Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:26-cv-00661Njd06.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALEX EFRAIN LEMA GUAMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 26-661 (JXN)
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Alex Efrain Lema Guaman’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued detention
by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing. (ECF No. 1.) Respondents
filed a letter response. (ECF No. 5.)
Petitioner, a native of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection. (Id. at 1.)
Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents and has been
detained in ICE custody since his arrest. (Id.) Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE,
he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory
detention under 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id.)
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (See ECF No. 2.) Respondents filed a
letter response. (ECF No. 5.)
The Petition contends that Respondents have violated Petitioner’s due process rights. (See
generally ECF No. 1.) Respondents do not dispute the salient facts and acknowledge that here they
assert the same position they have in many other similar cases in this District, including the
position they took before this Court in the recent matter Fuentes Velasquez v. Noem, No. 25-16797
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(JXN). (See ECF No. 5.) In Fuentes Velasquez, Respondents argued DHS has implemented a new
policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory detention of
noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection and to render them
ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals recently adopted
in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). See Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797
(ECF No. 5).
In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2). Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF Nos. 8, 9). In a factually similar situation, the
Court held that Fuentes Velasquez was unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)
and must be treated as being held under the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See id.
In Fuentes Velasquez, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or § 1226(a)
is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the country. “The line
historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that section 1225 governs
detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section
1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde,
No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238, at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL
2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that
Section 1226(a), and not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has
resided in this country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United
States when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival at
the border.”). “[T]he provisions at issue here are mutually exclusive—a noncitizen
cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary
detention under § 1226 . . . .” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL
2371588, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either seeking entry
to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and § 1226 has applied to
those aliens arrested within the interior of the United States. The Supreme Court in
Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction, describing § 1225 as the detention
statute for noncitizens affirmatively “seeking admission” into the United States,
and § 1226 as the detention statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.”
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583 U.S. at 289. And although the Jennings Court characterizes § 1225(b)(2) as the
“catchall” detention provision for noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it
identifies § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of
non-criminal aliens who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.
The 	vast 	majority 	of 	courts 	confronting 	this 	precise 	issue 	have 	rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado, as
contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.1 See, e.g., Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7
(finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e.,
affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners who
have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682,
2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the government’s
proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the context and structure of
the provisions governing detention of noncitizens who are arriving at the border
and those who are already present in the country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at *
3 (noting that “up until July 8 the predominant form of detention authority for
petitioner and other noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States was §
1226(a)”); Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17,
2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept. 23,
2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept.
23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22,
2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19,
2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19,
2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept.
17, 2025); [collecting additional cases].
Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797 (ECF No. 8 at 5-10).
Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Fuentes Velasquez, No. 25-16797, the
Court finds the facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner’s detention is authorized only by
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2). Accordingly,
IT IS, on this 6th day of February 2026,
ORDERED that the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
it is further
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the meaning of a statute [is]
at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than seven (7) days from the date
of this Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in
accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he
presents a flight risk or a danger to the community; it is further
ORDERED that within three (3) days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a
written notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically and CLOSE the case.
________________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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