USA v. MILLIRON

2:26-cr-00020Njd03.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

John M. Maloy, Esq.
United States Attorney’s Office
District of New Jersey
970 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Plaintiff
F.R. Chip Dunne, Esq.
The Dunne Law Firm, P.C.
675 Morris Avenue, Suite 100
Springfield, NJ 07081
Counsel for Defendant
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Re: United States v. Yusef Milliron, Crim. No. 25-00424/26-00020 (SDW)
Counsel:
Before this Court is Defendant Yusef Milliron’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss the
Criminal Complaint (25-424, D.E. 126) and Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (26-20, D.E. 3).
This Court finds that, having considered all relevant submissions, and for the reasons set forth
herein, Defendant’s Motions are DENIED.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This Court writes only for the parties and accordingly limits its discussion of the factual
and procedural background to only the facts pertinent to the instant decision.
On June 26, 2025, a grand jury sitting in Newark returned an indictment charging
Defendant with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, heroin, and
cocaine. (25-424, D.E. 108 (the “June Indictment”)). 	On August 18, 2025, Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the June Indictment with prejudice on Speedy Trial Act (“STA”) grounds. (25-
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHAMBERS OF
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
March 2, 2026
MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT ST.
NEWARK, NJ 07101
973-645-5903
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424, D.E. 113.) 	On November 5, 2025, this Court dismissed the June Indictment without
prejudice. (25-424, D.E. 125.) Then, on December 23, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the Complaint on the docket for the June Indictment. (25-424, D.E. 126.) On January 8, 2026, a
Grand Jury sitting in Newark returned a new indictment charging Defendant with the same offense
previously charged in the June Indictment. (26-20, D.E. 1 (the “January Indictment”)). On January
22, 2026, Defendant pled not guilty to the January Indictment. 26-20, D.E. 4.) On January 23,
2026, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the January Indictment with prejudice due to
an alleged STA violation. (26-20, D.E. 3.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Criminal
Complaint is moot. The criminal complaint is no longer operable because this Court dismissed
the June Indictment, which superseded the criminal complaint. See United States v. Vaughn, 492
F. Supp. 3d 336, 343 (D.N.J. 2020) (illustrating that a felony indictment supersedes a criminal
complaint and becomes the operative charging document) (citing United States v. Dorsey, 462
F.2d 361, 363 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) (“[T]he grand jury supersedes the complaint procedure by
returning an indictment.”)
Next, to effectuate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public trial, Congress
enacted the STA which sets forth “specified time limits after arraignment or indictment within
which criminal trials must be commenced.” United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295
(3d Cir. 1988). Under the STA's requirements, any information or indictment charging a defendant
must be filed within thirty-days of his arrest, and he must be tried within seventy-days of the later
of his indictment or initial appearance. 	18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c)(1). 	These deadlines are also
applicable to any subsequent indictment, based on the same conduct, after the initial indictment is
dismissed upon motion of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1)
Here, Defendant asserts that the Government violated the STA by failing to obtain a timely
indictment while the criminal complaint remained pending. 	However, as explained above, the
criminal complaint was no longer operable after this Court dismissed the June Indictment. 	As
such, after this Court dismissed the June Indictment without prejudice, there were no charges
pending against Defendant.1 	Moreover, when an indictment is dismissed on motion of the
defendant, and the defendant is thereafter reindicted, both the thirty-day and seventy-day periods
run anew. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1); see also United States v. Rabb, 680 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir.
1982). 	Accordingly, this Court does not find that the Government violated Defendant’s rights
under the STA as the STA’s clock did not begin to run anew until January 8, 2026 after the January
Indictment.
Lastly, although the Government did not promptly indict Defendant after the dismissal of
the June Indictment, the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to pre-
1 Unfortunately, Defendant was improperly subjected to pretrial release conditions in error. However, such error
does not warrant dismissal of the January Indictment.
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indictment delay. United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91, 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing United States
v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 429 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
789 (1977) (stating that pre-indictment delay is wholly irrelevant for speedy trial concerns; the
statute of limitations is the mechanism which shields against pre-indictment and pre-arrest delay).
Therefore, Defendant’s Motions are denied.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motions are DENIED. 	An appropriate order
follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Parties
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