposition of her
Jackson challenge to her conviction on Count Three.
b. 	Count Four
The Appellate Division concluded that the same proofs supporting the conspiracy to
commit armed robbery count also supported Petitioner’s conviction on Count Four (armed
robbery). 	Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *6. 	Under state law, see Coleman, 566 U.S. at 655
(stating that federal courts look to state law for the substantive elements of the criminal offense),
Petitioner could be convicted of armed robbery (Count Four) as either Villani’s accomplice or his
co-conspirator, e.g.:
As to count four, the judge correctly charged the jury with
the model jury charge on accomplice liability as well as co-
conspirator liability. Indeed, if the facts support liability as an
accomplice or a co-conspirator, each theory supported by the facts
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should be charged to the jury, and the jury need not agree on the
basis for liability to convict the defendant of the substantive crime.
State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 223, 680 A.2d 634 (1996) (noting that
“[w]hen a defendant may be found guilty either as a principal actor
or as an accomplice, the jury should be instructed about both
possibilities”). Therefore, not only was the jury charge correct, but
so was the verdict sheet, especially considering that the jury's
finding of guilt based on one theory of liability or another did not
affect gradation of the offense or sentencing. Ibid.; see also State v.
Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 643-45, 677 A.2d 1120 (1996) (providing
examples of when special verdict sheets should be used).
Contrary to defendant's argument, liability for substantive
crimes 	committed 	by 	co-conspirators 	is 	distinguishable 	from
liability for conspiracy to commit those same crimes. Compare
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6(b)(4). A person may be
convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime only if he or she intended
to promote or facilitate the commission of that crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2. 	Liability 	as 	a 	co-conspirator 	for 	the 	substantive 	crime 	is
significantly broader. State v. Roldan, 314 N.J. Super. 173, 188, 714
A.2d 351 (App. Div. 1998). Thus, it was not misleading or confusing
for the judge to instruct the jury on co-conspirator liability, as it
pertained to count four, in addition to conspiracy to commit a crime,
as it pertained to count three.
The Court has already concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Petitioner’s
conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery under Count Three and that, even if the Court
were to conclude that the evidence was insufficient, the Appellate Division nonetheless reasonably
applied Jackson rejecting Petitioner’s challenge to her conviction for conspiracy to commit armed
robbery in Count Three. 	See supra Section III.A.3.a. 	Accordingly, the Court must reject
Petitioner’s challenge to her conviction on Count Four.
The Appellate Division also determined that “the State presented multiple pieces of
evidence suggesting that defendant did act as Villani’s accomplice, and, therefore, the judge
correctly denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on those [accomplice] counts as
well.” Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *7. For substantially the same reasons that this Court has
concluded that a reasonable jury could find under the deferential Jackson standard that Petitioner
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was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, see supra Section
III.A.3.a., a jury could reasonably return a guilty verdict on a charge that, as her boyfriend’s
accomplice, Petitioner “knew that ‘Villani was armed with or used or threatened the immediate
use of a deadly weapon’ during the robbery and purposely aided the armed robbery” (ECF No. 1-
1 at 31 (citations omitted)). 	Specifically, considered together with the totality of the evidence
presented against Petitioner (viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution), the text
messages gave rise to a reasonable inference that Petitioner knew Villani possessed a functional
firearm and ammunition and that she anticipated, approved of, and agreed to the firearm’s use in
their planned robbery. In addition to the text messages, the prosecution presented evidence, inter
alia, of a close “controlling” relationship between Petitioner and Villani; Petitioner’s knowledge
of, and participation in, preparing and planning for the robbery (e.g., expressing her willingness to
surveil Patel and telling Kacandes not to buy marijuana because Villani was planning on robbing
someone the next day); and, around the time of the fatal robbery, she failed to go to class, lied to
her sister regarding her whereabouts, and was in close proximity to the scene of the crime.
Furthermore, after Patel was shot and killed, Petitioner aggressively encouraged and assisted in
efforts to cover up the homicide and, after the evidence of their crimes was apparently disposed
of, said “the best way to get away with murder is with a smile.” In any event, given such evidence,
it was not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA for the Appellate Division to uphold Petitioner’s
conviction on Count Four.
c. 	Count Five
According to the Appellate Division, the “same proofs” supporting the conspiracy to
commit armed robbery and robbery charges “also supported the felony murder count.” Garajau,
2021 WL 1750140, at *6 	Petitioner notes that “[t]he first-degree felony murder charge (Count
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Five) required the State to prove, among other elements, that [Petitioner] was ‘Villani’s accomplice
in committing the crime of armed robbery as charged’ when Villani shot and killed Patel.” (ECF
No. 1-1 at 31-32 (citations omitted).) 	The trial court instructed the jury that it could not find
Petitioner guilty of felony murder unless it found her guilty of committing the crime of robbery
charged in Count Four. (Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at 62:4-7 (A_2731).) “[T]he jury finding of guilt must
be for the felony itself based on a charge of liability, such as co-conspirator liability or accomplice
liability.” Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *8 (citing State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 15-18 (1996)). As
the Court has explained in Section III.A.3.b., supra, there was sufficient evidence under Jackson
to support the armed robbery conviction under either an accomplice or a co-conspirator theory of
liability, and, in any event, it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to sustain
this armed robbery conviction. Accordingly, the Court likewise rejects Petitioner’s challenge to
Count Five.6
d. 	Count Ten
Petitioner states that Count Ten required the prosecution to prove that Petitioner agreed
with Villani to commit the weapon possession charge and purposely promoted or facilitated the
6 	As part of Petitioner’s argument that she had to know prior to the commission of the
robbery that Villani intended to use the rifle in the course of the robbery because (unarmed second-
degree) “robbery” is one of the underlying felonies specified in the felony murder provision,
Respondents note that the “non-slayer affirmative defense” was submitted to the jury. (ECF No.
16 at 45-48). According to Respondents, the evidence adduced at trial amply supported the jury’s
rejection of the third prong of this defense (i.e., “Had no reasonable ground to believe that any
other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance,” N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:11-3a(3)(c)). (Id.) Petitioner insists that “[t]he State’s reliance on the non-slayer affirmative
defense to felony murder is misplaced” and a “red herring” because (although “the evidence plainly
establishes that [she] had no ground to believe that Villani would be armed with his father’s rile
during his solo robbery of Patel”) the real “issue” is whether the prosecution carried its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of armed robbery. (ECF No. 17 at
9-10.) 	However, for the reasons stated in Section III.A.3.b., the Court has rejected Petitioner’s
challenge to her armed robbery conviction.
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charge. (ECF No. 1-1 at 32.) For substantially the same reasons that the Court has concluded that
there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction on the charge of conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, see supra Section III.A.3.a., the Court also concludes that this evidence is
sufficient for purposes of sustaining her similar conviction for conspiracy to possess a weapon for
an unlawful purpose. The prosecution presented evidence of not only the text messages regarding
the rifle and bullets but also, among other things: (1) the “controlling” relationship between
Petitioner and Villani; (2) Petitioner’s knowledge of, and participation in, preparing and planning
the robbery; (3) her conduct on the day of the fatal robbery; (4) her subsequent role in covering up
the homicide; and (5) her message to Villani that the best way to get away with murder is with a
smile. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as well as resolving all
factual disputes and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, a reasonable
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner agreed with Villani to commit the offense
of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Even if the Court would have ruled differently
than the Appellate Division, the Court cannot conclude that the Appellate Division unreasonably
applied Jackson to uphold Petitioner’s weapons-related conspiracy conviction in Count Ten.
e. 	Count Eleven
Finally, Petitioner notes that the charge of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose
required the State to prove that she “knew that Villani possessed a firearm, intended to use it
unlawfully against Patel, and purposely aided that unlawful use.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 32 (citations
omitted)) The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Petitioner guilty on Count Eleven
under either a co-conspirator or an accomplice theory of liability. (See Sept. 6, 2018 Tr. at 118:15-
18 (A_2759)); Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *8. The Court has already concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to possess a weapon with an
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unlawful purpose and that, even if it were to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support
the 	conspiracy 	conviction, 	the 	Appellate 	Division 	reasonably 	applied 	Jackson 	rejecting
Petitioner’s challenge to her conviction on Count Ten. See supra Section III.A.3.d. Furthermore,
for substantially the same reasons that this Cout has concluded that a reasonable jury could find
under the deferential Jackson standard that Petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
conspiracy to possess a weapon for an unlawful purpose, a jury could reasonably return a guilty
verdict on a charge that, as her boyfriend’s accomplice, Petitioner knew that Villani possessed a
firearm, intended to use it unlawfully against Patel, and purposely aided that unlawful use. Again,
the Court notes that the prosecution presented evidence including the text messages regarding the
firearm and ammunition; the relationship between Petitioner and Villani and her role in preparing
for and planning the robbery; her conduct at the time of the fatal robbery; and Petitioner’s
incriminating behavior and statements following the fatal shooting. 	Furthermore, it was not
objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude that the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence to prove that Petitioner acted as Villani’s accomplice on the weapon possession
count. Garajau, 2021 WL 1750140, at *7.
B. 	Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a habeas
proceeding where that petitioner's detention arises out of his state court conviction unless he has
“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution
of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues presented here are adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
The Court finds that jurists of reason could disagree with this Court's resolution of Petitioner’s sole
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claim for habeas relief that “[t]he New Jersey state courts’ rejection of [Petitioner’]s insufficient
evidence challenges to the Weapon Convictions is objectively unreasonable under clearly
established federal law” (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1.), and that the issues raised by Petitioner
deserve encouragement to proceed further. 	See Eley, 712 F.3d at 845 (noting that certificate of
appealability was granted because claims were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further). As such, a certificate of appealability is granted as to Petitioner’s claim for relief.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and other good cause shown, the Petition is DENIED. 	A
certificate of appealability shall issue. An appropriate Order will be entered.
______________________________
GEORGETTE CASTNER
United States District Judge
Dated: February 24, 2026
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