3:17-cv-04516•CHAFFEY JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Fieldturf USA, Inc. et al
CHAFFEY JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Fieldturf USA, Inc. et al
3:17-cv-04516Njd28.01.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHAFFEY JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 17-4516 (MAS) (TJB)
v. MEMORANDUM ORDER
FIELDTUREF USA INC., et al.,
Defendants.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter'? comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Chaffey Joint Union High School
District’s (“Plaintiff’ or “Chaffey’’) letter brief (ECF No. 94) requesting that this Court set aside
its order dismissing the Member Case and return the Member Case to its originating court in the
Central District of California, Case No. 5:16-cv-204.? Defendants FieldTurf, Inc.; FieldTurf USA
Inc.; and FieldTurf Tarkett SAS (collectively, “FieldTurf’ or “Defendants” filed correspondence
opposing the request. (ECF No. 97.) The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions
and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1(b).
' The above-captioned matter (the “Member Case”) was a member case in In Re FieldT: urf Artificial
Turf Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, Case No. 3:17-md-2779 (the “MDL”). On January
3, 2025, the Court closed the Member Case (see Jan. 3, 2025, Text Order, ECF No. 90), pursuant
to the Final Judgment entered on December 13, 2024, in the MDL (MDL, Final J., ECF No. 378).
* Citations beginning with “MDL,” refer to the ECF Nos. from the MDL, Case No. 3:17-md-2779.
3 The Court also notes that after receiving the Court’s January 3, 2025, Text Order (ECF No. 90),
Plaintiff's counsel filed correspondence (ECF No. 91) on January 5, 2025, first raising this
argument. After receiving Plaintiff’s correspondence, the Court scheduled a telephone conference
(ECF No. 92) and subsequently ordered further briefing on the dispute (ECF No. 93).
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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The parties are familiar with the factual background and extensive procedural history of
this matter, and the Court, therefore, only recites those facts necessary to resolve the instant
dispute. Plaintiff initiated the Member Case in the Central District of California. (Pl.’s Br. *14,
ECF No. 94; Decl. of P. Lindborg (“Lindborg Decl.”) § 2, ECF No. 94.) In June 2017, the Member
Case was transferred into the MDL and Plaintiff's counsel appeared at the first hearing this Court
held for the MDL. (PI.’s Br. *1-2; Lindborg Decl. § 3; Defs.’ Br. 2, ECF No. 97.) After the Court
appointed class and liaison counsel for the MDL in August 2017 (see MDL, Order Appointing
Lead Counsel & Pls.” Exec. Comm., ECF No. 61), Chaffey “cooperated with class and liaison
counsel... , but [Chaffey’s counsel] individually appeared on behalf of Chaffey” at proceedings
for the MDL. (PI.’s Br. *2; Lindborg Decl. 4-5). For example, in advance of a November 2022
hearing, Chaffey’s counsel emailed the Court, seeking “permission to attend the [scheduled]
conference. . . by virtual means,” noting that Chaffey “is not a member of the proposed class.”
(Pl.’s Br. *2; Lindborg Decl. 4 5; Ex. A to Lindborg Decl., ECF No. 94.) Chaffey’s counsel also
did not actively participate in the prosecution of the class action. (Defs.’ Br. 2; see also Jan. 5,
2025, Correspondence *1, ECF No. 91.)
As the litigation progressed, in July 2023, the Court granted the Renewed Motion for Class
Certification and granted the request to appoint class counsel. (See generally MDL, July 13, 2023,
Mem. Op., ECF No. 285; MDL, July 13, 2023, Order, ECF No. 286.) The parties subsequently
reached a proposed class settlement, which was announced in Spring 2024. (See generally MDL,
Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Class Action Settlement, ECF No. 358.) After the proposed
settlement was announced, but before this Court granted preliminary approval, Chaffey’s counsel
“ Page numbers preceded by an asterisk refer to the page numbers noted in the ECF header.
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and FieldTurf’s counsel exchanged e-mail messages about the proposed class settlement. (See Pl.’s
Br. *2; Lindborg Decl. | 8; Ex. B to Lindborg Decl., ECF No. 94; Defs.’ Br. 2-3.) In the exchanged
e-mail messages, Chaffey’s counsel reached out to “raise the opportunity to resolve the remaining
individual actions” in light of the pending class action settlement. (Ex. B to Lindborg Decl. *14.)
In reply, FieldTurf’s counsel represented that FieldTurf “believes that the settlement reached with
the class represents a good value for the Chaffey plaintiffs and recommends that they consider
participating[,]” and asked Chaffey’s counsel to follow up on why Chaffey believes it is
“differently situated” from the class. (/d. at *13.) Chaffey’s counsel replied, stating that “Chaffey
has chosen not to participate in the class precisely because its situation is different,” but that
“Chaffey is still interested in exploring whether [its] case can be settled on an amicable basis[.]”(Ud.
at *11-12.)
In an Order dated June 26, 2024 (the “Preliminary Approval Order’), the Court approved
the preliminary class action settlement. (See generally MDL, Order Granting Prelim. Approval of
Class Action Settlement, ECF No. 365.) In that Order, the Court identified the “Settlement Class”
as “all purchasers and owners of a FieldTurf Duraspine turf field sold from 2005 to 2012 in the
United States and its territories.” (id. 95.) The Court further detailed the steps any Settlement
Class Member must take to be excluded from the Settlement Class:
[a]ny Settlement Class Member who wishes to be excluded from the
Settlement Class must timely submit a completed Request for
Exclusion. . . . All Requests for Exclusion and supporting papers
must be in writing and must:
(1) Clearly identify the case name and number, Jn re
FieldTurf Artificial Turf Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation, 3:17-md-02779-MAS-TJB; and
(2) Include the full name, address, telephone number, email
address of the person requesting exclusion and a
signature executed by the person requesting exclusion;
and
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(3) Include any reasonably available proof that the person
requesting exclusion is a Settlement Class Member.
(Id. { 16.) The Order specifically noted that “faJny Settlement Class Member who fails to submit
a timely and complete Request for Exclusion sent to the proper addresses shall remain in the
Settlement Class and shall be subject to and bound by all determinations, orders[,] and judgments
in the Action concerning the Settlement[.]” Ud. § 17 (emphasis added).) Chaffey did not timely
opt out of the Settlement Class by the October 9, 2024, deadline, according to the procedure
detailed in the Preliminary Approval Order. (See Defs.’ Br. 3.) On December 13, 2024, the Court
granted the Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement. (See generally MDL, Order Granting
Mot. for Settlement, ECF No. 377; MDL, Final J.)
Plaintiff now argues that it should not be bound by the final judgment entered by this Court.
(See generally Pl.’s Br.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it is not bound by the class settlement
for at least three reasons: “(1) Chaffey gave much more than a reasonable indication that it intended
to opt-out of the class settlement[;] (2) FieldTurf failed to give proper notice to Chaffey under
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure*] 23° of the proposed class settlement[;] and (3) even if the Court
finds against Chaffey on the first two grounds, the Court should grant Chaffey relief to opt-out of
the class under [Rules] 6(b) and 60(b).” (P1.’s Br. *3.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
First, Plaintiff argues that it gave the required “reasonable indication” that it intended to
opt out of the class settlement. (See id. at *3-4.) As Defendants point out, the Third Circuit rejected
the “reasonable indication” standard in Perrigo Institutional Investor Group v. Papa, 150 F.4th
> All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
6 In relevant part, Rule 23 provides that “the court may direct appropriate notice to the class” and
“upon ordering notice ... to aclass ... the court must direct to class members the best notice that
is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
4
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206 (3d Cir. 2025). (See Defs.’ Br. 4-5.) As articulated by the Third Circuit, “[b]ecause Rule 23
requires a district court to prescribe the way for class members to request exclusion, [class
members] have to follow [the required] instructions in order to opt out—a mere ‘reasonable
indication’ of an intent to opt out will not do.” Perrigo, 150 F.4th at 217; see also In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Pracs. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 216, 238 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Class members, however,
must file a valid request for exclusion regardless of whether they have an individual action filed
and pending prior to the opt-out deadline.”). Because Chaffey did not follow the procedure for
opting out of the class settlement as prescribed by the Court, Plaintiffs first argument must fail.
Second, Plaintiff argues that FieldTurf failed to give Chaffey proper notice of the proposed
class settlement. (See Pl.’s Br. *4.) Plaintiff contends that the notice that Chaffey purportedly
received was sent to “some dead email address that had not been in use for years” and that “Chaffey
has no record of ever receiving any notice of the proposed [class] settlement[.]” U/d. at *4, *4 n.4.)
Defendants argue that: (1) they provided notice to Chaffey pursuant to the method the Court found
“reasonable and adequate under the circumstances in accordance with [Rule 23;]” (2) “Chaffey
received actual notice of all Court filings through ECF—since Chaffey was an individual named
plaintiff in the MDL—via its counsel’[;] (3) “Chaffey also received individual notice through
direct mailing at its address, as confirmed by the Claims Administrator”; and (4) Chaffey “received
public and constructive notice through the settlement website and the settlement toll-free telephone
number.” (Defs.’ Br. 4; Decl. of R. Skibell 45, ECF No. 97-1 (“The Claims Administrator Epiq
confirmed . . . that Chaffey received individual: notice of the settlement (with the opt-out
procedures) by direct mail on August 8, 2024[,] at its address 211 W Sth Street, Ontario, CA
91762-1698 and that this direct mailing was received and not returned.”’).)
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FieldTurf’s confirmation that notice was mailed to Chaffey’s address (and not returned)
creates a rebuttable presumption that notice was received. See In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig.
311 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The common law has long recognized a presumption that an
item properly mailed was received by the addressee.” (citations omitted)); In re Chevrolet Bolt EV
Battery Litig., No. 20-13256, 2025 WL 2976843, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025) (noting that
because a party “does not dispute that the notice was sent to both her correct address and correct
email address .. . [she] failed to rebut the presumption that the notice was received” (citation
omitted)). Chaffey conspicuously takes issue with the notice sent to a purportedly outdated email
address but fails to advance any argument about the mailed notice.’ (See PI.’s Br. *2-3, *3 n.1; see
also id. at *4 (arguing that FieldTurf was required to send notice to “Chaffey’s counsel in this case
or to acurrent Chaffey official, not to some dead email address that had not been in use for years”)).
Further, it is clear that Chaffey’s counsel received notification of the procedure to opt-out of the
class via ECF filings.’ See Silvercreek Memt., Inc. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 534 F.3d 469, 472-73
(Sth Cir. 2008) (“A court may hold a party accountable for the acts and omissions of its
counsel.... This case presents a prime example of such conduct. There is no doubt that
[plaintiffs] counsel received the preliminary order[.]”). The Court, accordingly, rejects Plaintiff's
argument that FieldTurf failed to provide proper notice.
Third, Plaintiff argues that it should not be bound by the class settlement pursuant to Rules
6(b) and 60(b). (See Pl.’s Br. *4-5.) “[Rules] 6(b)(1)(B) and 60(b)(1) allow[] courts to provide
7 Although “testimony denying receipt [may] suffice[] to rebut the presumption[,]” see Jn re
Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 311 F.3d at 304 (citing In re The Yoder Co., 758 F.2d 1114, 1118 (6th
Cir. 1985)), Chaffey does not advance any argument specifically denying receipt via mail, and
instead conclusorily states that it did not receive the required notice (see Pl.’s Br. *4).
8 While Plaintiff’s counsel does not affirmatively state that it received ECF filings for the MDL
litigation, which includes filings related to the proposed class settlement, the Court has no reason
to conclude that Plaintiff’s counsel did not receive them.
6
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litigants relief from a missed deadline or an order or judgment upon a showing of excusable
neglect.” Roofer’s Pension Fund v. Papa, No. 16-2805, 2024 WL 4205638, at *12 (D.N.J. Sep.
12, 2024), aff'd sub nom., Perrigo Institutional Inv. Grp. v. Papa, 150 F.4th 206 (3d Cir. 2025).
To determine whether to excuse Plaintiff's failure to timely opt-out as “excusable neglect,” the
Court must consider and balance four factors: (1) “the danger of prejudice; [(2)] length of delay;
[(3)] reason for delay; and [(4)] whether the movant acted in good faith” (the “Pioneer factors”).
Perrigo, 150 F.4th at 217 (discussing factors articulated in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993)). Here, the factors weigh against finding
excusable neglect.”
The prejudice factor heavily weighs against Chaffey because allowing Chaffey to opt-out
of the class settlement well after the deadline and after the Court entered the Final Judgment (see
generally MDL, Final J.) would “jeopardize the security and finality” of the class settlement. See
Roofer’s Pension Fund, 2024 WL 4205638, at *15; see also Inre Dvi, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 03-5336,
2016 WL 1182062, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2016) (“The prejudice . .. weighs heavily in favor of
denial of the [plaintiffs’] request for exclusion. . . . The opt-out deadline . . . was a negotiated,
express term... by which [d]efendants sought to achieve finality and thereby financial certainty.
Allowing the [plaintiffs] to belatedly opt out now would increase [d]efendants’ potential financial
obligations.”); In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 12-md-2323,
2019 WL 95917, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2019) (“[A]llowing additional opt-outs at this late date
° The Court also notes that Plaintiff did not analyze the four Pioneer factors in its letter brief (see
generally P\.’s Br.), and instead conclusorily argued that “Chaffey has dealt independently with
defense counsel cthe [sic] category of the successful moving parties in Roofer s [Pension Fund]
and all other factors under Rules 6[(]b) and 60(b) militate in Chaffey’s favor” (id. at *5).
7
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would further prejudice the [defendants] because they relied on the guarantee that they would
know the number of opt-outs by a certain date when they agreed to the [s|ettlement.”).
The length of the delay factor'® slightly weighs against Chaffey because Chaffey waited
approximately three months after the deadline to request opting out. (See Defs.’ Br. 3 (noting
October 9, 2024, opt-out deadline); Jan. 5, 2025, Correspondence); see, e.g., In re Imprelis
Herbicide Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2884, 2014 WL 348593, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 31, 2014) (explaining that an opt-out request filed either two or five months after deadline
was “materially delayed”).
The reason for delay factor also weighs against Chaffey because a mistaken belief that
Chaffey need not comply with the opt-out procedures is not a cognizable justification for
non-compliance or delay here. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., 2019 WL 95917, at *9 (“[Plaintiff’s] confusion about her opt-out status, standing alone, is
not enough to support a finding of excusable neglect.”); In re Imprelis, 2014 WL 348593, at *6
(finding factor weighed against finding excusable neglect where plaintiff had mistaken belief that
defendant understood its intention to opt-out).
Lastly, even if Chaffey’s misunderstanding and current request were made in good faith,
that is not sufficient grounds to find excusable neglect. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., 2019 WL 95917, at *9 (“[T]he [c]ourt does not question that [plaintiff s]
misunderstanding of the opt-out requirements and her present request are in good faith. It is
unfortunate for [plaintiff], who has been continuously represented by counsel, that the [c]ourt must
10 “(The Court] measure[s] delay ‘in absolute terms and not by reference to the import of
intervening circumstances,’ meaning the operative period is the time between when the opt-out
notice should have been filed versus the date leave was sought to file it late.” Perrigo, 150 F.4th
at 218 (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 2001)).
8
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attribute the mistaken assumption that she did not need to individually opt out... to her.”);
Roofer’s Pension Fund, 2024 WL 4205638, at *15 (“Nothing in the record suggests [plaintiff]
failed to timely opt out to gain a tactical advantage. . . . Still, the other Pioneer factors disfavor
[plaintiff]. . . . So [plaintiffs] failure to timely opt out is inexcusable.”). Chaffey’s delay is,
therefore, inexcusable.
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS, on this hy of January 2026, ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s request (ECF No. 94) to reopen and return the Member Case to its
originating court is DENIED.
2 The Member Case will remain closed.
Loti?
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEWas bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
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